Chong Leng Lee v. Nicholas Sanchez

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted March 28, 2024*
Decided April 5, 2024
Before
DIANE S. SYKES, Chief Judge
DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge
No. 22-3193
CHONG LENG LEE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
NICHOLAS SANCHEZ, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of
Wisconsin.
No. 21-CV-37
William E. Duffin,
Magistrate Judge.
O R D E R
Chong Lee sued three correctional officers at Waupun Correctional Institution in
Waupun, Wisconsin, alleging that they retaliated against him for exercising his right
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 22-3193 Page 2
under the First Amendment to file a grievance. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The magistrate
judge entered summary judgment for the defendants. We affirm.
One evening, after returning to his housing unit from the showers, Lee left his
cell to take mail to the mailbox. Officer Trevor Standish told Lee that he was not
allowed to leave his cell at that time and directed Lee to return to the cell and “lock in.”
(The prison’s handbook says that mail can be deposited only when prisoners leave their
cells for scheduled activities like meals and showers and that, upon return from those
activities, prisoners must remain in their cells with the doors locked.) Lee returned to
his cell but emerged a few minutes later with pen and paper. Standish again directed
Lee to return to his cell. Lee refused and, instead, asked for Standish’s name and badge
number. Lee asserts that he needed this information to write a grievance against
Standish for not letting him access the mailbox. Lee did not tell Standish that he
planned to write a grievance, but he assumes Standish knew his intent.
The parties disagree about what happened next. Standish testified that he told
Lee his name and that he did not have a badge number. According to Lee, Standish
refused to give his name. Standish says he ordered Lee several times to return to his
cell, Lee refused and began to shout, and Standish had to escort Lee to his cell. Lee
disagrees, saying he complied with Standish’s initial directive to return to his cell and
did not yell. Although these narratives differ, the parties agree that the interaction
caused other inmates to start yelling.
Standish told Lieutenant David Dingman about the disruption. Dingman
decided to place Lee in temporary segregation and instructed Standish to complete a
conduct report for Lee’s refusal to obey orders. According to Dingman, he was not
aware that Lee was intending to file a grievance about Standish. Lee, however, asserts
that Dingman saw him writing the grievance when he came to Lee’s cell to transport
him to segregation. Lee also says that he told Dingman he was writing a grievance.
Dingman then told his supervisor, Captain Nicholas Sanchez, about the incident
and Lee’s transfer to temporary segregation. Sanchez took no further action. Sanchez
testified that he did not know about Lee’s intent to file a grievance. Lee says that he
explained to Sanchez that his transfer to segregation was not for disobeying an order.
Lee sued Standish, Dingman, and Sanchez, alleging that they retaliated against
him for attempting to exercise his rights under the First Amendment. Standish, Lee
claimed, tried to prevent Lee from filing a grievance against him by refusing to give his

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No. 22-3193 Page 3
name. Dingman, Lee added, placed him in temporary lockup and issued a conduct
report because he tried to file a grievance against Standish. Lastly, Lee asserted that
Sanchez did nothing after Lee “explained the situation” to him. The defendants moved
for summary judgment, arguing that their actions were not motivated by Lee’s attempt
to file a grievance against Standish but by Lee’s noncompliant and disruptive behavior.
The magistrate judge, proceeding with the parties’ consent under 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(c), entered summary judgment for the defendants. He concluded that no
reasonable jury could find that Standish engaged in conduct likely to deter a protected
activity and that, in any event, Lee suffered no deprivation because he eventually filed a
grievance. Next, the magistrate judge determined that summary judgment was proper
for Dingman because Lee had presented no evidence from which a reasonable jury
could conclude that Lee’s First Amendment activity was a motivating factor in
Dingman’s decisions. And because neither Standish nor Dingman violated Lee’s
constitutional rights, Sanchez could not be held liable as a supervisor.
We review a summary judgment decision de novo in the light most favorable to
Lee, the non-movant. See Manuel v. Nalley, 966 F.3d 678, 680 (7th Cir. 2020). To succeed
on his First Amendment retaliation claims, Lee requires evidence that (1) he engaged in
an activity protected by the First Amendment; (2) he suffered a deprivation likely to
deter such activity; and (3) the protected activity was at least a motivating factor in the
deprivation. See id. The defendants do not contest that Lee satisfies the first prong.
To start, we agree with the magistrate judge that summary judgment for
Standish was appropriate. Lee argues that Standish’s refusal to give his name and his
instruction that Lee return to his cell amounted to conduct so “chilling” and
“intimidat[ing]” that it was likely to deter Lee’s efforts to write and file a grievance. The
test for this prong is an objective one: whether the alleged conduct “would likely deter a
person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in protected activity.” Douglas v.
Reeves, 964 F.3d 643, 646 (7th Cir. 2020). And, although Lee’s ultimate success in filing
his grievance “does not undermine his claim,” see id. at 646, Standish’s alleged conduct
was not adverse enough to meet this standard. See Holleman v. Zatecky, 951 F.3d 873, 882
(7th Cir. 2020) (transferring prisoner to a different prison, absent “some additional
aggravating factor,” unlikely to deter protected activity).
Generally, the severity of retaliatory conduct is a question of fact, but we can
resolve the issue as a matter of law when the injury alleged is “truly minimal.” Douglas,
964 F.3d at 647. Here, Lee asserts that Standish refused to give his name, which, Lee

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says, interfered with his efforts to file a grievance. But this conduct is hardly adverse.
Lee could have filed the grievance without Standish’s name. Indeed, nothing in the
Wisconsin Administrative Code requires a prisoner to include in a grievance the name
of the officer responsible for the harm. See WIS . A DMIN . C ODE DOC § 310.07; see also Jones
v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218–19 (2007) (same under federal law). Moreover, Lee does not
explain how Standish’s directive that Lee return to his cell at a time when prison rules
required it amounted “to a deprivation with some significant deterrent effect” on a
prisoner of ordinary firmness. See Douglas, 964 F.3d at 647–48.
Next, Lee suggests that Dingman violated his rights and was liable as a
supervisor, but these arguments are barely developed in Lee’s brief, and so we could
consider them waived. See F ED. R. A PP . P. 28(a)(8); Williams v. DeJoy, 88 F.4th 695, 705
(7th Cir. 2023). Regardless, they are without merit. Summary judgment was appropriate
for Dingman because the undisputed evidence shows that Lee’s attempt to write a
grievance against Standish was not a motivating factor in Dingman’s actions. A
“motivating factor” is a “causal link between the activity and the unlawful retaliation,”
and a defendant can rebut evidence of causation with evidence that the actions would
have occurred “regardless of the protected activity.” Manuel, 966 F.3d at 680. Here,
Dingman testified that he had a non-retaliatory motive for placing Lee in temporary
lockup and instructing Standish to complete a conduct report: Lee was “disobeying
orders and being disruptive.” Dingman also testified that he “would have taken the
same action” even if he knew Lee was trying to write a grievance. Because Lee offers no
evidence to counter this testimony, his retaliation claim fails. See id. at 681.
Finally, Lee does not contest the magistrate judge’s conclusion that Sanchez can
be liable only if Standish or Dingman violated Lee’s constitutional rights. Because we
agree that no such violation occurred, Lee’s attempt to hold Sanchez liable as a
supervisor also fails. See Stockton v. Milwaukee Cnty., 44 F.4th 605, 619 (7th Cir. 2022).
AFFIRMED

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