Marcus Watson v. D. Sward

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted May 10, 2024*
Decided May 10, 2024
Before
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge
AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge
JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge
No. 23-2636
MARCUS WATSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
D. SWARD, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois, Western
Division.
No. 23 C 50051
Iain D. Johnston,
Judge.
O R D E R
Marcus Watson, a federal prisoner, brought this lawsuit under Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), alleging that
prison employees violated his constitutional rights. He asserts that one officer
* The appellees were not served with process and are not participating in this
appeal. We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the appeal is
frivolous. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(A).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 23-2636 Page 2
“forcefully slid his hand up the crack of [his] buttock area” during a search and others
retaliated against him for filing a grievance by blocking its review. The district court
screened his complaint, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, and dismissed the suit for failure to state
a claim. It first construed Watson’s complaint as attempting to raise claims under the
Eighth Amendment for excessive force and sexual harassment, and the First
Amendment for penalizing him for his grievance. Then it reasoned that, under Ziglar v.
Abbasi, 582 U.S. 120 (2017) (limiting when federal courts may expand Bivens beyond its
original context) and Egbert v. Boule, 596 U.S. 482 (2022) (no Bivens action for a federal
official’s alleged violation of First Amendment rights), Watson’s constitutional claims
were not permissible under Bivens.
Watson’s appellate brief does not contain a discernible argument for disturbing
the district court’s decision. See F ED. R. A PP . P. 28(a)(8). He repeats the factual assertions
contained in his complaint and cites cases brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to suggest
that § 1983 authorizes this suit. But he has sued federal officers to recover for alleged
violations of his constitutional rights. Thus only the theory underlying Bivens—which in
limited contexts authorizes suits against federal officers for violations of constitutional
rights—not § 1983, is relevant to Watson’s claims about violations of his constitutional
rights. See Dist. of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 424–25 (1973). Yet he fails to address,
let alone attempt to refute, the district court’s conclusion that his claims arise under the
Eighth and First Amendments in a context for which Bivens does not authorize a federal
suit. And he has not developed an argument that a federal statute, such as the Prison
Rape Elimination Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 30301–30309, authorizes him to bring a private right
of action. Although we generously construe pro se filings, we will not attempt to craft
arguments and perform legal research on the litigant’s behalf when the litigant failed to
do so; instead, we must dismiss an appeal that presents no meaningful argument.
See Anderson v. Hardman, 241 F.3d 544, 545 (7th Cir. 2001).
We conclude with the matter of strikes. As the district court told Watson, he
incurred a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) because his complaint was dismissed in its
entirety for failure to state a claim. See Turley v. Gaetz, 625 F.3d 1005, 1012 (7th Cir. 2010).
Because he has not presented a meaningful argument for relief on appeal, he has
incurred a second “strike” for filing and pursuing this appeal.
DISMISSED

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