Firas M. Ayoubi v. Latoya Hughes

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted March 28, 2024*
Decided April 2, 2024
Before
DIANE S. SYKES, Chief Judge
DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge
No. 23-2689
FIRAS M. AYOUBI,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
LATOYA HUGHES, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Central District of Illinois.
No. 23-cv-4121
Joe Billy McDade,
Judge.
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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Nos. 23-2689 & 23-2838 Page 2
No. 23-2838
FIRAS M. AYOUBI,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
LATOYA HUGHES, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Central District of Illinois.
No. 23-cv-3274
Michael M. Mihm,
Judge.
O R D E R
Firas Ayoubi, an Illinois prisoner, brought two similar lawsuits against prison
staff and Illinois public officials. In both cases, he moved for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis and for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. The district
judges each denied him leave to proceed in forma pauperis because Ayoubi had three
strikes under the Prison Litigation Reform Act and, they determined, did not qualify for
the imminent-danger exception. In addition, they each denied injunctive relief upon
concluding that Ayoubi failed to show a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits.
We now consolidate Ayoubi’s appeals for disposition and affirm.
Because we are reviewing dismissals on the pleadings, we take Ayoubi’s
well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Nelson v. City of Chicago, 992 F.3d 599, 602 (7th
Cir. 2021). Ayoubi has a movement disorder, which causes his limbs to twist and jerk
involuntarily. In the past, this has caused him physical pain when he uncontrollably
collided with walls or furniture or hit other prisoners, who retaliated in kind. Ayoubi
was recently moved from Dixon Correctional Center in Lee County, Illinois to Hill
Correctional Center in Galesburg, Illinois. Ayoubi asserts that Hill has more aggressive
inmates, smaller cells, and a much smaller medical staff. He received no treatment for
his movement disorder and was required to live in a two-man cell, even after pleading
with the defendants.
Ayoubi filed two federal complaints. In the first (which corresponds to Appeal
No. 23-2689), he alleged that the defendants were acting with deliberate indifference to
his safety in violation of the Eighth Amendment because they knew that the conditions
at Hill were exacerbating his serious medical condition but refused to place him in a
single cell. He also asserted that the defendants violated the Americans with Disabilities

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Nos. 23-2689 & 23-2838 Page 3
Act and the Rehabilitation Act by denying him a single cell despite providing them to
others (including gay prisoners) who asked to be housed separately.
In his second complaint (corresponding to Appeal No. 23-2838), Ayoubi
reiterated these claims and added one under the First and Fourteenth Amendments,
alleging that a prison official retaliated against him for his grievance by transferring
him to Hill. He argued that the transfer was retaliatory and that the removal from
Dixon unlawfully deprived him of access to certain programs and jobs. He also asserted
that the Illinois Department of Corrections was liable under Monell v. Department of
Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) and brought state law claims of fraud against one
defendant, breach of contract and unjust enrichment against the prison’s medical
contractor, and negligence against all defendants.
In each case, Ayoubi moved to proceed in forma pauperis and for a preliminary
injunction and temporary restraining order requiring Hill to move him to a single cell.
The judges denied the motions, with identical reasoning: Because Ayoubi had
accumulated strikes in prior cases, the Prison Litigation Reform Act prohibits him from
proceeding in forma pauperis unless he is in imminent danger of serious physical
injury. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). The judges concluded that the potential for harm from his
involuntary movements or from conflict with inmates was not sufficiently imminent.
And as to Ayoubi’s requests for injunctive relief, the judges concluded that he had not
demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits of his claims and that the
public interest did not weigh in favor of a preliminary injunction.
Ayoubi appeals these decisions, and in each case, he also moved to proceed in
forma pauperis on appeal. Motions panels of this court previously concluded in Appeal
No. 23-2689 and Appeal No. 23-2838, however, that he had not demonstrated imminent
danger of serious physical injury.
On appeal, Ayoubi argues that the district judges ignored evidence that
established both an imminent and irreversible harm, requiring the district judges to
both grant him leave to proceed in forma pauperis and order injunctive relief.
We turn first to the denials of Ayoubi’s motions in the district court to proceed
in forma pauperis, decisions we review de novo. 28 U.S.C. § 1291; Wallace v. Baldwin,
895 F.3d 481, 483 (7th Cir. 2018); Turley v. Gaetz, 625 F.3d 1005, 1007 n.3 (7th Cir. 2010).
Prisoners with three strikes cannot proceed in forma pauperis in federal court unless
they show they are “under imminent danger of serious physical injury.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(g). Assertions of imminent danger that reference only past injuries, or that state

