United States of America v. Dylan Ostrum

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 23-1364
U NITED STATES OF A MERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
DYLAN O STRUM ,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.
No. 21-cr-00069 — Sarah Evans Barker, Judge.
____________________
A RGUED F EBRUARY 22, 2024 — DECIDED A PRIL 25, 2024
____________________
Before SYKES, Chief Judge, and R IPPLE and ST. EVE, Circuit
Judges.
ST. EVE, Circuit Judge. During a search of Dylan Ostrum’s
home for firearms and narcotics, Ostrum revealed that he had
moved his belongings, including his car, to his father’s house
two hours away. It turns out the car was not at his father’s
(officers found it nearby) and was not even Ostrum’s—a
rental company had reported it stolen. But Ostrum’s belong-
ings were inside: a search of the stolen car revealed a gun,

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2 No. 23-1364
methamphetamine, and marijuana, all stashed in two safes.
The questions on appeal are whether Ostrum has standing to
challenge the search of the stolen car, and if he does, whether
that search violated his Fourth Amendment rights. Because
Ostrum has failed to meet his burden on standing, and be-
cause the existence of probable cause otherwise justified the
search under the automobile exception to the Fouth Amend-
ment’s warrant requirement, we find the answer on both
counts to be no, and we affirm.
I. Background
A. Factual Background
The investigation into Dylan Ostrum began after law en-
forcement agents executed a search warrant at the Indianap-
olis home of Ricky Blythe. While Ostrum was not on the in-
vestigators’ radar before the search of Blythe’s home, that
quickly changed. Agents found numerous text messages be-
tween Blythe and Ostrum on Blythe’s phone showing that the
two repeatedly sold each other methamphetamine and mari-
juana.
The investigation progressed quickly from there. Investi-
gators learned that Ostrum had felony convictions for bur-
glary and possession of marijuana and methamphetamine.
They also became aware of statements from three confidential
informants, who credibly claimed to have seen Ostrum selling
firearms and narcotics out of his home in Indiana. The inform-
ants confirmed that Ostrum stored several of his own firearms
at the residence, and that he would possess pound quantities
of marijuana and methamphetamine at a time. One informant
reported that he had delivered Ostrum several pounds of
methamphetamine each week for the past several months.

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No. 23-1364 3
Another informant stated that Ostrum drove a light blue
Chrysler 300 sedan, which law enforcement observed parked
outside his residence. Further investigation revealed that the
Chrysler’s license plates, although registered in Ostrum’s
name, did not correspond to the Chrysler.
Based on this evidence, law enforcement obtained a valid
warrant to search Ostrum’s residence. The warrant author-
ized the search and seizure of firearms, narcotics, and other
drug distribution materials. It also permitted officers to seize
keys “relating to safe deposit boxes.”
The search turned up little—some ammunition, a small
amount of marijuana, and a keychain—but Ostrum was pre-
sent and willingly spoke with law enforcement officers. He
identified the seized keys as belonging to a safe, which he em-
phasized “literally ha[d] nothing inside of it.” He also admit-
ted that he had obtained methamphetamine and a gun from
Blythe, that he knew of Blythe’s arrest, and that he was ex-
pecting a delivery of drugs from Blythe on the day of his ar-
rest.
Yet Ostrum disclaimed having guns and drugs around, in-
sisting that he “got rid” of them after Blythe’s arrest. His wife,
he said, threatened to divorce him if he did not. He explained,
“I don’t have any of that stuff here. I don’t have any ‘go’
[methamphetamine] …. I got bud [marijuana]. No guns.” But
when officers asked where he had taken the contraband, Os-
trum was evasive. He confirmed only that he had taken
“pretty much” “everything” to his father’s house in Pend-
leton, Indiana.
The Chrysler was not on the premises at the time of the
search, so law enforcement probed Ostrum on its

