United States of America v. Keenan Seymour

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 23-1236
U NITED S TATES OF A MERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
K EENAN S EYMOUR ,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Indiana, Hammond Division.
No. 17-cr-00138 — Philip P. Simon, Judge.
____________________
A RGUED J ANUARY 17, 2024 — DECIDED M ARCH 5, 2024
____________________
Before F LAUM , EASTERBROOK, and PRYOR , Circuit Judges.
F LAUM , Circuit Judge. Keenan Seymour pleaded guilty to a
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)
conspiracy charge stemming from his involvement in the
street gang, Latin Dragon Nation (the Dragons). Seymour was
sentenced to 180 months’ imprisonment, below the Sentenc-
ing Guidelines’ recommendation. He now seeks re-sentenc-
ing on three grounds, arguing that the district court erred
when (1) making certain factual findings, (2) holding him

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2 No. 23-1236
accountable for murder, and (3) failing to discuss unwar-
ranted sentencing disparities. Finding no error, we affirm.
I. Background
A. Factual Background
In 2017, Keenan Seymour joined the Dragons, a street gang
in Northwest Indiana and Southeast Chicago. That year was
a violent one, marked by conflict between the Dragons and
one of their rival gangs, the Latin Kings (the Kings). In the
summer of 2017, Seymour’s childhood friend and fellow
Dragon, Anthony Anaya (Anthony), was killed in retaliation
for the murder of a prominent King. They had grown up to-
gether, along with Anthony’s brother Justin Anaya (Anaya),
Alec Aguilar, and DeAndre McGowan, referring to them-
selves as the “Reckless Boyz.” The Anaya brothers, Aguilar,
and Seymour later joined the Dragons.
In the aftermath of Anthony’s murder, Seymour was sad
and angry. He posted tributes to Anthony on social media
and referenced getting payback. Anaya was also upset and
looking to retaliate.
At around 1:00 AM on November 24, 2017, Seymour
agreed to drive around with Anaya, Aguilar, and McGowan.
While Aguilar drove, Anaya sat in the passenger seat, and
Seymour and McGowan were in the back. For approximately
six hours, the four drove around, drank, smoked marijuana,
took Xanax, and made videos “[d]ropping … gang signs.”
As the sun was coming up, they stopped at Anaya’s house
and he went inside, retrieving a gun. They continued driving
and around 10:00 AM spotted a Pontiac Grand Prix that Anaya
believed belonged to a King. The group pulled alongside the

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No. 23-1236 3
Grand Prix, flashed gang signs, and eventually chased the car
when it tried to flee. After a few blocks, Anaya leaned out of
the window and shot at the Grand Prix, killing Manuel Sala-
zar. Anaya was mistaken; Salazar was not a gang member.
After the shooting, the four dropped the gun back at Anaya’s
house and then visited Anthony’s grave.
B. Procedural Background
In 2019, a federal grand jury indicted Seymour and several
other Dragons on RICO conspiracy charges. Three years later,
Seymour pleaded guilty without a plea agreement. As part of
his plea, Seymour admitted to being a Dragon and supporting
the gang in various ways, including by participating in acts of
violence. He further admitted that he was in the car when
Anaya killed Salazar but maintained that Anaya started
shooting “without [his] prior knowledge or awareness.”
Nonetheless, the probation officer’s pre-sentence investi-
gation report (PSR) concluded that Seymour was responsible
for Salazar’s murder, constituting a predicate act supporting
the RICO charge. Consequently, the offense level under the
Guidelines jumped to 43. Seymour objected to the PSR, argu-
ing in-line with his plea declaration that he was not culpable
for Salazar’s death and thus the base offense level should be
19.
The district court held an evidentiary hearing to resolve
the dispute. The evidence presented included videos and so-
cial media posts showing Seymour flashing gang signs, hold-
ing guns, and discussing Anthony’s murder. Additionally,
the district court heard live testimony from FBI agent Jacob
Kerwin, Aguilar, McGowan, and Seymour about Salazar’s
murder.