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Nos. 23-2689 & 23-2838 Page 4
fears about the future without a reason to think that danger is imminent do not satisfy
this standard. Taylor v. Watkins, 623 F.3d 483, 485 (7th Cir. 2010); Sanders v. Melvin,
873 F.3d 957, 960 (7th Cir. 2017).
That is all Ayoubi has provided here, and so the exception does not apply. He
asserts that he has had violent encounters with cellmates after inadvertently hitting
them and fears it will happen again, chiefly because his current cellmate has expressed
anger about Ayoubi’s uncontrollable movements. But nothing in his pleadings suggests
that the potential danger is imminent or that the resultant harm, were it to occur, would
be serious. See Sanders, 873 F.3d at 960.
Before we review the denials of Ayoubi’s motions for injunctive relief, we must
determine whether we have jurisdiction to review these interlocutory rulings.
See Wheeler v. Talbot, 770 F.3d 550, 552 (7th Cir. 2014) (noting that appellate courts do not
have jurisdiction to review denials of temporary restraining orders). Ayoubi styled his
motions as requests for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, but
labels are not determinative. Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 86–88 (1974); Geneva
Assurance Syndicate, Inc. v. Med. Emergency Servs. Assocs. S.C., 964 F.2d 599, 600 (7th Cir.
1992). Instead, we look to the substance of the motion. Geneva, 964 F.2d at 600. The
hallmarks of a temporary restraining order are “its brevity, ex parte character, and…its
informality,” id.; F ED. R. C IV. P. 65(b)(2), while a preliminary injunction requires
notification to the opposing party, requests longer-term relief, and must be evaluated
with a longer, reasoned determination by the district judge than would be required for
a temporary restraining order. F ED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(2), 65(a)(1).
On balance, the factors favor interpreting the district judges’ orders as
addressing motions for a preliminary injunction as well as motions for a temporary
restraining order, giving us jurisdiction. True, Ayoubi requested injunctive relief before
the defendants were served with process and indeed before even obtaining the judges’
permission to file a complaint in forma pauperis. These factors suggest that only a
temporary restraining order would be appropriate. See Wheeler, 770 F.3d at 552. Here,
however, understanding the judges’ orders as addressing requests for both a temporary
restraining order and a preliminary injunction does not conflict with the notice
requirement because the judges denied the requests. Id. And Ayoubi seems to want
relief that would last longer than the 14-day lifespan of a temporary restraining order;
namely, a single cell, permanently. Finally, each judge issued a reasoned order, as
would be required for a preliminary injunction. F ED. R. C IV. P. 52(a)(2).

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Nos. 23-2689 & 23-2838 Page 5
Our conclusion that we have jurisdiction, however, does not help Ayoubi. He has
waived any argument that the district judges erred. See Bradley v. Village of Univ. Park, 59
F.4th 887, 897 (7th Cir. 2023). In his briefs, Ayoubi argues only that he was in danger of
irreparable harm. But each judge also concluded that Ayoubi failed to show that he had
a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits. Ayoubi’s arguments do not address
this reasoning, and he has therefore waived any argument against it. Id.
We end by observing that this is not the first repetitive appeal Ayoubi has filed in
this court, nor is it his first unsuccessful attempt to proceed in forma pauperis after
receiving three strikes. See Appeal No. 14-3553 (7th Cir.), Appeal No. 14-3681 (7th Cir.).
As he acknowledges in his complaint, his litigation history is extensive, and, in 2021, the
Northern District of Illinois barred him from filing further civil cases. Executive
Committee Order at 1, In re Firas M. Ayoubi, 1:20-cv-07288 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 26, 2021). We
warn him that further frivolous appeals may result in sanctions, including fines that, if
unpaid, may result in a bar on filing papers in civil lawsuits in any court within this
circuit. See Support Sys. Int’l, Inc. v. Mack, 45 F.3d 185, 186 (7th Cir. 1995).
AFFIRMED

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