United States of America v. Melvin Willis

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted December 20, 2023
Decided December 22, 2023
Before
DIANE S. SYKES, Chief Judge
CANDACE JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit Judge
JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge
No. 23-1613
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
MELVIN WILLIS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Illinois.
No. 4:10-CR-40059-JPG-1
J. Phil Gilbert,
Judge.
O R D E R
Melvin Willis appeals the four-year prison sentence imposed for the revocation
of his second term of supervised release. His attorney, however, asserts that the appeal
is frivolous and moves to withdraw. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). We
grant the motion and dismiss the appeal.
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. A PP. P. 32.1

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No. 23-1613 Page 2
Willis pleaded guilty in 2011 to conspiracy to distribute cocaine base, 21 U.S.C.
§§ 841(a)(1) & (b)(1)(A), 846, and the district judge sentenced him to 20 years in prison
and 10 years of supervised release. His prison term was later reduced to 108 months,
and he was released on supervision in August 2018. Willis served part of his supervised
release before being reimprisoned in 2019 for violating the conditions of his
supervision. Specifically, the judge found that in addition to other transgressions, Willis
had battered his ex-wife in violation of the mandatory condition that he not commit
another federal, state, or local crime. The judge sentenced him to a four-year prison
term and two more years of supervised release, and we affirmed. United States v. Willis,
814 F. App'x 156, 158 (7th Cir. 2020).
Shortly after Willis completed that prison sentence and began serving his second
term of supervised release, his probation officer petitioned for revocation because Willis
again violated the conditions of his supervision by committing domestic battery and
other violations. The judge appointed counsel for Willis and held a revocation hearing.
Willis admitted to several technical violations, including contacting Tajuana Sullivan,
his wife, despite a no-contact order; failing to report to his probation officer; and failing
to undergo mental-health treatment. But he denied that he had committed domestic
battery, so the judge held an evidentiary hearing.
To support the charge, the government called as witnesses two police officers
who had responded to reports of domestic violence in the early morning hours of
December 11, 2022. The officers stated that they found Sullivan with her and Willis’s
daughter in a car at a gas station on that day and that Sullivan had an inch-long, bloody
laceration above her left eye. One of the officers testified that Sullivan and her daughter
reported that Willis had grabbed Sullivan by her hair, pulled her head back, punched
her, and thrown her to the ground. He took pictures of Sullivan’s injuries and collected
her written statement. The other officer testified that he searched for Willis, who had
left the scene before police arrived, and found him hiding behind a refrigerator in the
backyard of a private residence. Officers then arrested Willis. Finally, Willis’s probation
officer testified that she talked to Sullivan after Willis’s arrest, and Sullivan reiterated
that Willis had attacked her.
Willis testified in his defense. He acknowledged that he was with Sullivan that
night and admitted that the “situation between [them] ended up getting more heated
and heated because [they] were arguing.” But he denied hitting her. Instead, he
suggested that she injured herself “with her car keys” while she was “being hysterical”

