Robert K. Decker v. Dan Sproul

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted December 20, 2023 *
Decided December 20, 2023
Before
DIANE S. SYKES, Chief Judge
CANDACE JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit Judge
JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge
No. 23-1585
ROBERT K. DECKER,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
DAN SPROUL,
Respondent-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of
Indiana, Terre Haute Division.
No. 2:21-cv-00168-JPH-DLP
James P. Hanlon,
Judge.
O R D E R
Robert Decker, a federal prisoner, appeals the denial of his petition for a writ of
habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, challenging the loss of good-conduct time and
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. FED. R. A PP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. A PP. P. 32.1

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No. 23-1585 Page 2
visitation privileges after a prison disciplinary proceeding. Because the disciplinary
proceeding did not violate Decker’s due process rights, we affirm.
In 2019, while at the federal penitentiary in Marion, Illinois, Decker spoke with
his lawyer for about 20 minutes during a pre-scheduled telephone call. When no one
came to retrieve him at the end of the call, Decker made additional calls that he says
were all legal in nature. The prison officer stationed outside the call room noticed that
Decker’s voice at times softened and that he had moved the phone closer to him. The
officer alerted the prison’s communications office and asked them to check the log of
that phone’s outgoing calls. The communications office reported that five calls had been
made while Decker used the phone. The officer then charged Decker in an incident
report with violating Offense Code 297, 28 C.F.R. § 541.3 (Table 1), which prohibits
using a telephone to circumvent prison staff’s ability to monitor call frequency, content,
or recipient.
At his disciplinary hearing, Decker sought to call a witness from the
communications office to show that they in fact were monitoring his calls and to ask
how he was able to make multiple calls if doing so was prohibited. The presiding
hearing officer denied the request because any testimony from this witness was
summarized in the incident report and would not be exculpatory. During the hearing,
Decker admitted that he made the phone calls in question but protested that no one told
him he could not. The hearing officer found that Decker had circumvented prison
officials’ ability to monitor his calls and docked him 27 days of good-conduct time and
90 days of visitation. Decker unsuccessfully appealed the decision.
Decker then petitioned under § 2241 to restore his good-conduct time and
visitation privileges, asserting that prison officials impermissibly monitored his phone
calls and that his staff representative for the hearing was ineffective.
The district judge denied Decker’s petition, explaining that Decker received all
the process he was due. Even if prison officials were monitoring his calls, the judge
ruled, he would not be entitled to relief because none of the incriminating evidence
came from the allegedly overheard calls. Decker did not dispute that he made the
additional unapproved calls, and the judge found this evidence sufficient to support the
prison disciplinary ruling. The judge also concluded that Decker was not
constitutionally entitled to a staff representative.
On appeal, Decker first maintains that the disciplinary proceeding violated his
due process rights because he was not allowed to call the communications-office

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No. 23-1585 Page 3
technician as a witness. But prison officials may refuse to call witnesses in disciplinary
proceedings whose testimony would be unnecessary. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539,
566–67 (1974). Here, the hearing officer reasonably declined to call the technician
because the substance of any testimony would duplicate what already had been
summarized in the incident report and would not be exculpatory.
Decker relatedly asserts that the evidence presented at his hearing was
insufficient to find him guilty. But that finding need be supported only by “some
evidence,” Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst., Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454–55 (1985),
and Decker himself admitted that he made additional phone calls despite being
authorized only one unmonitored call.
Decker also asserts that his staff representative was ineffective. But as the judge
rightly explained, due process did not entitle Decker to the aid of a staff representative
because he was not illiterate and the issues were not particularly complex. See Wolff, 418
U.S. at 570.
Decker next contends that the district judge erred by not issuing a scheduling
order, FED. R. C IV. P. 16(b), or allowing for discovery. But scheduling orders are not
required for certain actions exempted by local rules, FED. R. C IV. P. 16(b)(1), and the
district court’s local rules exempt habeas corpus petitions. See S.D. Ind. L. R. 16-1(g)(2).
Moreover, Decker did not request discovery, which is discretionary and should be
ordered only for good cause in habeas petitions. See Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 904
(1997); 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254, 1(b); id. at 6; Boutwell v. Keating, 399 F.3d 1203, 1210–11 n.2
(10th Cir. 2005) (district court acts within its discretion when applying § 2254 rules to
§ 2241 petition).
Finally, to the extent Decker challenges his conditions of confinement by alleging
that prison officials improperly listened in on his phone calls, this claim would not
affect the duration or fact of confinement and so may not be brought in a habeas action.
Robinson v. Sherrod, 631 F.3d 839, 840–41 (7th Cir. 2011).
AFFIRMED

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