Brian Haynes v. Bob Blum

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted April 15, 2024*
Decided April 17, 2024
Before
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge
MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge
JOSHUA P. KOLAR, Circuit Judge
No. 23-1368
BRIAN HAYNES,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
BOB BLUM, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of
Illinois.
No. 19-cv-912-NJR
Nancy J. Rosenstengel,
Chief Judge.
O R D E R
Brian Haynes, a state prisoner, sued medical professionals at the Pinckneyville
Correctional Center in Illinois, asserting that they were deliberately indifferent to his
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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torn Achilles tendon in violation of the Eighth Amendment. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The
district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, and we affirm.
I. Background
We consider the facts in the light most favorable to Haynes, the nonmoving
party. See Stewardson v. Biggs, 43 F.4th 732, 734 (7th Cir. 2022). On March 26, 2018,
Haynes injured his ankle while playing basketball. He was immediately brought to the
health-care unit in a wheelchair. Haynes told Bob Blum (a nurse practitioner) that he
“heard a loud pop” in his ankle. Blum observed severe pain and swelling of the ankle.
He diagnosed Haynes with a sprained ankle, ordered an x-ray, and provided an ace
wrap, crutches, and pain medication. Blum directed Haynes to rest, elevate the ankle,
and return to the health-care unit if pain, numbness, or skin discoloration continued.
The x-ray, performed later that day, found no sign of fracture or dislocation. (An x-ray
would not show signs of torn tendons or ligaments.)
In early May 2018, Haynes requested a follow-up appointment; he saw Tim
Adesanya (a physician’s assistant who was filling in for Blum) a few weeks later.
Haynes showed Adesanya a lump on the back of his heel and requested an MRI.
Adesanya determined that the ankle sprain had healed, and no additional treatment
was necessary—though he provided acetaminophen to be taken for pain as needed.
Haynes says that he pressed Adesanya to order an MRI, after which Adesanya “kicked
[him] out of his office” and told him he would not schedule additional testing, believing
there was no medical need for it.
Still experiencing pain a few days after his appointment with Adesanya, Haynes
submitted an emergency grievance to the warden asking for an MRI. The warden told
Haynes his grievance was not an emergency and referred it to the normal process. The
following month, a counselor denied the grievance, concluding that Haynes had
received appropriate treatment for a sprained ankle and that further complaints could
be dealt with by the health-care unit.
In August 2018, Haynes saw a non-party nurse for his ankle. The nurse observed
severe pain, inability to put pressure on the toes, trouble walking, and a “deformity” to
the ankle—the first time the medical records refer to any kind of lump. She referred
Haynes to a non-party doctor, who noted a deformed Achilles tendon and ordered an
ultrasound. The ultrasound showed a possible tear of the Achilles tendon, so an MRI
was scheduled for November. The MRI showed a “high-grade near full-thickness”
Achilles tear. Because Haynes had been walking on his ankle, surgery was the only way

