Deshawn D. Johnson v. Johnna Stanonik

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted November 28, 2023*
Decided December 14, 2023
Before
MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge
AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge
DORIS L. PRYOR, Circuit Judge
No. 23-1562
DESHAWN D. JOHNSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
JOHNNA STANONIK,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of
Wisconsin.
No. 21-CV-176
William E. Duffin,
Magistrate Judge.
O R D E R
DeShawn Johnson, a Wisconsin prisoner, sued a correctional officer, Johnna
Stanonik, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for allegedly violating his Eighth Amendment rights
by refusing to move him from his cell when he reported that his bunk was missing a
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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screw. He brought a state-law negligence claim based on the same facts. The district
court entered summary judgment for Stanonik, and Johnson appeals. Because Johnson
did not support his claims that Stanonik knew there was a serious risk to his safety and
deliberately disregarded it, we affirm.
We draw these undisputed facts from the record developed on the parties’
cross-motions for summary judgment. In Johnson’s cell at Waupun Correctional
Institution, the metal bed frame was bolted to a hinged metal beam along the wall on
one side and could be folded up against the wall. A bolt fell out of Johnson’s bed frame
on May 8, 2020. On May 12, Johnson gave the bolt to a correctional officer, Mykayla
Wade, who then gave it to Stanonik, the sergeant on duty. Stanonik put the bolt aside
and told her supervisor about the need for a repair. Wade placed a written work order
to repair the bunk, dated May 12. That day Stanonik received a written request for
information from Johnson and responded that the bolt was in the “sergeant’s cage” and
that a work order had been placed. Based on her knowledge of how the bedframes are
supported, she did not think that the single missing bolt presented a serious risk.
Early the next morning (May 13), Johnson stopped a passing correctional officer;
he told her that his bunk had “collapsed,” showed her his injuries, including a bruised
forehead, and requested medical attention. A second work order was placed, and later
that day, a maintenance worker fixed the bunk. The worker, William Homan, observed
that the bunk was still anchored to the wall in three places and had not come off the
wall or fallen to the floor. According to Homan, a missing corner bolt where the
bedframe meets the wall could cause the bedframe to sag in that corner.
Some facts remain in dispute. First, Johnson says he submitted two informational
requests to Stanonik on May 12: the one she answered by citing the work order, and one
request to move cells, to which she simply responded, “NO!” Stanonik attests that she
never responded to an oral or written request to change cells and that her signature is
forged on the document Johnson produced in discovery.1 Second, Johnson maintains in
1 Stanonik’s affidavit came after her answer, in which she admitted responding
to a request to move cells. Her lawyers admit that this was their mistake. Stanonik’s
affidavit that she did not respond to the request Johnson produced, and that the
signature is forged on it, was the basis of a motion for sanctions against Johnson.
Johnson also filed a motion for sanctions against Stanonik because she did not timely
produce photos of a typical bunk when asked for them in discovery. The court denied
both motions for sanctions, and neither party challenges these rulings on appeal.

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No. 23-1562 Page 3
his verified complaint that he was treated for a concussion and bruising caused by a
bunk “collapse”; he supports this not with medical records but with responses to his
health services requests from prison medical staff, referring to a concussion and
hematoma. And finally, Johnson tries to dispute that a work order was submitted on
May 12 and believes that there was only one work order, submitted on May 13 after the
“collapse.” He points to a complaint examiner’s response to a post-incident grievance; it
quotes Homan as saying he worked on the bed “on 5/13/20 the same day the work
order was written.” However, he produces no evidence to show that this was the only
work order relating to his bed. Stanonik maintains that work orders were placed on
May 12 and 13 and has produced Homan’s affidavit stating that his department
received a work order on May 12 and that he did the work on May 13. She also
submitted a physical copy of Wade’s work order dated May 12 and digital receipts for
two service requests about Johnson’s cell, one on May 12 and one on May 13.
The magistrate judge, presiding by the parties’ consent, see 28 U.S.C. § 636(c),
granted Stanonik’s motion for summary judgment and denied Johnson’s, concluding
that the undisputed facts showed Stanonik took reasonable remedial action
immediately upon learning of the broken bed. Johnson therefore could not establish
deliberate indifference on Stanonik’s part. The court relinquished supplemental
jurisdiction over the state-law negligence claim and entered final judgment. Johnson
timely moved for reconsideration. F ED. R. C IV. P. 59(e). The court denied relief,
concluding that Johnson failed to demonstrate any manifest error of law.
We review the summary judgment decisions de novo, construing the evidence
and drawing reasonable inferences in Johnson’s favor. Stockton v. Milwaukee County, 44
F.4th 605, 614 (7th Cir. 2022). For his claim to survive summary judgment, Johnson
needed sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer that (1) the
condition of his bunk objectively posed “an excessive risk to…health and safety” and
(2) that Stanonik knew of and disregarded this excessive risk to Johnson. See Thomas v.
Blackard, 2 F.4th 716, 719–20 (7th Cir. 2021).
We need not decide whether the missing bolt constituted a sufficiently serious
condition. Even if it were, Johnson has provided no evidence to show that Stanonik was
subjectively aware of, and disregarded, the risk. Id. at 720. Stanonik attested that she
was told that one bolt had come out of Johnson’s bunk and, because there were three
other bolts holding it in place, she did not consider it a serious safety risk. In response,
Johnson simply argues that it was obvious that a missing bolt would make the bunk
unstable. Johnson has not submitted any evidence, however, to refute Stanonik’s

