United States of America v. Derrick Claiborne

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Argued May 21, 2024
Decided May 30, 2024
Before
MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge
AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge
THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge
Nos. 23-2394 and 23-2541
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
DERRICK CLAIBORNE,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeals from the United
States District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois,
Eastern Division.
No. 1:19-cr-00392-1
Robert M. Dow,
Judge.
No. 1:18-cr-00797-4
Andrea R. Wood,
Judge.
O R D E R
Following a search of his Chicago apartment, Derrick Claiborne faced federal
gun and drug possession charges. He pleaded guilty to two of the charges, but elected
to take the third, possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime (18
U.S.C. § 924(c)), to trial, resulting in his conviction. Claiborne now challenges the
sufficiency of the evidence. We affirm.
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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Nos. 23-2394 & 23-2541 Page 2
I
In November 2018, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms agents executed
federal arrest and search warrants at Claiborne’s two-bedroom apartment. When the
agents entered, they encountered Claiborne wearing a construction dust mask and
exiting a small laundry room. A subsequent search of the apartment uncovered over a
kilogram of fentanyl-laced heroin, 61 grams of non-fentanyl-laced heroin, and drug
packaging supplies in and around the laundry room. Agents found three loaded
handguns in Claiborne’s bedroom closet: a Glock model 22 was on a shelf in the closet,
while the other two handguns—one loaded with a high-capacity magazine—and
$31,950 were found in a backpack in the closet. And the agents recovered additional
cash, more than $55,000, from the living room.
A federal grand jury indicted Claiborne with possessing a controlled substance
with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), being a felon in possession of a firearm,
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking
crime, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Claiborne pleaded guilty to the drug and felon-in-possession
charges but proceeded to a bench trial on the § 924(c) charge.
At trial the parties stipulated to details about the recovered drugs and firearms—
including Claiborne’s possession—and that Claiborne resided at the apartment. The
district court also heard testimony from four ATF agents. Three agents testified about
the arrest and search. The fourth offered expert testimony on drug trafficking, firearms,
and the use of firearms by drug traffickers. After post-trial briefing, the district court
found Claiborne guilty of possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking
crime, emphasizing that the proximity of the loaded handguns to significant quantities
of drugs and cash supported the inference that Claiborne used the guns to protect his
stash.
II
A
Claiborne’s sole challenge on appeal is to the sufficiency of the evidence at trial
to support the § 924(c) charge. While conceding that he committed a drug trafficking
crime and possessed the firearms, Claiborne argues that the guns were not used “in
furtherance of” any drug crime.
“We review a claim that a district court’s verdict after a bench trial is
unsupported by the evidence with the same deferential standard that applies to a jury
verdict: we reverse only if, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
government, we determine that no rational trier of fact could have found the defendant

