EDDIE L. HATCH JR. and MICHELLE DAVIS-HATCH v. Tom Barrett

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted April 24, 2024*
Decided April 30, 2024
Before
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge
DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge
No. 23-3051
EDDIE L. HATCH JR. and MICHELLE
DAVIS-HATCH,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
TOM BARRETT, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of
Wisconsin.
No. 20-CV-1791-JPS
J.P. Stadtmueller,
Judge.
* This successive appeal has been submitted to the original panel under
Operating Procedure 6(b). Judge Kanne died after the first decision and has been
replaced for this panel by Judge Easterbrook. We have agreed to decide the case
without oral argument because the briefs and record adequately present the facts and
legal arguments, and oral argument would not significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP .
P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 23-3051 Page 2
O R D E R
Eddie Hatch Jr. and Michelle Davis-Hatch believe that the City of Milwaukee,
Milwaukee’s then-Mayor Tom Barrett, and others rejected their effort to buy a
commercial building because of racial discrimination, in violation of the Civil Rights
Act of 1866 and the Fair Housing Act. Early in the proceedings, the district court
dismissed certain counts and defendants. The court ultimately entered summary
judgment against the Hatches on the remaining counts. In this appeal, the Hatches
principally challenge the district court’s denial of their initial attempt to amend the
complaint. We affirm.
In 2020, the Hatches brought this suit for racial discrimination under the Fair
Housing Act against more than 20 entities involved with the denial of their commercial
bid. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604. The district court dismissed the Hatches’ complaint for failure
to state a claim because the Act covers residences and not commercial buildings.
Recognizing that the Hatches needed to plead merely their grievances and not a legal
theory, see, e.g., Johnson v. City of Shelby, 574 U.S. 10, 12 (2014) (per curiam), we vacated
the dismissal order as premature and remanded with instructions to afford the Hatches
an opportunity to amend the complaint and possibly plead their claim under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1982. Hatch v. City of Milwaukee, No. 21-2805, 2022 WL 897676 (7th Cir. Mar. 28, 2022).
But the Hatches’ efforts to replead bogged down. Their first attempt invoked
multiple legal theories—fraud, intentional infliction of emotional distress, defamation,
and racial discrimination—and ran 85 pages, supplemented with another 272 pages of
exhibits. The district court denied the motion to amend, describing it as a “far cry” from
the “short and plain statement” envisioned by Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. The Hatches filed a second amended complaint, removing the exhibits and
excising the extensive references to them. The court accepted this version.
Several defendants then filed a flurry of motions to dismiss, which the court
granted in part and denied in part. The court permitted the Hatches to proceed with
several counts that alleged racial discrimination surrounding the bidding process,
see 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981–1983, and a theory of defamation against an individual defendant.
But the court dismissed, with prejudice, other counts that it found inapplicable,
including theories that the rejected bid amounted to destruction of government
property or contracts, see 18 U.S.C. § 1361, or that they had a constitutional right to be
free from defamation. And the court dismissed—but with leave to amend—theories of
fraud and racketeering, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, 1961–1968; intentional infliction of
emotional distress; or a municipal policy or custom of racial discrimination.

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No. 23-3051 Page 3
The Hatches responded with a document they styled as a third amended
complaint. In it, the Hatches rehashed the procedural background and expressed
particular displeasure with the court’s rejection of their first amended complaint. They
insisted that the first amended complaint did not have the deficiencies that the district
court identified with respect to the second amended complaint.
The court, noting that the Hatches’ submission was not an amended complaint
but merely criticism of prior rulings, denied the motion. The court dismissed with
prejudice the outstanding counts for which the Hatches had leave to amend but
permitted the Hatches to litigate their counts of racial discrimination against all non-
municipal defendants, as well as a state-law defamation theory against an individual
defendant.
After discovery, the court entered summary judgment on the Hatches’ remaining
counts. Regarding their arguments under § 1981 and § 1982, the court explained that the
Hatches had not proffered evidence that their bid was denied on account of their race.
As for their § 1983 civil conspiracy theory, the court concluded that the Hatches could
show neither that a conspiracy existed nor that any supposed conspiracy deprived them
of their constitutional rights. And concerning the state-law defamation argument, the
court determined that the challenged statement was a matter of opinion, arguably not
false, and lacked negative connotation.
On appeal, the Hatches largely confine their challenge to the district court’s
rejection of their first amended complaint. Given the complexity and number of their
theories of liability, they contest the court’s reliance on Rule 8(a) and its command that
complaints provide a “short and plain statement.” They add, in connection with their
allegations of fraud, that Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure required
them to “state with particularity” the basis of their claim. And they maintain that their
first amended complaint mirrored their second amended complaint, minus the lengthy
attachments and references.
The district court did not commit reversible error here. “[A] district court does
not abuse its discretion by denying a motion for leave to amend when the plaintiff fails
to establish that the proposed amendment would cure the deficiencies identified in the
earlier complaint.” See Pension Tr. Fund for Operating Eng’rs v. Kohl’s Corp., 895 F.3d 933,
941–42 (7th Cir. 2018) (alteration in original) (quoting Gonzalez-Koeneke v. West, 791 F.3d
801, 807 (7th Cir. 2015)). Here, the court afforded the Hatches multiple opportunities to
shore up deficiencies it had noted. The Hatches could have taken up the court’s
invitation to file another amended complaint and address the identified deficiencies or

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No. 23-3051 Page 4
they could have told us in their briefing what more they would plead. But they did
neither. Reversal is unwarranted if the plaintiffs cannot identify how they would cure
defects in their complaint. Id. at 942.
The Hatches contend that the court’s purportedly improper rejection of their first
amended complaint reflected bias that affected the entirety of the proceedings. But
adverse legal rulings by themselves are not enough to show impermissible bias. Liteky v.
United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994).
Finally, the Hatches do not challenge the summary judgment order dismissing
their counts of racial discrimination, so we consider those waived. Bradley v. Village of
University Park, 59 F.4th 887, 897 (7th Cir. 2023).
We have reviewed the Hatches’ remaining arguments; none merits discussion.
AFFIRMED

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