United States of America v. James Rippy

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted May 2, 2024
Decided May 6, 2024
Before
DIANE S. SYKES, Chief Judge
ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge
JOSHUA P. KOLAR, Circuit Judge
No. 23-2572
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
JAMES RIPPY,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Indiana, South Bend Division.
No. 3:22CR37-001
Damon R. Leichty,
Judge.
O R D E R
James Rippy pleaded guilty to production of child pornography and was
sentenced to 348 months in prison. Despite a broad appeal waiver in his plea
agreement, Rippy filed a notice of appeal. His appointed lawyer asserts that the appeal
is frivolous and seeks to withdraw under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967).
Counsel’s brief explains the nature of the appeal and addresses issues that an appeal of
this kind might be expected to involve. Because counsel’s analysis appears thorough,
and Rippy did not respond to the motion, see C IR . R. 51(b), we limit our review to the
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 23-2572 Page 2
subjects that counsel discusses. See United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014).
We grant the motion and dismiss the appeal.
Rippy was charged with production and possession of child pornography,
see 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a), (b)(2), (e), after local police and special agents from Homeland
Security Investigations seized his cell phone and found multiple images and videos of
child pornography. The images and videos showed Rippy sexually abusing a minor in
his custody over the course of three years, starting when the victim was approximately
14 years old.
Rippy pleaded guilty to the production charge in exchange for the government’s
agreement to dismiss the possession charge. In his plea agreement, Rippy expressly
waived the right to challenge his conviction and sentence “on any ground” except
ineffective assistance of counsel. This waiver further extended to “the manner in which
[the] conviction or [the] sentence was determined.” The district court accepted the plea
and four months later sentenced Rippy to 348 months’ imprisonment and a mandatory
5 years’ supervised release.
Counsel reports that after he advised Rippy of the risks and benefits of
challenging his guilty plea, Rippy confirmed that he wishes to challenge only his
sentence. Counsel therefore properly refrains from discussing the validity of the plea.
See United States v. Konczak, 683 F.3d 348, 349 (7th Cir. 2012); United States v. Knox,
287 F.3d 667, 671 (7th Cir. 2002).
Counsel next considers whether Rippy could challenge his sentence but rightly
concludes that the broad appeal waiver forecloses this challenge. An appeal waiver
“stands or falls” with the underlying plea, United States v. Nulf, 978 F.3d 504, 506
(7th Cir. 2020), and Rippy chose not to challenge the plea. Additionally, as counsel
rightly points out, no exception to the appeal waiver could apply because Rippy’s
sentence does not exceed the 360-month statutory maximum, see 18 U.S.C. § 2551(e),
and nothing in the record suggests that the judge considered any constitutionally
impermissible factors. See United States v. Campbell, 813 F.3d 1016, 1018 (7th Cir. 2016).
We GRANT counsel’s motion and DISMISS the appeal.

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