LATRONA RENEE MOORE, Administrator of the Estate of Lamont Deshawn Moore v. Western Illinois Correctional Center

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-1929
LATRONA R ENEE M OORE, Administrator
of the Estate of Lamont Deshawn Moore,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
WESTERN I LLINOIS C ORRECTIONAL
C ENTER , et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Central District of Illinois.
No. 3:16-cv-03289-CSB — Colin S. Bruce, Judge.
____________________
A RGUED S EPTEMBER 8, 2023 — DECIDED D ECEMBER 20, 2023
____________________
Before SYKES , Chief Judge, and R OVNER and K IRSCH , Circuit
Judges.
R OVNER , Circuit Judge. When he was an inmate at Vandalia
Correctional Center, Lamont Moore suffered a ghastly injury
at the hands of a fellow prisoner, Kaleel Sample. Moore sued
the guard on duty under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for failing to protect
him, and the prison to which he was subsequently sent for

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2 No. 22-1929
violating his rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act
(“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. He also filed a conspiracy
claim against the Vandalia officers who investigated the event
that led to this injury, asserting that they conspired to falsify
the official report in order to avoid liability for failing to pro-
tect him, instead blaming him for instigating the incident.
Moore filed additional federal claims that are not part of the
appeal, and also filed state law claims. The district court
granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on
Moore’s federal claims and relinquished jurisdiction over his
state law claims. We affirm.
I.
In June 2015, Moore was a prisoner at Vandalia Correc-
tional Center, a minimum-security prison where inmates are
housed in open-dorm settings. Moore’s dorm housed approx-
imately eighty-six inmates, including Sample. The dorm con-
tained approximately forty-four bunkbeds lined up in four
rows in a large room that was open like a large pole barn. Un-
der the bunks were lockboxes for each inmate to store his per-
sonal property. Each inmate was issued a key to his lockbox.
Moore’s bunkbed was “a couple bunks down” from Sample’s
bunkbed. At the back of the dorm was a shower room and
bathroom. A single guard sat at the front, overseeing the en-
tire dorm. Jason Gatewood was the guard on duty during the
day shift when Moore’s injury occurred, and in the days lead-
ing up to the attack.
Approximately four days before the attack, Moore was in
the dorm bathroom at the same time as Sample. Sample was
“pouring water,” “playing around and he was throwing and
splashing water.” Moore was brushing his teeth in a nearby
stall as Sample did this, and Moore told Sample to stop

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No. 22-1929 3
splashing water. A few days later, Moore complained about
Sample to Gatewood and asked to be moved to another part
of the dorm, away from Sample, but Gatewood did nothing.
On June 14, 2015, at approximately 10 a.m., shortly before
lunch, Sample said something to Moore that Moore could not
specifically recall later, but Moore “brushed it off and walked
it off.” Moore then asked Gatewood to move him to the other
side of the dorm so that he could stay away from Sample and
a “bunch of young guys” in the area where his bunk was lo-
cated. According to Moore, he could not sleep in his assigned
area because of the activities of the younger inmates. Gate-
wood declined to move his bunk assignment.
When Moore came back from lunch at approximately 11
a.m., he returned to his bunk and watched television with
some of the other men located nearby. Around noon, Moore
went back to Gatewood and asked again to be “move[d] off
this side to get me away from these guys.” Gatewood re-
sponded that he could not move Moore because he was not a
lieutenant, and that he had conveyed Moore’s request to a
lieutenant.
Moore then went back to his bunk, where he sat with some
of the other men for a few hours. At some point, Sample came
into Moore’s area and Moore asked him to leave. Sample and
another inmate were engaged in “horseplay.” They were
“falling all over [the] bunks.” Moore then went to the bath-
room. When he returned to his bunk, Sample and the other
man were still there, “tussling around” in Moore’s area. They
had moved some of the bunks. Moore again told them to
leave, and Sample replied by “mouthing off.” Moore then
“went and hollered at the officer again,” to no avail.

