James Lee Mosley v. Indiana Department of Correction

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted April 15, 2024*
Decided April 17, 2024
Before
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge
MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge
JOSHUA P. KOLAR, Circuit Judge
No. 22-2722
JAMES LEE MOSLEY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTION, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of
Indiana, New Albany Division.
No. 4:21-cv-00167-SEB-DML
Sarah Evans Barker,
Judge.
O R D E R
James Mosley appeals the dismissal of his suit alleging that the defendants
unconstitutionally prosecuted and incarcerated him for a probation violation for which
he was later exonerated. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court screened James’s suit
and properly dismissed it for failure to state a claim; we thus affirm.
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 22-2722 Page 2
The events in this suit arose six months after Mosley began a prison term for
fraud, to be followed by probation. While serving his prison term, he wrote to one of his
victims. The letter purported to be an apology, but because the terms of his probation
prohibited him from contacting his victims, a prosecutor petitioned the Ripley Circuit
Court to revoke Mosley’s probation. After a hearing, a state judge extended Mosley’s
prison term to include three of his original six years of probation. On appeal, the
Indiana Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that Mosley did not violate the terms of
his probation because the victim to whom Mosley wrote was dead. While Mosley was
in prison, he received a COVID-19 vaccination, which Mosley says blinded his right
eye.
Mosley then turned to federal court. He sued the state judge, the prosecutor,
Ripley County Courts, Indiana Department of Correction, and The GEO Group, Inc.,
which provides correctional services. Mosely accused them of wrongfully incarcerating
him and causing his right-eye blindness for which he sought damages. The district
court screened Mosley’s complaint, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, and dismissed it. The court
ruled that the judge and prosecutor were absolutely immune from damages, Ripley
County Courts is not a suable entity, and Indiana Department of Correction as a branch
of the state is not amenable to suit. It also dismissed Mosley’s claims against The GEO
Group because he did not allege that any harm resulted from it. The court allowed
Mosley to file an amended complaint to cure its deficiencies.
Instead of curing the deficiencies in his original complaint, Mosley named a
different set of defendants, including Lieutenant Sheriff Randy Holt, whom Mosley
calls the “probable cause officer.” The only factual allegation that Mosley makes about
Holt (we may ignore his legal conclusions, see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)),
was that he signed an affidavit stating that “Mosley had sent a letter to” a victim, even
though Holt was “aware” that the victim was “deceased” for over two years. In an
effort to see if the records in Mosley’s state prosecution might add context to his
allegations, the district court consulted them. Ultimately it ruled that Mosley’s
complaint stated no claim against Holt and the new defendants. The court also denied
Mosley’s motion for recruited counsel to assist with preparing his complaint. It
reasoned that, with his education (high-school equivalency) and his coherent pleadings,
he was competent to prepare his own complaint, even with his difficulty seeing.
On appeal, Mosley challenges the dismissal of his suit, which we review de novo.
Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 776 (7th Cir. 2015). He first contends that the district court
wrongly refused to revive his claims against the judge and prosecutor, but we disagree.

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No. 22-2722 Page 3
In dismissing the original complaint, the court gave Mosley a chance to address its
deficiencies, but instead of doing so, Mosley dropped the judge and prosecutor as
defendants and sued a new set of defendants. Generally, “an amended complaint
supersedes an original complaint and renders the original complaint void.” Flannery v.
Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am., 354 F.3d 632, 638 n.1 (7th Cir. 2004). Mosley’s amended
complaint omitted the claims against the judge and prosecutor; thus the court properly
left them out of the case. See Anderson v. Donahoe, 699 F.3d 989, 997 (7th Cir. 2012).
Mosley next argues that the district court erred by dismissing his claim against
Holt. He criticizes the district court for consulting the state-court docket to understand
the context of that claim. Proceedings in state court are proper subjects of judicial notice,
Ewell v. Toney, 853 F.3d 911, 917 (7th Cir. 2017), but we need not consult them to
conclude that Mosley’s claim against Holt is legally defective. The fatal problem with
Mosley’s claim is that his amended complaint does not allege facts suggesting that Holt
influenced the length of Mosley’s custody. At most, Mosley alleges that Holt, knowing
that Mosley wrote to a dead victim, had no reason to prepare an affidavit stating that
Mosley violated the terms of his probation. But Mosely never alleged (in his original
complaint, amended complaint, or on appeal) that this affidavit led to or prolonged his
custody. Without an allegation that Holt affected Mosley’s custody, the complaint fails
to state a claim that Holt violated Mosley’s constitutional rights. See Manuel v. City of
Joliet, 580 U.S. 357, 364–65 (2017); Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 381 (2007).
Mosley also argues on appeal that Steve Sullivan, a deputy sheriff, violated his
civil rights during the state proceedings. But this argument goes nowhere because
Mosley never named Sullivan as a defendant in his amended complaint. See Myles v.
United States, 416 F.3d 551, 552 (7th Cir. 2005).
Finally, Mosely argues that the district court erred by denying his motion for
recruited counsel, a decision we review for an abuse of discretion. Pruitt v. Mote, 503
F.3d 647, 658 (7th Cir. 2007) (en banc). Mosley contends that he could not adequately
represent himself because he was in jail. But a person’s status in custody, by itself, is not
ground for the recruitment of counsel. See Bracey v. Grondin, 712 F.3d 1012, 1017–18
(7th Cir. 2013). Instead, a district court must weigh the complexity of the pro se
litigant’s case at the time of the request against the litigant’s competence to represent
himself. Pruitt, 503 F.3d at 655. Here, the court reasonably determined that the case at
the pleading stage was straightforward, and that Mosley’s ability to represent himself,
as reflected in his coherent filings and education, showed that he could handle this
stage of litigation. We thus see no abuse of discretion in the denial of Mosley’s motion.

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No. 22-2722 Page 4
Mosley also requests appointment of counsel on appeal. We deny this request
because counsel is not warranted under Pruitt.
AFFIRMED

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