Kelly J. Chavez v. MARTIN J. O’MALLEY, Commissioner of Social Security

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 23-1196
KELLY J. CHAVEZ,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
MARTIN J. O’MALLEY,
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant-Appellee.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Indiana, Fort Wayne Division.
No. 1:22-cv-00062-WCL — William C. Lee, Judge.
____________________
A RGUED D ECEMBER 5, 2023 — D ECIDED MARCH 22, 2024
____________________
Before HAMILTON, BRENNAN, and S T . EVE , Circuit Judges.
BRENNAN, Circuit Judge. Kelly Chavez has suffered from
various mental and physical impairments for many years. Af-
ter she was denied supplemental security income, an admin-
istrative law judge conducted a hearing at which a vocational
expert testified. The ALJ found that Chavez could perform

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2 No. 23-1196
jobs that existed in significant numbers in the economy and
affirmed the denial. The district court affirmed the ALJ’s find-
ings. Chavez contends that the vocational expert did not pro-
vide substantial evidence in support of the ALJ’s decision, but
we disagree and affirm.
I. Background
Chavez applied for supplemental security income in 2019,
asserting she had been disabled since 2007. Her application
was denied initially and on reconsideration. She requested
and received a hearing before an ALJ in 2020 during which
she objected to the reliability of a vocational expert’s testi-
mony about job number estimates. The ALJ agreed that the
estimates were not reliable and ordered a supplemental hear-
ing.
A. The Supplemental Hearing
Chavez and a new vocational expert, Sarah Holmes, testi-
fied at the April 2021 supplemental hearing. Holmes has
served as a vocational expert witness in Social Security mat-
ters since 2018 and has board certifications as a Certified Re-
habilitation Counselor and Licensed Professional Counselor.
Chavez’s counsel did not object to Holmes’s qualifications.
Holmes testified that a person with Chavez’s age, back-
ground, and ability to perform a reduced range of light work
would be able to perform several light exertion jobs, including
cleaner, office helper, and storage rental clerk. She provided a
corresponding number from the Dictionary of Occupational

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No. 23-1196 3
Titles (“DOT”) for each occupation. 1 Holmes estimated those
occupations existed in the following numbers in the national
economy: 222,000 cleaner jobs, 14,000 office helper jobs, and
63,000 storage rental clerk jobs. Holmes explained that those
jobs were examples, not an exhaustive list, and she testified
that there were another 24,700 representative jobs that Chavez
could perform at the sedentary level.
After Holmes testified, Chavez’s counsel asked her how
recent the national-job numbers were. Holmes said she used
the most recent available data, which was from 2021. She ex-
plained that she used a software program, Job Browser Pro,
to estimate the number of jobs. That program uses data from
the Bureau of Labor Statistics to provide job numbers by DOT
title. Chavez’s attorney then questioned Holmes:
Q: So, tell me what formula … Job Browser Pro uses to
weight the numbers in the [Standard Occupational
Classification (“SOC”)] codes, to weight the DOT
categories and the SOC codes?
A: Now, I would have to read that specifically from
the information that I have here. I can’t tell you ex-
actly off hand that particular data.
Q: So, the answer is that you’re sitting there, you don’t
know, is that correct?
A: As I’m sitting here right now, correct. I could read
the summary and abstract for SkillTRAN
1 DOT 323.687-014, 1991 WL 672783 (cleaner, housekeeper); DOT
239.567-010, 1991 WL 672232 (office helper); and DOT 295.367-026, 1991
WL 672594 (storage rental clerk).

