United States of America v. Taiwo Onamuti

In the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 23-1497
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
TAIWO ONAMUTI,
Defendant-Appellant
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.
No. 1:16-cr-00093-JRS-MJD-01 — James R. Sweeney II, Judge.
____________________
SUBMITTED MAY 2, 2024* — DECIDED JUNE 10, 2024
____________________
Before SYKES, Chief Judge, and ROVNER and KOLAR, Circuit
Judges.
PER CURIAM. Taiwo Onamuti appeals the denial of his mo-
tion for attorney’s fees under the Hyde Amendment, which
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the
briefs and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and
oral argument would not significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP. P.
34(a)(2)(C).

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2 No. 23-1497
permits a criminal defendant to recoup fees paid in defending
against a frivolous, vexatious, or bad-faith charge. See Pub. L.
No. 105-119, Title VI, § 617, 111 Stat. 2440, 2519 (1997) (re-
printed in 18 U.S.C. § 3006A, historical and statutory notes).1
The district judge denied the motion on procedural grounds,
but we affirm on the alternate ground that Onamuti did not
show that the government’s position was frivolous, vexa-
tious, or in bad faith. We also address a threshold question
about the applicable time limit to appeal a Hyde Amendment
order. Joining the majority view in a lopsided circuit split, we
hold that the civil deadline applies because a motion for attor-
ney’s fees under the Hyde Amendment is a civil matter ancil-
lary to the criminal case.
I. Background
In 2017 Onamuti was charged in a superseding indictment
with 23 crimes related to his involvement in an elaborate tax-
fraud scheme. From at least 2014 until his arrest in 2016, he
and his coconspirators used stolen personal identifying infor-
mation to obtain millions of dollars in illegitimate tax refunds
from the United States Treasury. He eventually pleaded
guilty to one count each of identity theft, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1028(a)(7), aggravated identity theft, id. § 1028A, and pre-
senting false claims for tax refunds, id. § 287. After several
changes in defense counsel and an unsuccessful motion to
withdraw the guilty plea, Onamuti’s case proceeded to
1 The Hyde Amendment that we discuss here bears no relation to another
amendment of the same name, which prohibits certain federal funds to be
expended for abortion or to provide health benefits coverage that includes
abortion. See, e.g., Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2024, Pub. L.
No. 118-47, div. D, tit. V, §§ 506–07, 138 Stat. 460, 703; see also Harris v.
McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).

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No. 23-1497 3
sentencing. The district judge imposed a total sentence of 204
months in prison, which included a mandatory consecutive
24-month term for the aggravated identity theft under
§ 1028A.
Onamuti later moved to vacate his convictions under 28
U.S.C. § 2255, arguing in part that § 1028A did not criminalize
the conduct to which he pleaded guilty because it requires an
enumerated predicate conviction that he did not have. He
contended that his attorney had been ineffective for failing to
move to dismiss the charge and for advising him to plead
guilty.
The government did not oppose the motion as it pertained
to the aggravated identity theft count; to that extent, the
§ 2255 motion was successful. The judge vacated the aggra-
vated identity theft conviction, reduced Onamuti’s prison
sentence by 24 months, and denied all other relief. The judge’s
decision and a final judgment were entered on June 6, 2022,
on the separate civil docket that had been opened for the
§ 2255 motion; that same day, the decision was also entered
on the docket in the criminal case. Both the decision itself and
the accompanying minute entry in the criminal docket said
that Onamuti “is entitled to the issuance of an amended judg-
ment that reflects Count 21 is dismissed, thereby reducing his
total term of incarceration by 24 months.” But the amended
judgment was not entered until four months later, on October
14, 2022.
In the meantime, Onamuti sought review of the § 2255 de-
cision and order to the extent that the judge had rejected his
other grounds for relief. We denied his request for a certificate
of appealability, and the Supreme Court denied his petition
for a writ of certiorari on October 2, 2023.

