Adam Hendrix v. Leonardo Garcia

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted March 13, 2024*
Decided March 14, 2024
Before
ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge
CANDACE JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit Judge
DORIS L. PRYOR, Circuit Judge
No. 23-1980
ADAM HENDRIX,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
LEONARDO GARCIA, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 23-cv-2120
Sharon Johnson Coleman,
Judge.
O R D E R
After a state judge entered a restraining order against him, Adam Hendrix sued
the judge and others in federal court for injuries arising out of that order. The district
court dismissed the case based on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and judicial immunity.
* The appellees were not served with process and are not participating in this
appeal. After examining the appellant’s brief and the record, we have concluded that
the case is appropriate for summary disposition. See F ED. R. APP . P. 34(a)(2).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 23-1980 Page 2
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine blocks this court from addressing most of Hendrix’s
claims, and judicial immunity resolves the rest; therefore, we affirm.
Hendrix alleges the following events, which we take as true for purposes of this
appeal. See Sherwood v. Marchiori, 76 F.4th 688, 693 (7th Cir. 2023). After his personal
relationship with Leonardo Garcia had ended, Hendrix “protested” the breakup outside
of Garcia’s house. Garcia called the police for help, and an officer suggested that he seek
a restraining order, which Garcia did. During a hearing in state court on the matter,
Hendrix says he was not allowed to speak or present evidence. A state judge entered
the restraining order, and another state judge later amended it to increase the no-
contact distance. Hendrix then attempted to remove the case to federal court, but a
federal district judge remanded the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
Hendrix next sued Garcia, the police officer, both state judges, and the federal
judge in federal court for damages caused by the restraining order. He considers the
order “fraudulent,” “unlawful,” and the result of a violation of his constitutional rights
and Garcia’s perjury. The district court dismissed the case. First, relying on the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the court ruled that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over
Hendrix’s pursuit of relief from the restraining order. See Rooker v. Fid. Tr. Co., 263 U.S.
413 (1923); D.C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). Next, the court ruled that
judicial immunity protected the state judges and the federal judge for their judicial acts.
Last, the court explained that there was no private cause of action for perjury.
On appeal, Hendrix contests the district court’s reliance on Rooker-Feldman,
emphasizing that his federal constitutional rights are at issue. We review de novo the
district court’s application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Fliss v. Generation Cap. I, LLC,
87 F.4th 348, 353 (7th Cir. 2023). The doctrine bars federal district courts from hearing
cases brought by state-court losers who complain of injuries caused by state-court
judgments. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 283–84 (2005).
Jurisdiction is lacking “even if … the state court’s action was unconstitutional.” Feldman,
460 U.S. at 486.
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies here because the injury Hendrix alleged—
the “enforcement” of a “fraudulent” and “unlawful” judgment (the restraining order)—
did not occur until the state judge ruled against him. Mains v. Citibank, N.A., 852 F.3d
669, 677 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing Harold v. Steel, 773 F.3d 884, 886 (7th Cir. 2014)). Because
Rooker-Feldman barred the district court from hearing a case brought by a litigant
complaining about injuries caused by a state-court judgment, the district court properly

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No. 23-1980 Page 3
dismissed claims against Garcia, the officer, and the state judges for lack of subject-
matter jurisdiction.
That leaves only Hendrix’s claim against the federal judge. Hendrix contends
that judicial immunity does not protect the judge, who Hendrix says acted in the “clear
absence of all jurisdiction.” See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 357 (1978). But the
judge had the authority, which means jurisdiction, to remand the order for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction, see 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), and the judge is immune from suit for
that judicial action. See Stump, 435 U.S. at 355–57.
We conclude by noting that the district court did not state whether it dismissed
Hendrix’s suit with or without prejudice. Because a dismissal pursuant to
Rooker-Feldman must be without prejudice, see Mains, 852 F.3d at 678, we modify the
judgment to clarify that Hendrix’s claims against Garcia, the officer, and the state
judges are dismissed without prejudice.
AFFIRMED

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