Larry Brodanex v. Town of St. John

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted October 24, 2023*
Decided October 24, 2023
Before
DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge
MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge
JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge
No. 22-2955
LARRY BRODANEX,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
TOWN OF ST. JOHN,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Indiana, Hammond Division.
No. 2:17-CV-395-TLS
Theresa L. Springmann,
Judge.
O R D E R
Larry Brodanex contends that the Town of St. John, Indiana, is liable under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the actions of a detective who authorized a request for warrants to
search for and seize evidence of illegal dog fighting at Brodanex’s business. The district
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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court entered summary judgment for the Town. Because Brodanex did not furnish
evidence of municipal liability under § 1983, we affirm.
In reviewing the entry of summary judgment, we recite the facts and draw all
reasonable inferences in favor of Brodanex, the non-moving party. Stockton v. Milwaukee
County, 44 F.4th 605, 614 (7th Cir. 2022). Shortly after Brodanex opened a dog-training
business in St. John, a tipster notified the Town’s animal-control unit that dogs at the
facility had been shot with blanks and beaten with a whip. An officer with that unit
went to the facility, and Brodanex let her in. After she saw unclean conditions and
wounded dogs, she asked another officer to visit, but that officer did not observe those
problems. Later, the animal-control officer returned to the building with police officers
and—with the consent of the landlord—entered, finding evidence of dog fighting and
animal neglect. Based on these observations, a detective for the Town authorized and
approved affidavits to support search warrants. Relying on the affidavits, a state judicial
officer issued warrants to search Brodanex’s business and seize evidence of dog fighting
or animal neglect.
After police executed the warrants and seized evidence, Brodanex was charged in
state court with animal torture and animal cruelty, but he successfully moved the state
court to suppress the evidence from the searches. The state court ruled that the landlord
lacked authority to consent to the search that yielded the observations upon which the
search-warrant affidavits were based; therefore the court decided to exclude the fruits of
that search. The state then dismissed the charges against Brodanex.
Brodanex sued the Town of St. John in Indiana court under § 1983, alleging that
the Town violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches
and seizures. The Town removed the case to federal court based on federal-question
jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1441, and eventually moved for summary judgment. It raised
two grounds in defense. It argued that, first, the searches and seizures were lawful and,
alternatively, Brodanex had no basis for seeking municipal liability under § 1983 based
on Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Brodanex responded that,
in light of the ruling on the motion to suppress, issue preclusion barred the Town from
contesting the validity of the searches and seizures that the detective authorized.
The district court entered summary judgment for the Town. Focusing on the first
defense, it correctly observed that if the searches were reasonable, then they were lawful.
See United States v. Jackson, 598 F.3d 340, 346 (7th Cir. 2010). It then ruled that because
judge-authorized warrants supported the searches, the searches were reasonable. It also

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explained that issue preclusion did not alter its analysis because the two cases raised
different issues: The state court decided whether the landlord’s consent was valid and, if
not, whether the exclusionary rule applied; by contrast, the issue here is whether the
officers behaved reasonably. Finally, the court ruled, because the officers committed no
constitutional violation, the Town was not liable under § 1983.
We need not unravel the interplay of issue preclusion, the exclusionary rule, the
landlord’s consent, probable cause, and the reasonableness of the searches, because the
Monell defense blocks this suit. Under Monell, municipal liability requires evidence that
an official policy or custom caused the plaintiff’s injury. 436 U.S. at 694. Brodanex argues
on appeal that a policy or custom can be created by a person with final policymaking
authority for the municipality, see Wragg v. Village of Thornton, 604 F.3d 464, 467 (7th Cir.
2010), and that the detective who authorized the warrant requests had that authority for
St. John’s police department. But nothing in the record supports his argument. To the
contrary, under Indiana law the “police chief” is the final policymaker for a municipal
police department. See I ND. C ODE § 36-8-3-3(g); see also Eversole v. Steele, 59 F.3d 710, 716
(7th Cir. 1995) (affirming summary judgment for municipality where police chief was
not involved). The detective was not the police chief. Thus, even if he violated
Brodanex’s rights, Brodanex cannot impute his actions to the Town under § 1983.
AFFIRMED

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