Elizabeth Alicea v. COUNTY OF COOK and THOMAS J. DART

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-2863
ELIZABETH A LICEA, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
C OUNTY OF C OOK and THOMAS J. DART,
Defendants-Appellees.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 18-cv-05381 — Nancy L. Maldonado, Judge.
____________________
ARGUED NOVEMBER 1, 2023 — DECIDED DECEMBER 18, 2023
____________________
Before SYKES, Chief Judge, and ST. EVE and LEE, Circuit
Judges.
ST. EVE, Circuit Judge. Pretrial detainees challenge Cook
County’s use of cameras to record holding cell toilets in court-
houses throughout the county. They allege cameras that rec-
ord semi-private toilet areas in some holding cells infringe
upon their Fourth Amendment privacy interests and those of
similarly situated detainees. The district court disagreed,
granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants after

-- 1 of 15 --

2 No. 22-2863
denying Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification. Plaintiffs
now appeal, and we affirm.
I. Background
Elizabeth Alicea, Katina Ramos, Michelle Urrutia, and
Jack Artinian challenge the constitutionality of cameras
placed in holding cells in Cook County courthouses and claim
intrusion upon seclusion under Illinois law. They also appeal
several of the district court’s discovery rulings.
A. Factual Background
Cook County and Cook County Sheriff Thomas Dart op-
erate holding cells in courthouses throughout the county for
detainees awaiting court appearances. Each holding cell con-
tains a toilet partially separated from the rest of the cell with
a partition. Mounted cameras record holding cells; footage is
maintained for thirty days although it may be retained be-
yond that time for legal purposes. Some of those cameras cap-
ture the toilet area, though most do not.1
Officers monitor camera feeds infrequently, and Cook
County policy prohibits officers reviewing footage from
“view[ing] an individual’s private underclothing, buttocks,
genitalia, or female breasts while that individual is shower-
ing, performing bodily functions or changing clothes, unless
he/she otherwise qualifies for a strip search.”
Alicea, Ramos, Urrutia, and Artinian occupied holding
cells in Cook County courthouses before and after court
1 The parties dispute how many surveillance cameras capture holding
cell toilets. Out of approximately 250 cameras county-wide, Defendants
argue only 6 capture the toilet, while Plaintiffs assert the number is at least
28.

-- 2 of 15 --

No. 22-2863 3
appearances. They each allege that they used the toilet in the
holding cell in which they were detained, although only Al-
icea has identified the exact holding cell she occupied. No one
alleges any officer viewed video footage of their toilet use.
B. Procedural Background
Plaintiffs sued Cook County and Sheriff Dart in August
2018, alleging that their use of cameras to monitor and record
holding cell toilet areas violated the detainees’ Fourth
Amendment rights against unreasonable searches and in-
truded upon seclusion under Illinois state law. They also re-
quested class certification for all similarly situated past and
current detainees.
Judge Ronald A. Guzman ordered class-certification dis-
covery, overseen by Magistrate Judge Maria Valdez, and set a
deadline for close of that discovery on January 14, 2019, ulti-
mately extended to March 15, 2019. During discovery, Plain-
tiffs complained that Defendants were unresponsive to dis-
covery requests and filed two motions to compel in January
and February of 2019, each of which Judge Valdez granted in
part and denied in part. In April, Plaintiffs requested leave to
take additional depositions, also moving to compel and for an
award of attorneys’ fees, but the district court denied each
motion.
In October 2019, Judge Guzman granted Defendants’ mo-
tion to determine the claims’ merits prior to class certification.
Defendants then moved for summary judgment on all