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4 No. 23-1196
estimating employment numbers, which I have in
front of me, but I don’t know it just off the top of
my head.2
Chavez’s attorney did not ask Holmes to read the summary
and began a new line of questioning.
Chavez’s counsel objected to the reliability of Holmes’s
testimony, including:
 That it was insufficient because she “cannot de-
scribe the weighing formula from Job Browser
Pro”;
 Any “top down weighing methodology” could not
be reliable given the “mismatching of the SOC
codes and the DOT codes”; and
 Unless there was a rational way of severing the dif-
ferent skill and exertional levels within the SOC
codes, “any weighing of a DOT title within a SOC
code cannot yield a reliable result.”
The ALJ considered those objections and asked Holmes clari-
fying questions. Holmes explained that, in Job Browser Pro,
jobs “are broken out by DOT title and not by SOC code.”
When asked if other vocational experts use Job Browser Pro,
2 SkillTRAN is the company that produces the Job Browser Pro soft-
ware. See Job Browser Pro, S KILLTRAN LLC, https://skilltran.com/in-
dex.php/products/pc-based-solutions/job-browser-pro (last visited March
22, 2024).
The document that Holmes referenced is publicly available. See
S KILLTRAN LLC, SKILLTRAN P ROCESS FOR ESTIMATING EMPLOYMENT
N UMBERS 1–10 (2020), https://skilltran.com/pubs/DOTemp-
num_method.pdf.

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No. 23-1196 5
Holmes responded: “I’m not saying other people don’t use
other things, but every person that I know that does this work,
uses, relies upon Job Browser Pro.”
Chavez’s counsel then asked Holmes if “Job Browser Pro
uses a formula in order to weight DOT title occupations that
exist within a SOC code, in order to reach their number for
the DOT title.” Holmes confirmed that was correct. Chavez’s
attorney did not pose any more questions about the formula.
B. The ALJ’s Decision
In August 2021, the ALJ ruled that Chavez was not disa-
bled and denied Chavez’s application for supplemental secu-
rity income. Applying the familiar five-step process set forth
in 20 C.F.R. § 416.920, the ALJ found that Chavez had numer-
ous severe impairments. Those include migraine disorder,
asthma, lumbar and cervical degenerative disc disease,
neuropathy of the left leg, acoustic neuroma, obesity, social
anxiety disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, depressive
disorder, and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder. The ALJ
also deemed Chavez to have the residual functioning capacity
to perform light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 416.967(b),
with specific exceptions. The ALJ concluded that Chavez
could not perform her past work, but that she could perform
jobs existing in the national economy such as cleaner, office
helper, and storage rental clerk.
The ALJ overruled Chavez’s objections to Holmes’s testi-
mony:
The vocational expert was found to be a quali-
fied expert by this agency, and [Chavez’s] coun-
sel agreed to this prior to her testimony. The vo-
cational expert stated that the jobs she offered

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6 No. 23-1196
were not an exhaustive list of possible jobs that
would satisfy the hypothetical and that her job
numbers were based on numbers given by the
[Bureau of Labor Statistics] and JobBrowser Pro,
which gives the number of jobs by the DOT
code. The vocational expert testified that this is
standard procedure among the vocational ex-
perts she knows. … [B]ased on careful consider-
ation of the totality of the record, the [ALJ] finds
the testimony of the [v]ocational [e]xpert con-
forms to the rules and regulations of the Social
Security Administration and is therefore ac-
cepted.
Chavez appealed, and the Appeals Council denied review.
She then sought judicial review.
C. The District Court’s Decision
The district court affirmed the ALJ’s findings. Because
Holmes identified the source for her job number estimates, of-
fered to provide additional information on the underlying
data source, and gave a straightforward explanation for the
reliability of the numbers she provided, the district court con-
cluded that the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial
evidence. So, the district court granted judgment for the Com-
missioner.
On appeal, Chavez asks us to conclude that Holmes’s tes-
timony is unreliable, and that substantial evidence does not

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No. 23-1196 7
support the ALJ’s finding that Chavez could perform jobs that
existed in significant numbers in the economy.3
II. Discussion
This court reviews de novo the district court’s judgment
affirming the Commissioner’s decision. Gedatus v. Saul, 994
F.3d 893, 900 (7th Cir. 2021). But we “apply a deferential
standard of review when assessing the ALJ’s decision.” Skin-
ner v. Astrue, 478 F.3d 836, 841 (7th Cir. 2007). A reviewing
court “will not reweigh the evidence, resolve debatable evi-
dentiary conflicts, determine credibility, or substitute [its]
judgment for the ALJ’s determination so long as substantial
evidence supports it.” Gedatus, 994 F.3d at 900. Substantial ev-
idence means “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Skinner,
478 F.3d at 841 (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401
(1971)). If substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclu-
sions, the court “must affirm the ALJ’s decision even if rea-
sonable minds could differ about the ultimate disability find-
ing.” Brown v. Colvin, 845 F.3d 247, 251 (7th Cir. 2016).
A. Statutory and Regulatory Framework
To establish disability, a claimant must show that he or she
“is unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity by rea-
son of any medically determinable physical or mental impair-
ment which can be expected to result in death or which has
lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not
less than twelve months.” 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). The
Commissioner utilizes a five-step sequential evaluation
3 This court has appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 42
U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3).

