United States of America v. Fernando De La Torre

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted March 28, 2024*
Decided March 29, 2024
Before
DIANE S. SYKES, Chief Judge
DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge
No. 23-1502
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
FERNANDO DE LA TORRE,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 03-cr-90-1
Steven C. Seeger,
Judge.
O R D E R
Fernando de la Torre, a federal prisoner, appeals the denial of his combined
motion for sentence modification under the First Step Act and for compassionate
release. Because the district judge reasonably denied the motion, we affirm.
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 23-1502 Page 2
In 2008, a jury convicted de la Torre of crimes connected to his membership in a
street gang. These included two counts that involved distribution of crack cocaine and
three counts of murder in aid of racketeering. For the drug convictions, de la Torre
faced a minimum of 10 years and a maximum of life in prison. See 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) (2009). His three murder convictions carried mandatory life sentences.
See 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(1) (2009). The remaining three charges (including assault with a
dangerous weapon in aid of racketeering) carried maximum penalties of 5 years, 20
years, and life. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(k), 924(a)(1)(B), 1959(a)(3), 1962(d), 1963(a) (2009).
De la Torre was sentenced to six concurrent life terms (three for the murder
convictions, two for the crack-cocaine convictions, and one for racketeering conspiracy),
a concurrent 20-year sentence, and a concurrent 5-year sentence. We affirmed
de la Torre’s convictions and sentence, and we affirmed the denial of a post-conviction
motion. See United States v. Benabe, 654 F.3d 753 (7th Cir. 2011); United States v. Benabe,
436 F. App’x 639 (7th Cir. Aug. 18, 2011); Delatorre v. United States, 847 F.3d 837 (7th Cir.
2017).
About 15 years into his life sentence, de la Torre moved to modify his sentence
under the First Step Act and for compassionate release. See First Step Act of 2018,
Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 404, 132 Stat. 5194; 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). First, he argued
that relief under § 404 was appropriate because his aggregate sentence included
offenses covered by the Act. Second, he argued that his age when he offended (before
and at 18), traumatic childhood, and “tremendous rehabilitation” were extraordinary
and compelling reasons for compassionate release, and that the sentencing factors in
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) warranted release. The government countered that de la Torre’s
murder convictions yielded mandatory life sentences that the Act did not cover, leaving
“no room” for the judge to reduce the aggregate sentence under § 404. The government
further argued that de la Torre offered no extraordinary and compelling reasons for
release and, highlighting the seriousness of his “organized and systematic killings,” that
the § 3553(a) factors also did not support relief.
The district judge denied de la Torre’s motion. First, the judge explained, he had
no authority to reduce de la Torre’s sentence under § 404 of the First Step Act: Even
though de la Torre was eligible for relief based on his crack-cocaine convictions, the Act
does not cover his murder convictions, which carry mandatory life sentences. Second,
the judge concluded that relief under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) was not appropriate because
de la Torre’s young age at the time of the offenses, his childhood trauma, and his
rehabilitation efforts in prison were not extraordinary and compelling reasons for

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No. 23-1502 Page 3
release. In any event, the judge reasoned, the factors outlined in § 3553(a)—namely, the
seriousness of de la Torre’s conduct, the need to promote respect for the law, and the
need to deter similar conduct—did not warrant release.
On appeal, de la Torre first argues that the district judge erred in concluding that
he had no discretion to grant relief under § 404 of the First Step Act, but the judge was
correct. It is true that § 404 permits a judge to revise the “entire sentencing package”
when a defendant has been sentenced for some offenses that are affected by the Act and
some that are not. United States v. Hible, 13 F.4th 647, 652 (7th Cir. 2021). But
de la Torre’s sentence includes at least one statutory minimum penalty (a mandatory
life sentence), which judges have no discretion to alter. See id.
De la Torre responds that he was not—as the district judge stated—subject to
three mandatory life sentences, only one. He contends that one life term is vulnerable
under Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 465 (2012), because he committed the murder
before he turned 18, and a second is undermined by United States v. Harris, 51 F.4th 705,
720 (7th Cir. 2022), because of a discrepancy between the written judgment (life in
prison) and the oral pronouncement (five years of supervised release).
We need not evaluate the merits of this argument because de la Torre still faces
the mandatory life sentence for the third murder conviction. The presence of an intact
life sentence obviates any need to evaluate other concurrent life terms. See Ruiz v.
United States, 990 F.3d 1025, 1033 (7th Cir. 2021). And de la Torre does not contest that
the third murder conviction carries a mandatory life sentence. Still, he insists that the
district judge had discretion to lower that mandatory life term. He cites out-of-circuit,
district-level cases in which judges reduced mandatory life sentences through motions
for compassionate release, and he asserts that the district judge had to address these
cases. But motions for compassionate release come under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), and that
statute involves factors different from those under § 404 of the First Step Act.
Compare United States v. Peoples, 41 F.4th 837, 840 (7th Cir. 2022) (evaluating
compassionate-release motion), with United States v. McSwain, 25 F.4th 533, 537 (7th Cir.
2022) (evaluating § 404 motion). Thus, the cases he cited were not those that the judge
was required to discuss or apply under § 404. See Concepcion v. United States, 142 S. Ct.
2389, 2404 (2022).
That brings us to de la Torre’s challenge to the denial of his motion for
compassionate release, which we review for an abuse of discretion. United States v.
Williams, 65 F.4th 343, 346 (7th Cir. 2023). We can bypass discussing whether de la Torre

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presents an extraordinary and compelling reason for release because the district judge
properly denied the motion for an independent reason: The judge did not abuse his
discretion in deciding that the § 3553(a) factors weighed against release. “[J]ust one
good reason” for denying a compassionate-release motion is enough. United States v.
Rucker, 27 F.4th 560, 563 (7th Cir. 2022). The judge considered de la Torre’s “tragic
upbringing,” his age at the time of the offenses, his “large and meaningful support
group,” and his “commendable” rehabilitation efforts in prison. But the judge
reasonably concluded that a life sentence was nonetheless necessary because of ample
counterbalancing factors. These included the seriousness of murder, racketeering, and
extensive drug distribution; de la Torre’s lack of respect for the law as reflected in his
extensive participation in organized, illegal gang activity; and the need to deter him and
others from similar misconduct.
AFFIRMED

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