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4 No. 22-1929
When Moore returned from talking to Gatewood, Sample
said something else to him, and Moore again “brushed it off,”
and “walked off from it.” Moore did not recall what Sample
said because he was not paying attention to him. According
to Moore, Sample then suddenly punched Moore in the face.
Sample was aiming for Moore’s neck, but Moore turned and
took the blow in his left eye. Sample had the key to his lockbox
intertwined in his fingers, and the key pierced Moore’s eye-
ball. When Sample pulled back from the punch, Moore’s eye-
ball came out of its socket with the key. By this time, the 3 p.m.
shift change had begun, and Gatewood was no longer pre-
sent. Fellow prisoners immediately alerted the officer on
duty, who notified the healthcare unit. Within minutes,
Moore was rushed to the healthcare unit in a wheelchair and
then sent to the emergency room of an outside hospital. He
was in the hospital for a few days. A doctor there pushed the
eyeball back into the socket and treated Moore for his injuries.
Moore returned to the healthcare unit at Vandalia where he
continued to receive treatment for his injuries. On July 15,
2015, Moore was transferred to the healthcare unit at Western
Illinois Correctional Center.
After spending two weeks in the healthcare unit at West-
ern Illinois, Moore was placed in the general population
against his wishes. He expressed that he felt safer in the
healthcare unit than in the general population where he might
be attacked again. Moore was never able to see from his left
eye again. Moore’s doctor recommended removing the dam-
aged left eye in order to preserve the vision in his right eye.
In September 2015, Moore was moved to a hospital in Spring-
field, Illinois for the operation and was then returned to the
healthcare unit at Western Illinois. After a week in the
healthcare unit, Moore was sent to the general population

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No. 22-1929 5
again. He was placed in a part of the prison that was a great
distance from the healthcare unit, where he needed to walk
each day for continued care. With monocular vision, Moore
had balance problems, blurry vision in his remaining eye, and
no depth perception. Although he had no problems with
“physically walking,” these conditions nevertheless made
walking difficult and slow. He was issued a low bunk permit
and a slow walk permit. It took him thirty to forty minutes to
get to the healthcare unit from the unit where he was housed.
Asked whether other inmates helped him, he answered,
“Yeah, a couple sometimes.” R. 55-1, at 40. Moore took medi-
cation three times a day. Prison staff brought his medication
to him in the morning and the evening, but once a day, he had
to walk to the healthcare unit for medication and to get his
bandage changed. During lockdowns, prison staff came to
Moore’s housing unit three times a day to deliver medication
and change his bandage. The chow hall was approximately
five minutes from the healthcare unit and when the prison
was not on lockdown, Moore generally went from his
healthcare visit directly to lunch. He asked a few officers, a
lieutenant, someone in internal affairs, a nurse, a doctor, and
his counselor to be placed closer to the healthcare unit but was
not moved closer until shortly before he was transferred out
of Western Illinois to Graham Correctional Center. Although
he walked slowly, Moore never fell while he was at Western
Illinois and never injured himself there. He was able to get to
all the places he wanted and needed to go, including the
healthcare unit, the chow hall, the visitor’s center, the com-
missary, the yard, and the school building.
At Graham, he was forced to walk long distances to get to
the healthcare unit three times every day. The trip took
twenty to thirty minutes. Nevertheless, Moore was able to get

