Angela Moyer v. MARTIN J. O’MALLEY, Commissioner of Social Security

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted March 28, 2024 *
Decided April 2, 2024
Before
DIANE S. SYKES, Chief Judge
DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge
No. 23-2599
ANGELA MOYER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
MARTIN J. O’MALLEY,
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the
United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Wisconsin.
No. 22-C-1202
Lynn Adelman,
Judge.
O R D E R
Angela Moyer suffers from severe post-traumatic stress disorder, depression,
and anxiety after experiencing extreme abuse at the hands of her parents and, later, the
man she married and has since divorced. Based on these conditions and multiple
physical impairments, she twice applied for disability benefits from the Social Security
* We granted the appellant’s unopposed motion to waive oral argument, see CIR .
R. 34(2), because the briefs and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments,
and oral argument would not significantly aid the court. See FED. R. A PP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. A PP. P. 32.1

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Administration, which denied both claims. Moyer appeals, and although we
sympathize with her horrific past, she does not establish that the administrative law
judge’s (“ALJ”) decision lacked the support of substantial evidence. We therefore
affirm.
On appeal Moyer challenges the ALJ’s decision only as it relates to her mental
disabilities, so we limit our discussion of the facts accordingly. As a child, Moyer was
physically abused by her parents, and as an adult, she was physically and sexually
abused by her husband. After she left her husband, he stalked her and threatened her
and their two children (whom he also abused). As a result of this abuse, Moyer has
severe post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”), which causes her to experience panic
attacks, flashbacks, and nightmares. She also struggles with depression and generalized
anxiety.
Moyer’s symptoms are worse when she leaves the house. She freezes if she sees
someone resembling her ex-husband and experiences visual and auditory
hallucinations of him, including while she works. Moyer also gets severe anxiety and
panic attacks if she is in a crowd of people and has said that even five other people are
too many for her to be around. Because of these symptoms, Moyer avoids leaving her
house unless she must for appointments or to go grocery shopping. In 2017 a doctor
considered whether she suffered from agoraphobia, an extreme fear of places (often
public) that may cause panic, but concluded that she did not meet all requirements for
that diagnosis. By 2020 Moyer’s symptoms had worsened, and she did not drive or
leave the house without medication, which she reported helped at times. Around this
time she was diagnosed with social anxiety disorder.
In 2017 and again in 2019, Moyer applied for both disability benefits and
supplemental security income, stating that her disability began in 2017. The applications
were consolidated before her hearing in 2021. In connection with Moyer’s claims for
benefits, four different state-agency mental-health practitioners reviewed Moyer’s
treatment records. The psychologist who first reviewed her records in 2018 determined
that she was moderately limited in remembering and carrying out detailed instructions;
maintaining attention and concentration for extended periods; completing work
without interruptions to concentration, persistence, and pace; and adapting to changes
in the workplace. To accommodate these limitations, he recommended limiting Moyer
to unskilled work. Upon review a second psychologist agreed with these assessments.
The psychologist who reviewed her records in 2019, however, noted her
increased difficulties around others. This psychologist determined that Moyer was

