United States of America v. Christopher J. Anderson

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted May 28, 2024
Decided May 29, 2024
Before
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge
JOSHUA P. KOLAR, Circuit Judge
No. 23-2931
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
CHRISTOPHER J. ANDERSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of
Illinois.
No. 3:12-CR-30178-SMY-1
Staci M. Yandle,
Judge.
O R D E R
Christopher Anderson appeals the revocation of his supervised release and the
resulting sentence, but his appointed attorney asserts that the appeal is frivolous and
moves to withdraw under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). Although a
defendant does not have an unqualified constitutional right to counsel in revocation
proceedings, see Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 787 (1973), it is our practice to apply
the safeguards of Anders in this context, see United States v. Brown, 823 F.3d 392, 394 (7th
Cir. 2016). Counsel’s brief explains the nature of the case and addresses issues that an
appeal of this kind would typically involve. Because counsel’s analysis appears
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. A PP. P. 32.1

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thorough, and Anderson did not respond to the motion, see C IR . R. 51(b), we limit our
review to the subjects that counsel discusses, see United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776
(7th Cir. 2014).
In November 2012, Anderson pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute and to
possess with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C.
§§ 846, 841(a)(1), (b)(l)(A)(viii), and possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or
more of methamphetamine, id. §§ 841(a)(l), 841(b)(l)(A)(viii). He was sentenced to 108
months in prison, and in November 2019, he began a 5-year term of supervised release.
Within a year, Anderson violated multiple conditions of supervision, including
the requirement that he abide by all federal, state, and local laws. In December 2020, his
probation officer petitioned the district court to revoke Anderson’s supervised release,
and an amended petition in September 2021 charged more violations. The most serious
violations were the offenses of drug possession (multiple times) and aggravated fleeing
of a police officer. After a final revocation hearing in January 2022, the court revoked
Anderson’s supervised release and sentenced him to 8 months’ imprisonment followed
by a new 5-year term of supervised release.
Anderson was released from prison in September 2022 and began his supervised
release. Less than a year later, in August 2023, Anderson was again charged with
violating multiple conditions of supervision by, among other things, committing
criminal damage to property, violating a protective order, and unlawfully possessing a
controlled substance. The probation officer petitioned for the court to revoke
Anderson’s supervised release once again.
At the final revocation hearing, Anderson, who was represented by counsel,
admitted that the government could prove all charged violations by a preponderance of
the evidence, and so the district court revoked his supervised release (which was
mandatory as a result of the drug offenses, see 18 U.S.C. § 3583(g)(1)). As to the
sentencing options, the district court determined that Anderson’s criminal history score
was III when his term of supervised release was imposed. See U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4 cmt. n.1.
The most serious violation, possession of methamphetamine, was classified as Grade B.
See id. § 7B1.1(b). The policy statements in Chapter 7 of the Sentencing Guidelines
recommended a term of 8 to 14 months in prison, see id. § 7B1.4(a), well within the
statutory maximum, see 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). In determining Anderson’s sentence, the
court discussed several factors, including the seriousness of the violations—particularly
threats against women in his family—Anderson’s past violations of supervised release,

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and (as a mitigating factor) his drug addictions. Based on these factors, the court
sentenced Anderson to 36 months’ imprisonment and 5 years’ supervised release.
Counsel first reports that Anderson wants to withdraw his admissions and,
therefore, challenge the decision to revoke his supervised release. United States v.
Wheaton, 610 F.3d 389, 390 (7th Cir. 2010) (holding that defendant who challenges
admissions that undergird revocation must also challenge the outcome). We agree with
counsel that any such challenge would be frivolous. Because Anderson did not attempt
to withdraw his admissions in the district court, we would review for plain error.
United States v. Nelson, 931 F.3d 588, 590–91 (7th Cir. 2019). And no error occurred here.
The transcript of the hearing reflects that the district court complied with Rule 32.1(b)(2)
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: Anderson confirmed that he understood the
alleged violations and possible prison sentence and was satisfied with his legal
representation before he voluntarily waived his right to contest the allegations and
admit that his conduct violated the conditions of his supervision. See United States v.
Jones, 774 F.3d 399, 403 (7th Cir. 2014). Based on Anderson’s admissions, the court
properly revoked his term of supervised release. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3), (g)(1).
Counsel next considers whether Anderson could raise any non-frivolous
procedural challenges to his sentence. First, as counsel correctly concludes, there are no
errors in the calculation of Anderson’s sentencing range. Anderson admitted the
Grade B violation of possessing methamphetamine, and the district court properly
identified his criminal history category as III, yielding a range of 8 to 14 months’
imprisonment under the policy statements. U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4(a). And Anderson’s
sentence of 36 months’ imprisonment does not exceed the statutory maximum.†
See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). Counsel further explains that five years’ supervised release
† The district court stated the statutory maximum as 52 months, and counsel does not question
that. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (now and in 2011 when Anderson committed the underlying offenses),
60 months is the maximum prison sentence for a supervised-release revocation when the underlying
offense is a Class A felony. The district court credited the time Anderson served for his previous
revocation (8 months) to arrive at a maximum of 52 months. But this reduction is not required. See id.
§ 3583(e)(3) (setting maximum for “any such” revocation); United States v. Perry, 743 F.3d 238, 242 (7th Cir.
2014) (holding that “prior time served for violations of supervised release is not credited towards and so
does not limit the statutory maximum that a court may impose for subsequent violations of supervised
release pursuant to § 3583(e)(3)”). Of course, setting the maximum sentence too low could not have
prejudiced Anderson, and so the mistake does not create a nonfrivolous appellate argument. But our
decision need not reproduce the inaccuracy.

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does not exceed the limit imposed by § 3583(h) in light of the maximum period of
supervision authorized for offenses under § 841(b)(1)(A). See U.S.S.G. § 7B1.3(g)(2).
We also agree with counsel that it would be frivolous to argue that any other
procedural error occurred. The court confirmed that Anderson received proper notice,
gave him the opportunity to appear and present evidence, and considered his
mitigating arguments and allocution. See FED. R. C RIM. P. 32.1(b)(2).
Finally, counsel correctly concludes that it would be futile to argue that
Anderson’s sentence is substantively unreasonable. Although his 36-month term of
imprisonment is above the advisory range, a district court has substantial flexibility in
imposing a revocation sentence, and we will not vacate the sentence unless it is “plainly
unreasonable.” United States v. Dawson, 980 F.3d 1156, 1165–66 (7th Cir. 2020) (quoting
United States v. Durham, 967 F.3d 575, 580 (7th Cir. 2020)). Here, the court discussed the
applicable factors under § 3553(a). It specifically considered Anderson’s history of
substance abuse, his past violations of supervision, and the danger he posed to the
community, especially given his violent conduct toward women. This explanation
satisfied the court’s duty to justify an above-guidelines sentence. See Durham, 967 F.3d
at 580 (affirming sentence more than double the high end of the advisory range because
it was consistent with the district court’s “assessment of the gravity of [the defendant’s]
conduct, the need to protect the public, and the judge’s determination that a serious
sentence was necessary to deter [the defendant] from future violations”).
Therefore, we GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.

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