Donald Artz v. Hartford Life & Accident Insurance Company

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 23-2269
DONALD A RTZ ,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
HARTFORD LIFE & A CCIDENT I NSURANCE C OMPANY ,
Defendant-Appellee.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Wisconsin.
No. 2:21-cv-00391-BHL — Brett H. Ludwig, Judge.
____________________
A RGUED F EBRUARY 23, 2024 — DECIDED M AY 6, 2024
____________________
Before S CUDDER , JACKSON -A KIWUMI , and PRYOR , Circuit
Judges.
S CUDDER , Circuit Judge. Donald Artz worked as an electric
distribution controller at WEC Energy Group until his multi-
ple sclerosis caused him to retire. He sought long-term disa-
bility benefits from WEC under a plan administered by Hart-
ford Life and Accident Insurance Company. Concluding that
Artz was not “disabled” within the meaning of the plan, Hart-
ford denied his claim. Artz then filed suit under the Employee

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2 No. 23-2269
Retirement Income Security Act, alleging that the disability
determination was arbitrary and capricious because Hartford
misconstrued the terms of the plan and failed to provide a
reasonable explanation for its decision.
While Hartford’s denial letters were not models of thor-
oughness, we conclude that the plan administrator communi-
cated rational reasons for its decision based upon a fair read-
ing of the plan and Artz’s medical records—and provided
sufficient process besides. Because ERISA requires no more,
we affirm.
I
A
Donald Artz began working at WEC Energy Group, an
electric utility company in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, in 1998.
For most of his career he worked as a Senior Electric Distribu-
tion Controller, a position WEC described as an “[a]dminis-
trative or clerical occupation in which the employee is primar-
ily involved with sedentary work,” under conditions “gener-
ally associated with working in an office environment.” The
position required Artz to work rotating 12-hour shifts—one
week on the day shift, one week on the night shift. Artz
learned that he had multiple sclerosis in 2003 but managed to
continue in his role at WEC for sixteen more years. He finally
stopped working in November 2019 due to worsening fa-
tigue—a well-known symptom of MS.
In early 2020 Artz asked WEC to accommodate a reduc-
tion in shift length from twelve to eight hours due to his fa-
tigue, but the company denied the request. Artz received
short-term disability benefits under WEC’s plan beginning in
January 2020 (approved by the administrator, Hartford, and

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No. 23-2269 3
paid out by WEC), and the Social Security Administration
eventually awarded disability benefits in April 2020. When
Artz applied for long-term benefits under WEC’s disability
plan, however, Hartford denied the request in January 2021.
Under the terms of WEC’s long-term disability benefits
plan—governed by the Employee Retirement Income Secu-
rity Act of 1974—Hartford as the plan administrator has “full
discretion and authority to determine eligibility for benefits
and to construe and interpret all terms and provisions.” The
plan defines “Disability or Disabled” as being “prevented
from performing one or more of the Essential Duties” of
“Your Occupation.” The plan in turn defines “Essential Duty”
as
1) [] substantial, not incidental; 2) [] fundamen-
tal or inherent to the occupation; and 3) cannot
be reasonably omitted or changed. Your ability
to work the number of hours in Your regularly
scheduled workweek is an Essential Duty.
From there the plan states that “Your Occupation” is de-
fined “as it is recognized in the general workplace. Your Oc-
cupation does not mean the specific job You are performing
for a specific employer or at a specific location.”
Hartford reviewed Artz’s medical history but found con-
flicting information about his ongoing ability to work in his
field. His treating neurologist, Dr. Bhupendra Khatri, opined
in October 2019 (and several times thereafter) that Artz could
work 8 hours per day, 40 hours per week despite having MS,
whereas occupational therapist Jodi Kitzrow capped Artz’s
work capacity at 4 hours per day, 20 hours per week. A third
professional, Dr. Al Baltrusaitis, an occupational medicine

