Matthew R. Poulin v. Alisha Waite

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted November 28, 2023 *
Decided February 14, 2024
Before
MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge
AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge
DORIS L. PRYOR, Circuit Judge
No. 22-3050
MATTHEW R. POULIN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
ALISHA WAITE,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Central District of Illinois.
No. 22-2092
James E. Shadid,
Judge.
O R D E R
Matthew Poulin brought a Bivens action against his probation officer, alleging
that she violated several of his constitutional rights while administering the conditions
of his supervised release. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388 (1971). The district court screened his complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. FED. R. A PP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. A PP. P. 32.1

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and dismissed his case for failure to state a claim. Because a Bivens action is not
available for any of his alleged constitutional violations, we affirm the judgment.
Poulin has a fraught criminal history involving frequent returns to prison. He
pleaded guilty to receipt of child pornography in 2012. After two appeals, the district
court sentenced him to 7 years’ imprisonment and 10 years of supervised release. He
began his first term of supervised release in 2018 but was charged in 2019 with failing to
register as a sex offender. He pleaded guilty to the new charges, and the court revoked
his supervised release and sentenced him to a total of two more years in prison and two
ten-year terms of supervised release, served concurrently. He finished that prison term
in November 2020. Since then, the court has revoked Poulin’s supervised release twice
more, once in 2021 for possessing a controlled substance (for which he received one
year in prison and eight years of supervised release) and once in 2022 (for which he
received just one more year in prison with no further supervised release.) He completed
his sentences last year.
Poulin’s complaint centers on his second term of supervised release between
November 2020 and July 2021. (He previously included allegations relating to his first
term of supervised release but agrees on appeal that the statute of limitations has
lapsed.) Poulin vehemently denies that he is challenging the terms of his release or his
revocation for the violation of those terms.
Instead, Poulin alleges that his probation officer, Alisha Waite, improperly
expanded several of the terms of his release and thereby usurped the judicial power to
decide his punishment. He asserts that Waite unjustifiably restricted his internet access
by blocking him from social media, dating, and adult pornography sites, in violation of
the First Amendment, when the conditions required only monitoring of access to child
pornography. He also alleges that she monitored his cellphone activity, location, and
communications and mirrored his phone without probable cause in violation of the
Fourth Amendment. Waite further violated the Fifth Amendment, Poulin says, when
she contacted women Poulin associated with to determine whether they had minor
children and to let them know of his sex offender status, but his conditions only
required adults to know of this status before they could supervise his interaction with
minors. Finally, he asserts that these and other aspects of his supervision violated the
Eighth Amendment because of the psychological harm they caused him.
Poulin was in prison at the time he filed his complaint, so the district court
screened it under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and dismissed the case. The court first noted that to
whatever extent Poulin was challenging the terms of his release, his remedy was a

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No. 22-3050 Page 3
motion to modify those conditions under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) in his criminal case. And
any claims for damages that resulted from the revocation of his supervised release were
barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). Any remaining claim, the court ruled,
failed because Waite, as a probation officer, was entitled to absolute immunity from a
suit challenging conduct “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal
process.” Tobey v. Chibucos, 890 F.3d 634, 649 (7th Cir. 2018).
On appeal, Poulin argues that the judge misconstrued his complaint. He asserts
that he is not challenging the terms of his supervised release, but rather the way Waite
exceeded them. He also maintains Heck does not bar his claims because he is not
seeking damages based on his revocation, only Waite’s actions while supervising. He
finally disputes Waite’s immunity from suit regarding these claims, suggesting her
actions were closer to the investigatory, rather than judicial, phase of the proceedings.
The district court properly dismissed Poulin’s complaint, although we see a more
fundamental problem than those identified by the district court. See Rowe v. Shake,
196 F.3d 778, 782 (7th Cir. 1999) (affirming dismissal at screening on alternative
grounds). Regardless of the merit of any of his criticisms of the district court’s rationale,
Poulin failed to state a claim because he lacks a cause of action under Bivens. A two-step
framework applies when determining the availability of a Bivens action. See Snowden v.
Henning, 72 F.4th 237, 239 (7th Cir. 2023). First, courts ask whether the case arises in a
new context or one that mirrors the Supreme Court’s three cases recognizing Bivens
actions. Sargeant v. Barfield, 87 F.4th 358, 363 (7th Cir. 2023). Any substantial variance in
context, even if the constitutional rights involved are the same, means the plaintiff is
asking for a novel application of Bivens and the court must proceed cautiously. See
Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S. 120, 138–39 (2017). If the context is new, the second inquiry is
whether there are special factors or alternative remedies for the plaintiff that discourage
an extension of Bivens. Id. at 136–37. Extending Bivens into new areas is highly
disfavored. Sargeant, 87 F.4th at 366.
All of Poulin’s claims arise in new contexts. The Supreme Court has never
recognized a Bivens action under the First Amendment, so those claims always arise in
new contexts. Egbert, 596 U.S. at 498–99. And although Poulin correctly notes that the
Court has recognized Bivens actions for certain violations of rights under the Fourth,
Fifth, and Eighth Amendments, see Snowden, 72 F.4th at 241 (collecting cases), a mere
overlap in the relevant constitutional rights does not mean a claim arises in the same
context. Ziglar, 582 U.S. at 139. For one thing, Poulin was on supervised release, unlike
any plaintiff in a recognized Bivens action. This status matters because people on

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supervised release routinely have their constitutional rights lawfully limited. See, e.g.,
United States v. Sines, 303 F.3d 793, 801 (7th Cir. 2002). Moreover, the Court has been
clear that a new “category of defendants” is enough to move a Bivens suit into a new
context, Ziglar, 582 U.S. at 135, especially when that new category might implicate
separation-of-powers concerns, Snowden, 72 F.4th at 244–45. A probation officer is a
clear example of a new defendant that implicates distinct separation-of-powers issues.
Congress created the role of probation officers as an arm of the court, 18 U.S.C. § 3602,
and thus they possess absolute immunity for their quasi-judicial functions. Tobey, 890
F.3d at 649–50. Even if we were to assume Poulin’s claims do not relate to these
functions, this unique relationship still brings the case into a new context. Ziglar, 582
U.S. at 139–40.
Because Poulin’s claims arise in a new context, we can find an implied cause of
action only if there are no special factors or alternative remedies counseling hesitation.
Here, Poulin has a clear alternative remedy—if he believed Waite was misinterpreting
the conditions of his supervised release, Congress permitted him to ask the sentencing
judge to modify his conditions and clarify their scope. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2); United
States v. Neal, 810 F.3d 512, 516–18 (7th Cir. 2016). District courts may modify conditions
of supervised release at any time, even if there is no change in circumstances, to
promote effective supervision and allow the person on release to know his duties before
he is accused of violating them. Neal, 810 F.3d at 516–18. Poulin, therefore, could have
requested more specificity in his conditions to avoid Waite’s alleged overstepping of
authority—or the court might have confirmed for him that her interpretation was
correct. The existence of this Congressionally designed alternate remedy is enough
reason by itself to bar us from recognizing a Bivens cause of action in this new context.
See Sargeant, 87 F.4th at 367–68. The district court therefore correctly dismissed the case
at screening for failure to state a claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
AFFIRMED

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