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6 No. 22-1929
everywhere he needed to go at Graham including the
healthcare unit, the chow hall, the commissary, a special gym
for persons with disabilities, and the yard. At Graham, Moore
was given eyeglasses to help with the blurry vision in his re-
maining eye. As was the case at the other facilities, he had a
low bunk permit and a slow walk permit at Graham. While at
Graham, Moore asked an officer, a lieutenant, and a doctor to
be moved closer to the healthcare unit. No one ever re-
sponded to his requests. Moore suffered no injuries at Gra-
ham.
Moore testified at his deposition that he was not expecting
Sample’s attack and he was not afraid of Sample. When asked
if Sample ever said anything to him that made him think that
Sample would attack him, Moore replied, “No. If he did, I
would have—this wouldn’t have happened. I didn’t see it
coming.” R. 55-1 at 20 (Moore Deposition). Moore said that he
spoke to Gatewood about Sample approximately five times
before the attack. Asked what he said to Gatewood, he re-
sponded:
I asked him could he move me—move me from
out over here by these guys. Could you move
me over where these guys are at because they
horseplay and they playing too much. Bunch of
young kids. They young. Bunch of young kids.
I was trying to get away from the situation.
They was wrestling, throwing water all on peo-
ple’s bunks. So I was trying to get moved before
any of this occurred to me. Trying to get off of
this side. They told me they not going to move
me so I went back in there. Then he say he going
to holler at the lieutenant because I kept

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No. 22-1929 7
constantly nagging him about it. And I had my
wife to call down there to the penitentiary and
tell them that I’m constantly trying to get away
from this situation.
R. 55-1, at 91–92.
Moore filed this lawsuit in 2016 claiming, among other
things, that Gatewood failed to protect him, and that the Illi-
nois Department of Corrections and officials at Western Illi-
nois Correctional Center violated his rights under the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act. He was released from custody in
2017. As we noted earlier, the district court granted summary
judgment in favor of the defendants on all of Moore’s federal
claims and relinquished jurisdiction over his state law claims.
Moore died in 2022. This court granted a Motion for Substitu-
tion of Party Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure
43(a)(2), and substituted Moore’s wife, Latrona Renee Moore,
as the plaintiff-appellant.
II.
On appeal, Latrona Moore challenges the district court’s
view of the evidence. In particular, she asserts that, in con-
cluding that Gatewood was not aware of the risk of harm to
Moore, the district court failed to view the evidence in the
light most favorable to Moore and failed to draw all reasona-
ble inferences in his favor. She also asserts that the court erred
in finding that Moore’s loss of one eye did not substantially
limit his ability to walk.
We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment
de novo, examining the record in the light most favorable to
the nonmovant and construing all reasonable inferences from
the evidence in his favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477

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8 No. 22-1929
U.S. 242, 255 (1986); Tolliver v. City of Chicago, 820 F.3d 237, 241
(7th Cir. 2016). Summary judgment is appropriate when there
are no genuine disputes of material fact, and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a);
Tolliver, 820 F.3d at 241.
A prisoner’s claim for failure to protect is analyzed in the
same manner as other conditions-of-confinement claims un-
der the Eighth Amendment. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 303
(1991). Prison officials “are under an obligation to take rea-
sonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates them-
selves.” Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526–27 (1984). That in-
cludes a duty to protect prisoners from violence at the hands
of other prisoners. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994).
It is not, however, every injury suffered by one
prisoner at the hands of another that translates
into constitutional liability for prison officials
responsible for the victim’s safety. Our cases
have held that a prison official violates the
Eighth Amendment only when two require-
ments are met. First, the deprivation alleged
must be, objectively, “sufficiently serious[;]” …
a prison official’s act or omission must result in
the denial of “the minimal civilized measure of
life’s necessities[.]” … For a claim (like the one
here) based on a failure to prevent harm, the in-
mate must show that he is incarcerated under
conditions posing a substantial risk of serious
harm. … The second requirement follows from
the principle that “only the unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain implicates the Eighth
Amendment.” … To violate the Cruel and