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4 No. 23-1364
whereabouts. Unprompted, Ostrum clarified that “everybody
always thought that [car] … was mine and really I was just
renting it.” He provided the keys and told officers it was also
at his father’s house in Pendleton. So too, he averred, was the
missing safe.
Law enforcement soon located the Chrysler—not in Pend-
leton, but in a nearby driveway. The home’s occupant gave
law enforcement consent to enter the property and conduct a
“free air” dog sniff of the vehicle’s exterior. The dog did not
alert for the presence of drugs. A search of the Chrysler’s Ve-
hicle Identification Number (“VIN”), however, revealed that
a rental car company had reported it stolen several months
earlier.
Officers searched the vehicle and discovered two safes in-
side. They used the keys seized from Ostrum pursuant to the
warrant to unlock both. Inside they found a loaded Glock
9mm pistol and matching ammunition, 513.5 grams of meth-
amphetamine, around two pounds of marijuana, a digital
scale, and what appeared to be a drug ledger.
B. Procedural Background
Law enforcement arrested and charged Ostrum with one
count of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute meth-
amphetamine, 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846; one count of posses-
sion with intent to distribute methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a)(1); one count of possession with intent to distribute
marijuana, 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(D); and one count of
being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
Before trial, Ostrum moved to suppress the evidence
found inside the Chrysler, arguing that it was the fruit of an
illegal search. He did not request an evidentiary hearing. The

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No. 23-1364 5
district court denied the motion, finding that (1) Ostrum
lacked standing to challenge the search because the car was
stolen; (2) the search was valid under the automobile excep-
tion because officers had probable cause to believe it con-
tained contraband; and (3) the search was otherwise permis-
sible as an inventory search of a lawfully impounded vehicle.
The case went to trial, and a jury convicted Ostrum on all
counts. He received a 240-month sentence.
II. Analysis
Ostrum appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to
suppress. He maintains that he has standing to challenge the
searches of the Chrysler and the safes, and that neither the
automobile nor inventory search exceptions justified them.
We evaluate his claims under a “mixed standard”: we review
the district court’s legal conclusions and conclusions on
mixed questions of law and fact de novo, and we review its
factual findings for clear error. United States v. Hudson, 86
F.4th 806, 810 (7th Cir. 2023) (citations omitted). The existence
or absence of probable cause is one such mixed question of
law and fact that gets a fresh look. United States v. Williams,
627 F.3d 247, 251 (7th Cir. 2010).
A. Standing
Fourth Amendment standing is not “jurisdictional,” but
instead reflects the “idea that a person must have a cognizable
Fourth Amendment interest in the place searched before seek-
ing relief for an unconstitutional search.” Byrd v. United States,
584 U.S. 395, 410 (2018). The question is whether a defendant
possesses a “legitimate expectation of privacy in the prem-
ises” searched. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978). Os-
trum asserts distinct expectations of privacy in the stolen

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6 No. 23-1364
Chrysler and safes. We consider each in turn, recognizing that
he bears the burden of establishing both a subjectively and
objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in each place
searched. United States v. Walton, 763 F.3d 655, 658 (7th Cir.
2014).
1. The Chrysler
The Chrysler here was stolen. This makes one thing certain
under our caselaw: if Ostrum stole the car or otherwise knew
it was stolen, he would have no reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in it or its contents, and thus no standing to object to its
search. See Byrd, 584 U.S. at 409 (“[A] person present in a sto-
len automobile at the time of the search may [not] object to the
lawfulness of the search of the automobile.” (alteration in
original) (quoting Rakas, 439 U.S. at 141 n.9)); Walton, 763 F.3d
at 665 (“A driver of a stolen car does not have standing to chal-
lenge a car search.”).
The wrinkle here is that Ostrum denies knowing the car
was stolen. This raises the question: does the unwitting driver
of a stolen vehicle stand in the same Fourth Amendment po-
sition as a car thief? That, however, is a question we need not
reach today. Even if a defendant’s knowledge of the stolen na-
ture of the vehicle has some bearing on his standing to chal-
lenge its search, “[the defendant] bears the burden of showing
that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy.” United States
v. Sawyer, 929 F.3d 497, 499 (7th Cir. 2019); see also United States
v. Carlisle, 614 F.3d 750, 758 (7th Cir. 2010). So, if Ostrum
wanted to show that he was innocently driving the stolen
Chrysler, he needed to offer evidence to that effect. He has
not.