-- 3 of 15 --

4 No. 22-2863
claims.2 Judge John F. Kness, to whom the case was reas-
signed in February 2020, granted that motion.3 He explained
that because detainees have no reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in jail or prison cells, routine and incidental viewing by
authorized employees reviewing camera footage does not vi-
olate the Fourth Amendment. For that same reason, Plaintiffs
had not established intrusion upon a private matter as neces-
sary for a claim of intrusion upon seclusion under Illinois law.
Plaintiffs now appeal the district court’s summary judg-
ment ruling in favor of Defendants on both the Fourth
Amendment and intrusion upon seclusion claims. They also
appeal various discovery-related decisions by the district
court.
II. Analysis
A. Standing
Defendants have not contested Plaintiffs’ standing to sue.
We must nevertheless reassure ourselves that we have author-
ity to resolve a dispute; we review that authority de novo.
Pierre v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc., 29 F.4th 934, 939 (7th Cir.
2022).
Federal courts are limited by Article III of the Constitution
to certain “Cases” and “Controversies.” TransUnion LLC v.
Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2203 (2021). This limitation requires,
in part, that plaintiffs establish standing or “a personal stake
2 Plaintiffs twice moved for class certification. The first time, the dis-
trict court denied the motion on the basis that Plaintiffs defined the class
too broadly. The second time, the district court struck the motion without
prejudice to decide the merits before class certification.
3 The case has since been reassigned to Judge Nancy L. Maldonado.

-- 4 of 15 --

No. 22-2863 5
in the case.” Id. (cleaned up). This is a three-part burden: “a
plaintiff must show (i) that he suffered an injury in fact that is
concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent; (ii) that the
injury was likely caused by the defendant; and (iii) that the
injury would likely be redressed by judicial relief.” Id. (citing
Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992)); see also
Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 691–92 (7th
Cir. 2015).
To satisfy standing at summary judgment, plaintiffs must
“set forth by affidavit or other evidence specific facts support-
ing their standing to sue.” Flynn v. FCA US LLC, 39 F.4th 946,
952 (7th Cir. 2022) (cleaned up).
The parties do not dispute that Cook County and its sher-
iff are responsible for and operate the cameras allegedly cap-
turing private information; nor is there any dispute that this
court can rectify that intrusion, if unconstitutional. Yet at this
stage in the proceedings, Plaintiffs’ allegations that they were
placed in holding cells that may have been monitored by cam-
eras that captured the toilet area are not enough. See id. (hold-
ing that summary judgment requires “specific facts,” not just
“mere allegations,” to establish standing). Each named plain-
tiff must set forth particular facts assuring the court that she
has suffered an actual injury.
Alicea has established facts necessary to satisfy standing
at summary judgment. She affirmatively identified the cell
she occupied from a still photo taken from the camera moni-
toring that cell. That camera captures the cell’s toilet area,
leaving little doubt that the camera captured Alicea when she
used the holding cell toilet.

-- 5 of 15 --

6 No. 22-2863
Unlike Alicea, Ramos, Artinian, and Urrutia have not es-
tablished facts necessary to demonstrate an actual and partic-
ularized injury. Although they claim they occupied Cook
County holding cells and that they used the toilet while in
those cells, none can identify which holding cell they occupied.
Nor did they testify that they in fact occupied a holding cell
with a toilet area recorded by a camera. We have no way of
knowing whether Ramos, Artinian, or Urrutia occupied one
of the fraction of courthouse holding cells in which the camera
captures the toilet area. Because these three plaintiffs have not
established an actual injury, they do not have standing.
At oral argument, Plaintiffs explained that they had been
unable to establish standing for purposes of summary judg-
ment because the district court permitted only class discovery
prior to granting Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
More discovery is necessary, they contend, and the district
court improperly denied their requests to that end. We are not
persuaded. Plaintiffs purporting to represent a class are obli-
gated to demonstrate that they have standing to seek relief on
behalf of the class. See Keep Chi. Livable v. City of Chicago, 913
F.3d 618, 621 (7th Cir. 2019).
Because Alicea has standing to sue, she alone can continue
as class representative in this putative class action. See Kohen
v. Pac. Inv. Mgmt. Co. LLC, 571 F.3d 672, 677 (7th Cir. 2009)
(holding that “one named plaintiff with standing … is all that
is necessary”).
B. Reasonableness of the Search
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of
Defendants, finding that the detainees have no reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy when using the toilets in courthouse