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No. 22-1929 9
Unusual Punishments Clause, a prison official
must have a “sufficiently culpable state of
mind.” … In prison-conditions cases that state
of mind is one of “deliberate indifference” to in-
mate health or safety[.]
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (internal citations omitted).
Under the well-established standard in Farmer, in order to
hold Gatewood liable for failing to protect Moore, Latrona
Moore must demonstrate that Gatewood knew of and disre-
garded an excessive risk to inmate health or safety. She must
show that Gatewood was both aware of facts from which the
inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious
harm existed, and he must also have drawn the inference.
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. In failure-to-protect cases, plaintiffs
normally prove actual knowledge of impending harm by
showing that they complained to prison officials about spe-
cific threats to their safety. Gevas v. McLaughlin, 798 F.3d 475,
480 (7th Cir. 2015). “Complaints that convey only a general-
ized, vague, or stale concern about one’s safety typically will
not support an inference that a prison official had actual
knowledge that the prisoner was in danger.” Gevas, 798 F.3d
at 480–81.
The plaintiff’s evidence here is not sufficient to defeat
summary judgment on the issue of Gatewood’s state of mind
as articulated in Farmer. Moore’s own testimony demon-
strates that his complaints to Gatewood regarding Sample in-
dicated little more than annoyance over Sample making
noise, splashing people and bunks, and “horseplay.” In none
of his testimony did Moore indicate that he conveyed to Gate-
wood a fear for his safety or facts from which Gatewood could
infer that there was a substantial risk of serious harm. Indeed,

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10 No. 22-1929
Moore testified that he was not afraid of Sample, that Sample
said and did nothing to indicate that he posed a danger to
Moore, and that Moore himself did not see the attack coming.
If Moore could not predict the attack, it would be difficult to
see how Gatewood could have anticipated it. See Dale v.
Poston, 548 F.3d 563, 569 (7th Cir. 2008) (plaintiff’s vague state-
ments that inmates were “pressuring him” and “asking ques-
tions” were inadequate to alert the officers that there was a
true threat at play); Grieveson v. Anderson, 538 F.3d 763, 776–
77 (7th Cir. 2008) (plaintiff’s statements that he was afraid and
wanted to be moved without also conveying that he was per-
ceived as a snitch by fellow prisoners was too vague to put
officers on notice of a specific threat to plaintiff’s safety).
The plaintiff’s additional evidence is also insufficient to
defeat summary judgment. Latrona Moore points to Gate-
wood’s knowledge that Sample had a disciplinary record. But
prior to this attack, Gatewood knew only about Sample’s non-
violent disciplinary history: Sample had been cited for inso-
lence. Prior to the attack, Sample’s behavior toward Moore
was perfectly consistent with his reputation for insolence and
“mouthing off,” not for engaging in physical violence.
Latrona Moore also cites the affidavit of Xavier Brownlee,
Moore’s fellow inmate who averred that, on the day of the at-
tack, he “witnessed an altercation between Lamont Moore
and Kaleel Sample.” Brownlee also said that, on that same
day, he witnessed Moore telling Gatewood that “he was con-
cerned about his physical safety after the altercation with
Kaleel Sample.” R. 63-4. The district court found the second
part of Brownlee’s statement (where he repeated what he
overheard Moore say to Gatewood) to be inadmissible hear-
say. The case that Latrona Moore cites in answer to the district