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No. 23-1364 7
While Ostrum now denies knowing the car was stolen, he
has failed to identify any evidence to support this assertion.
See Ho v. Donovan, 569 F.3d 677, 682 (7th Cir. 2009) (“Asser-
tions in an appellate brief are no substitute for evidence.”).
And while Ostrum did tell law enforcement that the car was
a rental that did not belong to him (true, as far as it goes), that
says nothing about his knowledge of the vehicle’s stolen na-
ture. Further, the Chrysler displayed license plates registered
to Ostrum but associated with another vehicle, even though
Ostrum claimed it was a rental. Ostrum cannot meet his bur-
den of proof on this record.
Ostrum attempts to evade this burden by offloading it
onto the government. Ostrum contends that because he
claims a possessory interest in the car, the burden shifts to the
government to prove he knew it was stolen. We have never
held that merely claiming a possessory interest in a vehicle
shifts the burden to the government to prove that the asserted
privacy interest is not legitimate. We certainly did not do so
in United States v. Sholola, the only case on which Ostrum re-
lies. 124 F.3d 803, 816 n.14 (7th Cir. 1997). Sholola simply as-
sumed the defendant had standing to challenge the search. Id.
(“The record before us does not disclose how Sholola came to
be in possession of the Acura, i.e., whether it was stolen or
used with or without permission. We will assume, for pur-
poses of our analysis, that the defendant had a legitimate ex-
pectation of privacy in the Acura, and thus has standing to
challenge the search.”). It did not shift that burden onto the
government. So, the burden of proving a privacy interest
never left Ostrum’s shoulders. His failure to meet it means he
cannot challenge the search of the Chrysler. See Byrd, 584 U.S.
at 409.

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8 No. 23-1364
2. The Safes
Ostrum also asserts a distinct expectation of privacy in the
safes. He has none given the safes were found inside a stolen
vehicle. While a person lawfully present in a vehicle might be
able to assert a privacy interest in a container inside (even
without any expectation of privacy in the car itself), see, e.g.,
United States v. Barber, 777 F.3d 1303, 1305 (11th Cir. 2015);
United States v. Iraheta, 764 F.3d 455, 462 (5th Cir. 2014), a per-
son wrongfully present in a stolen vehicle is differently situ-
ated. A stolen car is not a safehouse that society is prepared to
recognize as reasonable. See United States v. Hargrove, 647 F.2d
411, 412 (4th Cir. 1981) (“A person who cannot assert a legiti-
mate claim to a vehicle cannot reasonably expect that the ve-
hicle is a private repository for his personal effects.”); see also
Sawyer, 929 F.3d at 500 (finding that a trespasser lacked stand-
ing to challenge the search of a backpack when he “d[id] not
assert that his—and therefore his backpack’s—presence was
lawful or offer any basis for his privacy interest in the home”);
United States v. White, 504 F. App’x 168, 172 (3d Cir. 2012) (re-
jecting the defendant’s claim that he had a legitimate expe-
cation of privacy in the contents of locked box in a stolen
minivan). Under the circumstances here, the driver of a stolen
vehicle lacks standing as to any of its contents, “whether or
not they are enclosed in some sort of a container.”1 Hargrove,
647 F.2d at 412. Ostrum therefore can challenge neither search.
1 The Supreme Court’s treatment of containers, cars, and privacy in-
terests under the automobile exception allows us to equate property in a
movable container with loose property discovered in a vehicle compart-
ment. In United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 817 (1982), and California v.
Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 579–80 (1991), the Court held that searches justified

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No. 23-1364 9
B. Automobile Exception
Even assuming Ostrum has standing to object to the
search of the Chrysler, his suppression arguments fail. The
searches of the car and safes fall squarely within the automo-
bile exception.
“Warrantless searches are per se unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment, subject to only certain exceptions.”
United States v. Kizart, 967 F.3d 693, 695 (7th Cir. 2020) (citing
Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338 (2009)). One of those is the
automobile exception, which allows law enforcement to con-
duct a “warrantless search of a vehicle … so long as there is
probable cause to believe it contains contraband or evidence
of illegal activity.” United States v. Washburn, 383 F.3d 638, 641
(7th Cir. 2004) (citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132
(1925)). Authority to search the vehicle extends to all contain-
ers inside where there exists probable cause to believe they
contain contraband or evidence. United States v. Hays, 90 F.4th
904, 907 (7th Cir. 2024) (citing Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 580). That
is, “[i]f probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully
stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of every part of the vehicle
and its contents that may conceal the object of the search.” Wy-
oming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 301 (1999) (quotation marks
omitted) (emphasis in original). Probable cause is “based on a
totality of the circumstances” and allows officers to “draw
reasonable inferences from the facts based on their training
under the automobile exception extend to all containers inside, so long as
law enforcement officers have probable cause to believe they contain evi-
dence or contraband.

