Thomas Moorer v. City of Chicago

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-1067
THOMAS M OORER ,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
C ITY OF C HICAGO, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 18-cv-03796 — Manish S. Shah, Judge.
____________________
A RGUED M ARCH 29, 2023 — DECIDED F EBRUARY 9, 2024
____________________
Before S YKES , Chief Judge, and R OVNER and B RENNAN , Cir-
cuit Judges.
R OVNER , Circuit Judge. Thomas Moorer was arrested and
indicted on charges including murder and attempted murder,
and ultimately was acquitted by a jury of those charges. He
then brought an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that
the defendants, officers of the Chicago Police Department, vi-
olated his Fourth Amendment rights in that they lacked prob-
able cause for his pretrial detention. The district court granted

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summary judgment in favor of the defendants, and Moorer
appeals that determination.
We begin, as did the district court, with facts not disputed
by the parties. At around midnight on August 27, 2010, a
number of men went to the apartment shared by Edward Ra-
mos, his brother Edwin Ramos, and three of his cousins, Mi-
guel Velez, Walter Velez, and Eliezer Martinez, and their en-
suing actions culminated in the murder of Edward.1
On the night of Edward’s murder, three friends, Jacklyn
Hernandez, Alina Kindelan, and Delia Rivera, pulled up to
the apartment shortly before midnight. Walter emerged from
the apartment to speak with his girlfriend, Hernandez, in the
car, and the other two women exited the car and began walk-
ing toward the apartment. At that time, a man dressed in
black clothing and brandishing a gun stepped out from the
gangway of the building and told them to go away. During
that interaction, the lower part of his face was covered. Alt-
hough the area was dark, as the man moved toward them, he
traversed an area lit by streetlights. The two women got back
into the car with Hernandez, and the man forced Walter to the
apartment door. A second man then emerged from the gang-
way, at which time the three women drove away and called
911.
The first man then held a gun to Walter’s head and in-
structed him to knock on the apartment door. When Edward
opened the door, the man rushed into the apartment and be-
gan shooting. In a struggle for the gun, Edward and Martinez
fell to the ground. The armed man, whose face by now was
1 We refer to Edward and Edwin Ramos and Miguel and Walter Velez
by their first names to avoid confusion.

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No. 22-1067 3
uncovered, then fired several shots while standing, striking
Martinez in the leg. Hearing the shots from another room of
the apartment, Miguel looked into the living room, saw Ed-
ward struggling with the man, and ran out the back door. Ed-
win also heard the struggle, saw a man on top of Edward and
Martinez, and ran to assist. The armed man hit Edwin in the
head with the gun, but Edwin punched him and he dropped
his weapon. The man then ran out of the apartment with Ed-
win in pursuit. When he reached the outside, Edwin saw a
second man pointing a gun at him. The first man instructed
his accomplice to start shooting. As Edwin lunged backward
into the doorway, Edward moved past him, entering into the
line of fire, and was shot in the chest. The two men fled, and
Edwin drove his brother Edward and Martinez to the hospi-
tal. Edward died later that night.
Officers from the Chicago Police Department arrived at
the scene within minutes after the shooting and began can-
vassing the area and gathering physical evidence. At the po-
lice station, interviews were conducted individually with wit-
nesses Edwin, Miguel, Walter, Hernandez, Kindelan, and Ri-
vera. Edwin informed Detective Valkner that he recognized
the man who entered the apartment. He stated that the man’s
nickname was “Boom,” and that his brother had sold drugs
to the man and a dispute had arisen over an unpaid debt. Ed-
win further stated that Boom had made threatening phone
calls to his brother in the week before the shooting. He told
the detectives that Edward’s phone contained contact infor-
mation for Boom.
A cell phone was recovered at the scene, but Detective
McDermott instructed the forensic investigator to turn it over
to him. The phone, however, was never properly inventoried

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4 No. 22-1067
and its ultimate whereabouts is unknown. Police reports in-
dicate that Edwin identified a cell phone at the station and
that he and Valkner searched the phone and located an entry
for “Boom” and a phone number associated with the name.
Neither Edwin nor Valkner later remembered that event.
An officer ran a nickname search for “Boom” in a data-
base. Detective Gonzalez stated that the database search
yielded a photograph of Moorer which was then placed in a
photo array, although Gonzalez could not recall details as to
how the search was conducted and the photo chosen. The de-
tectives then had Edwin review two books or “a bunch of pa-
pers” that included photographs of six people on each page.
From those pages, Edwin identified Moorer as having been
involved in the shooting. The detectives then left and re-
turned with a printout including Moorer’s image, and asked
Edwin to confirm his identification, circle Moorer’s photo,
and sign his name under the image.
A photo array was subsequently created of six photo-
graphs, including Moorer’s, and shown to Hernandez, Ed-
win, Kindelan, Rivera and Miguel. Before viewing the array,
each witness signed an advisory form acknowledging that a
suspect would not necessarily be in the spread and that the
witness was not required to make an identification. Individu-
ally, each one of those five witnesses positively identified
Moorer as being involved in the attack, and Hernandez, Ed-
win, and Miguel confirmed that they were 100 percent certain
in their identification.
Assistant State’s Attorney Maria Augustus then came to
the police station and was briefed on the investigation, re-
viewed police reports, and reinterviewed witnesses with
McDermott. Following those interviews, McDermott and

