Continental Indemnity Company, individually v. BII, INC ., an Illinois Corporation doing business as Paramount Post

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 23-1648
C ONTINENTAL INDEMNITY C OMPANY, individually and as
subrogee of The Linn Contracting Companies, Inc.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
BII, INC ., an Illinois Corporation doing business as Paramount
Post,
Defendant,
and
S TARR INDEMNITY & LIABILITY C O.,
Garnishee-Appellee.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 1:18-cv-05520 — Rebecca R. Pallmeyer, Chief Judge.
____________________
A RGUED J ANUARY 25, 2024 — D ECIDED J UNE 12, 2024
____________________
Before HAMILTON, BRENNAN, and KIRSCH , Circuit Judges.
HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff-appellant Continental
Indemnity Company secured a default judgment for

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2 No. 23-1648
$607,712.12 against defendant BII, Inc. arising from an injury
to a worker at a construction site. Continental sought to col-
lect on the judgment by adding appellee Starr Indemnity &
Liability Company to the action as a garnishee using Illinois
state law procedures under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
69(a). Starr denied that its insurance contract with BII covered
the workers’ compensation claim that was the subject of Con-
tinental’s default judgment against BII. The district court
found that adjudicating the disputed scope of coverage under
the Starr-BII insurance policy was outside its subject matter
jurisdiction because it was too distinct, factually and legally,
from the underlying suit between Continental and BII. The
district court dismissed the proceeding against garnishee
Starr, and Continental has appealed.
We must confess some uncertainty about the purpose of
this appeal. As the district court explained, if Continental
wants a federal forum to litigate this dispute with Starr, that
forum is available for the price of filing one new civil action
in the Northern District of Illinois. Still, Continental had the
right to appeal, and we are obliged to decide it. As we explain
below, we agree with the district court and affirm its dismissal
for lack of jurisdiction.
At bottom, the appeal turns on the scope of a federal
court’s ancillary jurisdiction in the context of Rule 69 post-
judgment enforcement efforts. Precedents from the Supreme
Court and this circuit make clear the general principle that
federal courts have ancillary enforcement jurisdiction to con-
sider proceedings collateral to an underlying suit, but the sub-
ject of those proceedings must still be sufficiently related to
the facts and legal issues of the original action. Attempting to
adjudicate new issues of liability against new parties falls

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No. 23-1648 3
outside the scope of ancillary enforcement jurisdiction and
therefore cannot be done through certain enforcement pro-
ceedings under Rule 69. But at the end of the day, whether a
proceeding falls into a federal court’s ancillary jurisdiction
will be a case-by-case, fact-dependent inquiry.
I. Facts and Procedural History
A. The Injury to Mr. Lumpkins
On August 19, 2016, Alfred Lumpkins was injured while
working for defendant BII on a construction site on South
Maplewood Street in Chicago, Illinois. In early June 2016,
Linn-Mathes, a general contractor, had contracted with BII to
perform post-construction cleaning work at the Maplewood
Street site. The contract between Linn-Mathes and BII
required BII to maintain insurance, including workers’
compensation coverage, because it was responsible for the
safety of its employees at the Maplewood Street site. After his
injury, Mr. Lumpkins filed a workers’ compensation claim
against both BII and Linn-Mathes.
In most such cases of on-the-job injury, the employer’s
workers’ compensation insurer will step in and handle the
case through the Illinois workers’ compensation system, and
indeed, BII had purchased a workers’ compensation
insurance policy from Hartford Insurance Company. The
problem was that BII had failed to pay premiums. BII’s
workers’ compensation policy lapsed from July 11, 2016 to
August 26, 2016. BII was not insured by Hartford when Mr.
Lumpkins was injured.
Plaintiff Continental is Linn-Mathes’s insurer. Pursuant to
the contract between BII and Linn-Mathes, as well as under
Illinois insurance law, Continental paid Mr. Lumpkins’

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4 No. 23-1648
worker compensation claim in the amount of $451,402.28 plus
defense costs and expenses in the amount of $137,576.31. This
totaled $588,978.59. Continental then sought reimbursement
from BII for the payment of the Lumpkins claim pursuant to
the contract between Linn-Mathes and BII and Illinois insur-
ance law. Hartford declined a claim made by BII to provide
coverage for the Lumpkins claim because of the lapse in in-
surance coverage. During this time, BII never informed gar-
nishee-appellee Starr of the Lumpkins claim.
B. The Default Judgment
In 2018, Continental filed this action in the Northern Dis-
trict of Illinois seeking a declaratory judgment that BII was li-
able for the Lumpkins workers’ compensation claim and that
BII was therefore indebted to Continental for the amounts it
paid on the claim. All parties and we agree that the district
court had subject matter jurisdiction over the declaratory
judgment action based on diversity of citizenship under
28 U.S.C. § 1332. In July 2021, the district court entered a de-
fault judgment in favor of Continental in the amount of
$607,712.12, comprising the $588,978.59 principal claim plus
prejudgment interest and costs.
C. Garnishment Proceeding
At the time of the entry of the default judgment for Conti-
nental, then-District Judge John Lee presided over the case.
After securing the judgment, Continental sought to collect on
the judgment using Illinois state procedures, as allowed un-
der Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 69(a). On August 17, 2021,
Continental filed and served a “Non-Wage Garnishment
Summons” against Starr, which had never been a party to the
underlying suit that led to the default judgment. The

