Devonere Johnson v. Pls Financial Solutions of Wisconsin, Inc.

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted February 16, 2024*
Decided February 26, 2024
Before
MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge
THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge
DORIS L. PRYOR, Circuit Judge
No. 23-2392
DEVONERE JOHNSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
PLS FINANCIAL SOLUTIONS OF
WISCONSIN, INC., et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Wisconsin.
No. 22-cv-77-wmc
William M. Conley,
Judge.
O R D E R
Devonere Johnson brought this suit after the defendants purportedly refused to
cash his checks because of his race. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The district court entered
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 23-2392 Page 2
summary judgment for the defendants. Because the court correctly ruled that Johnson
did not produce sufficient evidence to reach a jury, we affirm.
We recite the facts and draw all inferences in Johnson’s favor. Singmuongthong v.
Bowen, 77 F.4th 503, 510 (7th Cir. 2023). This suit arose from Johnson’s attempts, on
July 30, 2021, to cash checks at two locations of PLS Financial Solutions of Wisconsin,
Inc. PLS provides financial services, including check-cashing services. To prevent
cashing bad checks, PLS has policies that require employees—before cashing a check—
to examine the check (e.g., by verifying the signature), review any notes about the
customer’s recent transactions, and ask the customer questions to determine the check’s
origin. Employees are expected to ask additional questions about the check’s origin if a
customer wants to cash a check that is large or was issued by an employer. Employees
at times must seek a manager’s review before cashing a check.
Johnson, who is African American, first went to a PLS branch on Madison’s
northeast side and attempted to cash two settlement checks he received from a
construction company—one for $10,750 and one for $6,809.65. Employees at this
location inquired about the checks; Johnson later characterized their questions as part of
“normal procedure.” An employee told Johnson that he could not cash the checks, so
Johnson went to a different PLS location.
Johnson then attempted to cash the smaller of the two checks at the company’s
branch on Madison’s south side. An employee again asked Johnson questions; Johnson
later described the questions as “peculiar,” but the questions he identified generally
concerned the check’s origin. Johnson answered the queries and PLS got assurance
(presumably from the check issuer) that the check was real. Despite this, employees
thought the check required review by a manager and held onto it for approval.
Around this time, Johnson began using his cellphone to make a video recording
of the encounter. On the recording, he can be overheard repeatedly asking for his check.
An employee then said that she had to wait for her boss to decide whether to cash the
check; some time later, she explained that her boss told her not to cash “these checks.”
Another employee eventually returned the check to Johnson, and they argued about
calling the police. The audio from the recording is unclear, but the second employee
apparently said that the checks could not be cashed. The recording also captures the
voice of another customer; though the customer is not visible on the recording, Johnson
asserts that he was white and was able to cash a check. Johnson eventually left the store
and cashed both of his checks elsewhere.

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No. 23-2392 Page 3
Johnson then brought this suit, asserting that the defendants refused to cash his
checks because of his race. The district court eventually granted the defendants’ motion
for summary judgment, in part based on its conclusion that Johnson had not produced
evidence of racial discrimination. The court acknowledged that Johnson was asked
questions he regarded as “peculiar,” but pointed out that these were the sort of
inquiries that PLS employees were supposed to ask of all customers. The court also
determined that Johnson had not identified evidence that he was treated differently
from customers in similar circumstances, such that a jury could infer racial animus.
Days after filing his notice of appeal, Johnson filed multiple post-judgment
motions, arguing, among other things, that the judge (1) improperly entered judgment
before discovery closed and (2) was biased against him and should have recused
himself. The court denied these motions.
On appeal, Johnson challenges the district court’s conclusion that he did not
present evidence that the defendants discriminated against him based on race. He
argues, specifically, that the court omitted key facts, such as the recorded statement of
the south side branch’s employee that she had been told not to cash the checks.
But even if we account for that statement, Johnson has not satisfied his burden to
stave off summary judgment for the defendants. To succeed on his claim under § 1981,
he needed to show that race was the “but-for” cause of the defendants’ actions. Comcast
Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of African American-Owned Media, 140 S. Ct. 1009, 1019 (2020). Johnson
has not produced evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could infer such
causality: Nothing in the employee's statement suggests that PLS refused to cash
Johnson's checks because of his race.
Johnson also argues that the court should not have granted summary judgment
because discovery was ongoing. But the federal rules do not require that discovery be
complete before summary judgment can be granted. F ED. R. C IV. P. 56; see Smith v. OSF
HealthCare Sys., 933 F.3d 859, 864 (7th Cir. 2019). If a party—including a pro se litigant—
needs additional discovery to respond to a motion for summary judgment, he may
request more time under Rule 56(d), explaining by affidavit or declaration specific
reasons why he cannot present essential evidence at the time. See F ED. R. C IV. P. 56(d);
Stevo v. Frasor, 662 F.3d 880, 886 (7th Cir. 2011). Johnson did not seek such relief.
Finally, Johnson maintains, based largely on the judge’s rulings, that the judge
should have recused himself due to bias. But adverse rulings standing alone are not
evidence of bias, see Thomas v. Dart, 39 F.4th 835, 844 (7th Cir. 2022) (citing Liteky v.
United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994)), and there is no evidence of any disqualifying

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conflict of interest or other ground for recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 144 or 28 U.S.C.
§ 455(a).
We have considered Johnson’s remaining arguments; none merits discussion.
AFFIRMED

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