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No. 22-1067 5
Augustus mutually agreed to issue an investigative alert with
probable cause to arrest Moorer.
Once Moorer was taken into custody, detectives then
learned that Moorer’s nickname was “Boomer” rather than
Boom. Moorer informed them that he had been home on the
day of the shooting with his sisters and his sisters’ children.
He also told them the name of someone who could confirm
that alibi, and the district court held that the reasonable infer-
ence from the context of his statement was that the person he
was referring to was his girlfriend, Lakisha Shorter. The de-
tectives did not interview her, although she answered the
door when they went to Moorer’s residence. But they did
speak with his sisters, who were the persons he claimed to be
with, and the sisters were subsequently brought to the station
to provide signed statements. One of them signed a statement
stating that she was asleep from 10pm to 2am during the night
of the offense and that she did not see Moorer between 7pm
and 2am that night. The other sister’s statement provided that
her cousin had a party with around ten people on the first
floor of the home that night, that she was upstairs taking care
of her child most of the time during that night, and that she
saw Moorer some of the times that she went downstairs to the
party but not every time. Dist. Ct. Docket 165, Exhs. 39, 40.
Witnesses Edwin, Miguel, Walter, Kindelan, Hernandez,
and Rivera returned to the station to view an in-person
lineup, which included Moorer and four other individuals.
The witnesses viewed the lineup independently of each other
and waited in separate rooms following the viewing until all
the witnesses had finished viewing the lineup. Walter identi-
fied Moorer but was only 80 percent certain, and his identifi-
cation was treated by Detective Gonzalez as a negative

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6 No. 22-1067
identification. Rivera, Edwin, Hernandez, Kindelan, and Mi-
guel positively identified Moorer as the perpetrator, and none
of those witnesses expressed any doubt in their identification.
Assistant State’s Attorney Augustus reinterviewed all six wit-
nesses, who provided videotaped statements of their ac-
counts. The next day, Martinez was released from the hospital
and proceeded to the police station. The detectives assembled
another physical lineup including Moorer and others, and
Martinez, who had never viewed the photo array and there-
fore could not have been influenced by that prior exposure,
identified Moorer as the assailant.
On August 30, Augustus approved three felony charges
against Moorer of first degree murder, attempted murder,
and aggravated battery with a firearm. In September 2010, a
grand jury returned a 135-count indictment charging Moorer
with first-degree murder and other crimes. Moorer’s criminal
trial was not held until July 2017—although the reason for
that lengthy delay is neither discussed nor challenged in this
case—and the jury found Moorer not guilty on all counts.
Moorer then filed this lawsuit contesting the constitutionality
of his pretrial detention.
Moorer argues that probable cause did not exist because
each of the identifications were flawed in that they were
coached, were based on descriptions of the event that would
have been physically impossible for the witness to observe,
were unreliable because the witness did not see the offender,
or contained erroneous facts about the offender. He asserts
that the unreliability of those identifications was further con-
firmed by facts that emerged when he was arrested. Although
the district court rejected those arguments and granted sum-
mary judgment in favor of the defendants, Moorer argues that

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No. 22-1067 7
the district court improperly examined whether the identifi-
cations were coerced or manipulated, asserting that the cor-
rect framework for a probable cause determination should fo-
cus on reliability and the totality of the circumstances.
Summary judgment is appropriate when, taking all rea-
sonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, there is
no genuine issue of material fact, and the movant is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. Young v. City of Chicago, 987
F.3d 641, 643 (7th Cir. 2021); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). We review
the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Id.
The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable
seizures, and the “general rule [is] that Fourth Amendment
seizures are reasonable only if based on probable cause to be-
lieve that the individual has committed a crime.” Bailey v.
United States, 568 U.S. 186, 192 (2013) (internal quotation
marks omitted); Lewis v. City of Chicago, 914 F.3d 472, 476 (7th
Cir. 2019). “[T]he constitutional injury arising from a wrong-
ful pretrial detention rests on the fundamental Fourth
Amendment principle that a pretrial detention is a ‘seizure’—
both before formal legal process and after—and is justified only
on probable cause.” Lewis, 914 F.3d at 476–77; Manuel v. City
of Joliet, 580 U.S. 357, 366–67 (2017). Accordingly, the Fourth
Amendment can be violated by a detention without probable
cause “not only when it precedes, but also when it follows,
the start of legal process in a criminal case.” Manuel, 580 U.S.
at 366–67; Mitchell v. Doherty, 37 F.4th 1277, 1284 (7th Cir.
2022).
Probable cause is a fluid concept that is based on the total-
ity of the circumstances. Garcia v. Posewitz, 79 F.4th 874, 879–
80 (7th Cir. 2023); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232–33 (1983).
It is established where a probability or a substantial chance of