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4 No. 23-1497
While the § 2255 appeal was pending, Onamuti filed a mo-
tion in his criminal case seeking attorney’s fees under the
Hyde Amendment for the legal expenses he had incurred to
fight the charges of aggravated identity theft. He argued that
the government had pursued those charges vexatiously and
in bad faith. The government objected on procedural
grounds, arguing first that the Hyde Amendment does not
apply in a § 2255 proceeding. The government also argued
that it had pursued the aggravated identify theft charges in
good faith and had simply made a mistake, which it conceded
as soon as the error was discovered.
The judge denied the motion for fees, passing over the par-
ties’ arguments and concluding that the motion was proce-
durally deficient. He reasoned that because the Hyde
Amendment incorporates the procedures and limitations of
the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B)
(“EAJA”), an application for fees must be filed within 30 days
of the final judgment, which in this case was the June 6 final
judgment in Onamuti’s § 2255 proceeding. The judge further
explained that Onamuti had not provided an itemized de-
scription of the hourly rates of his attorneys and the number
of hours spent working on the case, as the EAJA requires.
Onamuti appealed the judge’s order denying his motion
for fees, filing his notice of appeal after the 14-day deadline
for criminal appeals had elapsed but within the 60-day
timeframe for a civil appeal when the United States is a party.
See FED. R. APP. P. 4(b)(1)(A) (criminal time limit); see also 28
U.S.C. § 2107(b), FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(1)(B) (civil time limit). Af-
ter soliciting memoranda from the parties about the timeli-
ness of the appeal, we ordered the parties to address the issue
in their briefs.

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No. 23-1497 5
II. Discussion
Our first question is whether Onamuti’s notice of appeal
was timely. The answer depends on which appeal deadline
applies: the appeal was timely if the 60-day civil time limit
applies but untimely if the 14-day criminal time limit applies.
Onamuti argues, of course, for the civil deadline; he reasons
that although Hyde Amendment motions arise in criminal
cases, they are fundamentally civil in nature and substance.
The government argues that the appeal deadline in criminal
cases should apply.
Whether Hyde Amendment orders are subject to the civil
or criminal appeal deadline is both an open question in this
court and the subject of a circuit split. The Fourth, Fifth,
Ninth, and D.C. Circuits have held that the civil deadline ap-
plies. United States v. Holland, 214 F.3d 523, 526–27 (4th Cir.
2000); United States v. Truesdale, 211 F.3d 898, 903 (5th Cir.
2000); United States v. Braunstein, 281 F.3d 982, 993 (9th Cir.
2002); United States v. Wade, 255 F.3d 833, 837–39 (D.C. Cir.
2001). The Tenth Circuit has held that the criminal deadline
applies. United States v. Robbins, 179 F.3d 1268, 1270 (10th Cir.
1999).
The civil time limit to appeal is jurisdictional. See Hamer v.
Neighborhood Hous. Servs. of Chi., 583 U.S. 17, 19, 27 (2017). The
time limit for criminal appeals is not jurisdictional, United
States v. Neff, 598 F.3d 320, 323 (7th Cir. 2010), but it is a man-
datory claim-processing rule, and the government invokes it
against Onamuti. We therefore must resolve the dispute over
which time limit applies.
We agree with the majority view: appeals from Hyde
Amendment orders are governed by the civil appeal deadline.

