Denia Raquel Alfaro Bonilla v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General of the United States

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Argued November 15, 2023
Decided December 14, 2023
Before
DIANE S. SYKES, Chief Judge
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge
JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge
No. 21-1409
DENIA RAQUEL ALFARO BONILLA,
Petitioner,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND,
Attorney General of the United States,
Respondent.
Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals.
No. A206-684-601
O R D E R
Denia Raquel Alfaro Bonilla and her minor son, both Honduran citizens, petition
for review of the denial of their applications for asylum and withholding of removal.
Alfaro Bonilla sought relief on the basis that she had been, and would continue to be,
persecuted by Honduran gangs who previously targeted her husband. Because
substantial evidence supports the determinations that Alfaro Bonilla did not satisfy her
statutory burden of showing past persecution or risk of future persecution on account
of a protected status, we deny the petition for review.
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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I. Background
In 2014 Alfaro Bonilla and her son entered the United States without the required
authorization. The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings.
Alfaro Bonilla and her son conceded removability but sought asylum and withholding
of removal based on membership in a particular social group of domestic-violence
victims. In 2017 Alfaro Bonilla had another son, who is a United States citizen.
Alfaro Bonilla explained in her application that she came to the United States to
escape the abuse of Jhonny Matute Mijango—her husband and her older son’s father—
as well as “gang-related harm” that, she believed, targeted Jhonny and those close to
him. But in 2016 Jhonny was shot in the head and killed. After learning of Jhonny’s
death, Alfaro Bonilla supplemented her application with an affidavit detailing threats
that she and her son had experienced while living with Jhonny in Honduras; she
attributed most of the threats to the “MS-18 gang.” She also attested that Jhonny had
been shot in 2006, that “gang members” had tried to kill him several times since then,
and that Jhonny had warned her that his enemies would try to harm or kill her and
their son. She stated that Jhonny was a hitman who had enemies. In a later filing, Alfaro
Bonilla stated that Jhonny’s death prompted her to change her proposed social-group
membership to “widow of a gang member ‘hitman’ with many enemies who will
continue to seek revenge for the acts of Jhonny.”
At her hearing before an immigration judge, Alfaro Bonilla testified about the
harm she encountered while living with Jhonny. She stated that since 2006, people—
whom she could not identify—had tried several times to kill Jhonny. Jhonny, she
reiterated, had frequently warned her that his enemies might also try to harm her and
her son. She testified that in 2009 a man came toward her and her son in front of their
house and pointed a gun at them; at Jhonny’s direction she took her son inside and no
one was hurt. She also testified that in 2013 while she and her son were riding in a car
with Jhonny, a motorcyclist cut in front of the car and threatened to kill them; after the
motorcyclist “tried to pull something out,” Jhonny steered the car into him. She added
that she had seen motorcyclists attack people “many times” and that hitmen in
Honduras commonly used motorcycles to kill people. Later in 2013 she moved out of
her home with Jhonny and lived elsewhere in Honduras with family members.
Alfaro Bonilla testified that she learned of Jhonny’s death from a friend whose
relative was killed alongside Jhonny. The friend told Alfaro Bonilla that Jhonny and her