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8 No. 22-1067
criminal activity exists and does not require a certainty that a
crime was committed. Gates, 462 U.S. at 243, n.13. As the
Court has repeatedly noted, probable cause “’is not a high
bar.’” District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 57 (2018), quot-
ing Kaley v. United States, 571 U.S. 320, 338 (2014). It is assessed
objectively, based upon conclusions that an arresting officer
reasonably could draw from the information known. Young,
987 F.3d at 644.
An unlawful detention without probable cause can occur
in varied circumstances, such as “’when the police hold some-
one without any reason before the formal onset of a criminal
proceeding, … [b]ut it can also occur when the legal process
itself goes wrong—when, for example, a judge’s probable
cause determination is predicated solely on a police officer’s
false statements.’” Lewis, 914 F.3d at 476, quoting Manuel, 580
U.S. at 367; Coleman v. City of Peoria, Illinois, 925 F.3d 336, 344
(7th Cir. 2019). Similarly, the withholding of information by
officers that would be material to the probable cause determi-
nation can also undermine the probable cause determination
and result in a violation of the Fourth Amendment. See Camm
v. Faith, 937 F.3d 1096, 1106–07 (7th Cir. 2019). In those situa-
tions, although the defendant may have obtained legal pro-
cess such as a hearing or a grand jury proceeding, that process
itself has “done nothing to satisfy the Fourth Amendment’s
probable-cause requirement … [a]nd for that reason cannot
extinguish the detainee’s Fourth Amendment claim.” Manuel,
580 U.S. at 367; Young, 987 F.3d at 646. In Kuri v. City of Chi-
cago, 990 F.3d 573, 575 (7th Cir. 2021), the defendants argued
that the Fourth Amendment challenge to pretrial detention
failed as a matter of law because the order detaining Kuri for
trial was controlling unless the judicial process had been cor-
rupted. We recognized that pre-Manuel that argument might

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No. 22-1067 9
have found some support, but that Manuel recognized that a
Fourth Amendment challenge based on a lack of probable
cause survives a judicial decision holding a suspect in cus-
tody, and therefore that “the right question is whether the ar-
rest and detention are supported by probable cause.” Id. at
575; see also Lewis, 914 F.3d at 474. Accordingly, the mere ex-
istence of legal process in the pretrial detention does not itself
defeat a constitutional challenge under the Fourth Amend-
ment.
We have recognized that Manuel did not sub silentio over-
rule Kaley v. United States, 571 U.S. 320, 328 (2014), however,
which held that a grand jury indictment cannot be challenged
based on whether the probable cause finding was founded on
sufficient proof. United States v. Schreiber, 866 F.3d 776, 781 n.8
(7th Cir. 2017). But here, Moorer does not argue that the infor-
mation presented to the grand jury was insufficient to estab-
lish probable cause. Similar to the plaintiff in Coleman, he ar-
gues that the indictment was obtained through improper or
fraudulent means because the defendants withheld infor-
mation and knew that the identifications were not reliable.
See Coleman, 925 F.3d at 351. And as in Coleman, to succeed
Moorer must demonstrate that the defendants knew they
lacked probable cause to arrest him. Id.; Lewis, 914 F.3d at 477.
Because the defendants did not lack probable cause here, the
claim must fail.
Moorer alleges that the prosecutor was unaware of all of
the facts known to the officers, and that the prosecutor would
have concluded there was no probable cause if properly in-
formed. Moorer fails to provide a sufficient factual basis for
that argument, relying largely on speculation as to what was
known by the prosecutors and the officers, but we need not