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8 No. 23-1196
process to determine whether a claimant can engage in sub-
stantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920; see Weatherbee v.
Astrue, 649 F.3d 565, 568–69 (7th Cir. 2011).
Only step five of the disability evaluation process is at is-
sue here: whether Chavez could perform jobs that existed in
significant numbers in the economy. At the fifth step, the
Commissioner bears the burden to establish that the claim-
ant—considering age, education, job experience, and func-
tional capacity to work—can perform other work and that
such work exists in the national economy in significant num-
bers. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.912(b)(3), 416.920(g), 416.960(c); 42
U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(B). If the claimant is unable to make an
adjustment to other work, she will be found disabled. 20
C.F.R. § 416.920(g).
B. Step Five and the Vocational Expert’s Testimony
ALJs commonly rely on vocational experts to provide “an
impartial assessment” of the (1) “types of occupations in
which claimants can work” and (2) “availability of positions
in such occupations.” Weatherbee, 649 F.3d at 569 (citing Lis-
kowitz v. Astrue, 559 F.3d 736, 743 (7th Cir. 2009)). Vocational
experts are experienced in job placement and typically hold
advanced degrees in vocational rehabilitation or psychology.
Sok v. Kijakazi, No. 21-3039, 2022 WL 17413558, at *1 (7th Cir.
Dec. 5, 2022). To make their assessment, vocational experts
may rely on a variety of sources and tools, as well as their
knowledge of the job market, experience placing individuals
in jobs, and surveys of employers. Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S.
---, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1152–53 (2019).
The Social Security Administration uses the DOT to cate-
gorize occupations. Fetting v. Kijakazi, 62 F.4th 332, 337 (7th

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No. 23-1196 9
Cir. 2023). Once a vocational expert determines the types of
occupations in which a claimant can work, the expert pro-
vides the corresponding DOT number. Id. But the DOT does
not provide job numbers for each occupation. So vocational
experts convert job numbers from the Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics—which uses the SOC system—to the DOT system. Id.
There are widely used, commercially available resources that
help with this conversion process. One is the Job Browser Pro
software. See Chavez v. Berryhill, 895 F.3d 962, 966 (7th Cir.
2018). 4
When an ALJ bases a decision on the testimony of a voca-
tional expert, the substantial evidence standard requires the
ALJ to “ensure that the [vocational expert’s job number esti-
mate] is the product of a reliable method.” Fetting, 62 F.4th at
339 (citing Brace v. Saul, 970 F.3d 818, 821 (7th Cir. 2020)). A
“precise count is not necessary,” but the vocational expert’s
testimony “must be supported with evidence sufficient to
provide some modicum of confidence in its reliability.” Id.
(citing Brace, 970 F.3d at 822). “[A]ll the substantial evidence
standard requires” is that a vocational expert “gave enough
detail for [the Court] to understand the sources of his data and
the general process he adopted.” Hohman v. Kijakazi, 72 F.4th
248, 254 (7th Cir. 2023) (quoting Fetting, 62 F.4th at 339).
4 Chavez previously applied for supplemental security income in
2010. In Chavez v. Berryhill, this court vacated and remanded for further
proceedings. 895 F.3d 962, 966 (7th Cir. 2018).
The administrative decision on appeal here concerns only Chavez’s
2019 application and is not related to the proceedings on remand follow-
ing her previous case.

