United States of America v. David Hueston

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 23-1057
U NITED STATES OF A MERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
DAVID HUESTON ,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Indiana, Fort Wayne Division.
No. 21-CR-37 — Holly A. Brady, Chief Judge.
____________________
A RGUED DECEMBER 1, 2023 — DECIDED J ANUARY 12, 2024
____________________
Before W OOD, ST. EVE, and LEE, Circuit Judges.
ST. EVE, Circuit Judge. A tipster alerted law enforcement
that David Hueston was dealing drugs out of his Marion,
Indiana apartment. After a brief investigation, detectives
obtained a search warrant and discovered Hueston along
with drugs, cash, a gun, and ammunition in the apartment.
Indicted on various drug-related charges, Hueston moved to
suppress the evidence, arguing that the detectives
deliberately or recklessly made misleading omissions and

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2 No. 23-1057
misrepresentations to obtain the search warrant. The district
court denied Hueston’s motion to suppress after holding a
Franks hearing, and Hueston now appeals that decision.
I. Background
A. Investigation
In February 2021, a tipster reported to a Grant County,
Indiana Sheriff’s Deputy that David Hueston was dealing
drugs. That deputy passed the information along to the Joint
Effort Against Narcotics (“JEAN”) Team Drug Task Force. A
few days later, Detectives Michael Ross and Leland Smith,
members of the JEAN Team and Marion, Indiana police
officers, met with the tipster.
In a partially recorded conversation, the tipster explained
that he wanted to break his methamphetamine addiction by
turning in his dealer, Hueston, to police. He told detectives he
had been buying drugs from Hueston for a few months. In
fact, he had been in Hueston’s apartment three or four days
earlier and seen a softball-sized bag of heroin and three
pounds of methamphetamine. He also reported that Hueston
had guns “just laying around.”
After showing the detectives Hueston’s picture, the tipster
rode with them to the duplex in Marion where he claimed
Hueston lived. He identified the front door of the building,
explaining that the building had only two interior doors, one
leading to the downstairs apartment and another leading to
Hueston’s apartment upstairs. A green Mini Cooper was
parked outside the duplex, which the tipster said Hueston
owned.
At some point that day, Detective Ross retrieved the tip-
ster’s records in the local Grant County database and found

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No. 23-1057 3
an arrest for theft in 2015. Sometime after Hueston’s arrest,
Detective Ross ran a full background check on the tipster and
discovered convictions for theft and domestic battery, as well
as misdemeanor arrests.
The day after meeting the tipster, the detectives began
electronic and in-person surveillance of Hueston’s apartment.
A pole camera recorded the back of the duplex throughout
the day; the detectives conducted visual surveillance of the
front entrance during the afternoon and evening hours with a
brief break for dinner. The detectives observed about 30 peo-
ple enter the building during this time. A few cars also came
and went, including the Mini Cooper, which was driven by a
woman. After running the plates on that Mini Cooper, the de-
tectives discovered they belonged on a 2012 Hyundai owned
by a woman.
That evening, the detectives attempted to apprehend a
blue car that had parked for a few minutes near Hueston’s
apartment; the detectives believed the car’s occupants had
gone into Hueston’s apartment. After an unsuccessful attempt
to stop the car, Detectives Ross and Smith returned to the
stakeout.
Later that night, a man parked a black truck outside the
building and entered the duplex. Although the detectives did
not see him enter the interior door to Hueston’s apartment,
Detective Smith could see the only other interior door leading
to the downstairs apartment, which he did not use. They in-
ferred, then, that the man must have gone to Hueston’s apart-
ment. When the driver returned to the truck and drove away,
a Grant County Sheriff’s Deputy pulled him over for a traffic
violation and found methamphetamine, other drugs, and a