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No. 23-2599 Page 3
moderately limited in her ability to maintain a regular schedule; work close to others;
complete a normal workday without interruptions to concentration, persistence, and
pace; interact with the public; ask questions; and respond to changes in the workplace.
And this psychologist gave more specific limitations: namely, that Moyer should
interact only occasionally with the public, supervisors, and coworkers; that she should
be limited to simple, routine work; and that she would be expected to be off task up to
10% of the workday. On reconsideration a psychiatrist affirmed these findings and
added that Moyer could tolerate only occasional changes to her workplace, that she
should be limited to simple tasks without tight quotas and timelines, and that she could
only have brief and superficial social contact and interactions.
After Moyer’s applications were denied, she requested a hearing before an ALJ.
At the hearing she testified only briefly. She said that she struggled with being in
crowds and that she drove only to go to the store. She said she had to leave a previous
job at a casino because she kept seeing hallucinations of her ex-husband and would
have to leave the room. She also testified that she had panic attacks at least once or
twice per month and that she struggled to focus on one thing.
The ALJ questioned a vocational expert and asked the expert to make the
following relevant assumptions about a hypothetical claimant: “Assume limitations to
simple tasks with no more than occasional workplace changes. There should be no
assembly line work. The work should not require interaction with the public.” In a
second hypothetical question, the ALJ asked the expert also to assume that the claimant
needed “no more than brief and superficial social contact required to do the work.” The
expert testified that although someone with these restrictions could not do Moyer’s
previous work, jobs for such a claimant existed in significant numbers nationally. The
expert also later testified that any of these jobs would tolerate an employee being off
task no more than 10% of the time.
The ALJ concluded that Moyer was not disabled. As part of the familiar five-step
process, the ALJ created a residual functional capacity for Moyer, which stated that
Moyer was limited to work with “simple tasks; no more than occasional workplace
changes; no assembly line work; work that does not require more than brief and
superficial social contact; and work that does not require interaction with the public.”
The ALJ relied on the four state-agency doctors’ reports, as well as various mental-
status examinations in Moyer’s record that showed that she typically had a normal or
flat affect and tolerated all her interactions with medical and mental-health providers of
all sexes. The ALJ determined that Moyer was not disabled because she could do other

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jobs, which were identified by the vocational expert, with her limitations. The Appeals
Council denied review, and the district judge upheld the denial of benefits.
Moyer now appeals. We will reverse the ALJ’s decision only if it is unsupported
by substantial evidence or if it is the result of an error of law. Martin v. Kijakazi, 88 F.4th
726, 729 (7th Cir. 2023). Under this deferential standard, “[w]e will not reweigh the
evidence, resolve debatable evidentiary conflicts, determine credibility, or substitute
our judgment for the ALJ’s determination.” Gedatus v. Saul, 994 F.3d 893, 900 (7th Cir.
2021).
Moyer raises two primary arguments on appeal: first, that the ALJ completely
ignored lines of evidence about the trauma leading to Moyer’s PTSD and about the
extent of her social limitations; and second, that the residual functional capacity did not
account for Moyer’s moderate limitation in concentration, persistence, and pace. The
Commissioner responded at length to these contentions, though framing them
differently. As a result, in her reply brief, Moyer contends that the government created
two “new” issues in its response brief and therefore waived any response to the issues
as she framed them. We disagree. The Commissioner had no obligation to parrot
Moyer’s issue statements. The response brief engages with Moyer’s arguments and
defends the ALJ’s decision; it waives nothing. Moreover, the burden is on the claimant
to demonstrate entitlement to benefits, 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A), so Moyer’s attention
would have been better focused on affirmative evidence of her disability.
We begin with Moyer’s contention that the ALJ ignored entire lines of evidence
showing that she is disabled and conclude that the ALJ addressed everything she
needed to. Moyer says that the ALJ ignored the cause of her PTSD, including the abuse
from her parents and her ex-husband, but the ALJ did not need to discuss every detail
from her medical history. See Gedatus, 994 F.3d at 901. Further, the cause of a disability
“drops out of the picture” once its relevance has been determined. Gentle v. Barnhart,
430 F.3d 865, 868 (7th Cir. 2005). Moyer acknowledges that the ALJ discussed and
credited her diagnoses of PTSD and anxiety yet insists that the ALJ’s failure to mention
the origin of her disorders means that the ALJ did not adequately explain her
conclusions. But Moyer does not explain why specifically discussing the history of
abuse would have compelled a different decision when the impairments caused by the
abuse were part of the ALJ’s reasoned decision.
The ALJ also did not “ignore” evidence of “extreme” social limitations. Moyer
asserts that she has an “almost complete inability to function socially” and “no ability to
interact socially with men” because of the abuse she suffered. She embraces Mandrell v.