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10 No. 23-1196
This “case-by-case” inquiry considers “all features of the
[vocational expert’s] testimony” to determine whether the
testimony establishes “‘more than a mere scintilla’ of evi-
dence supporting the ALJ’s conclusion.” Hohman, 72 F.4th at
252 (citing Biestek, 139 S. Ct. at 1156–57). “[W]hatever the
meaning of ‘substantial’ in other contexts, the threshold for
such evidentiary sufficiency is not high.” Biestek, 139 S. Ct. at
1154. But a critical aspect of the vocational expert’s job esti-
mation process is how that expert matches general economic
data reported in SOC codes to specific DOT numbers used by
the agency. See Ruenger v. Kijakazi, 23 F.4th 760, 761–62 (7th
Cir. 2022) (“This creates a matching problem … .”); Brace, 970
F.3d at 820–21 (“Because the database of job titles is so
outdated, an expert’s methodology for connecting job titles to
reliable estimates of the number of jobs for each title is espe-
cially important.”).
1. The vocational expert provided reliable testimony.
Here, the ALJ could “readily trace the path of [Holmes’s]
reasoning” for her job number estimates. Hohman, 72 F.4th at
253. Holmes testified that Job Browser Pro used 2021 data
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics to provide the most recent
job numbers. She explained that by providing job numbers by
DOT title, rather than SOC code, Job Browser Pro was able to
exclude numbers from occupations that did not fit Chavez’s
situation. In response to questioning from Chavez’s counsel,
Holmes identified the SOC codes that corresponded to each
of the DOT titles she listed as suitable for Chavez, and the ex-
ertional and skill levels of all the DOT titles that fell under
each SOC code. Cf. Ruenger, 23 F.4th at 763 (remanding where
the vocational expert “obscured the origin of her job estimates
and even denied the most likely source—SOC codes.”).

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No. 23-1196 11
Holmes also described how Job Browser Pro worked. She
confirmed that the software used a formula to weigh the DOT
occupations within a SOC code in order to reach their number
for the DOT title. She even offered to provide detailed infor-
mation about Job Browser Pro’s underlying formula: “I could
read the summary and abstract for SkillTRAN estimating em-
ployment numbers, which I have in front of me… .” But
Chavez’s counsel did not accept her offer and moved to an-
other line of questioning: “Okay. Let’s look at the cleaner job.”
After considering objections by Chavez’s counsel, the ALJ
asked Holmes additional questions clarifying how Job
Browser Pro separated jobs and confirming that many voca-
tional experts use the software.
So, Holmes did provide substantial evidence and the ALJ
appropriately relied on her testimony. Even if Holmes had
not explained her method in detail, it was enough of a “rea-
soned and principled explanation” to meet the low substan-
tial evidence threshold. Chavez, 895 F.3d at 970.
The jobs Holmes identified and the ALJ ultimately relied
on—cleaner, office helper, and storage rental clerk—are prev-
alent within the national economy. Chavez “cannot credibly
argue” that these jobs, which are “commonly found in the na-
tional economy,” do not exist in significant numbers. Sok, 2022
WL 17413558, at *2. To avoid foreclosing the claimant from
disability benefits on “the basis of the existence of a few iso-
lated jobs,” the vocational expert must show that the jobs exist
in significant numbers. Walker v. Mathews, 546 F.2d 814, 819
(9th Cir. 1976); see Sok, 2022 WL 17413558, at *2. This is satis-
fied by the common nature of the jobs and supports the ALJ’s
reasonable reliance on her testimony.