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4 No. 23-1057
scale. Sometime later—it is not clear when—that man was
identified as a known drug dealer.
B. Affidavit and Search Warrant
After the discovery of drugs in the black pickup truck, De-
tective Smith continued surveillance on Hueston’s apartment
and Detective Ross left to draft an affidavit in support of a
search warrant for the apartment. Detective Ross discussed
the case with a local prosecutor, drafted the affidavit, and re-
ceived the prosecutor’s approval on the written affidavit be-
fore submitting it to the issuing judge.
The affidavit included no information about the tipster
other than noting the receipt of his initial tip; it did not indi-
cate that the tipster’s identity was known to police or that he
had met with detectives who recorded their conversation.1 It
did not mention the tipster’s drug addiction or arrest history
known to Detective Ross at the time. Although it stated that
the detectives had been told Hueston had drugs and guns in
his apartment, it did not indicate the tipster had firsthand
knowledge of this information. The affidavit included the tip
about the Mini Cooper but did not disclose that the detectives
only observed a woman driving the car or that it was not reg-
istered to Hueston. It also incorrectly stated that the driver of
the black truck “was observed walking out of the residence,”
even though the detectives did not specifically observe him
enter or exit the interior door leading to Hueston’s apartment.
1 Although Hueston argues that the affidavit also omitted the fact that
the tipster was paid for the information he provided, the detectives testi-
fied that they only decided to pay the tipster after the successful raid on
Hueston’s apartment. Consequently, the fact of payment could not have
been included in the affidavit.

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No. 23-1057 5
The affidavit included other details gleaned from the in-
vestigation, including foot and vehicle traffic and the contents
of the black pickup truck, which tests revealed to be metham-
phetamine, opiates (including fentanyl), and marijuana.
Based on the affidavit, an Indiana Superior Court magis-
trate judge issued a search warrant for Hueston’s apartment,
which the detectives executed later that night. They found
Hueston in the apartment, as well as thousands of dollars in
cash, methamphetamine, heroin, fentanyl, and a handgun
and ammunition.
C. District Court Proceedings
In April 2021, Hueston was indicted in the Northern Dis-
trict of Indiana for possession with intent to distribute 50
grams or more of methamphetamine and 100 grams or more
of heroin, possessing a firearm in furtherance of those drug
trafficking crimes, and being a felon in possession of a firearm.
In September of that year, Hueston moved to suppress the ev-
idence seized from his apartment because the supporting af-
fidavit did not establish probable cause. Hueston also filed a
motion for a Franks hearing. The district court granted his re-
quest for a hearing, finding the affidavit and its alleged omis-
sions “troubling.”
At the hearing, both Detective Ross and Detective Smith
testified before the district court judge, answering questions
on direct and cross-examination about their interactions with
the tipster, the information they gathered while conducting
surveillance on Hueston’s apartment, and the information
contained within and excluded from the affidavit. After the
hearing, the district court concluded that the detectives’ testi-
mony was credible and found no reckless or deliberate

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6 No. 23-1057
disregard for the truth, despite identifying multiple omis-
sions and one misstatement in the affidavit. The district court
found that most of the omissions were immaterial, and some
would have actually bolstered probable cause, indicating a
lack of deliberate intent to mislead the issuing judge.
Although the court expressed some doubt about whether
the affidavit supported probable cause, it ultimately con-
cluded that it need not answer that question because the
good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied.
After the district court denied his motion to suppress,
Hueston pled guilty and expressly reserved his right to
appeal the court’s suppression order. He now appeals that
order.
II. Analysis
When a district court denies a motion to suppress follow-
ing a Franks evidentiary hearing, we review that decision and
any factual findings for clear error. United States v. Hansmeier,
867 F.3d 807, 813 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing United States v. Gregory,
795 F.3d 735, 741 (7th Cir. 2015)). Factual findings include
“whether the officer made statements deliberately or with
reckless disregard for the truth.” United States v. Edwards, 34
F.4th 570, 580 (7th Cir. 2022) (citing United States v. Williams,
718 F.3d 644, 649 (7th Cir. 2013)).
We review legal determinations de novo. United States v.
Woodfork, 999 F.3d 511, 516 (7th Cir. 2021). Application of the
good-faith exception is one such legal determination. Gregory,
795 F.3d at 741; United States v. Bell, 585 F.3d 1045, 1049 (7th
Cir. 2009).

