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22-1104•James Synnott v. PAUL BURGERMEISTER and IAN NORTHRUP
22-1104Court of Appeals for the Seventh CircuitJan 10, 2024
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted January 4, 2024*
Decided January 10, 2024
Before
ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge
DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge
AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge
No. 22-1104
JAMES SYNNOTT,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
PAUL BURGERMEISTER and IAN
NORTHRUP,
Defendants-Appellants.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 16 C 9098
Matthew F. Kennelly,
Judge.
* After the defendants/appellants, Paul Burgermeister and Ian Northrup,
appealed the judgment, Synnott cross-appealed other orders from the district court. We
consolidated all appeals and later dismissed Synnott’s appeals, Nos. 22-1270, 22-1893,
and 22-2447, after he did not timely file his appellee/cross-appellant brief. We thus
decide the defendants’ appeal without a brief by Synnott. Further, we have agreed to
decide the case without oral argument because the brief and record adequately present
the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not significantly aid the court.
F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1
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No. 22-1104 Page 2
O R D E R
James Synnott sued two police officers, Paul Burgermeister and Ian Northrup,
for unlawfully entering his home and using excessive force. A jury awarded Synnott $0
in compensatory damages and $85,000 in punitive damages. Burgermeister and
Northrup moved for a new trial or, in the alternative, a remittitur of the punitive
damages, and the district court denied their motion. Because a reasonable jury could
find that the officers acted with callousness or reckless indifference, and the award was
not excessive or otherwise improper, we affirm.
We view the facts in the light most favorable to Synnott, the prevailing party at
trial. Sommerfield v. Knasiak, 967 F.3d 617, 619 (7th Cir. 2020). In 2016, Synnott and two of
his sisters were at his home when a process server arrived. Without speaking to anyone
there, the process server phoned 911, and Burgermeister and Northrup, two police
officers with the DuPage County Sheriff’s Department, came to Synnott’s home. It was
undisputed at trial that the officers lacked a warrant, a reason to suspect criminal
wrongdoing, and, from the outside of the home, anything to suggest that anyone inside
was in danger. Although the officers said that an “open” door at the home concerned
them, Synnott testified that the door was closed. The officers entered the home without
ringing the doorbell, knocking, or (as one of Synnott’s sisters testified) “say[ing] who
they were,” despite knowing that entering the home in this manner without an
emergency is prohibited. See United States v. Jones, 208 F.3d 603, 609 (7th Cir. 2000). Once
inside, Northrup drew his gun and pointed it at Synnott and his sisters—even though
he knew, as he admitted at trial, that “one of the safety rules” was not “to point at
anything you’re not intending to kill.” Synnott presented evidence that Burgermeister,
too, aimed his gun at Synnott. This one-sided, armed confrontation inside Synnott’s
home lasted a half hour.
Synnott sued Burgermeister, Northrup, and others, and the case was tried twice.
The first trial occurred after the district court dismissed all of Synnott’s claims except for
those against Burgermeister and Northrup for unlawful entry and excessive force.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. A jury in 2019 returned a verdict in favor of Synnott, awarding him
$100,000 in punitive damages ($30,000 against Burgermeister and $70,000 against
Northrup) and $250,000 in compensatory damages. The defendants moved for a new
trial or, alternatively, a remittitur of the damages award. The district court granted the
motion in part, allowing Synnott either to proceed to a new trial or to accept the award
of punitive damages with a reduced amount of compensatory damages. After Synnott
declined the remittitur, the parties proceeded to a second trial only on damages.
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No. 22-1104 Page 3
The second jury awarded Synnott no compensatory damages but $85,000 in
punitive damages ($10,000 against Burgermeister and $75,000 against Northrup), and
the defendants once again moved for a new trial or a remittitur of damages. The district
court denied this motion. It ruled that the evidence at trial—that the defendants
“recklessly disregarded” the “sanctity” of the home and unjustifiably endangered
Synnott—supported the award, that Synnott could be awarded punitive damages even
without compensatory damages, and that no bias infected the award. The defendants
then took this appeal. We review the district court’s decision generally for abuse of
discretion, but we review de novo its ruling about the constitutional limits on the
amount of punitive damages. Kunz v. DeFelice, 538 F.3d 667, 678 (7th Cir. 2008).