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4 No. 23-2269
physician, was even less optimistic and determined that Artz
was altogether “not capable of gainful employment.” Dr. Bal-
trusaitis based his view on the disability standards in the So-
cial Security Administration’s Handbook for Physicians. But
he later amended his opinion to state that Artz could handle
working 4 hours per day, 20 hours per week.
To resolve these inconsistent opinions, Hartford retained
a third-party contractor to provide an independent medical
assessment. Neurologist Sherry Leitch reviewed Artz’s medi-
cal records and spoke with Dr. Baltrusaitis before concluding
that Artz could work 8 hours per day, 40 hours per week. Dr.
Leitch’s notes indicate that Dr. Baltrusaitis had informed her
that Artz struggled with dexterity and endurance after 8
hours. Her notes also reflected her own opinion that “the ev-
idence does not substantiate severe cognitive abnormalities.”
While Artz’s cognitive function would be affected by fatigue,
Dr. Leitch believed he could work up to 8 hours per day. Dr.
Leitch later clarified that Artz’s workday should be confined
to the hours of 6:30 a.m. and 4:30 p.m. She also recommended
physical limitations that would allow Artz to avoid walking
and standing for extended periods of time. Dr. Khatri, Artz’s
treating neurologist, later opined that he agreed with Dr.
Leitch’s conclusions.
Hartford’s claim review process also entailed a case man-
ager performing an “occupational analysis” to determine the
“essential duties” of Artz’s occupation in the general work-
place as defined by the terms of WEC’s long-term disability
plan. The case manager consulted the U.S. Department of La-
bor’s Dictionary of Occupational Titles, the Occupational In-
formation Network, and the Occupational Access System da-
tabase, and determined that Artz’s position at WEC equated

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No. 23-2269 5
to a “power-distribution engineer” in the general work-
place—a “sedentary” job that might require “exert[ing] up to
10 pounds of force occasionally.” The essential duties of the
position, the case manager continued, included “planning
construction” and “coordinating operation of facilities for
transmitting power.” The position did not require squatting,
stooping, or walking on irregular surfaces, activities problem-
atic for Artz due to his MS. The case manager’s occupational
analysis reached no conclusion on shift length, but a second
Hartford representative later added a note to the claim file ac-
knowledging that “12 hour day[s]” are “not essential to
[Artz’s occupation].”
Hartford’s initial denial letter in June 2020 reiterated Dr.
Leitch’s conclusion that “from a cognitive perspective, there
was no objective evidence to substantiate severe cognitive ab-
normalities.” The broader medical record, Hartford ex-
plained, indicated that Artz could work 40 hours per week
(over a standard 5-day work week). The letter then explained
that although “your specific employer may require working
shifts longer than 8 hours, that is not a requirement in the na-
tional economy, and not an Essential Duty of your Occupa-
tion.” In the end, then, Hartford concluded that Artz was not
“disabled” within the meaning of WEC’s long-term disability
plan.
Artz filed an administrative appeal in November 2020.
Hartford responded by providing Artz with a copy of his
claim file and informing him twice that he could submit addi-
tional information (to include his Social Security disability
records) in support of his appeal. But Artz declined to submit
anything further to Hartford.

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6 No. 23-2269
During the administrative appeal, Hartford requested an-
other round of independent assessments—again from a third-
party reviewer—to take a fresh look at Artz’s medical history.
Neuropsychologist Michael Sugarman reviewed Artz’s med-
ical record and concluded that Artz, despite suffering from
MS, could work standard 8-hour days. Dr. Sugarman ex-
plained that he saw “no objective documentation of reduc-
tions in [Artz’s] ‘ability to focus’” and declined to comment
on the need for “fatigue”-based restrictions. Neurologist Ste-
phen Selkirk also reviewed Artz’s records and likewise
opined that the “available evidence” did not support fatigue-
or focus-based restrictions beyond the 8-hour workday. Dr.
Selkirk saw no evidence to support cognitive dysfunction or
attention deficits and concluded that “[t]he severity and fre-
quency of [Artz’s] reported symptoms are not corroborated
by clinical data in the medical record.”
Before making a final decision on Artz’s claim, Hartford
sent Dr. Selkirk’s and Dr. Sugarman’s reports to treating neu-
rologist Dr. Khatri for his review and included a form for
written comments. Dr. Khatri responded, “I do not agree with
your decision,” but provided no explanation for his view.
Hartford denied Artz’s administrative appeal and upheld
the denial of benefits in January 2021, explaining that “the to-
tality of the evidence does not corroborate a severity in the
symptoms such that functional impairment is established.”
Hartford acknowledged that it had considered Artz’s receipt
of Social Security disability benefits but explained that the
terms of WEC’s long-term disability plan differed from the
federal Social Security disability standard in critical ways.

