United States of America v. Michael Hill

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted January 31, 2024
Decided February 1, 2024
Before
ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge
DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge
DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge
No. 23-2105
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
MICHAEL HILL,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Western Division.
No. 3:99-CR-50004(1)
Philip G. Reinhard,
Judge.
O R D E R
Michael Hill appeals the 30-day prison sentence imposed upon the revocation of
his supervised release. Because he has already served that sentence and is no longer in
custody, his lawyer moves to withdraw from the appeal, arguing that it is moot and it
would be frivolous to contend otherwise. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). A
defendant does not have an unqualified constitutional right to counsel in revocation
proceedings, see Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790–91 (1973), but our practice is to
apply the Anders safeguards to them anyway, see United States v. Wheeler, 814 F.3d 856,
857 (7th Cir. 2016). Counsel’s brief explains the nature of the case and addresses the
issue of mootness. The analysis appears thorough, and so we limit our review to the
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 23-2105 Page 2
issue counsel discusses and those Hill raises in his Circuit Rule 51(b) response.
See United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014). Because Hill has completed his
sentence and faces no collateral consequences from it, the appeal is moot; therefore, we
grant the motion to withdraw and dismiss the appeal.
The revocation occurred in 2023, four years after Hill completed a 23-year prison
term for drug and gun offenses and was nearing the end of a 5-year term of supervised
release. Around that time, he provided urine samples that contained traces of cocaine,
and the probation office sought revocation. At a hearing in May 2023, the government
submitted the drug tests and examined an expert in toxicology, who testified that the
tests showed that Hill had used cocaine. Hill unsuccessfully challenged this evidence.
He first cited scientific studies suggesting that someone could test positive for cocaine
through secondhand smoke or bodily contact. He then testified that he never used
cocaine and that he was exposed to it through secondhand smoke from his girlfriend.
Discrediting Hill’s evidence, the district court found by a preponderance of the
evidence that Hill violated the conditions of his supervised release by using cocaine.
After finding that Hill committed the violations, the district court imposed a
below-range sentence of 30 days’ imprisonment with no additional supervised release.
The court determined that the violation belonged in Grade C, that Hill had a criminal
history category of VI, and that this resulted in a sentencing range of 8 to 14 months.
The government argued for 8 months’ imprisonment and Hill requested a below-range
prison term. The district court explained that a prison term above 30 days was not
necessary given Hill’s age (62) and his prior, long prison term. Hill was taken into
custody that day and has now completed his 30-day sentence.
We agree with counsel that because Hill has completed his sentence after
revocation, any appeal of the revocation would be unquestionably moot and therefore
frivolous. An appeal of an already-completed sentence may present a live controversy if
the defendant faces collateral consequences from it. See Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7–8
(1998). When a defendant has completed a sentence underlying a conviction, we may
presume that the defendant faces collateral consequences to the conviction. Id. But we
may not presume that collateral consequences arise when after a prison term,
conditional release is revoked. Id. at 12. Further neither counsel nor Hill can identify
anything special about this case that might generate such consequences. Finally,
because Hill will not serve any further term of supervised release for this offense,
neither counsel nor Hill can overcome mootness by citing an issue from the revocation
proceeding that is arguably capable of repetition and yet evading review. See id. at 17.

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No. 23-2105 Page 3
To argue that the case is not moot, Hill speculates that his rejected testimony
from his revocation proceeding—denying his use of cocaine—could expose him in the
future to a prosecution for perjury; he therefore seeks to overturn the district court’s
factual findings. But no such prosecution is pending, and speculations about possible
future prosecutions are insufficient to confer standing. See id. at 15–16.
Finally, Hill asserts that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in his
revocation proceedings. But the mootness of a challenge to his already-completed
sentence obviates this argument. In any case, such a claim would typically depend on
developing a factual record and is thus not well-suited for a direct appeal.
See United States v. Stokes, 726 F.3d 880, 898 (7th Cir. 2013).
Therefore, we GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.

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