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No. 23-1648 5
summons contained an attached affidavit signed by the secre-
tary and general counsel of Continental attesting that, upon
belief, Starr was either indebted to the judgment-debtor BII,
or, alternatively, possessed or controlled property (other than
wages) belonging to BII. More specifically, Continental said it
believed that Starr held an insurance policy for BII that cov-
ered Mr. Lumpkins’ claim that was the basis for the default
judgment against BII.
Due to an internal mix-up, Starr’s legal department never
received the summons. As a result, Starr failed to file an
appearance or answer by the deadline specified under the
Illinois garnishment statute that was being used by the district
court under Rule 69(a). Continental then filed a Motion for
Entry of Conditional Judgment against Starr pursuant to 735
ILCS 5/12-706, again, acting under Rule 69. Judge Lee issued
a conditional judgment against Starr on October 19, 2021 and
ordered Starr to show cause why the judgment should not be
made final. Continental also sent interrogatories to Starr
asking for sworn answers to whether Starr had issued a
workers’ compensation policy to BII that was in force on the
date of the Lumpkins injury and whether Starr ever assumed
a defense of the Lumpkins claim.
This time Starr responded. It appeared in the district court
and filed answers to the interrogatories. It explained that
while Starr had issued an insurance policy for BII that was in
force at the time of Mr. Lumpkins’ injury, the policy was only
for a different worksite and did not cover the Lumpkins claim.
The answers also explained that Starr never assumed a de-
fense of BII to the Lumpkins claim because BII never provided
Starr notice of the case and never sought coverage for the
claim under the Starr policy.

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6 No. 23-1648
Continental filed a motion contesting the sufficiency of
Starr’s response and answer pursuant to 735 ILCS 5/12-711(a).
Starr filed a response in opposition to Continental’s motion
and Judge Lee ultimately set a summary judgment briefing
schedule.
D. District Court Decision
After Judge Lee’s appointment to this court in September
2022, the case was reassigned to Chief Judge Pallmeyer. After
the parties completed summary judgment briefing, Chief
Judge Pallmeyer ordered Continental to “show cause … why
the garnishment proceeding it filed against [Starr] should not
be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.” Both par-
ties briefed subject matter jurisdiction.
Ultimately, Chief Judge Pallmeyer dismissed the
garnishment proceeding, vacated the conditional judgment
against Starr, and dismissed Starr from the case. Continental
Indemnity Co. v. BII, Inc., No. 18-cv-5520, 2023 WL 2333293, at
*4 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 1, 2023). The court explained that it lacked
subject matter jurisdiction over the garnishment proceeding
because it fell outside the scope of the court’s ancillary
jurisdiction when proceeding under Rule 69. Id. at *2. Because
the record showed complete diversity of citizenship between
Continental and Starr, the court explained that Continental’s
“proper course of action is to file a complaint against Starr.”
Id. at *4. The court invited Continental to notify the Clerk of
Court, should it file a complaint against Starr, that the suit was
related to the original action against BII so that it could be
assigned to the same judge. Id. Instead of filing a new
complaint against Starr, Continental appealed the dismissal.

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No. 23-1648 7
II. Standard of Review
“Subject-matter jurisdiction is the first issue in any
case….” Miller v. Southwest Airlines Co., 926 F.3d 898, 902 (7th
Cir. 2019). It is axiomatic that federal courts have an
independent obligation to ensure that they have subject
matter jurisdiction over each case heard, regardless of
whether the parties have raised the issue. See Ware v. Best Buy
Stores, L.P., 6 F.4th 726, 731 (7th Cir. 2021). This is because
“[f]ederal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They
possess only that power authorized by Constitution and
statute….” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511
U.S. 375, 377 (1994).
“Once jurisdiction has been called into doubt, the
proponent of federal jurisdiction bears the risk of non-
persuasion.” Ware, 6 F.4th at 731. “If the court determines at
any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court
must dismiss the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). We typically
assess de novo a district court’s decision to dismiss a claim for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Democratic Party of
Wisconsin v. Vos, 966 F.3d 581, 584 (7th Cir. 2020). Other
circuits have also applied de novo review specifically when
analyzing a district court’s decision whether to exercise its
ancillary enforcement jurisdiction. See Butt v. United B’hood of
Carpenters & Joiners of America, 999 F.3d 882, 886 n.2 (3d Cir.
2021); Robb Evans & Assocs., LLC v. Holibaugh, 609 F.3d 359, 362
(4th Cir. 2010); Zimmerman v. City of Austin, 969 F.3d 564, 567
(5th Cir. 2020); Hudson v. Coleman, 347 F.3d 138, 141 (6th Cir.
2003); Atlas Biologicals, Inc. v. Kutrubes, 50 F.4th 1307, 1312
(10th Cir. 2022). The applicable standard of review does not
seem to have been contested in these cases, let alone decisive,
and the cited opinions did not analyze the standard of review.