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No. 23-2269 7
B
Artz sued both Hartford and WEC in state court, alleging
that the denial of long-term benefits amounted to a breach of
contract under Wisconsin law. Hartford removed the case to
federal court, viewing the claim as completely preempted by
§ 1132(a)(1)(B) of the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act. The doctrine of complete preemption, the Supreme Court
has explained, creates an exception to the well-pleaded com-
plaint rule that a court look only to the complaint to deter-
mine whether there is federal question jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1331. See Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 207
(2004). “When a federal statute wholly displaces the state-law
cause of action through complete pre-emption, the state claim
can be removed” under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) because the claim
“is in reality based on federal law.” Id. at 207–08 (cleaned up).
Following removal to federal court, Artz filed an amended
complaint against Hartford alone. Invoking § 1132(a)(1)(B) of
ERISA, which provides a civil action “to recover benefits due
to [the employee] under the terms of his plan,” Artz alleged
that he was entitled to recover long-term disability benefits
under the terms of WEC’s plan. The amended complaint
dropped the state law claim.
The district court upheld the denial of benefits at sum-
mary judgment, concluding that Artz had placed too much
emphasis on the duties of his specific position at WEC rather
than the “essential duties” of his job in the general workplace
as required by the company’s plan. Going further, the district
court underscored the independent medical reviews commis-
sioned by Hartford and, after canvassing the opinions of the
third-party physicians, saw the medical evidence as support-
ing only one conclusion—that Artz’s MS did not prevent him

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8 No. 23-2269
from working a standard 40-hour week as a power-distribu-
tion engineer. The decision to hire independent examiners,
the district court continued, alleviated any “conflict of inter-
est” based on Hartford’s dual role in approving and paying
out the long-term disability benefits, especially where Hart-
ford provided Artz with “a review process, copies of the med-
ical opinions, [and] opportunities to respond.”
Finally, the district court rejected Artz’s contention that
the approval of other forms of disability benefits (in particu-
lar, Social Security benefits and short-term benefits under
WEC’s plan) required Hartford to approve long-term bene-
fits, observing that Artz had declined to provide copies of his
Social Security records and had not clearly identified the
terms of WEC’s short-term benefits plan.
Artz now appeals.
II
ERISA requires an employee benefit plan (or here its
claims administrator) to “set[] forth the specific reasons” for
the denial of disability benefits. 29 U.S.C. § 1133(1). The Act
also states that claimants must receive a “reasonable oppor-
tunity” for “a full and fair review by the appropriate named
fiduciary of the decision denying the claim.” 29 U.S.C.
§ 1133(2). To that end, ERISA’s implementing regulations re-
quire that the plan administrator describe in the initial denial
letter “any additional material or information necessary for
the claimant to perfect the claim and an explanation of why
such material or information is necessary.” 29 C.F.R.
§ 2560.503-1(g)(1)(iii). That way, “when a claimant appeals a
denial to the plan administrator, he will be able to address the
determinative issues and have a fair chance to present his

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No. 23-2269 9
case.” Halpin v. W.W. Grainger, Inc., 962 F.2d 685, 689 (7th Cir.
1992).
The parties agree that WEC’s long-term disability benefits
plan grants Hartford as the plan administrator discretionary
authority to determine benefits. “When the administrator has
such discretionary authority, as the vast majority now do, the
court applies a more deferential standard [of review], seeking
to determine only whether the administrator’s decision was
arbitrary and capricious.” Holmstrom v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co., 615 F.3d 758, 766 (7th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks
omitted). The controlling questions under this standard of re-
view incorporate the terms of § 1133: whether Hartford com-
municated “specific reasons” for the denial of benefits and
whether Artz received an opportunity for “a full and fair re-
view” of the decision. See Majeski v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
590 F.3d 478, 484 (7th Cir. 2009). We also review more gener-
ally whether Hartford’s decision finds rational support in the
record. Our cases are clear that we will not overturn the denial
of benefits “absent special circumstances such as fraud or bad
faith.” Dragus v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 882 F.3d 667,
672 (7th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted).
One final note about the standard of review. With Hart-
ford as the plan administrator shouldering responsibility for
both evaluating and paying Artz’s claim, we must remain
mindful of the possibility that this conflict of interest “affected
the benefits decision.” Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554
U.S. 105, 116–17 (2008). The substantive standard of review is
still the same—the arbitrary-and-capricious standard—but
“the conflict of interest is ‘weighed as a factor in determining
whether there is an abuse of discretion.’” Jenkins v. Price Wa-
terhouse Long Term Disability Plan, 564 F.3d 856, 861 (7th Cir.