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Kijakazi, 25 F.4th 514, 518–19 (7th Cir. 2022), in which we reversed the finding that a
rape victim was not disabled because the ALJ did not address several of the claimant’s
limitations, including that she struggled to be around men. We note that we decided
Mandrell before Moyer filed her opening brief in the district court, yet she mentions it
on appeal for the first time. And, unlike in Mandrell, Moyer did not provide any
evidence—either from medical records or her own testimony—of any male-specific
fears or “extreme” social limitations. Further, the ALJ addressed the social difficulties
that were supported by the record: Moyer struggled to leave the house but could do so
with the help of medication; she became anxious in crowds or at the store; and two
doctors in 2019 and 2020 reported that she had moderate social limitations. At bottom,
Moyer had the duty to submit evidence supporting her claims, see 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1512(a)(1), and the narrative she submits on appeal is not supported by her
evidence.
Further, to the extent Moyer contends that the ALJ did not incorporate enough
social limitations in the decision, her argument is unavailing. An ALJ does not err in
assigning a residual functional capacity if “there is no doctor’s opinion contained in the
record which indicated greater limitations than those found by the ALJ.” Rice v.
Barnhart, 384 F.3d 363, 370 (7th Cir. 2004). In Moyer’s case, two psychologists
recommended no social limitations for Moyer; one recommended that Moyer only
occasionally interact with the public, supervisors, and coworkers; and one
recommended that Moyer only briefly and superficially interact with the public,
supervisors, and coworkers. The ALJ adopted these limitations and then went further,
determining that Moyer could have no interaction with the public—eliminating the
possibility of her ex-husband appearing at her job—and only “brief and superficial”
interactions with supervisors and coworkers. Moyer cannot point to any objective
evidence in the record for stricter restrictions, nor did her subjective testimony suggest
that she could not endure the minimal interaction the ALJ called for.
Moyer’s second argument—that the ALJ did not account for her moderate
limitations in concentration, persistence, or pace in the residual functional capacity—
also does not require reversal. Although an ALJ generally must incorporate limitations
suggested by doctors, see id., we do not require a precise match between the ALJ’s
language and the restrictions articulated by medical sources. Rather, we have upheld
the ALJ’s restrictions when it was “manifest that the ALJ’s alternative phrasing
specifically excluded those tasks that someone with the claimant’s limitations would be
unable to perform.” Moreno v. Berryhill, 882 F.3d 722, 730 (7th Cir. 2018) (quotation
marks omitted).

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Here the ALJ did not expressly adopt two recommended limitations. The first
limitation would preclude work with “tight quotas or timelines.” This language appears
nowhere in the residual functional capacity, yet the ALJ appeared to accept that opinion
anyway. The ALJ limited Moyer to no assembly-line work, and the only objective basis
for this limitation is the opinion that Moyer could not work jobs with tight quotas or
timelines. And on appeal Moyer does not explain how the ALJ’s language was
inadequate, for example, by showing that the jobs she was found to be capable of
require tight quotas or deadlines but not assembly-line labor. Cf. Hess v. O’Malley,
92 F.4th 671, 678 (7th Cir. 2024) (holding that a residual functional capacity limiting a
claimant to no “fast paced production quota[s],” such as assembly lines, accommodates
moderate limitations in concentration, persistence, and pace).
The second omitted limitation was that Moyer would be expected to be off task
up to 10% of the workday. The ALJ did not include this limitation, nor impose one that
appears to encapsulate it. But as the Commissioner explains, the vocational expert
testified that all the potential jobs for someone with Moyer’s residual functional
capacity would allow for an employee to be off task up to (and no more than) 10% of
the time. We therefore cannot say that the exclusion of this limitation made a difference
to the bottom-line disability conclusion. See Jozefyk v. Berryhill, 923 F.3d 492, 498 (7th Cir.
2019) (reviewing a residual functional capacity assessment for harmless error).
Moyer further contends that the ALJ did not set appropriate restrictions based on
her moderate limitation in concentration, persistence, or pace because the ALJ relied in
part on “mental status examinations” that are not meant to diagnose any psychological
problems, let alone work restrictions, because they screen for dementia. But the
regulations specifically permit an ALJ to rely on these examinations as evidence of
disability. 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 § 12.00(C)(2)(c). And the ALJ relied on
evidence from these examinations that both detracted from (for example, “speech, eye
contact, and behavior were appropriate”) and supported (for example, “anxiety in busy
stores”) a finding of disability. In any event, Moyer still fails to point to any objective or
material evidence for more aggressive restrictions related to concentration, persistence,
or pace, so we need not dwell on the best use of mental-status examinations.
AFFIRMED

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