United States of America v. Calvin C. Freeman

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted November 2, 2023 *
Decided November 3, 2023
Before
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge
ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge
DORIS L. PRYOR, Circuit Judge
No. 21-2907
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
CALVIN C. FREEMAN,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of
Wisconsin.
No. 2:19-cr-103-PP
Pamela Pepper,
Chief Judge.
O R D E R
Calvin Freeman violently forced women into prostitution for his financial
benefit. A jury found him guilty of multiple offenses, including sex trafficking by force,
fraud, or coercion. The district court sentenced him to 45 years’ imprisonment, a term
below the applicable range under the Sentencing Guidelines. On appeal, he contests the
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. FED. R. A PP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. A PP. P. 32.1

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sufficiency of the evidence on the sex trafficking counts; the soundness of several
evidentiary rulings and the jury instructions; and the constitutionality of the sex
trafficking statute and the Guidelines. We affirm the judgment and sentence.
Starting in 2007, Freeman recruited women to perform commercial sex acts in
multiple cities including Milwaukee, Las Vegas, New Orleans, and Chicago. He
provided them with luxury items, housing, and essentials. Freeman took for himself all
the money the women earned, and he exerted significant control over their lives. He
dictated when they had to work and who they could talk to, monitored their
movements, and often verbally and physically abused them to maintain control.
Freeman was indicted for conspiracy to engage in sex trafficking, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1594(c); sex trafficking by force, fraud, or coercion, § 1591(a)(1), (b)(1); sex trafficking
of a minor, id.; transporting someone in interstate commerce for prostitution, § 2421(a);
obstructing sex trafficking enforcement, § 1591(d); transporting a minor in interstate
commerce to engage in criminal sexual activity, § 2423(a); unlawfully possessing guns
and ammunition as a felon, § 922(g)(1); and contempt of court, § 401(3). During the
seven-day jury trial, the government called several witnesses. Two victims described
their work for Freeman and the physical and psychological injuries he inflicted. A third
woman who had worked intermittently for Freeman corroborated the victims’ accounts.
A trafficking expert explained the psychology of sex trafficking offenses. One victim’s
father and a friend testified about their attempts to persuade her to stop working for
Freeman. Several Las Vegas and Milwaukee police officers detailed their investigations
of Freeman’s conduct, and a financial investigator introduced bank records and travel
records tracing the cash Freeman made from sex trafficking and his interstate travel
with his victims. The jury found Freeman guilty on 14 of the 15 counts that it
considered, acquitting him only of sex trafficking a minor. The district court denied
Freeman’s motions for a judgment of acquittal.
Before the sentencing hearing, Freeman lodged no objections to the presentence
investigation report (PSR), which the district court adopted at the sentencing hearing
after confirming that neither party objected. The Guidelines capped the offense level at
43—though it would have been 45 if possible—and set a criminal history category of V;
these inputs yielded a sentencing range of life imprisonment. The government asked for
a life sentence, and Freeman argued for 25 years. After considering the parties’
arguments, the § 3553(a) factors, and pleas for mercy from Freeman’s family, the district
court imposed a 45-year prison sentence and 5 years of supervised release. In the
statement of reasons, the court explained that the sentence was “an expression of hope”