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10 No. 23-1364
and experience.” United States v. Zahursky, 580 F.3d 515, 521
(7th Cir. 2009).
Law enforcement had ample probable cause to believe the
Chrysler contained contraband. The same wealth of evidence
that allowed law enforcement to lawfully search Ostrum’s
residence for guns and drugs in the first place, coupled with
Ostrum’s statements during the search, gave law enforcement
probable cause to search the Chrysler. Indeed, during the
search Ostrum himself admitted to getting “rid of” of his guns
and drugs and moving “everything,” Chrysler and safes in-
cluded, to his father’s house.
Ostrum argues that law enforcement had no reason to be-
lieve that evidence would be in the Chrysler, as opposed to an-
ywhere else. Yet in his statements to officers, Ostrum dis-
cussed the car, the safes, and the contraband together, imply-
ing that he used the Chrysler to move his belongings. That,
coupled with his misdirection about the car’s location, gave
law enforcement good reason to think that the missing car,
the missing safes, and the missing contraband would be in the
same place.
We are equally unpersuaded by Ostrum’s other argu-
ments. Ostrum’s claim that officers had no basis to think that
the safes were in the Chrysler is beside the point. What matters
is whether officers had probable cause to believe that guns
and drugs were in car. They did. And to the extent Ostrum
complains that it was insufficient for officers to rely on their
knowledge that “drug traffickers frequently store their con-
traband in vehicles,” we have long held that law enforcement
experience is one of the many factors that can contribute to
probable cause. See, e.g., Hays, 90 F.4th at 907–08.

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No. 23-1364 11
Ostrum also argues that the dog’s failure to alert for the
presence of narcotics dispelled any probable cause that may
have existed. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 430 F.3d 345, 356
(6th Cir. 2005). We disagree. Even if a negative dog sniff could
impact the existence of probable cause to search for narcotics
(a question we do not take up here), the possible presence of
narcotics was not the only source of probable cause. Firearms
were also in play. The null dog sniff did nothing to undermine
officers’ probable cause to believe that the Chrysler contained
them.2
Finally, Ostrum appeals to Collins v. Virginia to argue that
the automobile exception cannot justify the search of the
Chrysler because it occurred on the curtilage of a home. 584
U.S. 586, 596 (2018). A home, but not Ostrum’s home, and that
makes a big difference. Collins does not categorically prohibit
warrantless searches of cars parked on any curtilage, but ra-
ther forbids using the exception to justify an otherwise imper-
missible trespass. Id.; United States v. Richmond, 924 F.3d 404,
414–15 (7th Cir. 2019).3 There was no trespass here—officers
obtained the homeowner’s written consent to enter the
2 No circuit has found that a null dog sniff always dispels probable
cause. Indeed, the Sixth Circuit specifically distinguished its holding from
cases where, as here, “there was probable cause to justify a more extended
detention.” Davis, 430 F.3d at 356.
3 In United States v. Banks, we held “that the automobile exception—
which ordinarily allows officers to conduct a warrantless search of a car
based on probable cause—does not apply to a vehicle parked in a partially
enclosed driveway.” 60 F.4th 386, 390 (7th Cir. 2023). Banks, like Collins,
and unlike here, featured officers’ trespass onto the curtilage.

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12 No. 23-1364
property. Their right of access was lawful, and Collins is thus
inapposite.4
Under the totality of circumstances—which here includes
the evidence of Ostrum’s past narcotics dealing and firearm
possession, his statements to law enforcement, and the offic-
ers’ experience—there was ample probable cause to believe
the Chrysler contained contraband.5 The searches of the
Chrysler and safes thus safely fall within the automobile ex-
ception.6
A FFIRMED
4 Ostrum’s appeal to Collins suffers from another shortcoming: Os-
trum lacks standing to challenge entry onto another’s curtilage. See Car-
lisle, 614 F.3d at 756 (“Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights which
… may not be vicariously asserted.” (quoting Rakas, 439 U.S. at 133–34)).
5 Separately, we have held that “[w]hen a car is reported stolen and is
recovered, the police have probable cause to look in the car for some evi-
dence of ownership.” United States v. Edwards, 769 F.3d 509, 516 (7th Cir.
2014). Once officers found out the Chrysler was stolen, the need to confirm
ownership supplied an independent basis for the search.
6 Because we resolve this case under the automobile exception, we do
not consider Ostrum’s arguments under the inventory search doctrine.

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