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6 No. 23-1497
An application for attorney’s fees under the Hyde Amend-
ment does not pertain to the adjudication of guilt and or the
defendant’s punishment. Instead, it invokes a statutory rem-
edy for a private injury, Holland, 214 F.3d at 526, and does not
implicate the defendant’s liberty, Braunstein, 281 F.3d at 993.
Accordingly, a Hyde Amendment proceeding is an ancillary
civil matter within the underlying criminal case. See, e.g., Hol-
land, 214 F.3d at 526; Truesdale, 211 F.3d at 903–04.
In other contexts, we have held that appeals from orders
in criminal cases should be treated as civil matters when they
are ancillary or collateral to criminal punishment. United
States v. Lee, 659 F.3d 619, 620–21 (7th Cir. 2011) (holding that
the civil appeal deadline applies to postjudgment garnish-
ment and collection remedies within an underlying criminal
case). Following this same reasoning, we have previously sig-
naled our approval of the majority side of this circuit split. In
United States v. Segal, we addressed an appeal from a
postjudgment order in a criminal case resolving a dispute be-
tween the parties over an earlier settlement agreement gov-
erning the defendant’s forfeiture obligations. 938 F.3d 898,
902–03 (7th Cir. 2019). Taking a “pragmatic approach” and
considering the substance and context of the proceeding ra-
ther than its label, id. at 902, we concluded that the civil appeal
deadline applied because the postjudgment proceeding was
civil in nature, id. at 903. In so holding, we approvingly cited
Holland and Truesdale, the cases from the Fourth and Fifth Cir-
cuits holding that Hyde Amendment proceedings are gov-
erned by the civil time limit to appeal. Id. at 903 n.1.
The government’s contrary argument is unpersuasive.
Urging us to follow the Tenth Circuit—the only circuit that
applies the criminal deadline, see Robbins, 179 F.3d at 1270—

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No. 23-1497 7
the government simply asserts that the criminal time limit
must apply because Hyde Amendment proceedings arise in
criminal cases. This reasoning is conclusory, see Braunstein,
281 F.3d at 993, and it also focuses on the proceeding’s label
rather than its nature and substance, an approach we have re-
peatedly rejected, see Segal, 938 F.3d at 902–03 (collecting
cases).
Because the civil deadline applies, this appeal is timely.
Turning to the merits, we review the denial of a Hyde
Amendment motion for abuse of discretion. United States v.
Terzakis, 854 F.3d 951, 953 (7th Cir. 2017). The judge denied
Onamuti’s motion on procedural grounds, concluding that it
was untimely and lacked appropriate documentation. The
separate dockets, belated entry of the amended criminal judg-
ment, and the effect of Onamuti’s § 2255 appeal complicate
these questions. But the case is straightforward on the merits,
and we may affirm the judgment “on any ground supported
in the record so long as it was adequately addressed below.”
Hero v. Lake Cnty. Election Bd., 42 F.4th 768, 775 n.3 (7th Cir.
2022). The parties addressed the substance of the Hyde
Amendment motion—in the district court and here—so we
can skip the complexities of the judge’s procedural rulings
and proceed directly to the merits.
Onamuti had the burden to show by a preponderance of
the evidence that the government’s position was vexatious,
frivolous, or in bad faith. See Terzakis, 854 F.3d at 954. The
Hyde Amendment does not define these terms, but we have
stated that they entail both objective deficiency—not at issue
here—and subjective bad intent. Id. at 956 n.3.
Onamuti has not met his burden to show subjective bad
faith. He claimed that the government’s sole motive for

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8 No. 23-1497
adding the two aggravated identity theft charges in the super-
seding indictment was to induce a guilty plea. But he has no
support for that assertion. Moreover, there were 21 other
charges carrying lengthy minimum sentences; these provided
ample incentive for him to negotiate a plea deal. Further,
charging decisions and plea negotiations are often inter-
linked, and so some other specific evidence of subjective bad
intent is required here. Finally, the government conceded the
error as soon as it was brought to its attention and did not
oppose Onamuti’s § 2255 motion as it pertained to the aggra-
vated identity theft conviction.
Onamuti points to no evidence that the government’s pur-
suit of these charges resulted from anything other than a mis-
taken reading of the statute, which is insufficient to
demonstrate the culpable state of mind required by the Hyde
Amendment. Indeed, Onamuti’s lawyer did not notice the
mistake either. Onamuti therefore is not entitled to an award
of attorney fees under the Hyde Amendment.
AFFIRMED

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