-- 6 of 15 --

No. 22-2863 7
holding cells. We review that decision de novo. Henry v.
Hulett, 969 F.3d 769, 776 (7th Cir. 2020).
A search subject to the protections of the Fourth Amend-
ment exists if two conditions are met: “[F]irst, has the individ-
ual manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the ob-
ject of the challenged search? Second, is society willing to rec-
ognize that expectation as reasonable?” United States v. Tuggle,
4 F.4th 505, 513 (7th Cir. 2021) (quoting California v. Ciraolo,
476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986)).
This case raises difficult questions about the extent to
which detainees have a reasonable expectation of privacy in
their bodies while in a holding cell. It also asks us to consider
whether recordings of private acts, retained for a finite period
of time, are equivalent to direct human observation, and
whether a recording, without evidence of viewing by the hu-
man eye, can constitute a search.
Our caselaw does not squarely determine whether elec-
tronic surveillance and recording of private bodily functions
in a jail or prison cell constitute a search. Although we had
previously interpreted the Supreme Court’s decision in Hud-
son v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984), to categorically foreclose any
Fourth Amendment right to privacy for prisoners, Johnson v.
Phelan, 69 F.3d 144, 146, 150 (7th Cir. 1995), we later clarified
that Hudson eliminated only an inmate’s “privacy and posses-
sory interests in personal effects,” or the contents of a cell,
Henry, 969 F.3d at 777 (quoting Hudson, 468 U.S. at 538
(O’Connor, J., concurring)). Strip searches, on the other hand,
do trigger Fourth Amendment privacy interests. Conse-
quently, we held that “the Fourth Amendment protects (in a
severely limited way) an inmate’s right to bodily privacy dur-
ing visual inspections,” a holding that “pertains to pretrial

-- 7 of 15 --

8 No. 22-2863
detainees and convicted prisoners alike.” Henry, 969 F.3d at
779. We have rejected any rule “that the interior of one’s body
is as open to invasion as the interior of one’s cell.” Id. at 782
(quoting Sparks v. Stutler, 71 F.3d 259, 261 (7th Cir. 1995)).
Although detainees do not relinquish all bodily rights to
privacy as soon as they are placed in jail cells, those privacy
rights are substantially diminished. See id. at 784 (“[T]he fact
that institutional concerns significantly diminish the privacy
rights of persons in prison does not mean that the Fourth
Amendment provides no protection at all.”). It is the extent of
those limitations on an inmate’s right to bodily privacy that
this appeal calls into question.
We leave those difficult questions for another day. Even if
a Fourth Amendment search occurs, invasions of privacy may
be “subject to reasonable intrusions that the realities of incar-
ceration often demand,” so long as those intrusions are lim-
ited in response to “ever-present institutional concerns over
safety and security.” Id. at 779, 783. Because we find that Cook
County’s use of cameras in courthouse holding cells is reason-
able under the circumstances, we need not determine whether
a search occurred in the first instance.
The reasonableness of a search depends on four factors:
“the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which it
is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place in
which it is conducted.” Id. at 779 (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441
U.S. 520, 559 (1979)). One such reasonable, limited intrusion
is guards “routinely and incidentally observing [inmates] in
various states of undress in their … toilets.” Id. at 783 (citing
Johnson, 69 F.3d at 145).

-- 8 of 15 --

No. 22-2863 9
Scope and Manner. Cook County limits the scope and man-
ner of any intrusion upon privacy interests. It is uncontested
that recording of holding cell toilet areas is incidental; only a
few cameras even capture the toilet. The intrusion is further
limited by not continually monitoring video feeds, storing re-
cordings for only thirty days unless legally necessary beyond
that time, restricting who can access stored footage, and fur-
ther limiting incidental recordings by adopting a policy that
prohibits officers from “view[ing] an individual’s private un-
derclothing, buttocks, genitalia, or female breasts while that
individual is showering, performing bodily functions or
changing clothes, unless he/she otherwise qualifies for a strip
search.” Due to these practices and policies, the scope and
manner of the intrusion is quite limited, and “incidental ob-
servations of undressed inmates—particularly ones that are
infrequent or at a distance—that are inherent to the continu-
ous surveillance necessary in prisons are almost always rea-
sonable.” Id. at 783. The scope and manner of any intrusion
incidental toilet recordings might constitute is limited and in-
frequent, and therefore reasonable in the context of a pre-trial
holding cell.
Justification. The security risks inherent in this setting also
justify the intrusion; courthouse cameras are necessary re-
sponses to those risks. Defendants offered testimony from
courthouse superintendents listing security needs such as ad-
dressing emergencies, monitoring detainees with behavioral
or mental health problems, ensuring detainee safety, and in-
vestigating allegations of employee misconduct. This list sup-
ports that the incidental recording of the toilet area in holding
cells intended for multiple detainees is, in the judgment of jail
administrators, “needed to preserve internal order and disci-
pline and to maintain institutional security,” a judgment that