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10 No. 22-1067
explore that argument because Moorer can point to no evi-
dence known to the defendants that could have impacted the
existence of probable cause. Even considering all of the evi-
dence known to the officers at the time, there was probable
cause to detain Moorer and therefore the district court
properly granted summary judgment in favor of the defend-
ants.
We have held that an identification by even one eyewit-
ness who lacks an apparent grudge against the accused per-
son is sufficient to demonstrate probable cause. Phillips v. Al-
len, 668 F.3d 912, 915 (7th Cir. 2012); Beauchamp v. City of No-
blesville, Ind., 320 F.3d 733, 743 (7th Cir. 2003) (“The complaint
of a single witness or putative victim alone generally is suffi-
cient to establish probable cause to arrest unless the complaint
would lead a reasonable officer to be suspicious, in which case
the officer has a further duty to investigate.”) Here, seven wit-
nesses to the offense independently identified Moorer as the
perpetrator. In addition, Moorer went by a nickname, Boom,
that was similar to and indeed merely a shortened version of
the “Boomer” name that had been identified as the name of
the person involved.
Moorer does not allege that those identifications were fal-
sified. In fact, Moorer repeatedly disavows any argument that
the identifications were coerced or manipulated, arguing the
proper focus is on reliability. He fails, however, to point to
evidence that would make the identifications so incredible
that an officer could not reasonably believe the witnesses
were telling the truth. Coleman, 925 F.3d at 351 (noting that
even questionable witness identifications are enough to pro-
vide probable cause to arrest); Garcia, 925 F.3d at 351 (“[a]n
officer need not even believe that a witness is reliable to

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No. 22-1067 11
determine that her statement supports probable cause for an
arrest because the assessment of credibility rests with courts,
not officers”); Cairel v. Alderden, 821 F.3d 823, 835 (7th Cir.
2016). In fact, we have held that even the recantation of a state-
ment by a witness does not on its own negate probable cause.
Garcia, 79 F.4th at 880, citing Coleman, 925 F.3d at 351. Instead,
Moorer consistently seeks to impose a trial-level burden of
proof on a probable cause pretrial detention. He points to
facts that undermine the identifications, which would be
proper arguments to pursue on cross-examination and in
closing arguments at trial, but which do not preclude reliance
by the officers in establishing probable cause.
For instance, Moorer argues that the viewing conditions
were poor. He further asserts that the details of the eyewitness
identifications “show that for each witness there was a spe-
cific reason to doubt their reliability.” Appellate Brief at 33.
Toward that end he challenges details of and inconsistencies
in the descriptions, or questions whether some witnesses
could have seen Moorer sufficiently to provide a description.
He points out that Moorer’s nickname was not an exact
match, that Moorer lacked injuries to his body, that other po-
tential alibi witnesses were not pursued, that Edwin was
coached to pick Moorer’s photo out of the array, and that
DNA evidence subsequently showed that Moorer was not at
the scene. Some of those arguments overstate the factual rec-
ord. The lack of DNA from Moorer on evidence found at the
scene that ostensibly came from one or more of the attackers
does not establish that Moorer was not at the scene; it just fails
to provide support for the claim that Moorer was at the scene.
And the identification of Moorer by Edwin from the pages of
photos was not in any way compromised by the post-identi-
fication actions of copying the photo and having Edwin circle

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12 No. 22-1067
and sign the photo to confirm the identity. Moorer’s use of
those facts overstates their significance.
Moreover, all of those arguments by Moorer, and the
many similar ones raised by him, are arguments for trial. The
question for pretrial detention is not whether the officers have
evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that Moorer committed
the crime. Nor is it whether a judge or jury could choose to
disbelieve the witnesses. As we noted in Coleman, police offic-
ers are constantly faced with reluctant witnesses, recanted
confessions, and witness identifications replete with incon-
sistencies, but the weighing of evidence is for the judge and
jury. Coleman, 925 F.3d at 351. “Where a reasonable person
would have a sound reason to believe the suspect committed
a crime, the police may arrest and allow the criminal justice
system to determine guilt or innocence.” Id.: Beauchamp, 320
F.3d at 743, 745 (holding that it is not the obligation of the po-
lice to exclude all suggestions that the witness is not telling
the truth, and that “the responsibility of sorting out conflict-
ing testimony and assessing the credibility of putative victims
and witnesses lies with the courts”). Woods v. City of Chicago,
234 F.3d 979, 987 (7th Cir. 2000) (“so long as a reasonably cred-
ible witness or victim informs the police that someone has
committed … a crime, the officers have probable cause to
place the alleged culprit under arrest …. [and] once such a
reasonably credible complaint has been made, the existence
of probable cause to arrest does not depend upon the actual
truth of the complaint”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Moorer has not identified any facts known to the defendants
that would eliminate probable cause, and therefore no evi-
dence withheld from the prosecutor or the grand jury that
could impact the probable cause determination. See Young,
987 F.3d at 645 (upholding summary judgment for defendants

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No. 22-1067 13
even assuming they committed misconduct in falsifying evi-
dence, because the evidence even as the plaintiff described it
gave the officers adequate probable cause to detain him).
None of the evidence negates the probable cause established
by the witness identification—and here there is not one but
seven independent witness identifications of Moorer as the
perpetrator. The undisputed evidence in the record estab-
lishes probable cause for the pretrial detention.
Accordingly, the decision of the district court is
AFFIRMED.

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