United States of America v. Waith A.e. Williams

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Argued June 6, 2023
Decided February 27, 2024
Before
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge
AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge
JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge
No. 22-2250
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
WAITH A.E. WILLIAMS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of
Illinois.
No. 4:21-CR-40048-SMY-10
Staci M. Yandle,
Judge.
O R D E R
Waith Williams pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute a mixture
or substance containing methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). At the
sentencing hearing, he argued that he qualified for the “safety valve” under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(f) based on his cooperation with the government. If the safety valve applied, the
statutory minimum sentence for his crime would drop away, and his imprisonment
range under the Sentencing Guidelines would decrease. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f); U.S.S.G.
§§ 5C1.2(a), 2D1.1(b)(18).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. A PP. P. 32.1

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The parties submitted briefs on the safety-valve issue, and Williams’s counsel
informed the district court at the sentencing hearing that he had nothing more to add.
As a result, rather than entertaining further argument, the court ruled that Williams had
not satisfied the requirements of § 3553(f) and, after reviewing the § 3553(a) sentencing
factors, imposed the mandatory minimum sentence. On appeal, Williams contends that
the court’s failure to provide for oral argument on this issue violated Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 32 and denied him his Sixth Amendment right to assistance of
counsel. We disagree. Williams’s lawyer affirmatively represented that he had nothing
more to say and had submitted his arguments in writing. In any event, any error would
have been harmless because Williams could not have shown that he qualified for the
safety valve in the first place. Accordingly, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Williams was charged with possession with intent to distribute
methamphetamine after law enforcement officers intercepted text messages suggesting
that he had planned to buy methamphetamine from a Jaylen Vinson. Officers stopped
Williams after he met with Vinson and found about 300 grams of methamphetamine in
Williams’s car. He later pleaded guilty to possessing methamphetamine with intent to
distribute. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).
In anticipation of sentencing, the probation office issued a presentence
investigation report (PSR) on April 28, 2022, which concluded that Williams’s
guidelines range was 120 to 121 months (the range actually was 97 to 121 months, but
his offense carried a 120-month minimum sentence). See id. § 841(b)(1)(A)(viii); U.S.S.G.
§ 5G1.1(c)(2). Shortly thereafter, on May 3, Williams and his attorney met with the
government to try to qualify for the safety valve under § 3553(f). Williams told the
prosecutors that a third person—whom Williams did not name—had introduced him to
Vinson. He also admitted that he had bought small amounts of methamphetamine from
Vinson on two previous occasions, but he did not identify his own buyers. And
Williams acknowledged that he knew Jason Akes, one of his codefendants, but he
refused to talk about Akes.
After the meeting with the government, Williams’s lawyer objected to the PSR,
arguing in part that Williams was eligible for safety-valve relief. In that case, Williams
would have faced no minimum sentence, and his guidelines range would have been
78 to 97 months’ imprisonment. In response, the probation office issued a revised PSR
on May 23, 2022, but maintained its position that § 3553(f) did not apply.

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Prior to the sentencing hearing, the parties filed briefs on whether Williams
qualified for the safety valve. They disputed only its fifth and final requirement—that
Williams had “truthfully provided to the Government all information and evidence [he]
ha[d] concerning the offense or offenses that were part of the same course of conduct or
of a common scheme or plan.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(5). In Williams’s view, he met that
requirement because he had identified Vinson as his supplier, admitted to the two
earlier purchases, and “answered all of the [g]overnment’s questions truthfully.” The
government—relying on a summary of the interview—responded that Williams’s
statements fell short because he had not identified the person who had introduced him
to Vinson, had not identified his own methamphetamine buyers, and had refused to
talk about Akes. Williams did not file a reply, which the court’s local rules allowed.
The district court made a point of raising the safety-valve issue at the sentencing
hearing. The court first asked Williams’s attorney whether he had any additional
evidence on the issue. The attorney replied that he had only the arguments in his
sentencing brief. Given this, the court thought any further argument unnecessary and
ruled that Williams had not satisfied § 3553(f) because he had refused to talk about
Akes. Nor had Williams disclosed other relevant information, such as the names of his
buyers and the identity of the person who had introduced him to Vinson. Later, when
the court asked if Williams’s lawyer had any more objections, he replied that he had
“nothing additional.”
In the end, the court sentenced Williams to 120 months’ imprisonment, the
statutory minimum. The court added that, in the absence of the statutory minimum, it
would have “seriously and likely grant[ed] a variance down” based on its disagreement
with the Guidelines’ treatment of methamphetamine offenses.
II. A NALYSIS
On appeal, Williams argues that the district court’s failure to entertain oral
argument on the safety-valve issue during the sentencing hearing violated Rule 32 and
denied him assistance of counsel. But, for the reasons below, we conclude that the court
did not err in either respect, and even if it had, any error was harmless.
A. Rule 32
Rule 32 requires the district court at sentencing to “allow the parties’ attorneys to
comment on … matters relating to an appropriate sentence.” F ED. R. C RIM. P. 32(i)(1)(C).
Whether Williams qualified for the safety valve undoubtedly was a matter “relating to