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12 No. 23-1196
Holmes also testified that every vocational expert she
knows relies on Job Browser Pro. Her reliance on a source that
is “well-accepted” in her field supports her opinion. See
Biestek, 139 S. Ct. 1155; Bruno v. Saul, 817 F. App’x 238, 241, 243
(7th Cir. 2020) (affirming vocational expert testimony based
on the “SkillTRAN approach”); Purdy v. Berryhill, 887 F.3d 7,
14, 16–17 (1st Cir. 2018) (affirming and describing Job Browser
Pro as “widely relied upon by vocational experts in estimat-
ing the number of relevant jobs in the national economy”).
Holmes’s testimony was also reliable for other reasons.
She served as a vocational expert in Social Security proceed-
ings for three years. She confirmed that her resume—which
shows education including a Master of Science in rehabilita-
tion psychology and more than two decades of professional
experience as a vocational consultant—accurately reflected
her professional qualifications. She also testified that, as part
of her education and training, she took statistics classes and
conducted population surveys. So, she had “top-of-the-line
credentials, including professional qualifications and many
years’ experience.” Biestek, 139 S. Ct. at 1155, 1153 (affirming
ALJ’s denial of benefits after relying on testimony of voca-
tional expert with five years’ experience in Social Security
proceedings and ten years’ experience counseling those with
disabilities about employment opportunities).
Chavez submits that Holmes did not explicitly tie her pro-
fessional experience to her job number estimates. But a voca-
tional expert need not do so for her testimony to constitute
substantial evidence. In Biestek, the Court recognized a voca-
tional expert’s qualifications based on his resume. See id. at
1153. The ALJ’s findings about job number estimates, which
were based on that expert’s testimony, were affirmed. Id. at

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No. 23-1196 13
1157. That standard is satisfied here because the ALJ ques-
tioned Holmes about her resume and experience and specifi-
cally inquired about her job estimates and methodology. And
although not Chavez’s burden, she simply did not offer any
evidence conflicting with Holmes’s opinion on the jobs she
could perform and their existence in substantial numbers in
the economy.
In sum, the ALJ relied on vocational expert testimony from
an undisputed expert in the field who:
 used a generally accepted source of job num-
bers;
 provided a straightforward overview of how
the source worked;
 offered to provide additional information about
the source’s underlying formula;
 provided additional details about the jobs she
selected in response to the claimant’s questions;
and
 identified jobs commonly found in the national
economy.
The expert “gave enough detail for [the Court] to understand
the sources of h[er] data and the general process [s]he
adopted.” Hohman, 72 F.4th at 254 (quoting Fetting, 62 F.4th at
339). The ALJ therefore satisfied the Commissioner’s “modest
evidentiary burden.” Sok, 2022 WL 17413558, at *2.
2. The underlying formula need not be explained.
Chavez argues that Holmes’s evidence is less than sub-
stantial because she did not explain Job Browser Pro’s under-
lying formula. Holmes consulted Job Browser Pro to obtain

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14 No. 23-1196
job number estimates which, Chavez concedes, is a generally
accepted methodology. But in Chavez’s view, the lack of an
explanation is “conclusive proof” that Holmes’s testimony is
unreliable and that therefore the ALJ’s conclusion was not
supported by substantial evidence.
We reject this argument for three reasons.
First, Chavez’s position is contrary to the Supreme Court’s
holding in Biestek that categorical rules regarding the substan-
tiality of a vocational expert’s opinion are inappropriate.
Biestek, 139 S. Ct. at 1157. There, the claimant petitioned the
Supreme Court to adopt a categorical rule precluding a voca-
tional expert’s testimony from qualifying as substantial evi-
dence if the expert declined a claimant’s request to provide
supporting data. Biestek, 139 S. Ct. at 1153–54. The Court re-
jected that request and held that the inquiry in determining
substantiality of evidence must be case-by-case. Id. at 1157.
Adjudicators should evaluate the entirety of a vocational ex-
pert’s testimony. Even if an expert refused to provide the un-
derlying data, the expert’s testimony could still constitute
substantial evidence if it had other markers of reliability. Id.
at 1156–57.
As in Biestek, Chavez’s request for a categorical rule is in-
appropriate. A vocational expert’s testimony is not precluded
simply because the expert did not describe the underlying for-
mula of the resource relied upon. Instead, the court looks at
the expert’s testimony as a whole and the specific facts of this
case. As discussed above, Holmes’s testimony has sufficient
indicia of reliability to clear the low substantial evidence
threshold.

