John Seely v. James Seely

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted November 2, 2023*
Decided November 13, 2023
Before
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge
ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge
DORIS L. PRYOR, Circuit Judge
No. 22-2651
JOHN SEELY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
JAMES SEELY, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northen District of
Indiana, Fort Wayne Division.
No. 1:22-CV-103-HAB
Holly A. Brady,
Chief Judge.
O R D E R
John Seely appeals the dismissal of his complaint, which sought to reinstate an
unsuccessful case in state court. Because the district court properly determined that the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars Seely’s suit, we affirm.
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 22-2651 Page 2
In 2015, the will of Seely’s father was conclusively probated in Allen County,
Indiana. Two years later, Seely petitioned the probate court to allow him to file a
document, but the judge denied the petition because nothing was pending. Seely sought
further relief there, which the state judge denied. Seely then unsuccessfully appealed.
Dissatisfied, Seely turned to federal district court. He alleged that, in denying his
requests for relief, the state judge and the clerk for the Court of Appeals of Indiana
violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Seely asked
the federal court to reinstate his appeal in Indiana state court, order the state appellate
court to grant him relief, require a state appellate judge to recuse himself, and award
him damages arising from the courts’ adverse decisions.
The district court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. It explained that
under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, see Rooker v. Fid. Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415–16 (1923);
D.C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482 (1983), it had no power to overturn
incorrect state-court decisions. Seely responded by arguing that the state judge was
merely a magistrate judge who lacked jurisdiction over the case, making the state-court
case a nullity, in his view, under state law. But the district court reiterated that it lacked
jurisdiction to review the validity of state-court judgments.
On appeal, Seely maintains that Rooker-Feldman does not bar his claims. We
review the district court’s dismissal de novo. Andrade v. City of Hammond, 9 F.4th 947,
949 (7th Cir. 2021). The district court rightly dismissed this suit for lack of jurisdiction.
In his complaint, Seely has asked a federal district court to reinstate his case in state
court and then order the state court to grant him the relief that it had denied him. But
Rooker-Feldman holds that district courts lack jurisdiction to entertain suits from
dissatisfied state-court litigants seeking to overturn state-court decisions. Exxon Mobil
Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 291–92 (2005).
Seely offers three unavailing responses. First, he contends that the district court
had jurisdiction because his complaint alleges constitutional questions. But Rooker-
Feldman blocks jurisdiction over suits attempting to overturn state-court decisions even
when they are based on constitutional claims. Johnson v. Orr, 551 F.3d 564, 570 (7th Cir.
2008). Second, Seely argues that a litigant to the probate case fraudulently induced the
state court into rendering adverse decisions, and that fraud, he believes, overcomes the
bar of Rooker-Feldman. But a fraud that induces a state judge to decide a case adversely
does not endow a district court with the power to overturn that decision. See Iqbal v.
Patel, 780 F.3d 728, 730 (7th Cir. 2015). We recognize that Seely also seeks damages from
that alleged fraud, and we have sometimes questioned whether Rooker-Feldman applies

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No. 22-2651 Page 3
if a plaintiff seeks only damages “for injuries caused not by state court corruption but
by the fraudulent conduct of state court opponents.” Hadzi-Tanovic v. Johnson, 62 F.4th
394, 406 (7th Cir. 2023). But, in the district court, Seely focused exclusively on the state
court’s alleged wrongdoing. No allegations in his complaint nor any arguments in his
briefing below alluded to fraud caused by any state court opponent. Because litigants
cannot raise arguments for the first time on appeal, this contention is waived. See Fednav
Int’l Ltd. v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 624 F.3d 834, 841 (7th Cir. 2010) (holding that a party waived
appellate arguments because “[a] liberal reading of [its] complaint and argument in the
district court yield[ed] no signs of” the arguments presented on appeal). Finally, Seely
argues that Rooker-Feldman does not apply because he did not appeal his state case to
the Indiana Supreme Court. But Rooker-Feldman applies even if a litigant has forgone the
opportunity to appeal to every level of the state judiciary. See, e.g., Jakupovic v. Curran,
850 F.3d 898, 901 (7th Cir. 2017).
AFFIRMED

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