John Doe v. Loyola University Chicago

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-2925
JOHN DOE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
LOYOLA UNIVERSITY CHICAGO,
Defendant-Appellee.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 18-cv-7335 — Steven C. Seeger, Judge.
____________________
ARGUED APRIL 20, 2023 — DECIDED MAY 3, 2024
____________________
Before EASTERBROOK, ROVNER, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.
EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. Loyola University Chicago ex-
pelled John Doe after concluding that he had engaged in sex-
ual activity with Jane Roe, a fellow student, without her
properly obtained consent. Contending that the University
discriminates against men, Doe sued under Title IX of the Ed-
ucation Amendments Act of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–88, plus
Illinois contract law. The district court granted summary

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2 No. 22-2925
judgment to Loyola. 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175968 (N.D. Ill.
Sept. 28, 2022).
The parties’ appellate briefs did not explain Doe’s use of a
pseudonym, so we directed them to file post-argument mem-
oranda on that subject. The memoranda mention facts that
lead us to ask whether the case is moot. We now remand to
the district court to address both mootness and anonymity.
The memoranda told us that Doe was admi_ed to another
university in 2017, soon after his expulsion from Loyola, and
graduated with honors in 2018. The normal remedy in cases
of this kind—an injunction directing the college to readmit the
expelled student—is therefore unavailable. (Doe does not
contend that he wants to a_end Loyola for post-graduate ed-
ucation.) As for damages: Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181
(2002), holds that punitive damages are unavailable in private
litigation under laws based on the Spending Clause. Title IX
is such a law; it applies only to institutions that accept federal
funds. 20 U.S.C. §1681(a). Cummings v. Premier Rehab Keller,
P.L.L.C., 596 U.S. 212 (2022), adds that damages for emotional
distress also are unavailable under Spending-Clause statutes.
That leaves standard compensatory damages. See Hayden
v. Greensburg Community School Corp., 743 F.3d 569, 583 (7th
Cir. 2014). But what could they be in a case such as this? Doe’s
brief does not explain what remedy he seeks, and the district
judge did not mention this subject. Compensatory damages
may depend on the resolution of factual disputes about what
happened to Doe following his expulsion, disputes best re-
solved by a district judge. We do not say that Doe must win
on damages to have a live claim, see Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678
(1946), but, unless compensatory damages are an option, this
suit is not justiciable. That makes a remand necessary.

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No. 22-2925 3
Anonymity is the other issue requiring a_ention on re-
mand. District Judge Feinerman, who handled this case until
his resignation, authorized Doe to proceed under a pseudo-
nym. He gave a brief oral explanation:
Other courts in similar cases involving these kinds of hearings at
colleges have allowed the plaintiffs to proceed as Does, and I don’t
see any reason to chart a different path in this case.
It would defeat the purpose of the suit if the plaintiff were named
because this is all about the plaintiff preserving his reputation and
his future employment prospects. And if the plaintiff were
named, it would be preLy easy to put two and two together and
figure out who the person whom Loyola deemed to be the victim
was.
This comes to three reasons: (1) anonymity is the norm in Title
IX litigation; (2) plaintiff wants to keep out of public view Loy-
ola’s finding that he commi_ed misconduct; and (3) the victim
is entitled to anonymity. We address them in turn.
First, although anonymity may be common in Title IX
suits, it must be justified in each case. “Title IX [does not create
an] easement across the norm of using litigants’ names.” Doe
v. Indiana University, No. 22-1576 (7th Cir. Apr. 26, 2024), slip
op. 9. Complaints normally must name all parties. Fed. R. Civ.
P. 10(a). Exceptions such as the use of initials for minors, Fed.
R. Civ. P. 5.2(a)(3), may apply to some first-year college stu-
dents, but Doe was an adult when he filed this suit. “[J]udicial
proceedings, civil as well as criminal, are to be conducted in
public.” Doe v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wisconsin, 112
F.3d 869, 872 (7th Cir. 1997). “Identifying the parties to the
proceeding is an important dimension of publicness. The peo-
ple have a right to know who is using their courts.” Ibid. “Se-
crecy makes it difficult for the public (including the bar) to
understand the grounds and motivations of a decision, why