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8 No. 23-1648
For reasons that will become apparent below, it may well
be that a district court’s decision on whether to exercise ancil-
lary enforcement jurisdiction involves elements of case-by-
case judgment that are close cousins to decisions about
whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367 or jurisdiction under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28
U.S.C. § 2201. We review such decisions not de novo but for
an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Tobey v. Chibucos, 890 F.3d
634, 652 (7th Cir. 2018) (supplemental jurisdiction); Medical
Assurance Co., Inc. v. Hellman, 610 F.3d 371, 378 (7th Cir. 2010)
(declaratory judgment).
A district court will ordinarily be better situated to deter-
mine whether and to what extent the post-judgment ancillary
proceedings would depend on new legal and factual issues,
and we should ordinarily give deference to such judgment
calls about mixed questions of fact and law. See Salve Regina
College v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 233 (1991) (“deferential review
of mixed questions of law and fact is warranted when it ap-
pears that the district court is ‘better positioned’ than the ap-
pellate court to decide the issue in question or that probing
appellate scrutiny will not contribute to the clarity of legal
doctrine”) (quoting Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985)).
Ancillary enforcement jurisdiction may often present such
questions where “there are compelling and familiar justifica-
tions for leaving the process of applying law to fact to the trial
court and according its determinations presumptive weight.”
Miller, 474 U.S. at 114.
We need not wrestle this question to the ground, however,
for whether our review here is de novo or for an abuse of dis-
cretion, the result is the same. The district court correctly

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No. 23-1648 9
found here that the garnishment proceeding was outside its
ancillary enforcement jurisdiction.
III. Analysis
A. Rule 69 and Ancillary Enforcement Jurisdiction
As previously explained, Starr was brought into this suit
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 69(a), after a final
judgment was entered. Rule 69(a) “provides a mechanism for
a court to enforce its own judgments, drawing upon state law
for the procedures to govern such proceedings.” Boim v.
American Muslims for Palestine, 9 F.4th 545, 552 (7th Cir. 2021).
Rule 69(a) is a choice of law provision. It is not in and of itself
jurisdictional. Vukadinovich v. McCarthy, 59 F.3d 58, 62 (7th
Cir. 1995). Enforcement actions under Rule 69 exercise a
court’s “ancillary” jurisdiction as part of the court’s “inherent
power to enforce its judgments.” Peacock v. Thomas, 516 U.S.
349, 356 (1996).
The Supreme Court has explained that federal courts ex-
ercise ancillary jurisdiction for “two separate, though some-
times related, purposes: (1) to permit disposition by a single
court of claims that are, in varying respects and degrees, fac-
tually interdependent; and (2) to enable a court to function
successfully, that is, to manage its proceedings, vindicate its
authority, and effectuate its decrees.” Kokkonen v. Guardian
Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375, 379–80 (1994) (citations
omitted). The first category was codified by Congress in the
supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367. See Boim,
9 F.4th at 551.
The second category, perhaps most accurately called “an-
cillary enforcement jurisdiction,” remains a matter of federal
common law. Id., citing Peacock, 516 U.S. at 354 n.5, 356, and

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10 No. 23-1648
Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and
Procedure §§ 3523, 3523.2 (3d ed. 2021) (explaining that ancil-
lary enforcement jurisdiction is still governed by common
law); see also Atlas Biologicals, Inc. v. Kutrubes, 50 F.4th 1307,
1318 (10th Cir. 2022) (“Not governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1367, an-
cillary enforcement jurisdiction is a creature of the common
law and thus is governed by caselaw.”); Energy Mgmt. Servs.,
LLC v. City of Alexandria, 739 F.3d 255, 257 n.1 (5th Cir. 2014)
(“The second type of ancillary jurisdiction, though not codi-
fied, remains a viable doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction and is
often referred to as ‘ancillary enforcement jurisdiction.’”); Butt
v. United B’hood of Carpenters & Joiners, 999 F.3d at 886 n.3
(“[A]ncillary enforcement jurisdiction relates to the power of
a federal court to exercise jurisdiction over separate proceed-
ings. Although not mentioned in § 1367, this common-law
doctrine has survived the codification of supplemental juris-
diction and remains independent of the statute.” (emphasis in
original)).
Without ancillary enforcement jurisdiction, “the judicial
power would be incomplete and entirely inadequate to the
purposes for which it was conferred by the Constitution.”
Riggs v. Johnson County, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 166, 187 (1868). Such
ancillary judicial power refers to a court’s “power to protect
its proceedings and vindicate its authority.” Kokkonen, 511
U.S. at 380. Thus, we ask whether exercise of ancillary en-
forcement jurisdiction in a particular case is “essential to the
conduct of federal-court business.” Id. at 381.
B. Question of Federal Law
Whether a federal court has ancillary jurisdiction over an
action or proceeding brought pursuant to Rule 69 is a matter
of federal law, not state law (as the parties seem to contend).