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4 No. 23-1236
Aguilar testified that as they were driving through King
territory, Anaya suggested getting a gun to shoot at some
Kings “for Solo,” referring to Anthony. According to Aguilar,
this conversation was loud enough for Seymour and
McGowan (who were high and drunk in the backseat) to hear.
Aguilar also testified that after Anaya retrieved the gun, it
was visible to Seymour. Although the group did not explicitly
discuss shooting Kings, there was “an understanding” that
they would watch out for rival gang members to shoot. Agui-
lar testified that when they pulled up to the Grand Prix, he,
Anaya, and Seymour started flashing gang signs, believing
the car belonged to a King. Aguilar then chased the Grand
Prix until Anaya started shooting. Aguilar viewed the shoot-
ing as retaliation for Anthony’s death, prompting the group
to visit Anthony’s grave after.
McGowan also testified. Sitting in the backseat with Sey-
mour, he did not overhear Aguilar and Anaya discuss getting
a gun. But McGowan testified that after Anaya retrieved the
gun, he held it up for everyone to see and Seymour re-
sponded, “[l]et me see that mother fucker,” referring to the
gun. McGowan also recalled Seymour suggesting a specific
block in King territory to drive down, saying, “Go through J,
they [referring to Kings] probably out on … Avenue J.” Right
before the shooting, Anaya told Aguilar, “Slow the car down,
I’m gonna do my thing.” Seymour then instructed McGowan
to lean back so that they would not be visible. McGowan tes-
tified that after the shooting Seymor “was smirking and
laughing and shaking up [the Dragon’s handshake] with”
Aguilar.
When Seymour testified at the evidentiary hearing, he de-
nied overhearing any conversation about getting the gun,

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No. 23-1236 5
knowing that Anaya had a gun, or knowing that they were
searching for Kings to shoot. According to Seymour, they
were “[j]ust riding around, drinking, smoking,” and listening
to loud music. He thought that they might get in a fight if they
saw a King. Seymour admitted to flashing gang signs at the
Grand Prix to “confront the suspected Latin King,” but main-
tained that he did not see the gun until Anaya “started hang-
ing out the window shooting.”
On cross-examination, the government confronted Sey-
mour with statements that he made to police in a recorded
interview less than a week after the shooting.1 In that inter-
view, Seymour admitted that by 8:00 or 9:00 AM he had seen
the gun on Anaya’s lap. Seymour also told police that while
he did not intend to shoot anyone, after he saw Anaya’s gun
he “knew what was going on.”
Seymour recounted that after he saw the gun, they went
to a suspected King neighborhood and drove around for an
hour or two, looking for some Kings to “beat or shoot.” At one
point Seymour considered leaving but decided that he might
as well “ride around” and “see what we get into.” He told
police that they eventually pulled up next to the Grand Prix
at a red light and flashed gang signs because Aguilar and
Anaya suspected that the Grand Prix’s passenger was a King.
They chased the car until Anaya leaned out and started shoot-
ing, shattering the back window of the Grand Prix. Seymour
said that during the chase he was “ready for whatever.” When
1 The district court suppressed the interview for trial purposes be-
cause of a Miranda violation. Seymour did not challenge the admission of
his recorded statement for sentencing purposes, nor could he since the ex-
clusionary rule does not apply at sentencing. Del Vecchio v. Ill. Dep’t of
Corr., 31 F.3d 1363, 1388 (7th Cir. 1994).

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6 No. 23-1236
asked about these admissions during the evidentiary hearing,
including his admission that he knew Anaya had the gun be-
fore the shooting, Seymour merely acknowledged making
those statements to police.
In a subsequent opinion and order, the district court found
multiple bases to treat Salazar’s murder as the “underlying
racketeering activity” for the purposes of calculating Sey-
mour’s sentence under the Guidelines. In doing so, it made
several findings of fact, including that Seymour knew the
Dragons’s rules, gang signs, and that Dragons “often shot at
persons suspected or known to be members of rival gangs,
with the intent of killing them, particularly as acts of retalia-
tion.” The district court also found, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that all the car’s occupants, including Seymour,
“were aware that Anaya had brought a gun into the car and
proposed that they set out to find some Latin Kings to shoot
at.” Furthermore, the district court determined that “Seymour
offered a suggestion about a street that might be fruitful” for
that purpose. Given these findings, the district court con-
cluded that Seymour’s claims of ignorance were unpersua-
sive.
With an “underlying racketeering activity” of first-degree
murder, the district court calculated Seymour’s offense level
as 43. This resulted in a Guidelines recommendation limited
by the statutory maximum of 240 months’ imprisonment. At
sentencing, Seymour requested 60 months. A 60-month sen-
tence, he argued, would avoid unwarranted sentencing dis-
parities with some of his co-defendants. The district court sen-
tenced Seymour to 180 months’ imprisonment. Seymour
timely appealed.