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to repair the tendon. In February 2019, Haynes had surgery to reattach the tendon. (He
later tore it again.)
Haynes sued Blum, three named doctors, and two “John Doe” providers under
42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that they were deliberately indifferent to his injury, in
violation of the Eighth Amendment. He also brought a claim of intentional infliction of
emotional distress under Illinois law, asserting that the defendants’ failure to follow the
treatment protocol for a torn Achilles resulted in severe emotional distress and mental
anguish. The claims against everyone but Blum and Adesanya, who was identified as
one of the Doe defendants, were dismissed early in the proceedings. The district court
denied a motion for summary judgment based on failure to exhaust administrative
remedies, and so the case proceeded against Blum and Adesanya.
After discovery, Blum and Adesanya moved for summary judgment, and the
district court granted the motion. The court assumed, contrary to the defendants’
contention that Haynes had incurred a new ankle injury in August 2018, that Haynes
had an Achilles injury as far back as his accident in March. But it concluded that Haynes
did not offer evidence that any misdiagnosis of the injury before August amounted to
deliberate indifference, rather than negligence at most. The court also determined that
the treatment Haynes received did not fall outside “all bounds of decency” and thus did
not support a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress.
II. Analysis
Haynes appeals, arguing that he adduced sufficient evidence for both claims to
withstand summary judgment. We review a summary judgment decision de novo.
See Arce v. Wexford Health Sources Inc., 75 F.4th 673, 678 (7th Cir. 2023).
Haynes’s deliberate indifference claim falls short because he lacked evidence that
Blum or Adesanya failed to exercise medical judgment in responding to his injured
ankle. To establish a violation of the Eighth Amendment through deliberate
indifference, Haynes must show that he had an objectively serious medical condition
that the defendants knew of and consciously disregarded. See Farmer v. Brennan,
511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). Medical personnel are deliberately indifferent only if their
treatment departs so substantially from accepted professional standards as to
demonstrate that they did not exercise professional judgment at all. See Brown v.
Osmundson, 38 F.4th 545, 551 (7th Cir. 2022). “Mistakes in medical judgment, even
negligence, are insufficient to support deliberate indifference.” Stockton v. Milwaukee
Cnty., 44 F.4th 605, 616 (7th Cir. 2022).

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Here, Haynes has no evidence that the failure to diagnose him with a torn
Achilles tendon—assuming he had this injury in March and May 2018—resulted from
anything but mistaken medical judgment. Regarding Blum’s care, Haynes contends that
the “pop” he mentioned should have pointed Blum to a torn Achilles. But Blum
considered Haynes’s symptoms and provided care for a sprain based on his medical
judgment: medication, an x-ray, crutches, an ace wrap, and orders to rest the ankle and
schedule a follow-up, if needed. Similarly, nothing in Adesanya’s notes indicates that he
departed from professional judgment or deliberately ignored signs of an Achilles injury;
rather, he believed based on his observation of minimal swelling that the previously
diagnosed sprained ankle had healed. Haynes faults Adesanya for not ordering an MRI,
but he cannot overcome the evidence that this decision was the product of Adesanya’s
judgment—even if mistaken—that Haynes did not require further treatment other than
pain relief as needed. See Johnson v. Dominguez, 5 F.4th 818, 825 (7th Cir. 2021).
Nor did Haynes adequately support his argument that the lump on his ankle and
pain lasting months after the injury prove that the defendants continued an ineffective
course of treatment or deliberately delayed proper treatment. Persisting in an
ineffective course of treatment can create a jury question about a doctor’s deliberate
indifference. See Petties v. Carter, 836 F.3d 722, 729–30 (7th Cir. 2016) (en banc). But a
plaintiff must show that the medical provider knew the treatment was ineffective and
persisted anyway. Id. at 728. Haynes has not made that showing. He saw both Blum and
Adesanya for treatment only once, and he has no evidence that either was personally
aware that the ankle continued to bother Haynes after these instances, or that either
disregarded superior treatment options. The x-ray showed that Haynes’s ankle was not
fractured or dislocated; Adesanya observed that his condition had improved after two
months of treatment; and, for three months after his follow-up appointment, Haynes
did not complain of ankle pain during medical appointments—with anyone.
Haynes’s evidence also comes up short on his state-law claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress. To prove intentional infliction of emotional distress
under Illinois law, Haynes must show that the defendants’ conduct was extreme and
outrageous, extending beyond all bounds of decency. See Feltmeier v. Feltmeier,
798 N.E.2d 75, 83 (Ill. 2003). We agree with the district court that, based on the evidence
in the record, no reasonable factfinder could conclude that Blum’s treatment or
Adesanya’s treatment was extreme and outrageous or that the treatment caused Haynes
distress. Id. It was not beyond all bounds of decency for Blum to diagnose and provide
treatment consistent with an ankle sprain or for Adesanya to decline an MRI request

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based on his medical judgment. See Diggs v. Ghosh, 850 F.3d 905, 911 (7th Cir. 2017)
(applying Illinois law).
AFFIRMED

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