Jason R. Dodd v. Salam Syed

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted June 25, 2024*
Decided July 1, 2024
Before
CANDACE JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit Judge
JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge
DORIS L. PRYOR, Circuit Judge
No. 23-3122
JASON R. DODD,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
SALAM SYED, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Western District of
Wisconsin.
No. 20-cv-913-wmc
William M. Conley,
Judge.
O R D E R
Jason Dodd appeals from a judgment on the pleadings in favor of the defendants
in his suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He challenges the district court’s conclusion that his
case is barred by a release he executed in a settlement agreement with the State of
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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Wisconsin. Because Dodd has not offered to return his settlement payment, and the
district court correctly enforced the valid settlement agreement, we affirm.
Dodd, a Wisconsin prisoner, filed the complaint in this case in October 2020. He
alleged that four staff members at Columbia Correctional Institution violated his rights
under the Eighth Amendment because, from June 2018 until May 2019, they were
deliberately indifferent to the ongoing effects—primarily pain—of the hand he
allegedly fractured in 2018. In November of 2022, the defendants moved for judgment
on the pleadings based on a settlement agreement that Dodd signed in September 2020
in a different lawsuit (alleging unconstitutional delay and improper treatment from a
previous hand fracture). In the agreement, Dodd released the State of Wisconsin, the
Department of Corrections, and their employees from claims based on “any and all
manner of action or actions” that occurred before the date of execution—September 18,
2020—in exchange for $13,000. In seeking judgment in this case, the defendants argued
that the release provision squarely barred Dodd’s claims because his allegations
concerned events predating the settlement agreement.
Dodd opposed the motion, contending that the language of the release was
ambiguous and that the attorney representing the State in the prior suit had misled him.
He argued that the lawyer should have informed him that his settlement payment
would be used by his prison’s administrators to pay his debts. Because of the
withdrawals Dodd says he did not anticipate, he netted only about $8,700 in the
settlement. Dodd asserted that he would not have accepted the settlement had he
known that he would not retain the full amount. He submitted a copy of his trust
account statement, which reflects that he received $13,000 from the State and that,
shortly thereafter, funds were withdrawn to pay restitution, court costs, and fines.
The district court granted the defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings,
concluding that the settlement agreement unambiguously precluded Dodd’s claims
under Wisconsin contract law. The court explained that the State complied with the
settlement agreement, and Dodd lacked evidence that anyone made a false statement or
material omission to induce the settlement. Dodd appeals.
Dodd maintains that his suit should proceed because the settlement agreement is
void. Release is an affirmative defense under Rule 8(c)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, and thus it is the proper subject of a motion under Rule 12(c). Yassan v. J.P.
Morgan Chase & Co., 708 F.3d 963, 975–76 (7th Cir. 2013). There is no question here that
the release would bar this lawsuit, so the only question is whether there is a valid
settlement agreement. We review that issue de novo and the district court’s decision to

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No. 23-3122 Page 3
enforce the agreement for an abuse of discretion. Beverly v. Abbott Lab’ys, 817 F.3d 328,
332 (7th Cir. 2016).
Dodd entered into a valid and enforceable settlement agreement. Under
Wisconsin law, which no one disputes applies here, a settlement agreement is a
contract, and courts are required to apply the plain and unambiguous terms of a
contract as they are expressed in the agreement. Raasch v. City of Milwaukee, 750 N.W.2d
492, 496–98 (Wis. Ct. App. 2008). Dodd concedes that under the agreement’s
unambiguous terms he agreed to release his claims relating to his hand injury (or any
other matter within the relevant time frame) in exchange for payment of $13,000. But he
insists that he is entitled to relief because the defendants omitted material facts (that his
payment would be subject to withdrawals) and breached their agreement (by executing
the withdrawals). True, Wisconsin law permits relief from a valid settlement agreement
based on a material breach or a material misrepresentation. See Kimberly Area Sch. Dist.
v. Zdanovec, 586 N.W.2d 41, 51 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998). But neither is present here.
As a preliminary matter, Dodd already received the settlement payment and,
before a court will consider unwinding a settlement agreement, a plaintiff must first
return or offer to return the consideration he received for settling his claims. See Fleming
v. U.S. Postal Serv. AMF O’Hare, 27 F.3d 259, 260 (7th Cir. 1994) (applying principals of
state contract law); see also Hampton v. Ford Motor Co., 561 F.3d 709, 717 (7th Cir. 2009).
Dodd does not dispute receiving the money, and neither party suggests that he has
offered to return it. Dodd’s retention of the money is sufficient grounds for affirming.
See Hampton, 561 F.3d at 717.
Regardless, the district court properly enforced the settlement agreement and
dismissed the case. First, the court rightly concluded that the defendants did not breach
the agreement. Dodd concedes, and his trust account reflects, that he received the
bargained-for payment of $13,000. His settlement award was an asset subject to debt
obligations. See generally Robertson v. French, 949 F.3d 347 (7th Cir. 2020) (state prisoner’s
settlement award becomes a financial asset upon receipt). And the Department of
Corrections (DOC) simply abided by state law when it withdrew money to satisfy
Dodd’s debts once he received funds in his account. See WIS . A DMIN . C ODE DOC
§ 301.32(1); State ex rel. Ortiz v. Carr, 973 N.W.2d 786, 804 (Wis. Ct. App. 2022).
Second, there is no evidence that Dodd was misled during the settlement
negotiations. As the district court highlighted, Dodd himself was in the best position to
know his own debts, and he cites no basis for his belief that his settlement payment
could not be used to pay them. Still, Dodd maintains that he is entitled to relief because

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the state’s lawyer, who had special knowledge of Wisconsin law, should have informed
him that the award would be tapped to pay his debts, and Dodd relied on this omission
when agreeing to the settlement. But recission of the agreement requires justifiable
reliance, see CMFG Life Ins. Co. v. RBS Sec., Inc., 799 F.3d 729, 738 (7th Cir. 2015), and
Dodd could not have reasonably believed that his settlement payment would be treated
differently than other funds in his prison trust account. In fact, Dodd’s trust account
statement shows that before he received his settlement payment, the DOC was already
withdrawing funds for victim restitution. Continued withdrawals for that and other
debts were predictable. In any event, neither ignorance of the law nor his unilateral
mistake in believing that settlement funds were exempt warrants rescission of the
agreement. See Farmers Auto. Ins. Ass’n v. Union Pacific Ry., 768 N.W.2d 596, 606 (Wis.
2009) (ignorance of the law); Sorce v. Rinehart, 230 N.W.2d 645, 649 (Wis. 1975)
(unilateral mistake) (applying Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 503).
AFFIRMED

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