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No. 23-1236 7
II. Discussion
Seymour makes three challenges to his sentence. We re-
view each in turn.
A. District Court’s Factual Findings
Seymour challenges two of the district court’s factual find-
ings: (1) that he knew Anaya had a gun and (2) that he knew
Anaya had proposed finding Kings to shoot. “[F]acts consid-
ered at sentencing must be prove[n] by a preponderance of
the evidence” and “based on reliable evidence, rather than
speculation or unfounded allegations.” United States v. Major,
33 F.4th 370, 379 (7th Cir. 2022) (citation and internal quota-
tion marks omitted), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 259.
We do not “disturb a sentencing court’s factual findings
unless they are clearly erroneous.” Id. (quoting United States
v. Ranjel, 872 F.3d 815, 818 (7th Cir. 2017)). Seymour faces “a
steep hill to climb.” Ranjel, 872 F.3d at 818. We will only re-
verse if, “after considering all of the evidence, the reviewing
court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mis-
take has been made.” United States v. Dickerson, 42 F.4th 799,
804 (7th Cir. 2022) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted). “If two possible conclusions can be drawn from the
evidence, then the choice between them cannot be clearly er-
roneous.” Major, 33 F.4th at 379 (quoting United States v. May,
748 F.3d 758, 760 (7th Cir. 2014)).
The court did not clearly err when making either factual
finding. Instead, the record reveals ample support for both. In
his recorded interview, taken less than a week after the shoot-
ing, Seymour admitted that (1) he knew Anaya had a gun in
the car before the shooting, (2) they were driving around look-
ing for Kings to “beat or shoot,” and (3) once he saw the gun,

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8 No. 23-1236
he “knew what was going on.” Aguilar and McGowan’s tes-
timony corroborated those admissions. Aguilar testified that
he and Anaya loudly discussed getting a gun, and that the
gun was visible to Seymour. McGowan similarly testified that
Seymour saw the gun before the shooting began.
Rather than challenging the sufficiency of the evidence un-
derpinning the court’s factual findings, Seymour takes issue
with the district court’s credibility determinations. “[W]here
a sentencing challenge boils down to a credibility deci-
sion, … our review is especially deferential to the district
judge’s assessment of the testimony.” Id. at 380 (alteration and
omission in original) (quoting United States v. Etchin, 614 F.3d
726, 738 (7th Cir. 2010)).
Seymour argues that the district court erred by finding
some of Aguilar and McGowan’s testimony credible, but not
all. This is a nonstarter. “[T]he district court may credit all or
part of a witness’s testimony, especially when there is more
than one permissible reading of the evidence.” United States v.
Vaccaro, 915 F.3d 431, 435 (7th Cir. 2019) (emphasis added).
Moreover, Seymour ignores that the district court credited the
portions of Aguilar and McGowan’s testimony that were con-
sistent with his statements to police within days of the shoot-
ing. Seymour may have told a different story during the evi-
dentiary hearing, but that does not make the district court’s
assessment of the evidence clearly erroneous.2
2 Seymour also complains that the district court did not identify the
specific witness testimony it relied upon in making its findings. But, as we
have explained, “it is of no consequence that the district court did not ex-
pressly refer to particular witnesses’ testimony in making the finding.”
United States v. Testa, 33 F.3d 747, 753 (7th Cir. 1994).