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No. 23-1196 15
Second, Chavez’s argument runs counter to this court’s
law recognizing that a vocational expert is not required to ex-
plain the statistical basis for the sources on which she relies.
In Liskowitz, this court ruled that the ALJ was entitled to rely
on a vocational expert’s testimony despite the expert’s admis-
sion that she could not assess the degree of accuracy of the
underlying data sources on which she relied. 559 F.3d at 743.
Even so, the vocational expert explained that her sources were
widely recognized as acceptable in the vocational rehabilita-
tion field. Id. The court emphasized that “[t]he witness was
testifying as a vocational expert, not a census taker or statisti-
cian.” Id.; see Hohman, 72 F.4th at 254 (reiterating that voca-
tional experts need not “provide exact data or calculations”);
see also Fetting, 62 F.4th at 339–40. And, in Bruno, the court af-
firmed the ALJ’s reliance on vocational expert testimony us-
ing the “SkillTRAN approach,” even though the expert “did
not reveal the precise mechanics and statistical model in-
volved.” 817 F. App’x at 243; see also Case v. Kijakazi, No. 22-
2379, 2023 WL 4882880, at *3 (7th Cir. Aug. 1, 2023) (holding
that “[t]he inability of the vocational expert to precisely ex-
plain the software’s algorithms does not render his explana-
tion unreliable”).
Chavez relies on Westendorf to argue that remand is
needed because the vocational expert did not sufficiently ex-
plain Job Browser Pro’s underlying formula. But in Westen-
dorf, claimants’ counsel did not decline the vocational expert’s
offer to provide details about the program’s underlying meth-
odology as Chavez’s counsel did here. Westendorf v. Saul, No.
19-cv-1019, 2020 WL 4381991, at *1–2 (W.D. Wis. July 31, 2020)
(the vocational expert promised to provide a document dis-
cussing Job Browser Pro’s methodology after the hearing,
counsel made a conditional objection to the testimony

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16 No. 23-1196
pending review of the document, and counsel raised post-
hearing objections specific to the methodology described).
Third, Holmes was willing to provide the very infor-
mation Chavez complains is missing from the record—details
regarding Job Browser Pro’s methodology—but Chavez’s
counsel did not pursue the matter. Vocational experts are en-
couraged, but not required, to have underlying sources avail-
able at the hearing. Krell v. Saul, 931 F.3d 582, 586–87 (7th Cir.
2019) (citing Biestek, 139 S. Ct. 1157). Here, Holmes was pre-
pared to provide further detail. As the district court ex-
plained, Chavez “cannot decline an offer of information and
then object that the information was not recited into the rec-
ord.”
3. The ALJ properly considered whether the vocational ex-
pert’s evidence was cogent and thorough.
Chavez now criticizes the ALJ for not seeking out the ex-
planation that her attorney declined. But where a vocational
expert’s testimony was sufficiently “cogent and thorough”
and “did not give the ALJ any reason to suspect that his meth-
odology was unreliable,” the ALJ is “not required to seek fur-
ther clarification.” Fetting, 62 F.4th at 340. As Fetting stated, a
“reliable methodology is based on well-accepted sources.” Id.
at 339 (quotations omitted). Here, Holmes testified “every
person” she knew that “does this work, uses, relies upon Job
Browser Pro.”
Fetting ruled that a vocational expert’s explanation “must
be sufficient to instill some confidence that the estimate was
not conjured out of whole cloth.” Id. (quotations omitted).
There, the vocational expert used “a simple formula … not a
hard and fast scientific type formula” and did not conduct any