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No. 21-1409 Page 3
relative were both hitmen. The friend also said that two more friends of Jhonny were
killed weeks later and that unidentified people went to the house Alfaro Bonilla shared
with Jhonny looking for her.
Finally, Alfaro Bonilla testified to fearing that Jhonny’s enemies would harm her
and her son if they returned to Honduras—“[b]ecause that’s what they do. They try to
hurt the people that were closest to the people that hurt them.” When asked to clarify
who Alfaro Bonilla meant by “they,” she said it “could be gangs” but she did not know.
She also did not know whether Jhonny had worked for any gangs.
Alfaro Bonilla also offered the declaration and testimony of Dr. Lirio Gutierrez
Rivera, an expert witness and political scientist from the National University of
Colombia who studied violence and criminal punishment in Honduras. Dr. Gutierrez
Rivera opined that assuming Jhonny was involved in a gang and targeted by gang
members, Alfaro Bonilla would be “at risk of being harmed by criminal gangs if [she]
returned to Honduras.” Regardless of Jhonny’s gang involvement, Dr. Gutierrez Rivera
added, if a gang had threatened and killed Jhonny, then Alfaro Bonilla would still be at
risk. Based on her research, it was “common” for gangs in Honduras to attack the
families of their enemies. She also opined that given the prevalence of gangs in urban
areas and the Honduran government’s disinterest in protecting targets of gang violence,
it would be “very difficult” for Alfaro Bonilla to relocate safely to an area in Honduras
where she could find work.
An immigration judge denied Alfaro Bonilla’s application. The judge found her
generally credible but noted that her testimony on Jhonny’s gang status and the gang
affiliation of his attackers was inconsistent. The judge then rejected her claim of past
persecution, finding that she had not suffered sufficiently significant physical harm or
comparable nonphysical harm, had not established a causal link between her claim of
harm and her membership in a particular social group, and had not established the
Honduran government’s inability or unwillingness to protect her. The judge similarly
rejected Alfaro Bonilla’s fear of future persecution as not being subjectively genuine
(because her testimony was too vague and inconsistent) or objectively reasonable
(because without knowing who her persecutors were, she could not show that they
were reasonably likely to harm her). Moreover, Alfaro Bonilla had not established that
there was a pattern or practice of persecution against members of her proposed social
group or that she could not relocate within Honduras to avoid persecution. Even if
Alfaro Bonilla had established a well-founded fear of future persecution, the judge

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explained that her application would be rejected because her proposed social group was
not cognizable, in part because it was neither sufficiently particular nor socially distinct.
The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA” or “the Board”) upheld the decision.
The Board agreed with the immigration judge, first, that Alfaro Bonilla had not shown
that she faced past persecution on account of a statutorily protected ground. According
to the Board, the incidents to which she testified—the 2009 gunpoint episode in front of
the home and the 2013 motorcycle confrontation—did not suggest that she had been
subjected to physical harm or any nonphysical harm of sufficient gravity to amount to
persecution. The Board also agreed with the conclusions that Alfaro Bonilla had not
shown that her fear of future persecution was well-founded, that she could not
reasonably relocate within Honduras, and that her proposed social group was
cognizable.
II. Discussion
To be eligible for asylum, an applicant bears the burden of demonstrating that
she is “unable or unwilling to return” to her country of origin “because of [past]
persecution or a well-founded fear of [future] persecution on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1101(a)(42), 1158(a). We will reverse the BIA’s determination only if the record
compels a contrary conclusion. Meraz-Saucedo v. Rosen, 986 F.3d 676, 684 (7th Cir. 2021).
Where, as here, the BIA affirms and supplements the immigration judge’s decision, we
review the underlying decision and the Board’s additional reasoning. See Cojocari v.
Sessions, 863 F.3d 616, 621 (7th Cir. 2017).
Alfaro Bonilla devotes most of her attention to contesting the immigration
agency’s alternative conclusion that her proposed social group was not sufficiently
particular or socially distinct. The framework for determining whether a petitioner’s
proposed social group satisfies these requirements remains an unsettled question in this
circuit, W.G.A. v. Sessions, 900 F.3d 957, 964 (7th Cir. 2018), but we need not reach it here
because Alfaro Bonilla has not met her threshold burden of showing that she suffered
past persecution or that she has a well-founded fear of future persecution, see 8 C.F.R.
§ 1208.13(b).