The appellants first contend that Synnott did not present evidence that they
acted with callousness or reckless indifference, the showing required for punitive
damages. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 51 (1983). But the appellants’ argument rests on a
view of the evidence in their favor, not Synnott’s. When we construe the evidence most
favorably to Synnott, as the district court did in rejecting this argument, the jury could
find callous or reckless conduct based on the following: Without reason to think that a
probable crime or emergency justified a warrantless entry into Synnott’s home, the
defendants barged in through a closed door without warning and aimed their loaded
guns at the family despite knowing that this behavior was unlawful. Such evidence of
callous or reckless indifference to Synnott’s rights supports an award of punitive
damages. Hakim v. Safariland, LLC, 79 F.4th 861, 868 (7th Cir. 2023); Smith, 461 U.S. at 51.
The district court thus did not abuse its discretion in rejecting this argument.
Next, the appellants make several arguments that the punitive damages were
unconstitutionally excessive, citing the guideposts outlined in BMW of North America,
Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574–75 (1996). In reviewing this challenge de novo, we agree
with the district court that the jury’s award comports with Gore’s guideposts.
First, appellants argue that $85,000 in punitive damages does not properly reflect
the required degree of reprehensibility because Synnott suffered no physical injury and
the officers acted out of concern for the family’s welfare. But physical injury is just one
of five factors relevant to reprehensible conduct. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v.
Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 419 (2003). Among the other factors (reckless disregard for health
or safety, financial vulnerability of the victim, repetition of misconduct, and malice)
Synnott supported at least two. First, far from showing genuine concern for the family’s
welfare, trial evidence shows that Burgermeister and Northrup recklessly disregarded
Synnott’s health and safety by aiming their loaded guns at him and his family without
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No. 22-1104 Page 4
justification. And the officers showed malice by entering Synnott’s home without a
warning, warrant, probable cause, or reasonable belief of an emergency, while aware
that they were prohibited from doing so. Because all five factors must be absent to
render a punitive award suspect, id., the jury permissibly found the required degree of
reprehensibility.
Next, appellants argue that the disparity between the lack of compensatory
damages and the punitive damages award is excessive. Although courts usually require
only a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, that ratio is not
mandatory where the compensatory damages are low or the constitutional rights at
issue protect dignitary harms. See Saccameno v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 943 F.3d 1071,
1088–89 (7th Cir. 2019); see also Sommerfield, 967 F.3d at 624 (“Punitive-damages awards,
however, are not conditioned upon the presence of compensatory damages.”). Further,
a higher ratio does not automatically violate due process but merely requires special
justification. Saccameno, 943 F.3d at 1089. Here, in properly allowing the higher ratio, the
district court cited the need to deter through meaningful punitive damages the loss of
privacy, the fright, and the peril that an unjustified, armed home invasion can cause.
Appellants further argue that the difference between the damages in this case
and comparable cases cannot be explained or justified. We disagree. For one thing, it is
not clear that Synnott’s award is particularly different: although the appellants cite
some older cases (and do not adjust for inflation) where juries awarded lower punitive
damages, they also reference awards comparable to Synnott’s. See, e.g., Marshall ex rel.
Gossens v. Teske, 284 F.3d 765, 769 (7th Cir. 2002) ($30,000 in compensatory and $100,000
in punitive damages for false arrest); Hendrickson v. Cooper, 589 F.3d 887, 890 (7th Cir.
2009) ($75,000 in compensatory and $125,000 in punitive damages for excessive force).
And the potential harm in this case—which we may consider, see Saccameno, 943 F.3d
at 1088—can explain the upward variation: Northrup’s firearm could have accidentally
or intentionally discharged, causing greater harm than in cases involving less force. An
upward deviation is also appropriate where, as here, the jury reasonably found that the
officers’ actions were “completely unjustified.” See Hendrickson, 589 F.3d at 894.
Finally, the appellants contend that the jury’s award of damages incorrectly
(1) incorporated the harm inflicted on Synnott’s sisters, (2) included consideration of
Synnott’s ongoing child custody dispute, and (3) reflected biases against law
enforcement. The appellants did not make the first two arguments in the district court;
therefore, they have waived them on appeal. See Love v. Vanihel, 73 F.4th 439, 449 (7th
Cir. 2023). But we would also reject all three arguments on the merits: the district court
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No. 22-1104 Page 5
admonished the jury to consider only Synnott’s injuries, within the context of his
unlawful entry and excessive force claims, and to decide the case without bias. We
presume that the jurors followed the court’s instructions. See Epic Sys. Corp. v. Tata
Consultancy Servs. Ltd., 980 F.3d 1117, 1138 (7th Cir. 2020). And Synnott did not inflame
anti-law enforcement sentiment by mentioning any contemporaneous news events.
AFFIRMED
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