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No. 23-1648 11
We can see where this confusion may arise. While federal sub-
ject matter jurisdiction is indisputably a question of federal
law, whether we have ancillary jurisdiction over a case is cer-
tainly affected by the relevant state-law procedures being
used under Rule 69. Once federal subject matter jurisdiction
is established, then, in the absence of a governing federal stat-
ute, the federal court’s duty is to follow state law. See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 69(a)(1) (“The procedure on execution—and in pro-
ceedings supplementary to and in aid of judgment or execu-
tion—must accord with the procedure of the state where the
court is located….”).
Federal courts look to state court precedents delineating
the limits of a state’s post-judgment enforcement mechanisms
when employing them under Rule 69 and to resolve any
disputes about the proper procedure. But whether the
particular use of those state procedural mechanisms would
fall inside or outside federal ancillary jurisdiction remains a
matter of federal law and will vary depending on the facts of
an individual case. See Sandlin v. Corporate Interiors Inc., 972
F.2d 1212, 1215 (10th Cir. 1992) (“Rule 69 creates a procedural
mechanism for exercising postjudgment enforcement when
ancillary jurisdiction exists, but cannot extend the scope of
that jurisdiction.” (citations omitted)); Argento v. Village of
Melrose Park, 838 F.2d 1483, 1487 (7th Cir. 1988) (“But Rule
69(a) cannot be the end of our jurisdictional analysis since the
Federal Rules neither create nor withdraw jurisdiction.”)1; cf.
Laborers’ Pension Fund v. Pavement Maintenance, Inc., 542 F.3d
1 Some sources indicate that Peacock abrogated other aspects of our
decision in Argento. We addressed the continuing vitality of Argento in
Wilson v. City of Chicago, 120 F.3d 681 (7th Cir. 1997), and Yang v. City of
Chicago, 137 F.3d 522 (7th Cir. 1998), as discussed below.

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12 No. 23-1648
189, 194 (7th Cir. 2008) (“State rules of procedure cannot
negate subject-matter jurisdiction….”).
Ancillary jurisdiction is just that, ancillary. For a proceed-
ing to fall within such jurisdiction, it must be sufficiently re-
lated to the underlying, original dispute. See Peacock, 516 U.S.
at 358. What do we mean by sufficiently? The question is
whether use of the state procedures under Rule 69 would in-
ject so many new issues into the underlying action as to ren-
der it essentially a new lawsuit. See Yang v. City of Chicago, 137
F.3d 522, 526 (7th Cir. 1998). This analysis is not dictated by
state courts’ treatment of their ancillary jurisdiction when ap-
plying these procedures. It is controlled by principles of fed-
eral jurisdiction.
We have said the same thing in the context of federal re-
moval jurisdiction. “Whether a particular state judicial proce-
dure qualifies as a separate action is not an all-or-nothing
proposition. It depends on the context of each case in which it
arises. Removability is a question of federal law, so the state’s
own characterizations of the proceeding are not decisive.”
Travelers Property Casualty v. Good, 689 F.3d 714, 724 (7th Cir.
2012) (citations omitted). Similarly, here, federal ancillary ju-
risdiction is a question of federal law. A state’s own charac-
terizations of the procedures are not decisive. Thus, we reject
Continental’s argument that if Illinois considers garnishment
actions to be a supplemental or ancillary proceeding within
state ancillary jurisdiction, see Chandler v. Doherty, 731 N.E.2d
1007, 1010, 314 Ill. App. 3d 320 (Ill. App. 2000), federal courts
must also treat any procedure labeled a garnishment as ancil-
lary to federal jurisdiction.

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No. 23-1648 13
C. Preliminary Matters
1. Conditional Versus Final Judgment
Before diving into the heart of the subject matter jurisdic-
tion dispute, we must address a few preliminary matters.
First, Continental argues that the conditional judgment en-
tered against Starr by Judge Lee amounted to a final judgment
on the issue of jurisdiction and was binding on Chief Judge
Pallmeyer.
This assertion is a non-starter. The conditional judgment
was entered pursuant to 735 ILCS 5/12-706(a) through the op-
eration of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 69(a). The Illinois
statute specifically provides a mechanism for a garnishee to
show cause why the conditional judgment should not be
made final. Under Illinois law, “[t]he trial court has discre-
tionary authority to vacate a conditional judgment.” Coleman
Financial Corp. v. Schuddekopf, 232 N.E.2d 104, 105, 89 Ill. App.
2d 150 (Ill. App. 1967). Given that Illinois courts have discre-
tion to vacate such a conditional judgment at any time, Illinois
law holds that such an order does not “finally determine the
rights of the parties” and therefore is “not a final or appeala-
ble order.” Chicago Catholic Workers’ Credit Union v. Rosenberg,
104 N.E.2d 568, 571, 346 Ill. App. 153 (Ill. App. 1952). Even un-
der Illinois law, the conditional judgment did not represent a
final adjudication on the merits, let alone on federal subject
matter jurisdiction.
More generally under federal civil practice, a question of
subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any point in the
proceedings. When a case is transferred from one judge to
another, the receiving judge has the power and the obligation
to ensure that she has jurisdiction. See Christianson v. Colt