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No. 23-1236 9
B. Accountability for Salazar’s Death
Next, Seymour argues that the district court erred in cal-
culating his offense level when it attributed Salazar’s death to
him. The base offense level for a RICO conspiracy—Sey-
mour’s crime—is either 19 or “the offense level applicable to
the underlying racketeering activity.” U.S.S.G. § 2E1.1. The
district court concluded that the “underlying racketeering ac-
tivity” was first-degree murder, which has a corresponding
offense level of 43. The district court concluded that Salazar’s
murder was attributable to Seymour because it was a jointly
undertaken criminal activity, he aided and abetted the shoot-
ing, and he was directly responsible under Illinois law.
“We review de novo a judge’s application and computa-
tion of a defendant’s Sentencing Guidelines range.” United
States v. Porraz, 943 F.3d 1099, 1102 (7th Cir. 2019). However,
we review the “factual determinations underlying the appli-
cation of the Guidelines,” such as the determination that Sey-
mour is responsible for murder, for clear error. Id. at 1102–03;
United States v. Schrode, 839 F.3d 545, 550 (7th Cir. 2016) (ex-
plaining that “[r]elevant conduct determinations are factual
determinations, which may only be reversed for clear error”).
The Guidelines hold defendants accountable for jointly
undertaken conduct that is “(i) within the scope of[,] … (ii) in
furtherance of[,] … and (iii) reasonably foreseeable in connec-
tion with” “a criminal plan, scheme, endeavor, or enterprise
undertaken by the defendant in concert with others.” U.S.S.G.
§ 1B1.3(a)(1)(B). Seymour challenges only foreseeability. He
argues that Salazar’s murder was not reasonably foreseeable
to him because the Reckless Boyz had, for years, driven
around, drinking and smoking, without shooting at anyone.

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10 No. 23-1236
On that basis, Seymour asserts that he had no idea Anaya had
a gun or would pull the trigger.
This argument is a repackaged attempt to challenge the
district court’s factual findings. But as already explained, the
district court’s factual findings were not clearly erroneous.
They were supported not only by the testimony of Seymour’s
co-defendants, but also by Seymour’s own admissions to the
police. That is more than enough to support the district
court’s conclusion that the murder was reasonably foreseea-
ble.
Stepping back, “[w]e have emphasized that murder can be
a reasonably foreseeable result of a defendant’s gang activi-
ties even if he did not kill anyone or otherwise personally par-
ticipate in a murder.” Porraz, 943 F.3d at 1103. Often, we have
applied this principle to gang leaders, holding them account-
able for murders committed by other members because
“[m]urder was … a foreseeable part of [defendant’s] agree-
ment with gang members.” Id.; see also United States v. Garcia,
754 F.3d 460, 484–85 (7th Cir. 2014) (concluding that murder
was reasonably foreseeable to an Inca—a leader of a section
of the gang—because he knew the rules of the gang, including
to shoot rival gang members, and protected his territory);
United States v. Hernandez, 37 F.4th 1316, 1320–21 (7th Cir.
2022) (holding an Inca accountable for murder because he
knew the gang’s rules, offered a rifle to other gang members
for security, and previously shot at rival gang members). In
those cases, we have emphasized that the defendant was an
active participant in the gang and responsible, per gang rules,
for safeguarding territory by shooting at rival gangs. Porraz,
943 F.3d at 1103.