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No. 22-1929 11
court’s hearsay finding is easily distinguishable. She relies on
Ani-Deng v. Jeffboat, LLC, 777 F.3d 452 (7th Cir. 2015), for the
proposition that courts may consider “first-hand” evidence in
an affidavit. The affidavit in that employment discrimination
case had been excluded because the affiant lacked personal
knowledge of the contents of her statement. We noted that,
had the “affidavit stated for example that she had overheard
a company official say that he’d get the plaintiff fired because
she was foreign, the affidavit, or at least that part of it, would
have been admissible.” 777 F.3d at 454. In that instance, the
affiant would have had personal knowledge as the person
who heard the statement of a company official, and the con-
tent of the company official’s statement would itself be admis-
sible as an admission of a party opponent. Fed. R. Evid.
801(d)(2). Although Brownlee had personal knowledge of
Moore’s statement because he heard Moore utter it, Moore’s
statement does not fall within the party opponent exclusion
from the hearsay rule. As that is the only argument that
Latrona Moore makes regarding the hearsay finding for
Brownlee’s statement, we find no abuse of discretion in the
court’s ruling. McCottrell v. White, 933 F.3d 651, 656 n.3 (7th
Cir. 2019) (although we review the grant of summary judg-
ment de novo, we review the court’s ruling on the hearsay is-
sue for abuse of discretion).
The second problem with Brownlee’s affidavit is that it is
directly contradicted by Moore’s own sworn testimony. We
have recounted everything that Moore said in his deposition
regarding his statements to Gatewood about Sample. In none
of those statements did Moore indicate that he was concerned
for his safety. In fact, Moore affirmatively denied that he
feared Sample or had any reason to fear Sample. We suppose
that Brownlee could nevertheless have heard Moore tell

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12 No. 22-1929
Gatewood that he feared for his physical safety. But allowing
Brownlee’s recitation of Moore’s out-of-court statement to
Gatewood would accomplish something that Moore himself
could not do, which is to directly contradict his own sworn
deposition testimony as to what he told Gatewood. More to
the point, it would allow into evidence a statement to Gate-
wood which was untruthful, because in his deposition, Moore
had unequivocally denied that he had any reason to believe
that Sample posed a danger to him.
The third problem with Brownlee’s retelling of Moore’s
statement to Gatewood is that this is the sort of vague state-
ment that our cases deem insufficient to have put the officer
on notice of a real threat to Moore’s safety. Brownlee does not
describe the nature of the “altercation” between Moore and
Sample; nor does he state why Moore had this fear, and the
statement that he purports to have heard from Moore to Gate-
wood does not answer these questions. But Moore’s sworn
testimony fills in the gaps: Moore made clear in his testimony
that it was a verbal dispute regarding horseplay, and that
Sample never said or did anything to cause Moore to think
that Sample would attack him. Based on Moore’s own sworn
statements regarding his conversations with Gatewood, at
most, Brownlee heard Moore relating a (false) fear for his
physical safety based on an argument over horseplay that in-
volved no threats of physical violence. That is not sufficient to
put the officer on notice of a substantial risk of serious harm.
See Klebanowski v. Sheahan, 540 F.3d 633, 639–40 (7th Cir. 2008)
(where officers knew only that plaintiff had been involved in
an altercation with three other inmates, and that he wanted a
transfer because he feared for his life but he did not tell them
that he had actually been threatened with future violence, nor
that a prior attack was inflicted by gang members because of

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No. 22-1929 13
his non-gang status, there was nothing leading the officers to
believe that the plaintiff himself was not speculating regard-
ing the threat he faced out of fear based on the first attack he
suffered).
Latrona Moore also cites her affidavit, where she re-
counted what Moore told her in telephone calls regarding his
conversations with Sample and Gatewood. She similarly re-
lies on statements that Moore made in grievances that he filed
in prison after the incident. The district court refused to credit
any of this evidence, finding that Latrona lacked personal
knowledge of the matters averred and that the affidavit re-
counted inadmissible hearsay. The court was correct. Latrona
Moore had no personal knowledge of conversations between
Moore and Sample, or Moore and Gatewood, and so her affi-
davit was inadmissible on these matters. Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c)(4) (“An affidavit or declaration used to support or op-
pose a motion must be made on personal knowledge, set out
facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the
affiant or declarant is competent to testify on the matters
stated.”). And Moore’s out of court statements to Latrona are
inadmissible for the truth of the matter asserted. Fed. R. Evid.
801(c). Even if her affidavit was not based on hearsay and
matters outside her personal knowledge, nothing that Moore
relayed to Latrona indicated that Moore alerted Gatewood to
a substantial risk of serious harm.
In the grievances, Moore claimed that he witnessed Sam-
ple attempting to break into his property box, that he con-
fronted Sample, and that an argument ensued. Moore as-
serted that he reported this incident to Gatewood, and told
Gatewood that there was “trouble brewing,” and that, if he
was not separated from Sample, “an altercation would