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No. 23-1057 7
A. Franks Violation
The Fourth Amendment requires probable cause for police
to obtain a search warrant. U.S. Const. amend. IV. “Probable
cause for issuance of a search warrant exists if there is a fair
probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be
found in a particular place.” Woodfork, 999 F.3d at 516 (inter-
nal quotations omitted). A “neutral and detached magistrate”
must determine whether probable cause exists. United States
v. Clark, 935 F.3d 558, 563 (7th Cir. 2019) (quoting Johnson v.
United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948)). Because “[t]he ability of
the neutral and detached magistrate to determine probable
cause depends on the accuracy of the information the police
submit,” a search warrant “is not valid if the police obtain it
by deliberately or recklessly presenting false, material infor-
mation, or by omitting material information from the affidavit
provided to the issuing judge.” Woodfork, 999 F.3d at 516 (in-
ternal quotations omitted).
If a defendant can make a “‘substantial preliminary show-
ing’ of (1) a material falsity or omission that would alter the
probable cause determination, and (2) a deliberate or reckless
disregard for the truth,” the defendant is entitled to a hearing
under Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), to determine
whether the court should suppress evidence obtained under
the search warrant. United States v. Glover, 755 F.3d 811, 819–
20 (7th Cir. 2014).
The district court then “must suppress evidence seized
during a search ‘when the defendant shows by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that (1) the affidavit in support of the
warrant contains false statements or misleading omissions, (2)
the false statements or omissions were made deliberately or
with reckless disregard for the truth, and (3) probable cause

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8 No. 23-1057
would not have existed without the false statements and/or
omissions.’” Edwards, 34 F.4th at 580 (quoting Williams, 718
F.3d at 647–48); see also Franks, 438 U.S. at 155–56.
Hueston argues that the district court clearly erred when
it found that the detectives did not make false statements or
omissions deliberately or with reckless disregard for the
truth. At the Franks hearing where both Detective Ross and
Detective Smith testified, the district court had the ability to
assess their credibility. After the hearing, the judge concluded
that the detectives’ testimony was credible and that any mis-
statements and omissions in the affidavit were not intentional
or reckless, findings that we defer to unless “after considering
all of the evidence, we cannot avoid or ignore a definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Edwards, 34
F.4th at 580–81 (quoting United States v. Hammond, 996 F.3d
374, 383 (7th Cir. 2021)).
We agree with the district court that the affidavit is lack-
ing. Certain details should have been included in the affidavit,
such as information about the tipster’s identity and the Mini
Cooper’s registration. The affidavit did not give a full picture
of the investigation and fell short of what we expect from an
investigating officer.
The district court did not, however, clearly err by crediting
the detectives’ explanations and finding that they did not act
with recklessness or a deliberate intent to mislead the issuing
judge. Cf. United States v. Spears, 673 F.3d 598, 603, 605–06 (7th
Cir. 2012) (finding no clear error where the district court cred-
ited officers’ testimony and no information in the record
showed that credibility determination to be an error). The af-
fidavit’s misstatements and omissions were unwise—even
sloppy—but the evidence in the record does not