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14 No. 23-1648
Indus. Operating Corp., 798 F.2d 1051, 1055 (7th Cir. 1986) (“[I]t
has been the settled rule that a court must make a
determination of jurisdiction sua sponte when it first receives
a case, and at any time thereafter in the course of the litigation
should jurisdiction appear questionable.” (emphasis added)
(footnote omitted)); see also Chicago Joe's Tea Room, LLC v.
Village of Broadview, 894 F.3d 807, 818 (7th Cir. 2018) (“[A]
second judge is ‘significantly less constrained by the law of
the case doctrine with respect to jurisdictional questions.’ And
the doctrine does not apply when the first judge never
decided the precise issue before the second judge.” (quoting
Gilbert v. Illinois State Bd. of Educ., 591 F.3d 896, 903 (7th Cir.
2010)). Accordingly, Chief Judge Pallmeyer did not err by
vacating the conditional judgment against Starr upon
determining the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to
consider the action.2
2. Rule 69 and State Procedures
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 69(a)(1) provides: “A
money judgment is enforced by a writ of execution, unless the
court directs otherwise. The procedure on execution—and in
proceedings supplementary to and in aid of judgment or exe-
cution—must accord with the procedure of the state where
the court is located, but a federal statute governs to the extent
it applies.” Continental invoked Illinois’s garnishment stat-
utes in the district court. See generally 735 ILCS 5/12 Part 7.
2 Like the district court, because we also find the garnishment pro-
ceeding falls outside the court’s federal subject matter jurisdiction, we
need not address whether and when a federal court may order a condi-
tional judgment. See 2023 WL 2333293, at *1 n.3.

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No. 23-1648 15
The state statute directs a judgment creditor to submit an
affidavit to the court identifying a garnishee who the affiant
believes either (1) is indebted to the judgment debtor, or
(2) has possession, custody, or control of the judgment
debtor’s property. 735 ILCS 5/12-701. The judgment creditor
must also provide a formal notice as specified in 735 ILCS
5/12-705 and a set of written interrogatories to be answered
by the garnishee. 735 ILCS 5/12-701. When those documents
are filed, the court issues a summons to the named garnishee
commanding it to appear in court and answer the interroga-
tories in writing under oath. Id.
If the named garnishee fails to appear or answer as re-
quired, the court may then enter a conditional judgment
against it for the amount due from the judgment debtor. 735
ILCS 5/12-706. The court may also order the garnishee to
show cause why the conditional judgment should not be
made final. If the garnishee again fails to appear and answer,
then the court may confirm the judgment against the gar-
nishee for the amount owed by the judgment debtor. Id.
If a garnishee does appear and answers the interrogato-
ries, the judgment creditor may contest the truth or suffi-
ciency of the garnishee’s answers. 735 ILCS 5/12-711. If the
judgment creditor does so, the court will try the contested is-
sues in the same manner as any other civil case. Id.
Here, the district court acted under the Illinois statutes
pursuant to Rule 69(a). It issued a summons to Starr, entered
a conditional judgment once it failed to appear, and began to
adjudicate Continental’s objections to Starr’s interrogatory
answers through summary judgment briefing. These post-
judgment proceedings, Continental contends, were all

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16 No. 23-1648
undertaken pursuant to the federal court’s ancillary enforce-
ment jurisdiction.
D. Standard for Determining Scope of Ancillary Jurisdiction
Here, the garnishment proceeding exceeded the scope of
federal ancillary enforcement jurisdiction under Rule 69,
whether we review de novo or for abuse of discretion. The
garnishment added a new party, Starr, to the underlying suit
between Continental and BII, and it raised new factual and
legal issues necessary to adjudicate the terms and extent of
coverage in the insurance policy between Starr and BII.
Peacock addressed limits on filing a new suit without an
independent basis of federal subject matter jurisdiction. 516
U.S. at 359. Here an independent basis of federal jurisdiction
appears to be available in a stand-alone suit by Continental
against Starr. Nevertheless, Continental has chosen to frame
its garnishment effort as an exercise of ancillary jurisdiction
in the original suit between Continental and BII, and that is
how we consider it. Accordingly, we apply the guidance from
Peacock. See Hudson v. Coleman, 347 F.3d 138, 143 (6th Cir.
2003) (explaining that the “precise issue presented by the
Plaintiff in actuality is whether the fact that the garnishment
action is proceeding under the same case number as the orig-
inal action, rather than in a second lawsuit, sufficiently distin-
guishes the case from Peacock” and finding it did not).
In addition to “proceedings that are entirely new and orig-
inal,” the Supreme Court in Peacock also identified as outside
the federal court’s ancillary jurisdiction proceedings “where
the relief sought is of a different kind or on a different princi-
ple than that of the prior decree.” 516 U.S. at 358 (cleaned up).
This principle applies because ancillary jurisdiction is

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No. 23-1648 17
incidental to the originally filed “case.” See National City Mort-
gage Co. v. Stephen, 647 F.3d 78, 85 (3d Cir. 2011) (“A district
court acquires jurisdiction over a case or controversy in its en-
tirety and, as an incident to the disposition of a dispute that is
properly before it, may exercise jurisdiction to decide other
matters raised by the case over which it would not have juris-
diction were they independently presented.” (internal quota-
tions and alteration omitted)); Jenkins v. Weinshienk, 670 F.2d
915, 918 (10th Cir. 1982) (“Ancillary jurisdiction rests on the
premise that a federal court acquires jurisdiction of a case or
controversy in its entirety. Incident to the disposition of the
principal issues before it, a court may decide collateral mat-
ters necessary to render complete justice.”).
If the ancillary proceeding is “founded not only upon dif-
ferent facts … but also upon entirely new theories of liability,”
Peacock, 516 U.S. at 358, then it is no longer ancillary and de-
pendent on the underlying case. See Local Loan Co. v. Hunt,
292 U.S. 234, 239 (1934). Instead, it is fundamentally a “sepa-
rate case” that needs an independent basis of federal subject
matter jurisdiction. See Yang, 137 F.3d at 526; Sandlin, 972 F.2d
at 1217 (“[W]hen postjudgment proceedings seek to hold non-
parties liable for a judgment on a theory that requires proof
on facts and theories significantly different from those under-
lying the judgment, an independent basis for federal jurisdic-
tion must exist.” (applying H.C. Cook Co. v. Beecher, 217 U.S.
497, 498–99 (1910)); cf. Federal Savings and Loan Ins. Corp. v.
Ferrante, 364 F.3d 1037, 1041–42 (9th Cir. 2004) (attorney effort
to enforce promissory note from client not within court’s an-
cillary jurisdiction because dispute was unrelated to the un-
derlying action and was not a lien for legal services performed
in that particular action).