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that Freeman was capable of redemption. Based on information in the PSR, the court
also ordered $266,000 in restitution to the victims.
Freeman appealed and then moved for permission to represent himself. We
granted the motion after concluding that his waiver was knowing and voluntary.
See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 831–35 (1975). Freeman challenges the sufficiency
of the evidence supporting the two convictions for sex trafficking by force, fraud, or
coercion. He also challenges several evidentiary rulings, and the validity of a statute he
was convicted under, the accuracy of the jury instructions, and the application of the
Sentencing Guidelines.
Freeman first argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction
on the two counts of sex trafficking by force, fraud, or coercion under § 1591(a)(1). He
contends that the evidence showed that the victims voluntarily performed sex work,
freely entering and exiting his employ at various times. We view the evidence in the
light most favorable to the prosecution and consider whether it would permit a rational
jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Freeman pushed his victims into sex
trafficking using force, fraud, or coercion. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979).
The convictions must stand because the testimony from two victims and an
expert, among other evidence, amply supports the jury verdict. Each count centered on
one victim, and both victims testified that Freeman forced and coerced them into
prostitution. The first, “AV-1,” testified that Freeman would often punch her and whip
her with leather belts for hours at a time when she refused to work. She explained that
everything she earned would go to Freeman, and that if he caught her keeping money
for herself, he would punish her. Several of Freeman’s attacks on AV-1 required her
hospitalization. She recounted that, on one harrowing occasion, Freeman smeared
human feces on her face after she tried to send money home to her family. AV-1
testified that, because of all this, at times she had no choice but to continue working for
Freeman. Her testimony was corroborated by photos of her injuries and testimony from
her father, a friend in Las Vegas, and police officers.
The second victim, “AV-2” (whom Freeman was accused of trafficking both
when she was a minor and an adult) testified about several occasions when Freeman
beat her with a belt; one time, he slammed her into a bathtub after she refused to work.
The jury also saw video of Freeman accosting AV-2 outside a Las Vegas casino and
forcing her into his car to go back to work for him.

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Further, the government’s expert—an attorney who trains criminal justice
professionals to identify and assist victims of sex trafficking—explained common tactics
of pimps and the trauma that many sex-trafficking victims experience. She discussed
how Freeman exploited the victims’ vulnerabilities to manipulate them into staying
with him. She also explained why AV-1 nervously laughed during her testimony (AV-1
said laughing was easier than crying), why AV-2 could not remember at trial certain
statements she had made to the grand jury (Freeman’s presence frightened her), and
why another victim-witness (known as L.R.) turned her body completely away from
Freeman during her testimony so she would not have to look at him. The jury was
entitled to rely on this expert to understand the behavior and psychology of the victims.
See United States v. Williams, 900 F.3d 486, 490–91 (7th Cir. 2018) (admitting testimony of
sex-trafficking expert to explain how defendant’s actions were consistent with sex-
trafficking scheme). And based on this evidence and the victims’ testimony, plus the
testimony of a victim’s family member, a reasonable jury could conclude that, at least at
times, the victims did not voluntarily engage in prostitution and instead were
compelled by Freeman. See United States v. Campbell, 770 F.3d 556, 573–74 (7th Cir. 2014)
(defendant forced victim to live and perform sex acts at spa). Therefore, sufficient
evidence supports the jury verdict on the two counts that Freeman challenges.
Freeman next challenges numerous evidentiary rulings, which we review for
abuse of discretion. United States v. Bonin, 932 F.3d 523, 540 (7th Cir. 2019). Freeman first
argues that the testimony of L.R., the victim whose trafficking was not the subject of any
charge, should have been excluded. He contends that her testimony was cumulative of
the other two victims’ and unfairly prejudicial, see FED. R. EVID. 403, and further that it
was improper evidence of other bad acts, see FED. R. EVID. 404. But L.R.’s testimony was
not cumulative: she provided direct evidence of conspiracy by testifying about how she
was recruited to work for Freeman, how others assisted the operation, and how he
forced his victims to perform that work. See United States v. Carson, 870 F.3d 584, 600
(7th Cir. 2017). For the same reason, L.R.’s testimony had a purpose other than proving
Freeman’s bad character, see FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(1). Finally, a district court has vast
discretion to determine whether the probative value of evidence outweighs its
prejudicial effects; here, we see no abuse of discretion in the court’s assessment.
See United States v. Jackson, 898 F.3d 760, 764–65 (7th Cir. 2018).
Freeman next challenges the district court’s decision to bar his evidence that AV-
2 had a business of making adult videos, which he believed would help prove that she
worked for him as part of a larger business strategy. But Rule 412 of the Federal Rules
of Evidence forbids the admission in criminal cases of evidence of a victim’s prior