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No. 23-1057 9
unequivocally show the detectives, including Detective Ross
as the author of the affidavit, intended to mislead the issuing
judge.
Two examples are illustrative. Detective Ross testified that
he did not disclose the tipster’s drug addiction because de-
spite his drug use, the tipster appeared to be of “sound mind”
and was not under the influence of drugs when he met with
the detectives. The record gives us no reason to believe that
the judge clearly erred in crediting that testimony. Similarly,
although Detective Ross did not disclose the tipster’s arrest
history in the affidavit, the district court found his explana-
tion for this omission reasonable when he testified that he dis-
closed the 2015 theft arrest to the prosecutor and that crimes
of dishonesty more than five years old did not typically alter
an informant’s credibility.
The district court’s credibility determination is especially
reasonable because Detective Ross left out both helpful and
unhelpful facts. It is difficult to discern an intent to mislead—
rather than mere carelessness—since much of the omitted in-
formation would have reinforced the affidavit. Many omitted
facts would have bolstered probable cause by establishing the
tipster’s credibility, including the fact that he met with the de-
tectives, that they recorded the conversation, and that the tip-
ster personally observed drugs in Hueston’s apartment and
purchased drugs from him just three or four days before talk-
ing to the detectives. As further evidence of good intent,

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10 No. 23-1057
Detective Ross also consulted with the prosecutor before and
after drafting the affidavit.2
Considering the helpful information the detectives omit-
ted from the affidavit and Detective Ross’s consultation with
the prosecutor both before and after drafting the affidavit, the
district court reasonably concluded after hearing his testi-
mony and assessing his credibility that Detective Ross did not
intend to mislead the issuing judge. Remaining inadequacies
do not firmly convince us that the district court committed
clear error here. We therefore affirm the district court’s find-
ing that no Franks violation occurred.
B. Good-Faith Exception
Hueston faces another hurdle: the good-faith exception
sometimes forgives reliance on a flawed warrant. The good-
faith exception responds to “the substantial societal costs of
the [exclusionary rule],” when wrong-doers go free because
of the exclusion of relevant and probative evidence. United
States v. Mitten, 592 F.3d 767, 770 (7th Cir. 2010).
Consequently, the “suppression of evidence is not an
appropriate remedy when the officers who obtained the
evidence did so in good faith reliance upon a facially valid
warrant issued by a magistrate or judge.” Id. The very
decision to obtain a warrant “creates a presumption that the
2 At oral argument, Hueston argued that the prosecutor’s approval
should not carry weight because that approval is only as good as the in-
formation police disclose to the prosecutor. But Detective Ross did reveal
the tipster’s identity to the prosecutor. Under these circumstances, consul-
tation with and disclosures to the prosecutor counsel against finding an
intent to mislead.

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No. 23-1057 11
officer acted in good faith.” United States v. Yarber, 915 F.3d
1103, 1106 (7th Cir. 2019).
A defendant can rebut this good-faith presumption “by
demonstrating that the issuing judge failed to perform his
neutral and detached function and served as a rubber stamp
for the police; that the officer was dishonest or reckless in
preparing the affidavit; or that the affidavit was so lacking in
probable cause that no officer could have reasonably relied on
it.” Bell, 585 F.3d at 1052 (citing United States v. Garcia, 528 F.3d
481, 487 (7th Cir. 2008)); see also United States v. Leon, 468 U.S.
897, 923 (1984).
Hueston has failed to present evidence that the issuing
judge was not acting in a neutral and detached way. Nor can
Hueston overcome the presumption of good faith by showing
dishonesty or recklessness since we have already concluded
that Detective Ross did not commit a Franks violation. And the
affidavit’s deficiencies were not so egregious as to alert any
reasonable officer to any lack of probable cause, particularly
in light of the detective’s consultation with the prosecutor
before and after drafting the affidavit.
Because Hueston has not overcome this heavy
presumption, we affirm the district court’s finding of good
faith. As the district court correctly noted, because the good-
faith exception applies, we need not decide whether the
affidavit is supported by probable cause. See Woodfork, 999
F.3d at 519.
III. Conclusion
Because the district court reasonably found the detectives’
testimony credible and because the good-faith exception
applies, we affirm its denial of Hueston’s motion to suppress.

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12 No. 23-1057
* * *
The judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.

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