United States of America v. Gustavo Reyes

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted June 14, 2024
Decided June 21, 2024
Before
MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge
AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge
JOSHUA P. KOLAR, Circuit Judge
No. 23-2655
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
GUSTAVO REYES,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Western District of
Wisconsin.
No. 3:23-cr-00039-001
William M. Conley,
Judge.
O R D E R
Over a five-year period, Gustavo Reyes concealed and underreported his income
from two drywall installation businesses that he owned. In 2023, he pleaded guilty to
attempted tax evasion, see 26 U.S.C. § 7201, and was sentenced within the Guidelines to
18 months’ imprisonment and 3 years’ supervised release. He was ordered to pay
$557,907.19 in restitution to the Internal Revenue Service and a $100 special assessment.
Reyes appeals, but his appointed lawyer asserts that the appeal is frivolous and moves
to withdraw. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). We notified Reyes of
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. A PP. P. 32.1

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No. 23-2655 Page 2
counsel’s motion, and he did not respond. See C IR . R. 51(b). Counsel’s brief explains the
nature of the case and addresses potential issues that an appeal of this kind would
typically involve. Because counsel’s analysis appears thorough, we limit our review to
the subjects that counsel discusses. See United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir.
2014). We grant the motion and dismiss the appeal.
Counsel first tells us that he advised Reyes about the risks and benefits of
challenging his guilty plea, and counsel reports that Reyes wishes to challenge only his
sentence. Counsel therefore properly forgoes discussing whether the plea was valid.
United States v. Konczak, 683 F.3d 348, 349 (7th Cir. 2012); United States v. Knox, 287 F.3d
667, 671 (7th Cir. 2002).
Counsel considers whether Reyes could raise a nonfrivolous challenge to the
district court’s guidelines calculations but rightly rejects such a challenge as frivolous.
The court correctly calculated his guidelines range at 18 to 24 months, based on a total
offense level of 15 and a criminal history category of I. And the court’s 18-month
sentence did not exceed § 7201’s 5-year statutory maximum.
Counsel also correctly concludes that Reyes could not raise a nonfrivolous
argument that his sentence is substantively unreasonable. We presume that a sentence
within the applicable guidelines range is reasonable. See United States v. Cunningham,
883 F.3d 690, 701 (7th Cir. 2018). Counsel does not identify a reason to challenge that
presumption, and we discern none. The court appropriately evaluated the relevant
§ 3553(a) factors, especially the nature and circumstances of the offense (an escalating
effort to avoid paying taxes, first, through repeated lies to the IRS and, later, through
use of dummy corporations to evade the IRS’s collection efforts); the need to promote
respect for the law (Reyes repeatedly “flout[ed]” the law by refusing to pay his taxes
and ignoring the IRS); and Reyes’s personal history and characteristics (his minimal
criminal history, his active community involvement, and his positive role as a father
and husband).
Counsel also properly concludes that Reyes could not raise any non-frivolous
arguments regarding the other parts of his sentence. Reyes’s 3-year term of supervised
release was amply justified by the court’s § 3553(a) analysis, United States v. Bickart,
825 F.3d 832, 839 (7th Cir. 2016), and did not exceed the statutory maximum,
see 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b)(2). Further, Reyes waived his right to challenge the conditions of
supervised release because he confirmed at the sentencing hearing that he did not object
to the proposed terms. See United States v. Anderson, 948 F.3d 910, 910–11 (7th Cir. 2020).

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No. 23-2655 Page 3
In addition, the special assessment was required by statute, see 18 U.S.C. § 3013, and the
restitution amount was set forth in Reyes’s plea agreement.
Counsel’s motion to withdraw is GRANTED, and the appeal is DISMISSED.

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