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4 No. 22-2925
the case was brought (and fought), and what exactly was at
stake in it.” Mueller v. Raemisch, 740 F.3d 1128, 1135–36 (7th
Cir. 2014). See also, e.g., E.A. v. Gardner, 929 F.3d 922, 926 (7th
Cir. 2019) (only “exceptional circumstances” justify the use of
a fictitious name for an adult).
Educational institutions that receive federal funds must
not disclose students’ records except under specified circum-
stances. 20 U.S.C. §1232g(b). But this statute does not apply to
plaintiff, who is not an educational institution and may dis-
close his own records. See Indiana University, slip op. 9–10.
More: a federal regulation, 34 C.F.R. §99.31(a)(9)(iii)(B), au-
thorizes educational institutions to disclose student records in
the course of litigation once a student sues the educational in-
stitution.
Second, although plaintiff understandably prefers to keep
the public from learning that Loyola has found that he com-
mi_ed misconduct, we have held that a desire to keep embar-
rassing information secret does not justify anonymity. See In-
diana University, slip op. 6–8 (citing cases and giving exam-
ples). See also, e.g., MiLe v. Saul, 968 F.3d 689, 692 (7th Cir.
2020); Doe v. Deerfield, 819 F.3d 372, 375, 377 (7th Cir. 2016);
Coe v. Cook County, 162 F.3d 491, 498 (7th Cir. 1998).
Doe’s supplemental memorandum contends that disclo-
sure may lead to “retaliation” against him, but all he seems to
mean by this is that many people prefer to avoid dealing with
wrongdoers. We observed in Indiana University that the sort of
retaliation that might warrant secrecy is a kind that is unjus-
tified by the facts—such as animus toward people with un-
popular religious beliefs. See slip op. 6–9 (discussing Doe 3 v.
Elmbrook School District, 658 F.3d 710, 721–24 (7th Cir. 2011),
adopted on this issue by Doe v. Elmbrook School District, 687

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No. 22-2925 5
F.3d 840, 842–43 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc), and similar deci-
sions).
Although we recognize that no one wants a college’s find-
ing of misconduct broadcast in the pages of the Federal Re-
porter, a desire to keep bad news confidential, if adequate to
justify secrecy, would lead to a norm of anonymity across
swaths of civil and criminal litigation. Take a worker who files
an age-discrimination suit, only to be met by the response that
he had been fired as incompetent. Or consider a criminal de-
fendant charged with crossing state lines to have a sexual en-
counter with a teenager. If those charges and defenses are
made in public, why should college students enjoy a privilege
to keep misdeeds secret?
Third, we come to the district judge’s concern that identi-
fying Doe would enable some people to infer Roe’s identity.
Loyola’s supplemental memo contends that it is “unlikely
that there are observers of this case who know enough about
[Doe’s] past romantic relationships and disciplinary history
to discover the identity of the nonparties involved simply
from having [Doe’s] name made public.” There is another
possibility: that everyone who could put two and two to-
gether already has done so. See Doe v. Smith, 429 F.3d 706, 710
(7th Cir. 2005). The people who might be able to identify Roe
after learning Doe’s identity are those who knew they had
been dating before Doe’s expulsion. These people also likely
learned about the expulsion. If they did not put two and two
together then, why would they do so now? Still, maybe there
is a reason why the litigation could provide that information,
even when the expulsion did not. An evidentiary hearing
could explore the subject, perhaps with input from Roe about

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6 No. 22-2925
the possible effect of disclosing Doe’s identity; a court of ap-
peals is not the right forum for factual findings.
Then there is the question whether Roe has a legal entitle-
ment to concealment. Courts often extend the protection of
anonymity to victims of sex crimes, Blue Cross, 112 F.3d at 872,
and perhaps that is the best analogy for Roe. See also Eugene
Volokh, The Law of Pseudonymous Litigation, 73 Hastings L.J.
1353, 1430–37 (2022) (collecting decisions pro and con on
whether status as a victim supports anonymity). There is also
a question whether 20 U.S.C. §1232g(b) offers some protection
to Roe. This issue was flagged but not resolved in Indiana Uni-
versity, slip op. 10. We do not resolve it here either. We lack
the benefit of an adversarial exchange in either the briefs or
the post-argument memos and think it best to postpone deci-
sion until the issue has been joined. Cf. United States v.
Sineneng-Smith, 590 U.S. 371 (2020).
Indiana University remanded to the district court so that the
plaintiff could decide whether to dismiss the suit rather than
reveal his name. That course is appropriate here as well. If
Doe wants to continue the suit—and if it is not moot—then
the district judge must decide whether Roe is entitled to ano-
nymity and, if she is, whether pu_ing Doe’s name in the pub-
lic record would be equivalent to revealing Roe’s identity as
well. If after the proceedings on remand a live controversy re-
mains, any appeal will return to this panel, with new briefs
limited to newly arising issues.
Remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

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