Anthony Roland v. United States Department of Justice

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted November 28, 2023*
Decided November 29, 2023
Before
MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge
AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge
DORIS L. PRYOR, Circuit Judge
No. 23-1620
ANTHONY ROLAND,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 1:22-cv-01066
Martha M. Pacold,
Judge.
O R D E R
Believing that the government was spying on him through his television,
Anthony Roland sent requests under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C.
§ 552, to federal agencies for documents about that spying. He targeted two divisions of
the Department of Justice: the FBI and the National Security Division. The Department
told Roland that a search had not identified any records responsive to his request and
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the appeal is
frivolous. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(A).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 23-1620 Page 2
that records, if they existed, were exempt from disclosure. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1). The
Department also told Roland of his right to file, and how to file, an administrative
appeal. The Department’s internal records show that he did not file one.
Instead, he sued the Department under FOIA for failing to disclose records.
During the short-lived suit, he unsuccessfully moved for the court to recruit counsel,
and the Department successfully moved for a protective order staying discovery. Later,
the court granted the Department’s motion for summary judgment. It reasoned that
Roland’s claim that the Department had documents about spying on him through his
television were implausible, and he had not exhausted his administrative remedies.
On appeal, Roland raises three baseless attacks on the judgment. First, he argues
that summary judgment was improper because, he says, he did not receive the required
notice, see F ED. R. C IV. P. 56(f), of the Department’s motion. True, the Department did
not file a certificate of service, see N.D. I LL. R. 56.2, but Roland told the court that he was
using its electronic filing system, so the certificate was not required, see N.D. I LL. R. 5.9.
And because he cannot show prejudice—he acknowledged receiving the motion,
requested more time to respond to it, and received more time than he requested—relief
is not warranted. See Kincaid v. Vail, 969 F.2d 594, 599 (7th Cir. 1992). Second, Roland
contends that he exhausted administrative remedies. But he points only to the letters
instructing him how to appeal administratively. They do not suggest that he followed
through on the appeal, as he had to do. See Scherer v. Balkema, 840 F.2d 437, 443 (7th Cir.
1988) (affirming dismissal where appellant failed to exhaust remedies under FOIA).
Third, he argues that the court wrongly ruled that his claim about spying over
television was implausible. We review that ruling for abuse of discretion, see Felton v.
City of Chicago, 827 F.3d 632 (7th Cir. 2016), and the court did not abuse its discretion
here: Roland relies on video recordings of television news personalities who he insists
unrealistically were responding to hand gestures that he made in front of his television.
Roland also contests two procedural rulings. He argues that the district court
abused its discretion by denying his motion for counsel. But as a civil litigant, he had no
right to counsel, see Lush v. Bd. of Trs. of N. Ill. Univ., 29 F.4th 377, 380 (7th Cir. 2022), and
nothing here warranted a favorable exercise of discretion. He also attacks the order
staying discovery. But “entertain[ing] summary-judgment motions before discovery”
fell within the court’s “considerable discretion[,]” especially because Roland did not
need discovery to contest the evidence that he failed to exhaust administrative
remedies. Henson v. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 892 F.3d 868, 874 (7th Cir. 2018).

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No. 23-1620 Page 3
AFFIRMED

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