Angela Boyd v. City of Chicago

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted February 8, 2024*
Decided February 12, 2024
Before
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge
CANDACE JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit Judge
No. 23-2241
ANGELA BOYD,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
CITY OF CHICAGO,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 20 C 710
Charles P. Kocoras,
Judge.
O R D E R
Angela Boyd sued her employer, the City of Chicago, asserting that it paid her
less than male employees with the same interoffice mail-carrying duties in violation of
both the federal and Illinois Equal Pay Acts. See 29 U.S.C. § 206(d); 820 ILCS 112/10(a);
see also 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (extending supplemental jurisdiction to certain state-law
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

-- 1 of 4 --

No. 23-2241 Page 2
claims). The district court granted summary judgment to the City because Boyd had not
identified a comparator employee who performs essentially the same job for higher pay.
We affirm.
We review grants of summary judgment de novo and construe evidence from the
summary judgment record in the light most favorable to the non-movant (here Boyd).
Lauderdale v. Ill. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 876 F.3d 904, 907 (7th Cir. 2017). Boyd is a “unit
assistant” who processes incoming mail and delivers papers and packages to various
City offices and worksites. But unit assistants are not alone in handling mail. Deposition
testimony from City employees reflects that some people originally hired for
construction or repair work have, over time, acquired mail and paperwork duties and
reduced their prior duties without any change in title, salary, or official job description.
One of those people, according to Boyd, is Rommel Shorter, a higher-paid male
employee who was originally hired to handle concrete at City construction and repair
sites. (At some points in this litigation, Boyd named potential comparators other than
Shorter, but she makes no issue of them on appeal.) In the years leading up to this suit,
Shorter spent much of his time making deliveries, which Boyd sometimes saw
firsthand. Boyd contends that this means she was doing the same work as Shorter for
less pay. Yet according to Shorter’s deposition testimony, he also continues to do
substantial work with concrete. Although mail delivery now takes up 60–70% of his
average day, he explained, in the other 30–40% he often performs other manual labor
like mixing, pouring, and grading concrete or lifting hefty materials, usually multiple
times per week.
Boyd sued under the federal and state Equal Pay Acts in 2020; the district court
appointed counsel for her; and, after discovery, the City moved for summary judgment.
The City argued that Shorter’s uncontradicted testimony about his still-ample work
with concrete meant no reasonable juror could conclude his job was similar enough to
Boyd’s. He often carried mail, but he often did construction and repair work too.
In response, Boyd asserted through counsel that Shorter must have lied in his
testimony because the City had not attached to its motion any corroborating evidence—
for instance, records memorializing Shorter’s work at construction and repair sites, or
deposition testimony from someone who saw Shorter doing that work. (Boyd did not
suggest that she herself had sought that kind of evidence in discovery and been
rebuffed.) Boyd’s counsel also attached photos that Boyd herself reported taking of
Shorter delivering mail on three occasions over three years, plus a printout of GPS data
from Shorter’s work truck listing many dates, numbers, and addresses. Counsel argued

-- 2 of 4 --

No. 23-2241 Page 3
that at a trial, these items would undermine Shorter’s testimony that he often works
with concrete. These materials, however, were attached to counsel’s legal-argument
memorandum and not, as Local Rule 56.1 of the Northern District of Illinois requires,
counsel’s separate list of factual disputes and additional proposed facts.
The district court granted the City’s motion. First, the court ruled, counsel’s
noncompliance with Local Rule 56.1 warranted disregarding Boyd’s photographs and
GPS printouts. See Shaffer v. Am. Med. Ass’n, 662 F.3d 439, 442 (7th Cir. 2011). Second,
the court concluded, Shorter’s concrete-handling duties made his job too dissimilar to
Boyd’s for jurors to find an Equal Pay Act violation.
Now representing herself on appeal, Boyd contends generally that the district
court wrongly relied on Shorter’s deposition testimony and overlooked her exhibits. But
because she develops no specific challenge to the district court’s ruling that her counsel
failed to comply with Local Rule 56.1 or argument that the court abused its discretion in
enforcing the rule, it is not clear that the photos and GPS printouts she cites are
properly before us. Regardless, we see no material factual dispute to bring to a jury.
Both the federal and Illinois Equal Pay Acts require plaintiffs to identify as a
comparator an employee of the opposite sex who is paid more despite having a job
requiring equal “skill, effort, and responsibility” performed under similar conditions.
29 U.S.C. § 206(d); 820 ILCS 112/10(a). To determine whether two jobs are equal, we
consider whether they have a “common core” of tasks, and, if they do, whether any
additional tasks make the jobs “substantially different.” Cullen v. Ind. Univ. Bd. of Trs.,
338 F.3d 693, 698 (7th Cir. 2003). Here, all agree that Shorter is paid more than Boyd
and, like her, often delivers mail. The question is whether Shorter’s concrete-handling
and heavy-lifting duties make his job substantially different—or, rather, whether Boyd
has established a material factual dispute about that point.
We conclude that Boyd has not. Her theory on appeal is that Shorter, in his
deposition, lied about having to spend significant time working with concrete each
week. But the GPS printouts Boyd cites bear no annotation allowing the district court
(or us) to understand what they show about Shorter’s daily work. And the photos
demonstrate only that on three scattered days over the course of three years, Shorter
delivered mail for a large part of the day—which is consistent with Shorter’s testimony.
Boyd’s contention that Shorter must be lying is too speculative to overturn a summary
judgment. See Estate of Logan v. City of South Bend, 50 F.4th 614, 615 (7th Cir. 2022).

-- 3 of 4 --

No. 23-2241 Page 4
To be sure, Boyd suggests that the City’s narrative would be more persuasive if
its motion had included other evidence corroborating Shorter’s testimony. But no
further corroboration was required. Once the City moved for summary judgment citing
Shorter’s testimony, it was Boyd’s burden to point to evidence creating a material
dispute of fact. See Grant v. Trs. of Ind. Univ., 870 F.3d 562, 568 (7th Cir. 2017).
Finally, Boyd characterizes Shorter’s testimony about his concrete work as self-
contradictory. For instance, he said his mail duties run from seven in the morning to
two in the afternoon, and also that he “squeezes in” mail delivery between responses to
concrete-work calls. We see no contradiction; Shorter testified that when he has time, he
is expected to complete both sets of duties.
Because Boyd has not presented evidence to establish a material dispute about
Shorter’s duties, we accept that he does additional concrete work. We next consider the
skill, effort, and responsibility involved in his job and Boyd’s to determine if they are
sufficiently comparable under the Act. See Cullen, 338 F.3d at 699–700. His duties
require additional skills for handling concrete. And Shorter’s work appears to involve
heavy lifting; for example, he reports that he must be able to lift 100 pounds, something
Boyd does not have to do. An employee who has additional responsibilities requiring
different skills is not similarly situated enough to create a prima facie case of sex
discrimination under either the federal or Illinois Equal Pay Act. See David v. Bd. of Trs.,
846 F.3d 216, 230 (7th Cir. 2017); Merillat v. Metal Spinners, Inc., 470 F.3d 685, 695–96 (7th
Cir. 2006).
AFFIRMED

-- 4 of 4 --