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No. 23-1196 17
“formal analysis.” Id. at 336 (quotations omitted). But the
court found the vocational expert’s testimony “sufficiently co-
gent and thorough for the ALJ to rely on it.” Id. “To be sure,
the [vocational expert] could have explained his methodology
more clearly, but he gave enough detail for us to understand
the sources of his data and the general process he adopted.”
Id. Holmes did that and more. She testified as to how Job
Browser Pro uses data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics to
provide job numbers, offered to provide SkillTRAN’s descrip-
tion of the formula Job Browser Pro uses, and clarified how
Job Browser Pro separated jobs by DOT title.
We have spoken to the reliability of the authority a voca-
tional expert can use and still be deemed to have presented
substantial evidence. In Leisgang v. Kijakazi, 72 F.4th 216 (7th
Cir. 2023), an ALJ credited the testimony of a vocational ex-
pert who relied on a publication that applied the equal distri-
bution method to estimate job numbers. Id. at 220. The ALJ
denied Social Security benefits. Id. at 219. When “asked if the
[vocational expert] believed the equal distribution method
was reliable, [he] reported that it was the only method he had
available.” Id. at 219. The court in Leisgang recognized the
sharp criticisms of the equal distribution method, and cited
law “identifying the ‘illogical assumption’ underlying the
equal distribution method and its ‘distorting effects.’” Id. at
220 (citing Chavez, 895 F.3d at 966). Still, the court affirmed the
ALJ’s denial based on the vocational expert’s testimony. Id.
Like in Leisgang, “nothing about [Holmes’s] testimony”
indicated “that the ALJ could not put some modicum of
confidence in the [her] job-number estimates.” Id. at 220 (quo-
tations omitted). By declining to pursue Holmes’s offer to pro-
vide further detail about her source’s methodology, Chavez

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18 No. 23-1196
failed to “give the ALJ any reason to suspect that h[er] meth-
odology was unreliable.” Fetting, 62 F.4th at 340. Chavez’s
questions established only that Holmes could not explain Job
Browser Pro’s formula without consulting her source. But
that does not make her testimony unreliable. And it does not
prove that “Job Browser Pro was simply a black box to the
vocation expert.” See Westendorf, 2020 WL 4381991, at *3.
4. The ALJ properly considered and overruled Chavez’s ob-
jections.
Chavez says the ALJ did not sufficiently follow up on her
objections. But Leisgang explains that an ALJ is better able to
“unpack and untangle objections and concerns” about the vo-
cational expert’s testimony. Leisgang, 72 F.4th at 220. “And the
ALJ is best positioned to do so when the claimant identifies
those objections and concerns expressly, allowing the proper
development of the evidentiary record in real time.” Id.
In her principal brief, Chavez says she made a “direct ob-
jection about how the methodology allocates data from SOC
codes to DOT codes, the most critical component of an esti-
mation methodology.” But it is unclear to what “direct objec-
tion” Chavez refers. Chavez’s attorney objected to “any top
down weighing methodology” and asserted that “any weigh-
ing of a DOT title within a SOC code cannot yield a reliable
result” But these complaints are not specific to Job Browser
Pro’s statistical methodology or to Holmes’s use of data from
that program. And after Chavez’s counsel lodged these objec-
tions, the ALJ asked follow-up questions to confirm that Job
Browser Pro could weed out jobs that were inconsistent with
the limitations in the hypothetical question and that the pro-
gram is widely relied upon in the vocational expert field.

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No. 23-1196 19
If Chavez is suggesting her objections should have
prompted the ALJ to ask additional questions, we disagree, as
her attorney’s objections did not give the ALJ any reason to
believe that Holmes’s testimony might be unreliable. See
Fetting, 62 F.4th at 340; see also Leisgang, 72 F.4th at 220–21. The
substantial evidence standard is “‘not high,’” Fetting, 62 F.4th
at 338 (quoting Biestek, 139 S. Ct. at 1154), and, for the reasons
explained, Holmes’s testimony satisfies it.
Finally, Chavez criticizes the ALJ’s reasons for overruling
her objections to Holmes’s testimony. Agency guidance di-
rects ALJs to “[r]ule on any objection(s)” to a vocational ex-
pert’s testimony by addressing them “on the record during
the hearing, in narrative form as a separate exhibit, or in the
body of his or her decision.” SSA, Hearings, Appeals, and Liti-
gation Law Manual I-2-6-74 (June 16, 2016). The ALJ did that.
Although Chavez believes the ALJ wrongly overruled her ob-
jections, she has not shown that the ALJ was required to do
anything further to address them.
III. Conclusion
Holmes’s vocational expert testimony provided substan-
tial evidence for the ALJ’s finding that Chavez could perform
jobs that existed in significant numbers in the economy. The
ALJ’s decision aligns with this court’s precedent on this ques-
tion, and the ALJ appropriately addressed Chavez’s objec-
tions.
For these reasons, we A FFIRM the district court.

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