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No. 23-1613 Page 3
during their argument. And, according to Willis, Sullivan later told him that she did not
know how she was injured.
The judge found that Willis had committed domestic battery, explaining that the
supporting evidence was “overwhelming” and that Willis’s testimony was not credible.
The judge thus revoked his release, as is required for a Grade B violation. See U.S.S.G.
§ 7B1.3(a)(1). Proceeding to sentencing, the judge noted that Willis had a criminal
history category of VI, so the policy statements in the Sentencing Guidelines
recommended a prison term of 21 to 27 months. See id. § 7B1.4(a). Nevertheless, the
judge explained, under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3), as modified by the Prosecutorial
Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today (“PROTECT”) Act
of 2003, Pub. L. 108-21, § 101, 117 Stat. 650, he could sentence Willis to up to five years
in prison for the violation.
Willis disagreed with the judge’s interpretation of § 3583(e)(3), arguing that the
judge was required to subtract the duration of Willis’s previous revocation sentence
from the statute’s five-year maximum. He had already served four years in prison for
the first revocation, he continued, so he could now be sentenced to a maximum of just
one year in prison. The judge overruled Willis’s objection and sentenced him to four
years in prison and three years of supervised release. This appeal followed.
Although Willis does not have an unqualified constitutional right to counsel in
revocation proceedings, see Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 789–91 (1973), we apply the
Anders safeguards when appointed counsel moves to withdraw so that all potential
issues receive consideration. See United States v. Brown, 823 F.3d 392, 394 (7th Cir. 2016).
Because counsel’s analysis appears thorough and Willis did not respond to counsel’s
motion, see 7TH C IR . R. 51(b), we limit our review to the issues that counsel discusses.
United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014).
In support of the motion to withdraw, counsel considers whether Willis could
raise a nonfrivolous challenge to the revocation of his supervised release. We have
noted previously that counsel should not explore a possible challenge to the revocation
in an Anders brief unless the client (after counsel informs him of the risks) wants to
challenge the revocation. See United States v. Wheeler, 814 F.3d 856, 857 (7th Cir. 2016);
United States v. Knox, 287 F.3d 667, 671 (7th Cir. 2002). It is unclear whether such a
consultation occurred here.

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No. 23-1613 Page 4
Regardless, we agree with counsel that Willis lacks a plausible argument against
the revocation. We review the proceedings on the technical violations for plain error
because Willis did not seek to withdraw his admissions in the district court. United
States v. Nelson, 931 F.3d 588, 590–91 (7th Cir. 2019). At his hearing Willis confirmed that
he understood the alleged violations and possible penalties and was satisfied with his
legal representation before he voluntarily waived his right to contest the allegations and
freely admitted that his conduct violated the conditions of his release. See FED. R. C RIM.
P. 32.1(b)(2); United States v. Jones, 774 F.3d 399, 403 (7th Cir. 2014).
Nor could Willis raise a nonfrivolous argument contesting the determination that
he violated his conditions by committing a domestic battery. The standard for proving a
violation is preponderance of the evidence, § 3583(e)(3), and we would review any
factual findings only for clear error. United States v. Patlan, 31 F.4th 552, 556 (7th Cir.
2022). Here the judge considered the evidence, including the testimony of Willis’s
probation officer and two police officers, the pictures of Sullivan’s injuries, and her
statements to the police and the probation officer. The judge also rejected Willis’s
testimony as not credible. The judge’s weighing of such evidence was not clearly
erroneous. See United States v. Waldman, 835 F.3d 751, 756 (7th Cir. 2016).
Counsel also considers and rejects other potential arguments related to the
revocation hearing. Counsel rightly concludes that Willis was not entitled to confront
Sullivan, whose hearsay testimony was introduced as evidence at the hearing. The Sixth
Amendment’s Confrontation Clause does not apply to revocation hearings, and the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment would secure Willis’s right to confront Sullivan
only if her hearsay testimony was not substantially trustworthy. United States v. Mosley,
759 F.3d 664, 667 (7th Cir. 2014). But because Sullivan’s account of the assault was
corroborated by several sources, we would conclude that Willis did not have a right of
confrontation. See id. at 667–68.
Finally, counsel considers whether Willis could challenge the determination that
he could receive up to five years in prison, the statutory maximum, even though he had
served four years for a prior revocation. Since the effective date of the PROTECT Act in
2003, the statute governing revocation sentences now provides, in relevant part, that a
defendant “may not be required to serve on any such revocation more than 5 years in
prison.” § 3583(e)(3) (emphasis added); see United States v. Perry, 743 F.3d 238, 241
(7th Cir. 2014). “[O]n any such revocation” means that the statutory maximum applies
anew after each revocation. Perry, 743 F.3d at 241–42. Thus, it would be frivolous to
challenge this ruling.

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No. 23-1613 Page 5
Counsel does not identify any other potential issues with the procedural
soundness or substantive reasonableness of Willis’s revocation sentence, and we see
none either. Therefore, we GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS the
appeal.

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