United States of America v. Travis Childress

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted March 22, 2024
Decided March 25, 2024
Before
MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge
THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge
JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge
No. 23-2513
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
TRAVIS CHILDRESS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Central District of Illinois.
No. 21-CR-20056
Colin S. Bruce,
Judge.
O R D E R
Travis Childress pleaded guilty to three counts of robbery. 18 U.S.C. § 1951. Over
Childress’s objections, the court applied three enhancements under the Sentencing
Guidelines that increased his recommended imprisonment range. The court then
sentenced him within that range to a 12-year prison term. Childress appeals, but his
appointed lawyer asserts that the appeal is frivolous and moves to withdraw. See Anders
v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). Counsel’s brief explains the nature of the appeal
and addresses issues that an appeal of this kind might be expected to involve. Because
counsel’s analysis appears thorough, and Childress has not responded to the motion,
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 23-2513 Page 2
see C IR . R. 51(b), we limit our review to the subjects that counsel discusses. See United
States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014).
Counsel begins by telling us that Childress does not wish to challenge his guilty
plea, and so counsel appropriately refrains from discussing any arguments related to
the plea’s validity. See United States v. Konczak, 683 F.3d 348, 349 (7th Cir. 2012); United
States v. Knox, 287 F.3d 667, 670–71 (7th Cir. 2002).
Counsel next considers challenges to the enhancements and rightly concludes
that contesting them would be frivolous. First, the district court applied an
enhancement to all three counts of robbery because Childress possessed or used a
“dangerous weapon” while committing the offenses. U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(2)(D), (E).
Childress argued that the weapon in his possession during the robberies—a BB gun—
was not “dangerous.” But an object that “closely resembles” a firearm is a “dangerous
weapon” under the Guidelines, id. § 2B3.1 cmt. n.2, and a BB gun has such a
resemblance. Id. § 1B1 cmt. n.1(H) (“‘BB’ or pellet gun … is a dangerous weapon.”);
see Bey, 748 F.3d at 777–78.
Second, Childress cannot raise a nonfrivolous challenge to the two-level
enhancement for a leadership role. See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c). Childress had his girlfriend
scout the businesses before each robbery, and he also directed her to drive the getaway
car after two of the robberies. The enhancement applies if the defendant “tells people
what to do and determines whether they’ve done it,” United States v. Anderson, 988 F.3d
420, 428 (7th Cir. 2021), and we would find that criteria satisfied here.
Third, Childress has no room to argue that the court improperly applied a two-
level enhancement for recklessly creating a substantial risk of death or serious bodily
injury. See U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2. While fleeing law enforcement after the third robbery,
Childress directed his girlfriend to speed and drive through red lights. That conduct
creates substantial risk of significant harm. See United States v. Brown, 716 F.3d 988, 995–
96 (7th Cir. 2013).
Counsel next considers whether Childress could raise a nonfrivolous challenge to
the court’s other sentencing calculations, and properly concludes he could not.
Childress objected to the inclusion of certain convictions from “over 10 years ago” that
increased his criminal history category, but the applicable time period under U.S.S.G.
§ 4A1.2(e)(1) is the 15 years preceding the commencement of the instant offense. We
would also uphold the court’s assessment that Childress’s adjusted offense level of 28

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No. 23-2513 Page 3
and criminal history category of VI yielded a guidelines imprisonment range of 140 to
175 months. U.S.S.G. ch. 5, pt. A. And Childress’s 12-year prison sentence was below
the statutory maximum of 60 years for three robberies. See 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (20-year
maximum for each offense).
Counsel is also correct that Childress cannot raise a nonfrivolous argument about
the reasonableness of his sentence. Childress’s within-Guidelines sentence was
presumptively reasonable, United States v. Ambriz-Villa, 28 F.4th 786, 791 (7th Cir. 2022),
and we see no basis to rebut that presumption. The court properly discussed the
sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), expressing deep concern about Childress’s
extensive criminal history (“a legacy of intimidating people, scaring people, threatening
people, and getting yourself locked up”) and the need to protect the public from further
crimes (despite “multiple incarcerations … nothing seems to register on you”). The
court also acknowledged his mental-health issues and his struggles with substance
abuse. We would not reweigh these factors on appeal. Ambriz-Villa, 28 F.4th at 791–92.
Finally, we agree with counsel that any challenge to the length and conditions of
supervised release would be frivolous. The three-year term of supervised release is
within statutory limits. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3559(a)(3), 3583(b)(2). And because Childress—at
sentencing—waived an explanation and reading of the conditions of supervised release
(and did not otherwise present any conditions-related argument), he cannot obtain
appellate review of those conditions. United States v. Flores, 929 F.3d 443, 449–50
(7th Cir. 2019).
Accordingly, we GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.

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