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10 No. 23-2269
2009) (internal citation omitted); see also Glenn, 554 U.S. at 117
(suggesting that the conflict-of-interest factor may “act as a
tiebreaker when the other factors are closely balanced”).
A
Because the terms of WEC’s long-term disability plan de-
termine eligibility for benefits, we begin there. And we do so
underscoring that everyone recognizes that Artz has MS and
has exhibited extraordinary strength struggling with its
symptoms for years.
The question before us mirrors the one before the district
court: whether Artz brought forth enough evidence at sum-
mary judgment to permit a finding that he meets the WEC
plan’s definition of “disabled” for purposes of receiving long-
term disability benefits. Recall from the plan itself that Artz
qualifies as “disabled” only if he cannot perform one or more
“essential duties” of his occupation as it is “recognized in the
general workplace.”
The core disagreement between the parties relates to the
“essential duties” of a power-distribution engineer. Hartford
emphasizes that WEC’s plan enumerates as one essential duty
“[y]our ability to work the number of hours in Your regularly
scheduled workweek.” We agree with the district court’s
takeaway from the medical evidence and, more specifically,
the opinions of the independent reviewers Hartford enlisted
to assess Artz’s ongoing ability to work as a power-distribu-
tion engineer. The medical record shows that Artz can still
work a traditional week of 40 hours broken down into five
eight-hour shifts. Artz’s primary pushback is to contend that
Hartford should have recognized that WEC called on its
power-distribution engineers not to work ordinary eight-

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No. 23-2269 11
hour days, but instead to work three 12-hour shifts each week.
Artz sees the longer shifts—the 12-hour shifts—as defining an
essential duty of his job at WEC and one that his MS no longer
allows him to perform.
The fatal flaw in Artz’s position is that an employer’s spe-
cific requirements—here WEC’s requirements for its power-
distribution engineers—differ from the way the company’s
long-term disability benefits plan defines the “essential du-
ties” of that position. In no uncertain terms, the plan states
that essential duties are “substantial,” “fundamental or inher-
ent to the occupation,” and “cannot be reasonably omitted or
changed,” and Artz has provided nothing aside from evi-
dence of his own job requirements at WEC to show that 12-
hour shifts (or nighttime shifts or overtime work) are inherent
to the power-distribution engineer occupation.
Artz failed to provide any such evidence despite Hart-
ford’s clear statement in the initial denial letter that “working
shifts longer than 8 hours” is “not an Essential Duty of your
Occupation.” We agree with Artz that Hartford’s denial letter
could have been more plain and precise—it could have ex-
plained, for example, that the Dictionary of Occupational Ti-
tles and other occupational sources say nothing at all about
shift length for a power-distribution engineer. Still, Hartford
said enough to survive arbitrary-and-capricious review. The
initial denial letter allowed Artz to “formulate [a] further
challenge” to Hartford’s conclusion that shift length was not
an essential duty, which is all that ERISA requires. See Gallo
v. Amoco Corp., 102 F.3d 918, 923 (7th Cir. 1996) (explaining
the purpose behind ERISA’s requirement that the plan ad-
ministrator state specific reasons for the denial of benefits);
see also Halpin, 962 F.2d at 690 (framing as the relevant