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A. Past Persecution
To establish that she experienced harm rising to the level of past persecution,
Alfaro Bonilla needed to show that she was subjected to physical harm or nonphysical
harm “of a gravity equivalent to significant physical force against [her] body.” Escobedo
Marquez v. Barr, 965 F.3d 561, 565 (7th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). The
immigration judge and the BIA concluded that she failed to do so. Alfaro Bonilla
challenges that conclusion, arguing that it rests on a mischaracterization of her
testimony concerning the 2009 incident in front of her home and disregards her
testimony that the motorcyclist in 2013 said he was going to kill them. But the record
supports the immigration agency’s conclusion. As the immigration judge stated, Alfaro
Bonilla did not show that she was physically harmed during either incident or that
these experiences caused comparable nonphysical harm. The only evidence she
introduced was her own testimony, and as the Board rightly noted, her recollection of
the motorcyclist incident was vague and did not show that she suffered harm rising to
the level of past persecution. Compare Cojocari, 863 F.3d at 626–27 (remanding because
disregarded evidence called the immigration judge’s conclusion into question), with Cui
v. Garland, 71 F.4th 592, 601 (7th Cir. 2023) (denying the petition because inconsistencies
in the evidence supported the immigration judge’s conclusion).
Even if Alfaro Bonilla established harm rising to the level of past persecution, she
cannot prevail because she has not shown that her familial relationship to Jhonny
caused her persecution. See Meraz-Saucedo, 986 F.3d at 685. The record does not bear out
that Jhonny was targeted by gangs. For instance, though she introduced affidavits in
which she identified gangs as the source of her persecution, she repeatedly testified that
she did not know whether gangs were the source. And to the extent she maintains that
she was persecuted by Jhonny’s unspecified enemies rather than gangs, “[t]he
possibility of private violence based on personal grudges … is not a basis for asylum.”
Duarte-Salagosa v. Holder, 775 F.3d 841, 846 (7th Cir. 2014).
Because Alfaro Bonilla asserted that she was persecuted by private actors, she
also needed to show that the Honduran government was unwilling or unable to protect
her. See Perez v. Garland, 83 F.4th 630, 633 (7th Cir. 2023). She points only to
Dr. Gutierrez Rivera’s testimony that she would not likely receive police protection if
she returned to Honduras. But the immigration judge permissibly relied upon portions
of the country-conditions reports suggesting otherwise, and Alfaro Bonilla does not
explain how the judge erred in doing so. See Vahora v. Holder, 707 F.3d 904, 909 (7th Cir.
2013) (denying the petition based on the State Department’s Country Report on Human

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Rights Practices reflecting that the Indian government had taken steps to punish
persons responsible for violence in Gujarat in 2002). Those reports state, for example,
that the Honduran government had “cooperated with the Office of the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees … and other humanitarian organizations to provide
protection and assistance to internally displaced persons, refugees, returning refugees,
asylum seekers, … and other persons of concern.” U.S. DEP ’ T OF S TATE, C OUNTRY R EPORT
ON HUMAN R IGHTS PRACTICES FOR 2016–HONDURAS 18–19 (Mar. 3, 2017), available at
https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/Honduras-1.pdf.
B. Well-Founded Fear of Future Persecution
Because Alfaro Bonilla did not establish past persecution, she is not entitled to
any presumption that she would be persecuted in the future. See Hernandez-Garcia v.
Barr, 930 F.3d 915, 920 (7th Cir. 2019); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1). Therefore, to show that
her fear of future persecution is well-founded, she needed to show that her fear was
both subjectively genuine and objectively reasonable. See Hernandez-Garcia, 930 F.3d
at 920. An applicant’s fear is objectively reasonable if she can establish a reasonable
possibility that she would be “singled out individually for persecution or that there is a
pattern or practice of persecution” against her social group. See id.; 8 C.F.R.
§ 1208.13(b)(2)(i), (iii). Fear of generalized harms is not enough. Orellana-Arias v.
Sessions, 865 F.3d 476, 488 (7th Cir. 2017).
Alfaro Bonilla generally argues that she established a well-founded fear of future
persecution but does not meaningfully engage with the immigration agency’s
conclusion that her fear was not subjectively genuine. She does, however, argue that the
immigration judge and the Board improperly discounted Dr. Gutierrez Rivera’s
testimony that gangs in Honduras have a pattern or practice of attacking family
members of their enemies. But again, the record did not compel a finding that there was
a pattern or practice of persecuting Jhonny’s family. Alfaro Bonilla testified
inconsistently about the source of the threats against Jhonny; once she stated that he
was targeted by the MS-18 gang, and at other times she testified that she did not know
who was behind the threats.
Nor did Alfaro Bonilla establish that she could not reasonably relocate within
Honduras to avoid future harm. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(3)(i). Dr. Gutierrez Rivera
based her testimony regarding relocation on the unwarranted presumption that Jhonny
belonged to a gang or had made himself an enemy of a gang. Moreover, as the Board

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observed, Alfaro Bonilla has not disputed that she was unharmed and unthreatened
while living with other family members in Honduras.
Finally, because Alfaro Bonilla did not establish her eligibility for asylum, she
cannot satisfy the higher bar required for withholding of removal. See Meraz-Saucedo,
986 F.3d at 686. We have considered Alfaro Bonilla’s remaining arguments, but none
has merit. The petition for review is DENIED.

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