-- 9 of 15 --

10 No. 22-2863
we must afford great deference. Id. (quoting Bell, 441 U.S. at
547). Indeed, security risks do not stop at the bathroom door
of a holding cell, particularly in semi-public holding cells
where there is no bathroom door.
Alicea counters with testimony from a deputy sheriff that
he could think of no security reasons for monitoring detainees
using holding cell toilets. We owe deference to jail and prison
administrators responsible for adoption and implementation
of policies, id., those “who bear a significant responsibility for
defining the legitimate goals of a corrections system and for
determining the most appropriate means to accomplish
them.” Singer v. Raemisch, 593 F.3d 529, 534 (7th Cir. 2010)
(quoting Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 132 (2003)). But a
deputy sheriff, as the district court pointed out, has no policy-
making authority or responsibilities, so his testimony cannot
outweigh that of courthouse superintendents or raise a genu-
ine issue of material fact where, as here, we lack “substantial
evidence in the record to indicate that the officials have exag-
gerated their response” to security concerns. Henry, 969 F.3d
at 783 (quoting Bell, 441 U.S. at 548).
Place. The location in which monitoring occurs also indi-
cates that this intrusion is reasonable. A visible camera
mounted on the ceiling captures a non-private bathroom sep-
arated by a partition from the rest of a non-private holding
cell. Multiple detainees might be placed in that holding cell at
a time. Since detainees enjoy very little privacy in these cells,
even from other occupants, camera monitoring is reasonable
when subject to limitations on scope and manner and respon-
sive to security concerns.
Under these policies and practices, any incidental viewing
of a detainee’s body while using the toilet in a holding cell

-- 10 of 15 --

No. 22-2863 11
intended to hold multiple detainees is a reasonably limited
intrusion. Consequently, we affirm the district court’s order
granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants.
C. Intrusion Upon Seclusion
To survive summary judgment on a claim for intrusion
upon seclusion, a plaintiff must identify specific evidence
showing a genuine dispute of material fact for each element
of that Illinois tort: “(1) the defendant committed an unau-
thorized intrusion or prying into the plaintiff’s seclusion; (2)
the intrusion would be highly offensive or objectionable to a
reasonable person; (3) the matter intruded on was private; and
(4) the intrusion caused the appellant anguish and suffering.”
Spiegel v. McClintic, 916 F.3d 611, 619 (7th Cir. 2019) (quoting
Busse v. Motorola, Inc., 813 N.E.2d 1013, 1017 (Ill. App. Ct.
2004)). We review the district court’s decision here de novo.
Henry, 969 F.3d at 776.
Illinois law does not presume injury; Alicea “must prove
actual injury in the form of, for example, medical care, an in-
ability to sleep or work, or a loss of reputation or integrity in
the community.” Spiegel, 916 F.3d at 619 (quoting Schmidt v.
Ameritech Ill., 768 N.E.2d 303, 316 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002)). Alicea
asserts only general anguish and embarrassment from being
recorded while using the holding cell toilet, allegations that
fall far short of state law requirements. Because Alicea has not
met her burden on the fourth element, anguish and suffering,
her claim cannot survive summary judgment.
D. Discovery-Related Motions
Finally, Alicea asks that we reverse several docket-man-
agement and discovery-related decisions, which we review
for abuse of discretion. Wanko v. Bd. of Trs., 927 F.3d 966, 969