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18 No. 23-1648
The fact that Rule 69(a) is used to “execute” a judgment
further supports this limit on ancillary enforcement jurisdic-
tion. See Peacock, 516 U.S. at 359 (“the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure provide fast and effective mechanisms for execu-
tion”), and 359 n.7 (“Rule 69(a), for instance, permits judg-
ment creditors to use any execution method consistent with
the practice and procedure of the State in which the district
court sits.” (emphasis added)). Execution typically involves
the discovery and attachment of a judgment debtor’s assets to
satisfy the judgment, even if held by a third party, but not the
litigation of new issues unrelated to the underlying action. See
Hudson, 347 F.3d at 144 (“the typical garnishment proceeding
referenced in Peacock contemplates the garnishee’s paying the
judgment creditor/garnishing party directly for funds, such as
a salary, owed by the garnishee to the defendant in the under-
lying action”).
The interests of judicial economy that underlie ancillary
jurisdiction, see Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S.
365, 377 (1978), are not served by “the shifting of liability for
payment of the judgment from the judgment debtor,” Peacock,
516 U.S. at 358, or “impos[ing] an obligation to pay an existing
federal judgment on a person not already liable for that judg-
ment,” id. at 357, or “an attempt to make [new] defendants
answerable for the judgment already obtained,” Beecher, 217
U.S. at 498.
Continental relies on the Supreme Court’s explanation in
Peacock that it has “approved the exercise of ancillary jurisdic-
tion over a broad range of supplementary proceedings in-
volving third parties to assist in the protection and enforce-
ment of federal judgments,” id. at 356, including garnishment,
id., citing Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486

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No. 23-1648 19
U.S. 825, 834 n.10 (1988). That general observation does not
decide this case.
Mackey involved an attempt to collect a judgment against
participants in an employee welfare benefit plan covered by
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(ERISA) using a Georgia garnishment statute. Mackey, 486
U.S. at 827–28. The Supreme Court held that money judg-
ments against ERISA welfare benefit plans are collectible
through garnishment. Id. at 834. In so doing, however, the
Court pointed out that the Georgia garnishment statute at is-
sue was described by the Georgia Supreme Court as a “pro-
cedural” mechanism for the enforcement of judgments:
Georgia’s statute that provides for garnishment
creates no substantive causes of action, no new
bases for relief, or any grounds for recovery; the
Georgia garnishment law does not create the
rule of decision in any case affixing liability. Ra-
ther under Georgia law, postjudgment garnish-
ment is nothing more than a method to collect
judgments otherwise obtained by prevailing on a
claim against the garnishee.
Id. at 834 n.10 (emphasis in original). The Supreme Court fur-
ther noted: “Such is the usual understanding of garnish-
ment.” Id. Whether a garnishment proceeding falls within a
federal court’s ancillary enforcement jurisdiction turns on the
nature of the dispute, not mere labels. “[W]hen the garnish-
ment proceeding is premised on an alleged indemnity agree-
ment between a judgment debtor and an insurer … a district
court does not automatically assume ancillary jurisdiction
but, in some instances, must require an independent basis for

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20 No. 23-1648
federal jurisdiction.” Macklanburg-Duncan Co. v. Aetna Casu-
alty and Surety Co., 71 F.3d 1526, 1535 (10th Cir. 1995).
While Continental has proceeded under Illinois’s garnish-
ment statute, the Illinois statute provides far broader substan-
tive remedies than the Georgia statute discussed in Mackey.
For example, 735 ILCS 5/12-711 specifies:
Contest of answer and trial
(a) The judgment creditor or the judgment
debtor may contest the truth or sufficiency of
the garnishee’s answer and the court shall im-
mediately, unless for good cause the hearing is
postponed, proceed to try the issues. The an-
swer of the garnishee shall be considered de-
nied without further pleading.
***
(c) The trial shall be conducted as in other civil
cases.
(d) If the finding or verdict is against a gar-
nishee, appropriate judgment or other orders
shall be entered against the garnishee and in fa-
vor of the judgment debtor to whom the gar-
nishee is indebted, or for whom the garnishee
holds property, for the use of the judgment
creditor, in the same manner as if the facts are
admitted.
Many garnishment proceedings under the Illinois statute
will not require adjudication of new disputed issues. See, e.g.,
Citizens Elec. Corp. v. Bituminous Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 68 F.3d
1016, 1020 (7th Cir. 1995) (“In federal practice, garnishment to