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No. 23-1236 11
Seymour was not a gang leader, nor responsible for safe-
guarding gang territory, but Salazar’s murder was nonethe-
less foreseeable. Neither our case law nor the Guidelines limit
jointly undertaken criminal activity to gang leaders. See
United States v. Curtis, 324 F.3d 501, 506 (7th Cir. 2003) (ex-
plaining that even if a defendant was a fringe member of the
conspiracy, so long as he participated in it and the violent acts
were reasonably foreseeable to him, the murder committed
by a co-conspirator could be attributed to him); U.S.S.G.
§ 1B1.3, cmt. n.4(C)(vi) (explaining that a street-level drug
dealer that pools resources and profits with other street-level
dealers is accountable for the drug quantities sold by the other
dealers). More importantly, Seymour, an active gang partici-
pant with knowledge of the gang’s rules, knew that Anaya
had a gun and furthered Anaya’s known aims by suggesting
where to find Kings—on Avenue J. As a result, the district
court did not clearly err by finding Salazar’s murder reasona-
bly foreseeable, nor did it clearly err by attributing Salazar’s
murder to Seymour as jointly undertaken criminal activity.
Because aiding and abetting liability and direct responsi-
bility are alternative bases for holding Seymour responsible
for Salazar’s murder, we need not reach them. See United
States v. Burnett, 37 F.4th 1235, 1240 (7th Cir. 2022); U.S.S.G.
§ 1B1.3, cmt. n.2.
C. Unwarranted Sentencing Disparities
Last, Seymour argues that the district court failed to avoid
unwarranted sentencing disparities among co-defendants by
imposing a 180-month sentence. Whether conceived as a pro-
cedural or substantive challenge, Seymour’s claim fails.

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12 No. 23-1236
“We review whether a district court procedurally erred
during sentencing de novo.” United States v. Gill, 889 F.3d 373,
377 (7th Cir. 2018). “A district court might commit procedural
error if it fails to consider the need to avoid unwarranted sen-
tence disparities among defendants with similar records who
have been found guilty of similar conduct.” Id. (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted); 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6).
However, “if a district court imposes a within-Guideline
range sentence, the court implicitly incorporates the United
States Sentencing Commission’s concerns regarding avoiding
unwarranted disparities among similarly situated defend-
ants.” United States v. Prado, 743 F.3d 248, 252 (7th Cir. 2014).
The district court’s correct calculation of the Sentencing
Guidelines’ range and imposition of a below-Guidelines sen-
tence means that it necessarily considered the need to avoid
unwarranted disparities. See United States v. King, 910 F.3d
320, 330 (7th Cir. 2018) (“Because … the sentencing guidelines
derive from national patterns, we have … held that a properly
calculated guidelines recommendation necessarily considers
the consistency between similarly situated defendants.” (cita-
tion and internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v.
Blagojevich, 854 F.3d 918, 921 (7th Cir. 2017) (“[T]he Sentencing
Guidelines are themselves an anti-disparity formula.”).
In any event, the district court addressed Seymour’s argu-
ment that two codefendants’ (Angelina Vilella and Tiffany
Barragan) 60-month sentences warranted a downward depar-
ture. The district court explained that there was “no compar-
ison” between Seymour’s conduct and that of Vilella and Bar-
ragan. More importantly, the district court noted that Vilella
and Barragan entered into negotiated plea agreements stipu-
lating 60-month sentences. Seymour, in contrast, gave the

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No. 23-1236 13
district court the ultimate discretion to consider and weigh all
§ 3553(a) factors. To the extent Vilella and Barragan’s sen-
tences created a disparity, that was a result of prosecutorial
discretion and not judicial error. Cf. Gill, 889 F.3d at 378 n.2
(recognizing that a prosecutor’s choice to dismiss a sentenc-
ing enhancement for some defendants, but not others resulted
in a disparity that “was created by the prosecutor, not the
court.”).
Finding no procedural error, we proceed to assess the sub-
stantive reasonableness of Seymour’s sentence for abuse of
discretion. Porraz, 943 F.3d at 1104. “[T]here is a nearly irre-
buttable presumption that a below-[Guidelines] range sen-
tence is reasonable.” United States v. Oregon, 58 F.4th 298, 302
(7th Cir. 2023) (first alteration in original) (quoting United
States v. Miller, 829 F.3d 519, 527 (7th Cir. 2016)). In fact, we
have never held that a below-Guidelines sentence is unrea-
sonably high. Id. “A defendant can only rebut this presump-
tion of reasonableness by showing that the sentence does not
comport with the factors outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).”
United States v. De La Torre, 940 F.3d 938, 953 (7th Cir. 2019)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Seymour has not rebutted the presumption. The district
court considered each of the § 3553(a) factors, including un-
warranted disparities. Seymour’s below-Guidelines, 180-
month sentence is substantively reasonable.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons explained, the judgment of the district
court is A FFIRMED.

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