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sexual behavior, with exceptions not argued here. We have previously held that
evidence of a victim’s prior, voluntary, sex work was not probative of whether the
victim was pushed into prostitution by force, fraud, or coercion on the charged
occasions. Carson, 870 F.3d at 593–94. Although Freeman asserts that his case is
distinguishable because his evidence about AV-2 pertained to the adult film business,
not prostitution, the same principle—that her other business says nothing of whether he
used force, coercion, and threats to make her work for him—applies, and so excluding
the evidence was proper. See id. And even if the evidence were admissible, Freeman did
not provide sufficient notice that he intended to introduce it, which is an independent
reason to affirm the ruling. See F ED. R. EVID. 412(c); United States v. Boyles, 57 F.3d 535,
548 (7th Cir. 1995).
Freeman next challenges the legality of the sex-trafficking statute, the jury
instructions, and the application of the Sentencing Guidelines. Because he did not raise
these arguments in the district court, we review only for plain error. See FED. R. C RIM.
P. 52(b); United States v. Natale, 719 F.3d 719, 742 (7th Cir. 2013) (jury instructions);
United States v. Tichenor, 683 F.3d 358, 362 (7th Cir. 2012) (Guidelines). But we see no
errors at all.
Freeman first contends that the statute prohibiting sex trafficking, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1591(a), is unconstitutionally vague because it sets out two offenses: sex trafficking of
a minor and sex trafficking of an adult by force, fraud, or coercion. He suggests that he
lacked notice of whether he was indicted for trafficking a minor (at all) or for trafficking
adults through force, fraud, or coercion. Even if the statute is not a model of clarity,
however, it unmistakably prohibits the sex trafficking of anyone when it occurs through
force, fraud, or coercion, and the sex trafficking of minors in any circumstance.
See United States v. McMillian, 777 F.3d 444, 447 (7th Cir. 2015) (rejecting constitutional
challenge to § 1591). And the indictment set forth the particulars of his conduct in
separate counts of trafficking a minor and trafficking adult women through force, fraud,
or coercion. Therefore, it provided the required notice of the allegedly unlawful
conduct. Relatedly, he argues that the legislative history of § 1591 demonstrates that
Congress intended stronger punishments for sex trafficking of minors than of adults,
making the penalty provision, which applies to both versions of the offense, ambiguous.
But the plain language of § 1591(b) does not leave room for doubt that the same
penalties apply whether someone traffics a minor or traffics an adult through force,
fraud, or coercion. Consulting legislative history is unwarranted. See Salinas v. United
States, 522 U.S. 52, 57 (1997) (“Only the most extraordinary showing” of contrary
legislative history justifies departing from plain language).

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Freeman next argues that the district court rewrote § 1591 in the jury instructions
and therefore violated the separation of powers. He explains that the statute places the
interstate commerce element first, while the court here put it at the end. But the court
gave this circuit’s pattern jury instruction, with the commerce element last, and those
instructions are presumed proper. See United States v. Marr, 760 F.3d 733, 744 (7th Cir.
2014). Moreover, the order of the elements does not matter as long as the instruction
captures them accurately. See United States v. Lawrence, 788 F.3d 234, 245 (7th Cir. 2015)
(no error if jury instructions, considered as a whole, do not mislead the jury).
Last, Freeman argues that the district court wrongly relied on a 2007 amendment
to the Guidelines that increased the offense level for his conviction for prostitution-
related transportation of a minor, 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a), in violation of the Ex Post Facto
Clause. See Peugh v. United States, 569 U.S. 530, 544 (2013). Indeed, Freeman’s criminal
conduct began before 2007, when the amendment increased the base offense level from
24 to 28, U.S.S.G. § 2B1.3. But this did not affect Freeman’s overall sentencing range.
See United States v. Fletcher, 763 F.3d 711, 718 (7th Cir. 2014). The offense of transporting
a minor was appropriately grouped with sex trafficking AV-2—the same victim—
through force, fraud, or coercion. See U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(a). The adjusted offense level for
the group was 40 both before and after the 2007 amendment. In any case, Freeman’s
criminal conduct continued well past 2007; for example, the indictment charged him
with trafficking AV-2 until at least 2016. When criminal conduct continues across two
versions of the Guidelines, the district court may use the newer version. See Fletcher,
763 F.3d at 716–17 (no Peugh error for applying newer Guidelines to grouped offenses).
Finally, we note that, throughout his appellate brief, Freeman briefly mentions
statutory or constitutional provisions that he implies are relevant to the issues on
appeal. But because he does not adequately develop arguments based on these
provisions, they are waived. United States v. Barr, 960 F.3d 906, 916 (7th Cir. 2020).
AFFIRMED

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