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No. 23-1648 21
collect a judgment is not—at least, need not be—an independ-
ent suit. It is part of the main action, prosecuted under [Rule]
69 by virtue of the supplemental jurisdiction.” (emphasis
added)); Sandlin, 972 F.2d at 1217 (explaining that “traditional
garnishment or indemnity agreement claims” fall within fed-
eral courts’ ancillary jurisdiction). We expect most will be
straightforward. Often there will be no genuine dispute
whether the garnishee holds property of the judgment debtor
that may be garnished to execute the judgment. Such cases
clearly fall within a federal court’s ancillary enforcement ju-
risdiction. See Macklanburg-Duncan Co., 71 F.3d at 1535 (“[A]
state law garnishment action against a third party holding
property of a judgment debtor is within the ancillary enforce-
ment jurisdiction of the federal court, at least if the garnishee
admits the debt.” (emphasis in original) (internal quotations
omitted)).
There are also cases where a garnishee disputes whether
it holds assets of a judgment debtor or an obligation to indem-
nify, but resolving such a dispute will not inject new issues or
theories of liability materially distinct from the underlying
suit. Such conflicts also fall within a court’s ancillary enforce-
ment jurisdiction. See, e.g., Yang, 137 F.3d at 523–24, 526 (ad-
judicating whether officer was acting in scope of employment
for purposes of city indemnification agreement did not inject
new issues into underlying suit when court had previously
determined officer was acting under color of law and within
scope of employment for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Mack-
lanburg-Duncan Co., 71 F.3d at 1535 (because Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
suit and ancillary garnishment proceeding both required de-
termining whether judgment debtor had generated and dis-
posed of hazardous waste leading to contamination,

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22 No. 23-1648
garnishment action against judgment debtor’s insurance com-
panies was within court’s ancillary enforcement jurisdiction).
But this is not such a case. Here, Continental seeks to hold
“the garnishee personally liable on the judgment based on
some independent legal theory,” Hudson, 347 F.3d at 144.
1. Functionally Separate Action
Recall that the original action between Continental and BII
arose under the subcontractor agreement between BII and
Linn-Mathes for the Maplewood Street construction site. The
specific issue was whether BII was liable to indemnify Linn-
Mathes (and thus Continental as Linn-Mathes’s insurer) for a
workers’ compensation payment to a BII employee injured at
the site. The case turned on the Continental insurance policy
issued to Linn-Mathes, as well as the contract between Linn-
Mathes and BII. Continental’s amended complaint alleged
that BII breached its contract with Linn-Mathes by failing to
maintain workers’ compensation insurance and that BII pro-
vided Linn-Mathes with an invalid Certificate of Insurance,
not from garnishee Starr, but from Hartford Insurance Com-
pany. Dkt 34. Notably missing from the relevant allegations
was any mention of a Starr insurance policy issued to BII.
The central issue in the garnishment proceeding—
whether the Starr-BII insurance policy even covered the
worksite where Lumpkins was injured—is a new issue. It was
not raised in, let alone central or material to, the prior pro-
ceedings.3 The court would have to consider new evidence
3 The judgment against BII was secured via default. We thus look to
Continental’s complaint to determine the material facts and legal issues
undergirding the judgment. We do not mean to imply, however, that a

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No. 23-1648 23
and analyze the language of the insurance policy to determine
its scope. Only then could the court decide whether Continen-
tal can collect its judgment against BII from Starr.
In other words, Continental seeks to hold a new party lia-
ble on a new theory. This is the type of dispute that courts
have found to fall outside their ancillary enforcement jurisdic-
tion. See Peacock, 516 U.S. at 358–59 (no ancillary jurisdiction
over “entirely new theories of liability”); Rizvi v. Allstate Corp.,
833 F.3d 724, 727 (7th Cir. 2016) ( no ancillary jurisdiction over
“new dispute governed by law distinct from the underlying
[ ] action and based on different facts”); cf. Atlas Biologicals
Inc., 50 F.4th at 1322 (court had ancillary jurisdiction over
fraudulent transfer claim because judgment creditor “asked
the district court to answer the question about the validity of
the transfer and thus the writ of attachment—not to impose
liability on a third party”).
2. Distinguishing Prior Garnishment Actions
Continental relies on several cases in this circuit to argue
that adjudicating the Starr insurance policy’s coverage falls
within the scope of the district court’s ancillary jurisdiction.
All are easily distinguishable.
In Yang v. City of Chicago, 137 F.3d 522 (7th Cir. 1998), plain-
tiff Yang had previously brought a federal action against two
police officers and the city of Chicago for violating his civil
rights. The city was dismissed from the case, but a default
judgment was eventually entered against the two officers. Id.
at 523. Yang then sought to have the city indemnify the
gratuitous reference in the complaint to a possible insurance policy from
non-party Starr would have affected the outcome of this appeal.