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assertion. The Eighth Amendment requires that the officer being sued have actually
inferred that the risk was present, even if conditions supporting that inference were
obvious. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 837, 844 (1994). Because Johnson failed to refute
Stanonik’s assertion that she did not infer an excessive safety risk, Johnson’s claim fails.
Further, Stanonik’s response to the condition could not lead a reasonable jury to
conclude that she displayed deliberate indifference. She notified her supervisor and had
Wade place a work order the same day she learned about the missing bolt. Johnson
contends that a work order was placed only after his bunk “collapsed” on May 13,
relying on Homan’s quoted statement in the complaint examiner’s response to his
grievance. Johnson may dispute this point in his affidavit, but otherwise has not refuted
Stanonik’s evidence that a work order was also placed on the morning of May 12 – her
and Homan’s affidavits, Wade’s hard copy, and the digital receipt. A jury could not find
otherwise based on Johnson’s interpretation of the grievance response (even assuming
its admissibility).
Thus, Stanonik took reasonable corrective action on May 12 despite failing to
avert the harm. Rasho v. Jeffreys, 22 F.4th 703, 711 (7th Cir. 2022). Johnson wanted her to
do more, but fixing the bunk and moving Johnson to another cell were both outside
Stanonik’s duties and authority. See Hunter v. Mueske, 73 F.4th 561, 566 (7th Cir. 2023).
She ensured that a work order was placed and notified her supervisor, who could
arrange cell moves. Therefore, on this record, no reasonable jury could find that
Stanonik acted with deliberate indifference. See Thomas, 2 F.4th at 721. This is true
despite any fact dispute about how many information requests Stanonik responded to
or whether Johnson had a concussion: they are not material to whether Stanonik acted
with the culpable state of mind required for deliberate indifference.
Next, Johnson challenges the court’s denial of his motion for reconsideration, a
decision we review for abuse of discretion. Doe v. Village of Arlington Heights, 782 F.3d
911, 914 (7th Cir. 2015). He argues that the court cited facts outside those presented in
the parties’ summary judgment briefs, specifically that Johnson slept in the bunk for
four days before requesting that it be fixed. But this was appropriate. Among the
evidence Johnson submitted was a copy of his verified complaint, in which he states
that the bolt came out on May 8, and he also directed the court to the complaint in his
brief supporting his motion for summary judgment. Courts may consider any evidence
in the record when deciding summary judgment motions, F ED. R. C IV. P. 56(c)(3), and so
the court did not abuse its discretion in doing just that.

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Finally, we recognize Johnson’s assertions that he had difficulty preparing his
reply brief because he lacked access to certain materials while he was transferred to a
different facility and placed in segregation for three weeks, and that he suspects the
Department of Corrections of erasing materials from a digital storage drive. He asks us
to recruit counsel for him to pursue this matter. But we have access to the full record,
and so Johnson’s lack of access did not prejudice him. Anyway, we consider only
arguments raised in the appellant’s opening brief. Laborers’ Pension Fund v. W.R. Weis
Co., Inc., 879 F.3d 760, 768 (7th Cir. 2018). The arguments Johnson raises do not affect
our conclusion that the record contains insufficient evidence of Stanonik’s culpable state
of mind, and so we see no need to recruit counsel or take other action.
AFFIRMED

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