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an appropriate sentence.” And, according to Williams, the court foreclosed his attorney
from presenting his views on this issue during the sentencing hearing. But this is not
accurate. In fact, the court asked his attorney whether he had anything else he wanted
to add on the issue, and his attorney answered that all of his arguments were contained
in his sentencing memorandum. Under these circumstances, Rule 32 does not require
the court to provide counsel with an opportunity to repeat arguments already made.
B. Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel
Williams next contends that the district court “completely” denied his Sixth
Amendment right to the assistance of counsel by not permitting additional argument on
the applicability of the safety valve at the hearing, thereby creating a presumption of
prejudice under United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984). And even if the denial was
not “complete,” Williams argues in the alternative, it was still a partial denial and, thus,
unconstitutional.
Under Cronic, courts presume that defendants are prejudiced when they are
completely denied assistance of counsel at a critical stage of the case. 466 U.S. at 659; see
also Schmidt v. Foster, 911 F.3d 469, 478–79 (7th Cir. 2018) (en banc). Only deprivations
“on par with total absence” trigger the Cronic presumption of prejudice. Schmidt,
911 F.3d at 478–80 (quoting Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 125 (2008)). It is beyond
dispute that sentencing is a critical stage. Lewis v. Zatecky, 993 F.3d 994, 1003 (7th Cir.
2021). Thus, the analysis turns on whether the district court’s actions completely denied
Williams assistance of counsel.
Our decision in Schmidt is instructive. Schmidt, facing a state charge for murder,
wanted to invoke the affirmative defense of provocation before the jury. The state
objected on numerous grounds, and the trial court asked Schmidt’s counsel to provide a
written offer of proof, which he did. Unpersuaded by the proffer, the court decided to
examine Schmidt about the factual basis for the provocation defense but conducted the
proceedings in camera and ex parte (with the agreement of the parties) so that the state
would not get an unfair preview of defendant’s theory. The court allowed defense
counsel to talk to Schmidt before the in camera hearing and attend the proceeding, but to
ensure that Schmidt would not merely parrot his attorney, the court ordered his
attorney not to speak during it. Id. at 473–74. As the examination proceeded, however,
the court allowed Schmidt to review his counsel’s written proffer and to consult with
him during a break. Later that day, the court ruled that the facts Schmidt raised did not
rise to provocation; the case proceeded to trial, and Schmidt was convicted.

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Schmidt later filed a habeas petition, and the matter came to us on appeal.
Relying on Cronic, Schmidt primarily argued that the state trial court had denied him
his right to counsel by prohibiting his counsel from speaking during the in camera
proceeding. In rejecting this argument, we explained that the trial court had not
completely denied Schmidt assistance of counsel because his counsel had presented the
provocation defense to the judge in other ways. For example, his attorney had filed the
initial notice that Schmidt wanted to argue that he had been provoked; a brief with
Schmidt’s legal argument; a proposed witness list; and a detailed offer of proof. Id. at
480–81. What is more, the trial court allowed Schmidt ample opportunity to consult
with his attorney before the in camera hearing and during a break. Such circumstances,
we concluded, fell well short of a “total absence” of counsel. Id.
Similarly, here, the district court did not “completely” deny Williams assistance
of counsel. Williams, like Schmidt, had his lawyer’s assistance in preparing and
presenting his safety-valve argument to the court. The lawyer attended Williams’s
interview with the government, filed the response to the PSR asserting that Williams
qualified for the safety valve, argued the issue in a sentencing memorandum, had the
chance to submit more evidence at sentencing, and told the court at sentencing that he
had nothing more to present. Indeed, given the level of assistance, Williams’s
alternative argument that he was “partially” denied counsel lacks grounding as well.
Williams offers two contrary arguments, but neither is persuasive. First, he
contends that Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 858–59 (1975), supports his position that
he was entitled to have his lawyer orally argue the safety-valve issue. But Herring held
only that defendants enjoy a right to have their lawyers present closing argument at
trial, not oral argument on an already-briefed sentencing matter. See id. To the extent
that Herring suggests that defendants have a right to argue sentencing issues through
counsel, Williams exercised that right by having his counsel respond to the PSR and
submit a sentencing memorandum.
Second, Williams argues that the district court should have allowed oral
argument because he had no other opportunity to reply to the government’s brief and
evidence. But he did—he could have filed a reply brief. See S.D. ILL . R. 7.1(g). And the
district court permitted him to submit evidence at the sentencing hearing and asked his
attorney if there was anything else he wanted to add.

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C. Harmlessness
Finally, even if the district court had erred (which it did not), any error would
have been harmless. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a). True, the district court stated that it
probably would have imposed a lower sentence but for the statutory mandatory
minimum, which Williams would have avoided had he qualified for the safety valve.
But the record simply does not support the latter contention.
To benefit from the safety valve, Williams was required to make a good-faith
effort to cooperate with the government—providing “only limited information instead
of complete disclosure” is not enough. United States v. Acevedo-Fitz, 739 F.3d 967, 970,
972 (7th Cir. 2014). As the district court explained, Williams’s cooperation was
incomplete. He withheld the name of the person who introduced him to his supplier,
the names of his customers, and whatever information he had about Akes.
In retort, Williams argues that he provided sufficient information about the crime
to which he pleaded guilty—possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute.
As he sees it, information about his customers and codefendants is unrelated to this
offense and exceeded the scope of his obligation under § 3553(f).
This is incorrect on two fronts. First, as we have held elsewhere, district courts
may decline to apply the safety valve when a defendant refuses to talk about customers
and codefendants, even if the defendant’s only offense was possessing drugs with
intent to distribute. See United States v. Nunez, 627 F.3d 274, 277–78, 281–82 (7th Cir.
2010). Second, information regarding his customers and the person who introduced him
to his supplier is plainly relevant to Williams’s possession of the methamphetamine in
question and his plans to distribute it.
AFFIRMED

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