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24 No. 23-1648
officers for the judgment pursuant to 745 ILCS 10/9-102 using
a supplemental collection proceeding under Rule 69(a). Id. at
522. We found that the garnishment proceeding fell within the
scope of ancillary jurisdiction. Garnishment depended on
whether one of the police officers was acting in the scope of
his employment. That was not so new an issue as to render
the garnishment proceeding a functionally separate suit. Id. at
526. In an earlier appeal, we had found that the officer was
acting under the color of state law for purposes of § 1983 lia-
bility, and that issue was factually close (though not identical)
to whether the officer was acting within the scope of his em-
ployment. Id. at 523–24, 526 n.2. In the present suit, by con-
trast, determining the scope of the Starr insurance policy in-
volves issues quite different from those adjudicated in the
case against BII.
Vukadinovich v. McCarthy, 59 F.3d 58 (7th Cir. 1995), simi-
larly, is not helpful to Continental. It presented the type of
traditional garnishment proceeding that is obviously within
ancillary enforcement jurisdiction. In Vukadinovich, a defend-
ant obtained a judgment for attorney fees after being subject
to a frivolous lawsuit. The plaintiff refused to pay, so the de-
fendant used Rule 69(a) to garnish the plaintiff’s wages from
the plaintiff’s employer. Id. at 60, 62. There was no dispute
that the garnishee-employer owed wages to the plaintiff.
There were no new disputed issues distinct from the underly-
ing action, and enforcing an attorney fee award that was a di-
rect result of the underlying suit has been a largely uncontro-
versial use of courts’ ancillary enforcement jurisdiction. See,
e.g., Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 395 (1990)
(“It is well established that a federal court may consider col-
lateral issues after an action is no longer pending,” including
“motions for costs or attorney’s fees.”). Continental’s attempt

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No. 23-1648 25
to garnish a Starr insurance policy issued to BII, by contrast,
raises new factual and legal disputes involving a new party,
so Vukadinovich does not help it here.
Finally, Continental cites Argento v. Village of Melrose Park,
838 F.2d 1483 (7th Cir. 1988). Argento was a pre-Peacock case,
but we have explained that Argento remains good law to the
extent that a post-judgment enforcement action “does not in-
ject so many new issues that it is functionally a separate case.”
Wilson v. City of Chicago, 120 F.3d 681, 684 (7th Cir. 1997) (ex-
plaining impact of Supreme Court’s decision in Peacock on Ar-
gento and related cases). The facts of Argento were very close
to Yang, discussed above, involving police officers’ violations
of a plaintiff’s civil rights and the plaintiff’s attempt to have
the village and its insurer indemnify the officers through a
Rule 69(a) proceeding. As we explained in Argento: “The lia-
bility of the Village and the insurer are related to the same
events that underlie the original civil rights action.” 838 F.2d
at 1490. As in Yang, a § 1983 action against police officers and
a municipality’s obligation to indemnify officers who acted
within the scope of their employment both depend on much
the same underlying facts and closely related legal standards
(acting under color of state law and within scope of employ-
ment). An indemnification claim in such cases does not neces-
sarily inject new issues that render the post-judgment pro-
ceeding a functionally separate suit. We see nothing in Ar-
gento that conflicts with the district court’s decision here.
E. Diversity Jurisdiction as Alternative Basis
The district court in this case was correct that it lacked the
subject matter jurisdiction to resolve the post-judgment gar-
nishment action under its ancillary enforcement jurisdiction.
That is how Continental framed the proceeding, and that is

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26 No. 23-1648
how the district court and we have addressed it. Continental
has also suggested briefly that the district court erred by not
exercising diversity jurisdiction over the garnishment pro-
ceeding. As Chief Judge Pallmeyer explained, it appears that
diversity jurisdiction would be available if Continental filed a
separate civil action against Starr. She suggested that Conti-
nental file such an action if it believes it has grounds to do so.
For the same reasons ancillary jurisdiction is not available
here, the district court properly treated the garnishment pro-
ceedings, in substance, as a new and different case. Putting
aside the fact that a final judgment had already been entered
against BII, Continental’s argument can be illuminated by
thinking about mandatory and permissive joinder under Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure 19 and 20. Continental’s claim
against Starr certainly would not be required to be brought as
part of the case against BII under Rule 19 (even if the final
judgment had not already been entered against BII). Potential
indemnitors and guarantors generally need not be sued in the
action against the original defendant. See Pasco Int’l (London)
Ltd. v. Stenograph Corp., 637 F.2d 496, 503 (7th Cir. 1980). As
for permissive joinder, under Rule 20, district courts have dis-
cretion, with “considerable flexibility in managing and struc-
turing civil litigation for fair and efficient resolution of com-
plex disputes.” UWM Student Ass’n v. Lovell, 888 F.3d 854, 863
(7th Cir. 2018); accord, e.g., Dorsey v. Varga, 55 F.4th 1094, 1103
(7th Cir. 2022) (“A district court may, in its discretion, deny
joinder even if the Rule 20(a)(2) requirements are met.”); see
also Brooks v. City of Pekin, 95 F.4th 533, 541 (7th Cir. 2024)
(“district courts have broad discretion to manage their dock-
ets”). The remedy for even a timely attempt at misjoinder can
include dismissal without prejudice. UWM Student Ass’n, 888
F.3d at 864. In effect, that is what the district court did here,

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No. 23-1648 27
telling Continental to bring its (post-judgment) claim in a sep-
arate civil action. The court acted well within its discretion in
doing so, and we do not understand why Continental has not
followed that suggestion.
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

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