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12 No. 23-2269
question whether the beneficiary received “a statement of rea-
sons that, under the circumstances of the case, permitted a
sufficiently clear understanding of the administrator’s posi-
tion to permit effective review”).
The facts here do not align in Artz’s favor—at least not
enough for the question to go to a jury. He knew at least as
early as his receipt of the initial denial letter that WEC did not
consider 12-hour shift length an essential duty of his occupa-
tion. Yet he provided no evidence during the appellate pro-
cess outside of his WEC job description to support his claim
that shift length is in fact an essential duty.
B
Perhaps anticipating that conclusion, Artz pivots and ar-
gues that that even if his occupation as defined by the terms
of WEC’s plan requires only 8-hour shifts, his MS leaves him
unable to dedicate the requisite attention and focus to his job
as a power-distribution engineer for that amount of time. But
here, too, we conclude that Artz’s position falls short because
Hartford, in denying long-term disability benefits, communi-
cated rational reasons for its decision based on the available
medical evidence. As Hartford explained in its denial letters,
the medical record on balance shows that Artz can work a
standard 8-hour shift as a power-distribution engineer with-
out accompanying fatigue-based limitations.
While two of the medical professionals who conducted in-
person physical exams (Dr. Baltrusaitis and Jodi Kitzrow)
capped Artz’s work capacity at 4 hours per day, Dr. Khatri
also conducted an in-person physical exam and concluded
that Artz could work 8-hour workdays between the hours of
6:30 a.m. and 4:30 p.m. And Hartford did not base its denial

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No. 23-2269 13
solely on Dr. Khatri’s opinion. Indeed, Hartford recognized
that Dr. Khatri’s 8-hour recommendation conflicted with the
4-hour recommendation and decided to investigate further.
To that end, Harford sought an independent medical assess-
ment to get to the bottom of Artz’s functional work capacity.
Hartford’s ultimate reliance on Dr. Leitch’s independent
assessment was reasonable. After reviewing Artz’s medical
records, and after speaking with Dr. Baltrusaitis (the occupa-
tional medicine physician), she concluded that Artz could still
work a standard 40-hour week (with 8 hours per day) despite
his fatigue- and focus-based MS symptoms. Dr. Leitch added
that Artz should avoid standing and walking for extended pe-
riods of time, but those restrictions are not inconsistent with
sedentary work. In these circumstances, Hartford reasonably
relied on the treating neurologist and independent assessor’s
consensus view to deny Artz’s claim for long-term disability
benefits at the initial decision-making stage. See Davis v.
Unum Life Ins. Co. of America, 444 F.3d 569, 578 (7th Cir. 2006)
(characterizing decisions about conflicting medical evidence
as “question[s] of judgment that should be left to [the admin-
istrator] under the arbitrary-and-capricious standard”).
When Artz pursued an administrative appeal, Hartford
again sought independent assessments. Two neurologists
agreed with Drs. Khatri and Leitch that Artz could work 8
hours per day, 5 days per week. And, for their part, independ-
ent assessors Drs. Sugarman and Selkirk explained that Artz
had not come forward with any objective evidence to substan-
tiate the need for additional fatigue- or focus-based re-
strictions or other functional limitations. See Williams v. Aetna
Life Ins. Co., 509 F.3d 317, 322 (7th Cir. 2007) (describing the
distinction between “the amount of fatigue or pain an

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14 No. 23-2269
individual experiences … [which] is entirely subjective,” and
“how much an individual’s degree of pain or fatigue limits
his functional capabilities, which can be objectively meas-
ured”).
Artz did not pursue follow-up testing even after receiving
these independent assessments—and despite receiving notice
in the initial denial letter that there was a lack of objective ev-
idence surrounding his cognitive function. He nonetheless in-
sists that this was not an evidentiary failure on his part, but
instead that Hartford as the plan administrator should have
ordered more objective tests. This strikes us as in tension with
the plain import of ERISA’s implementing regulations,
though. See 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(g)(iii) (stating that the
claimant—not the administrator—“perfect[s] the claim”); see
also Halpin, 962 F.2d at 691 (suggesting that once the ERISA
plan informs the claimant that more information is needed,
the claimant—not the administrator—must provide it).
We have stated our conclusion with caution because our
decision in Hennen v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company inti-
mated that the administrator would have done well to order
additional testing. But we offered that observation in very dif-
ferent circumstances. See 904 F.3d 532, 540–41 (7th Cir. 2018).
In Hennen, no fewer than five doctors examined the claimant
in person and found clinical evidence of an often-disabling
condition called radiculopathy. Id. at 540. But a sixth doctor
disagreed (without even being asked to opine on the diagno-
sis), suggesting that more tests were needed to find objective
evidence of the condition. See id. at 538. Instead of ordering
more tests or otherwise grappling with the fact that five doc-
tors had reached a different conclusion, the plan administra-
tor simply adopted the sixth doctor’s conclusion and denied