-- 11 of 15 --

12 No. 22-2863
(7th Cir. 2019). This standard is deferential because “[t]he dis-
trict court is in the best position to decide the proper scope of
discovery and to settle any discovery disputes.” Id. (quoting
Scott v. Chuhak & Tecson, P.C., 725 F.3d 772, 785 (7th Cir. 2013)).
1. Additional Discovery
First, Alicea argues that Judge Guzman abused his discre-
tion by denying Plaintiffs’ motion to compel, declining to
grant leave to take additional depositions, and ruling against
her at summary judgment before permitting full discovery.
District courts have broad discretion to manage their dockets,
including setting close-of-discovery dates, permitting exten-
sions, and disposing of claims through summary judgment
when appropriate. See Stevens v. United States Dept. of State, 20
F.4th 337, 341 (7th Cir. 2021). “The mere fact that discovery is
incomplete is not enough to prevent summary judgment.”
Smith v. OSF HealthCare Sys., 933 F.3d 859, 864 (7th Cir. 2019);
cf. Woods v. City of Chicago, 234 F.3d 979, 990 (7th Cir. 2000) (“A
district court’s decision to consider a defendant’s motion for
summary judgment before allowing the plaintiff to depose
certain witness[es] is a discovery matter which we review for
abuse of discretion.”). Nor is a district court obligated to per-
mit additional discovery after the close-of-discovery deadline
has passed, a deadline Judge Guzman extended multiple
times in this case.
When a defendant files a motion for summary judgment,
the plaintiff can request additional discovery under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d). See Kallal v. CIBA Vision Corp.,
Inc., 779 F.3d 443, 446 (7th Cir. 2015). Rule 56(d) instructs a
party seeking such discovery to “state the reasons why the
party cannot adequately respond to” that motion without ad-
ditional discovery. MAO-MSO Recovery II, LLC v. State Farm

-- 12 of 15 --

No. 22-2863 13
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 994 F.3d 869, 877 (7th Cir. 2021) (quoting
Deere & Co. v. Ohio Gear, 462 F.3d 701, 706 (7th Cir. 2006)). The
party requesting additional discovery must submit an affida-
vit or declaration stating that “for specified reasons, it cannot
present facts essential to justify its opposition.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(d); see also MAO-MSO Recovery II, LLC, 994 F.3d at 877;
Larsen v. Elk Grove Village, 433 F. App’x 470, 472 (7th Cir. 2011).
This explanation “requires more than a fond hope that more
fishing might net some good evidence.” MAO-MSO Recovery
II, LLC, 994 F.3d at 877 (quoting Smith, 933 F.3d at 864). Mere
speculation, for example, about unnamed witnesses that
might have helpful information will not suffice. Larsen, 433 F.
App’x at 472.
Although Plaintiffs did file a Rule 56(d) declaration with
the district court, that declaration simply listed the discovery
they hoped to conduct and the reasons they had not yet ob-
tained it. The declaration does not explain how the lack of this
discovery prevented Plaintiffs from responding to the sum-
mary judgment motion. Plaintiffs’ broad assertions that the
requested items were necessary to establish genuine issues of
material fact do not satisfy Rule 56(d). Indeed, the declaration
must not only explain why the party has not been able to ob-
tain requested discovery but also the import of that discovery
to “facts essential to justify its opposition.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(d). Because Plaintiffs have not provided the necessary
specificity to meet their burden, the district court did not
abuse its discretion by denying that request.
2. Attorneys’ Fees
The district court also did not abuse its discretion by deny-
ing Alicea’s motion for sanctions related to various discovery
requests.

-- 13 of 15 --

14 No. 22-2863
After the district court partially granted two of Alicea’s
motions to compel in February and March 2019, Alicea moved
for attorneys’ fees under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
37(a)(5)(C) in the same April group of motions requesting ad-
ditional discovery discussed above. Rule 37(a)(5)(C) provides
that if a motion to compel is partially granted, the district
court has discretion to, “after giving an opportunity to be
heard, apportion the reasonable expenses for the motion.”
This rule is in contrast with 37(a)(5)(A) and (B), which require
the award of appropriate attorneys’ fees to the prevailing
party. Alicea points out that the district court may have mis-
understood the motion, because that court explained the de-
nial of attorneys’ fees by noting that it was denying all mo-
tions for additional discovery without acknowledging the
motion for attorneys’ fees concerned previous motions to
compel.
Assuming this error to be true, we still find that the district
court did not abuse its discretion. Even if it properly under-
stood Plaintiffs’ motion for attorneys’ fees, it had discretion
under 37(a)(5)(C) to deny the motion. In February and March,
the district court only partially granted Alicea’s motions to
compel. After reviewing the record and district court rulings,
we conclude that the court would have been well within its
discretion to find that no attorneys’ fees were reasonable un-
der those circumstances. Consequently, any error was harm-
less.
III. Conclusion
For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s decision to
grant summary judgment on all claims in favor of Defendants
and deny Plaintiffs’ motions related to discovery and attor-
neys’ fees.

-- 14 of 15 --

No. 22-2863 15
* * *
The judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.

-- 15 of 15 --