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14 No. 22-1929
ensue.” R. 63-9, 63-10, 63-11. Moore’s out-of-court statements
in the grievances are both inadmissible for the truth of the
matter asserted, and also insufficient under our cases to alert
the officer that Sample posed a substantial risk of serious
harm to Moore.
In the end, there is no admissible evidence that Moore ever
made Gatewood aware of a substantial risk of serious harm.
That dooms the failure-to-protect claim. And because the fail-
ure-to-protect claim fails, the district court was also correct to
grant summary judgment in favor of the defendants on his
federal conspiracy claim. “Without a viable federal constitu-
tional claim, the conspiracy claim under § 1983 necessarily
fails; there is no independent cause of action for § 1983 con-
spiracy.” Katz-Crank v. Haskett, 843 F.3d 641, 650 (7th Cir.
2016) (citing Cefalu v. Village of Elk Grove, 211 F.3d 416, 423 (7th
Cir. 2000)).
That brings us to Moore’s ADA claim for discrimination
and failure to accommodate, against Western Illinois and the
Illinois Department of Corrections, seeking both injunctive re-
lief and monetary damages. As Moore is no longer in prison,
and in fact is no longer alive, there is no effective injunctive
relief that any court could grant him at this stage, and Latrona
Moore does not challenge the defendants’ argument to that
effect. Only the claim for monetary damages remains on ap-
peal.
Moore’s claim arises under Title II of the ADA, which pro-
hibits disability-based discrimination in the provision of pub-
lic services, programs, and activities. Lacy v. Cook County, Illi-
nois, 897 F.3d 847, 852 (7th Cir. 2018); 42 U.S.C. § 12132. To
make out a claim for discrimination under Title II of the ADA,
a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) he is a qualified

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No. 22-1929 15
individual with a disability; (2) he was denied the benefits of
the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or oth-
erwise subjected to discrimination by such an entity; and
(3) the denial or discrimination was by reason of his disabil-
ity. Lacy, 897 F.3d at 853. “Disability” is a defined term in the
ADA:
The term “disability” means, with respect to an
individual—
(A) a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more major life activ-
ities of such individual;
(B) a record of such an impairment; or
(C) being regarded as having such an im-
pairment (as described in paragraph (3)).
42 U.S.C. § 12102(1).
In Moore’s case, we are concerned only with the first part
of this definition, whether he had a (1) physical impairment
(2) that substantially limited (3) one or more major life activi-
ties. Moore certainly had a physical impairment: he lost his
left eye, and his vision was thereafter monocular. 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.2(h) (“Physical or mental impairment means— (1) Any
… anatomical loss affecting one or more body systems, such
as … special sense organs[.]”). Moore asserted that this con-
dition substantially limited his ability to walk. Walking is con-
sidered a “major life activity” under both the statute and the
regulations. 42 U.S.C § 12102(2)(A); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i)(1)(i).
There is therefore sufficient evidence to proceed past sum-
mary judgment on the first and third parts of the disability
analysis.