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No. 23-2269 15
benefits. Id. at 541. We explained in that specific situation,
where “all [five of] the examining doctors disagreed with [the
administrator’s reviewing doctor] on the key issue,” that the
administrator acted arbitrarily in deciding to privilege its own
doctor’s findings—especially where that doctor made the
“key final recommendation” to arrange for follow-up testing.
Id. at 540–41.
The record here, by contrast, contained rational support
for Hartford’s decision to deny long-term benefits under
WEC’s plan even without additional testing. See Davis, 444
F.3d at 576–77 (“The judicial task here is not to determine if
the administrator's decision is correct, but only if it is reason-
able.”). Treating neurologist Dr. Khatri concluded on multiple
occasions that Artz could work 8 hours per day, 5 days per
week despite his physical and cognitive MS symptoms. See id.
at 577 (suggesting that it is reasonable for a plan administrator
“to rely on its doctors’ assessments of the file and to save the
plan the financial burden of conducting repetitive tests and
examinations,” especially where the administrator’s doctors
were not “completely at odds with the claimant’s doctors and
the medical evidence”). Dr. Khatri may have later changed his
opinion about Artz’s overall employability—but he did so
without providing any explanation or evidentiary support.
See id. at 578 (discounting a physician’s change of opinion be-
cause it was made without “new data in the record”).
C
We owe a few words in response to Artz’s emphasis on
how his receipt of Social Security disability benefits and short-
term disability benefits under WEC’s plan further shows the
infirmity in Hartford’s conclusion. To Artz’s mind, those
more favorable determinations prove once and for all that

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16 No. 23-2269
Hartford’s conflict of interest affected the long-term benefits
decision. We cannot agree.
Remember that Artz declined to provide his Social Secu-
rity records to Hartford even though he was invited to do so.
See Black v. Long Term Disability Ins., 582 F.3d 738, 748 (7th Cir.
2009) (observing that the insurer reasonably rejected the
SSA’s disability finding because “the SSA did not review the
same information that [the administrator] obtained from its
consulting physicians”). Even had Artz provided these rec-
ords, the validity of his claim would turn, “in large part, on
the interpretation of terms in the plan at issue.” Black & Decker
Disability Plan v. Nord, 538 U.S. 822, 833 (2003) (internal quo-
tation marks omitted).
Nor did Hartford’s approval of short-term disability ben-
efits necessarily resolve the question of long-term benefits un-
der the WEC plan. See Holmstrom, 615 F.3d at 767 (explaining
that a plan administrator “is entitled to seek and consider new
information and, in appropriate cases, to change its mind”).
Prohibiting plan administrators from collecting new infor-
mation during the long-term benefits review process (or re-
quiring them to collect more information in the short term)
would effectively require a merger of short- and long-term
benefits determinations.
* * *
In no way is the human side of our conclusion lost on us.
Multiple sclerosis is a serious disease, and we have much
sympathy for Artz’s position. But this case is before us on ar-
bitrary-and-capricious review, and as Hartford explained in
its final denial letter, “the presence of a diagnosis or symptom
alone does not represent functional impairment resulting in

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No. 23-2269 17
Disability as defined by the Policy.” The evidence must show,
in addition to the existence of symptoms, that the “severity and
persistency” of those symptoms results in “functional impair-
ment”—especially for a “highly heterogeneous condition”
like MS. That is where Artz’s claim falls short. Several physi-
cians concluded that he did not present enough objective evi-
dence to show “severity and frequency” of symptoms “such
that functional impairment [was] established.” This eviden-
tiary record leaves us no choice but to AFFIRM.

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