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Nos. 23-2394 & 23-2541 Page 3
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Doody, 600 F.3d 752, 754 (7th Cir.
2010). “We have described this challenge for the defendant as an uphill battle, a
momentous task, a heavy burden, and a nearly insurmountable hurdle.” United States v.
Perryman, 20 F.4th 1127, 1133 (7th Cir. 2021) (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted).
“The ‘in furtherance of’ element [of § 924(c)] requires that the weapon further,
advance, move forward, promote or facilitate the drug-trafficking crime.” United States
v. Duran, 407 F.3d 828, 840 (7th Cir. 2005). The mere presence of a gun near drugs or a
drug crime does not suffice: “there must be a showing of some nexus between the
firearm and the drug selling operation—for example, that a possessed gun [furthered] a
drug-trafficking offense by providing the dealer, his stash or his territory with
protection.” United States v. Huddleston, 593 F.3d 596, 602 (7th Cir. 2010) (alteration in
original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Proving that nexus is fact intensive, Perryman, 20 F.4th at 1134, and guided by
“common sense,” Duran, 407 F.3d at 840. “Courts frequently ‘list factors that seem
relevant and leave it to the trier of fact to apply them to the facts of the case at hand.’”
Perryman, 20 F.4th at 1134 (quoting United States v. Brown, 724 F.3d 801, 803 (7th Cir.
2013)). The most common factors include “the type of drug activity that is being
conducted, accessibility of the firearm, the type of the weapon, whether the weapon is
stolen, the status of the possession (legitimate or illegal), whether the gun is loaded,
proximity to drugs or drug profits, and the time and circumstances under which the
gun is found.” Id. (quoting Brown, 724 F.3d at 803). “No single factor determines the
outcome; this inquiry is holistic.” Id.
B
Sufficient evidence establishes that Claiborne possessed the guns “in
furtherance” of his drug crime. The facts show beyond any dispute that Claiborne was a
drug dealer with large quantities of packaged drugs and cash in his two-bedroom
apartment. While federal law prohibited him, as a convicted felon, from possessing
firearms, he nonetheless also had three loaded handguns in the apartment. These
handguns were “not locked away or hidden,” they were near his drugs and money in
his bedroom closet. Perryman, 20 F.4th at 1134–35. In fact, two of the guns were in a
backpack containing more than $30,000 in cash, and all three were across the small
apartment from over a kilogram of heroin—valued at approximately $100,000. See
United States v. Mitten, 592 F.3d 767, 777 (7th Cir. 2010) (explaining that evidence that a
gun was found in a closet next to a cigar box containing $176 and down the hallway

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from drugs, cash, and drug packaging supplies supported the “in furtherance of
factor”).
But there was more evidence. Expert testimony at trial established that heroin
distribution may require a firearm, often located near drugs or drug proceeds, for
protection. See Huddleston, 593 F.3d at 602; Perryman, 20 F.4th at 1135. And handguns in
particular can “easily be concealed and carried to drug transactions.” Huddleston, 593
F.3d at 602; see also Mitten, 592 F.3d at 777. Guided by common sense, a reasonable
factfinder could conclude that the cash amounted to drug proceeds, and that Claiborne
illegally possessed the loaded handguns to protect his drugs and money against
robbery.
Claiborne disagrees and presses a different perspective on the evidence. First, he
contends that the government offered only general evidence about how drug dealers
use guns, instead of evidence that the specific guns furthered the drug crime. Not so.
“[T]he [g]overnment must offer evidence to validate the notion that the specific weapon
at issue in fact furthered the drug crime by, for example, being available for the
protection of the drug dealer or his drugs.” United States v. Castillo, 406 F.3d 806, 815
(7th Cir. 2005). That burden can be met with the sort of specific, non-theoretical
circumstantial evidence—e.g., the type of gun, whether the gun is loaded, the legality of
its possession, and the proximity to drugs or drug proceeds—offered here. See, e.g.,
Mitten, 592 F.3d at 777; Huddleston, 593 F.3d at 602.
Second, Claiborne insists that the district court should have made different
inferences regarding the evidence. But when reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of
the evidence, we must view the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in the light
most favorable to the prosecution. See United States v. White, 95 F.4th 1073, 1078 (7th Cir.
2024). On this record, the district court, as factfinder, was well within its purview to
reasonably infer that the cash amounted to drug proceeds and that the guns, located in
Claiborne’s closet, were accessible and proximately located to the drugs and cash. See
Duran, 407 F.3d at 845 (explaining that it is within the province of the factfinder to
assign proportionate weight to the inferences flowing from the factors).
Finally, Claiborne says that the government should have offered proof that
he “conducted drug transactions while the weapons were accessible.” We rejected this
exact argument in Mitten, explaining that “[t]here is no requirement that a drug dealer
have the gun in his possession during uncharged sales in order for his possession of a
firearm to be in furtherance of the crime of possession of [heroin] with intent to
distribute.” 592 F.3d at 777. “Even if the [court] heard no evidence that [Claiborne] sold
drugs at the apartment, it did know that more than [$100,000] worth of drugs and

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additional money was in the apartment on the day the warrant was executed.” Id. at
778.
For these reasons, we AFFIRM.

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