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16 No. 22-1929
The district court found that Moore’s ADA claim failed on
the second part: whether the impairment substantially limited
his ability to walk. But in reaching that conclusion, the court
relied on case law and regulations that predated significant
amendments to the ADA. See ADA Amendments Act of 2008,
Pub.L.No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008). New regulations
clarify that, “The term ‘substantially limits’ shall be construed
broadly in favor of expansive coverage, to the maximum ex-
tent permitted by the terms of the ADA. ‘Substantially limits’
is not meant to be a demanding standard.” 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.2(j)(1)(i). In fact, “[a]n impairment need not prevent, or
significantly or severely restrict, the individual from perform-
ing a major life activity in order to be considered substantially
limiting.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii). Even before those
amended provisions broadened ADA coverage, the Supreme
Court noted that people with monocular vision “ordinarily”
will meet the Act’s definition of disability in the major life ac-
tivity of seeing. Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555,
567 (1999). Under the new standard, whether Moore’s monoc-
ular status rendered him disabled in the major life activity of
walking is therefore a close question on summary judgment,
but we need not address it to decide the appeal.
We may affirm summary judgment on any basis we find
in the record. Nature Conservancy v. Wilder Corp. of Delaware,
656 F.3d 646, 653 (7th Cir. 2011). The defendants argued in the
alternative that Moore failed to demonstrate that any disabil-
ity-based discrimination was intentional. To recover damages
in a Title II action, a plaintiff must identify intentional conduct
(and not mere negligence) by a named defendant. Shaw v.
Kemper, 52 F.4th 331, 334 (7th Cir. 2022); Lacy, 897 F.3d at 862.
“[A] plaintiff can establish intentional discrimination in a Ti-
tle II damage action by showing deliberate indifference.”

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No. 22-1929 17
Lacy, 897 F.3d at 863. We have adopted a two-part standard
for deliberate indifference in this context; it requires both
(1) knowledge that a harm to a federally protected right is
substantially likely, and (2) a failure to act upon that likeli-
hood. Lacy, 897 F.3d at 863. “In other words, a plaintiff must
prove indifference that is a deliberate choice by defendants.”
Lange v. City of Oconto, 28 F.4th 825, 841 (7th Cir. 2022).
Latrona Moore did not respond to this argument on ap-
peal. Our review of the record demonstrates that there is no
evidence from which a jury could infer that any defendant
knew that harm to a federally protected right was substan-
tially likely. Although Moore complained to numerous peo-
ple about the distance to the healthcare unit, he never alerted
anyone at any prison that he required an accommodation in
order to access services. In fact, he never followed any of the
prisons’ prescribed policies for alerting the correct individu-
als of his need for an accommodation. He argued in the dis-
trict court that he alerted prison officials to his needs in three
grievances that he filed after the attack. But nothing in any of
the grievances alerted prison officials to a need for an accom-
modation. Moore did not check the box for “ADA Disability
Accommodation” on any of the grievances; nor did he list in
“relief requested” that he wished to be moved closer to the
healthcare unit. He never mentioned in the grievances any
problems with distance or the need to be closer to the
healthcare unit or any other destination. Instead, his griev-
ances were directed at the staff’s failure to protect him from
Sample, complaints about medical treatment, and his dissat-
isfaction with receiving a disciplinary report. Although he
mentioned the loss of his eye, he did not indicate in any griev-
ance or through any other authorized prison procedure that
he required an accommodation in order to access services.

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18 No. 22-1929
The record as it relates to accommodations demonstrates
that prison officials gave Moore a permit that allowed him to
walk more slowly than other prisoners, an eye patch, glasses,
and extensive medical care. Moore conceded that he was able
to get everywhere he wanted or needed to go in prison, albeit
more slowly. He was able to access every service (which we
define to include programs and activities, for the sake of brev-
ity) that he wanted in prison including the healthcare unit, the
chow hall, the visitor center, the commissary, the yard, and a
special gym, among other places. Moreover, there is no evi-
dence in the record that any defendant knew that he could not
access any services. Nor has he produced any evidence that
any defendant made a deliberate choice to deny him access to
services. Without any evidence supporting a finding of delib-
erate indifference, his claim for damages fails.
We therefore affirm the grant of summary judgment in fa-
vor of the defendants on this claim. Finally, having resolved
all of the federal claims, the court was well within its discre-
tion to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the
state law claims. Tobey v. Chibucos, 890 F.3d 634, 652 (7th Cir.
2018) (generally, we review for abuse of discretion a district
court’s decision not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
a plaintiff’s state-law claims).
AFFIRMED.

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