James Lockridge v. Charles Larson

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted February 26, 2024*
Decided February 26, 2024
Before
DIANE S. SYKES, Chief Judge
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge
AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge
No. 23-2423
JAMES LOCKRIDGE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
CHARLES LARSON, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of
Wisconsin.
No. 21-cv-558-pp
Pamela Pepper,
Chief Judge.
O R D E R
James Lockridge, a Wisconsin prisoner, appeals the judgment in favor of the
defendants in his lawsuit asserting that members of the prison medical staff were
deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs after he injured his back and
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 23-2423 Page 2
shoulder. During the proceedings, Lockridge moved four times for recruitment of
counsel. The district judge denied each motion, as well as Lockridge’s request for leave
to amend his complaint. On appeal, he challenges these rulings, but none was an abuse
of the judge’s discretion, and so we affirm.
The district judge’s summary-judgment decision sets forth the underlying facts
(including Lockridge’s complex medical history), and we do not recap them in detail
here because they are not material to the arguments on appeal. In February 2019,
Lockridge fell from the top bunk in his prison cell, landing on his feet but hitting his
back on a desk and wrenching his shoulder on the way down. A nurse, Roger Krantz,
responded to Lockridge’s complaint of shoulder pain the next day. Krantz, who could
not prescribe medication as a nurse, referred Lockridge to a doctor. Krantz had
additional interactions with Lockridge but not about his shoulder pain.
Over the next several months, Dr. Charles Larson treated Lockridge’s back and
shoulder pain, as well as his several other medical issues. Dr. Larson ordered an X-ray
of Lockridge’s shoulder, which showed mild degenerative joint disease and no acute
injury. He prescribed non-narcotic pain medication and a topical cream, administered
cortisone shots, ordered physical therapy, and eventually authorized an orthopedic
consultation. (Lockridge was also taking pain medications for other conditions.)
Lockridge told Dr. Larson that he got some relief from the various pain treatment
methods for at least some time. Almost a year after the injury, a different doctor
ordered an MRI of Lockridge’s shoulder. The images showed that Lockridge had a torn
rotator cuff. He received rotator cuff repair surgery almost two years after his injury.
Before his shoulder was fixed, Lockridge had submitted several requests to the
Health Services Unit for help with pain relief, complaining that Dr. Larson’s treatments
were inadequate. Although many of these requests were addressed to the manager of
the unit, Candace Whitman, various medical providers responded to them instead.
Based on these events, Lockridge sued Krantz, Larson, and Whitman under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs in violation of
the Eighth Amendment. He asserted that the defendants ignored the pain in his
shoulder for two years until he received surgery.
After the claims survived screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, Lockridge twice
moved for recruitment of counsel. He stated that he was unable to obtain representation
on his own and that he needed counsel because of the complexity of the case and the
logistical challenges presented by his incarceration. The district judge denied both

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No. 23-2423 Page 3
motions, concluding that, although Lockridge had made sufficient efforts to find his
own lawyer, he appeared competent to litigate the case on his own. Further, she noted,
his stated reasons for needing counsel applied to all incarcerated litigants.
Almost a year into the lawsuit, during discovery, Lockridge requested leave to
amend his complaint. He asked to add as a defendant the prison guard to whom he had
protested being assigned to a top bunk before he fell. Lockridge stated that the guard
“set in motion” the events leading to the lawsuit but did not otherwise describe what
the guard did or did not do that might have violated his rights. The judge denied
Lockridge’s motion without prejudice because he did not follow Civil Local Rule 15(b)
of the Eastern District of Wisconsin, which requires a party seeking leave to amend a
complaint to specify what changes are requested and attach a proposed amended
complaint. Lockridge did not seek leave to amend again.
The defendants moved for summary judgment, and Lockridge then moved for
recruitment of counsel again. The judge denied this motion for the same reasons as
before, noting that Lockridge still had not explained why he required a pro bono
attorney more than other incarcerated plaintiffs. Lockridge then filed his responses to
the motion for summary judgment, but he did not cite any evidence in the record when
he stated his disagreement with the defendants’ factual statements, nor did he submit
his own version of the facts supported by admissible evidence. After the defendants
pointed out these shortcomings in their reply brief, Lockridge moved for recruited
counsel for a fourth time, stating that he and his “help” “didn’t know what we were
doing.” The district judge denied this motion, too. She acknowledged that Lockridge
had struggled to respond properly to the motion for summary judgment but concluded
that recruiting counsel so late in the proceedings was unjustified when Lockridge was
unlikely to succeed on the merits.
The judge also granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. She
concluded that there was no evidence that Nurse Krantz was deliberately indifferent
when he examined Lockridge after his injury and referred him to a doctor because there
was nothing he could do. The judge further concluded that there was no evidence that
Dr. Larson was deliberately indifferent to Lockridge’s pain when he had continuously
examined Lockridge and provided various pain treatments, some of which were at least
temporarily successful. Finally, the judge concluded that there was no basis for liability
for Whitman, the manager of the health unit: There was no evidence that she knew of
Lockridge’s ongoing pain, and regardless, she was acting as an administrator and was
therefore entitled to defer to the treatment decisions of the other medical professionals.

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On appeal, Lockridge does not challenge these substantive conclusions. He
argues only that the district judge abused her discretion when she denied his motions
for counsel and motion to amend his complaint.1
We begin with Lockridge’s motions for counsel, reviewing the judge’s rulings for
abuse of discretion. Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 658 (7th Cir. 2007) (en banc). The judge
applied the correct standard when deciding whether to recruit counsel under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(1), first determining whether Lockridge made reasonable efforts to find
counsel, then asking whether Lockridge was competent to represent himself given the
case’s difficulty. See id. at 654–55. In ruling on the first two motions, the judge explained
that Lockridge appeared competent to represent himself because his complaint was
well-written and easy to follow. On appeal, Lockridge argues that he was incapable of
litigating for himself because he has a learning disability. But he never presented that
argument to the district judge, and we review the judge’s decision based only on what
was in the record at the time of her decision. See id. at 659.
The judge’s reasoning for denying the third motion was also proper. Judges must
rule based on the “particular plaintiff’s capacity” given “the challenges specific to the
case at hand.” Id. at 655. Yet, despite being prompted twice before, Lockridge still did
not explain, in the third motion, what individualized circumstances warranted
recruiting counsel for him more than other incarcerated plaintiffs facing similar
obstacles. The judge had to choose how best to allocate scarce resources, see Mejia v.
Pfister, 988 F.3d 415, 420 (7th Cir. 2021), and made a reasonable decision.
Nor did the judge abuse her discretion when she denied the fourth motion for
counsel. She acknowledged that Lockridge had struggled to respond to the defendants’
motion for summary judgment. But she concluded that enlisting a pro bono attorney
was not appropriate because it had become clear that Lockridge had little chance of
success on his constitutional claims. That consideration of the merits was appropriate.
See Watts v. Kidman, 42 F.4th 755, 767 (7th Cir. 2022).
As to the denial of Lockridge’s motion to amend his complaint, we again review
the decision for abuse of discretion. See MAO-MSO Recovery II, LLC v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 994 F.3d 869, 878 (7th Cir. 2021). District courts may require strict
compliance with their local rules, and so denying the motion on that ground was
1 Lockridge raises substantive challenges to the summary judgment decision in
his reply brief, but arguments not advanced in the opening brief are waived. See White
v. United States, 8 F.4th 547, 552 (7th Cir. 2021). We therefore do not discuss them.

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appropriate, especially because the judge made clear that she would entertain a
conforming motion. See Hinterberger v. City of Indianapolis, 966 F.3d 523, 528 (7th Cir.
2020). Further, Lockridge did not tell the court what the proposed defendant did that
might have violated his rights; it appears that this guard simply fielded a complaint
about being given a top bunk, and Lockridge never filed another motion stating
otherwise.
AFFIRMED

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