John A. Hawkins v. Frank Vanihel

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted June 25, 2024*
Decided July 1, 2024
Before
CANDACE JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit Judge
JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge
DORIS L. PRYOR, Circuit Judge
No. 23-3352
JOHN A. HAWKINS,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
FRANK VANIHEL,
Respondent-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of
Indiana, Indianapolis Division.
No. 1:22-cv-02331-SEB-CSW
Sarah Evans Barker,
Judge.
O R D E R
John Hawkins (who also goes by Hawkins-El), an Indiana prisoner, appeals the
denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, seeking relief
from a prison disciplinary sanction. Because the disciplinary proceeding did not violate
Hawkins-El’s right to due process, we affirm.
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the brief and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 23-3352 Page 2
After an argument, Hawkins-El punched a correctional officer, Sergeant D.
Betzner, in the face. As he attempted to strike Sergeant Betzner again, Officer T. Conley
interceded. (Neither officer’s first name is in the record.) The scuffle took Hawkins-El
and Officer Conley into an open cell nearby. Officer Conley emerged with bruises on
her face or scalp and a cut lip; she was later treated at the hospital.
A correctional officer tasked with investigating the incident later prepared a
conduct report charging Hawkins-El with offense number A-117, “Battery Against a
Staff Person,” for the incident with Officer Conley. (Sergeant Betzner wrote a separate
conduct report based on his encounter with Hawkins-El.) The investigator’s report
summarized a video that captured portions of the event: After Hawkins-El struck
Sergeant Betzner, Officer Conley responded and all three went off screen. Later, the
three re-entered the frame. Sergeant Betzner appeared to use pepper spray on Hawkins-
El, who covered his eyes, and Officer Conley walked forward, bending over at the waist
as though she could not breathe. The report also summarized an interview with Officer
Conley. She stated that Hawkins-El had turned and pushed her into a cell, where she
landed on her back on the bottom bunk, and Hawkins-El landed on top of her and then
placed his hand over her mouth and nose to close her airway.
Hawkins-El pleaded not guilty to the charged violation. In his view, Officer
Conley had used an illegal chokehold to hold him back, and they fell on the bed as he
struggled to get free from her. He requested that a witness, “Inmate Reed,” answer the
question, “Did I touch that lady?” and that the investigator answer the question, “Who
told you to write this up?” Reed’s statement said: “I never seen Hawkins touch/nor
assault Conley during any part of the incident.” The investigator responded that he had
issued the conduct report based on the evidence, including statements from Sergeant
Betzner, Officer Conley, and Hawkins-El himself.
Hawkins-El had separate disciplinary hearings pertaining to Officer Conley and
Sergeant Betzner. Procedural errors led to re-hearings in both cases, and Hawkins-El
asked that the disciplinary hearing officer, Officer N. Angle, and Hawkins-El’s lay
advocate, B. Myers, recuse themselves from the re-hearings. From his experience with
Officer Angle and lay advocate Myers in the original hearings, Hawkins-El believed
they would not be impartial in a second round. (According to his appellate brief,
Hawkins-El’s concern with Myers was that she “work[ed] closely with Mr. Angle, and
just signed off two medical expenses restitution fees.”) They each declined to recuse.
Officer Angle cited a staffing shortage and said he decided the case based solely on the
evidence, and the record does not contain Myers’s reasoning.

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No. 23-3352 Page 3
After the short re-hearing, which took place through the door to Hawkins-El’s
cell, Officer Angle found him guilty. Officer Angle wrote on the hearing report that
Hawkins-El had stated in his defense: “I did not touch that woman,” and “it’s stacking.”
(The second statement ostensibly refers to his belief that he shouldn’t have had two
disciplinary hearings based on the same evidence.) Officer Angle explained that he
found Hawkins-El guilty based on the conduct report and “witness statements.” He
sanctioned Hawkins-El with the loss of 365 days of good time credit, 365 days in
restrictive housing, up to $1000 in restitution for medical expenses, and a demotion of
two credit classes. The warden denied his appeal but reduced the sanction from 365 to
180 days’ loss of good time and 180 days in restrictive housing. (Separately, the State of
Indiana criminally prosecuted Hawkins-El, and he pleaded guilty to battery of a public
official, see Indiana Code § 35-42-2-1(c).)
Hawkins-El petitioned the district court for habeas relief, alleging that the
duration of his sentence had been increased based on disciplinary proceedings that did
not afford him due process. Four of the due-process violations he asserted are relevant
on appeal: (1) there was no proof that Officer Conley suffered a serious bodily injury;
(2) insufficient evidence supported the guilty finding; (3) Officer Angle cut off the
hearing before Hawkins-El could present his best defense; and (4) the hearing was not
impartial. Hawkins-El later elaborated in a reply brief that he had wanted to submit
exculpatory evidence that Officer Conley used an illegal chokehold and had a history of
using such techniques, as well as to argue that there was insufficient documentation of
medical expenses justifying restitution. The district court denied his petition.
Hawkins-El appeals and now renews his arguments from the district court. We
review the denial of a petition for habeas corpus de novo. Love v. Vanihel, 73 F.4th 439,
445 (7th Cir. 2023). Indiana prisoners have a liberty interest in good-time credits and are
entitled to due process before losing them. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974);
Scruggs v. Jordan, 485 F.3d 934, 939 (7th Cir. 2007). In this case, Hawkins-El received the
process to which he was entitled.
Hawkins-El’s contention that he could not be found guilty of battery of a staff
person without documentary proof of serious bodily injury (or bodily injury in general)
is incorrect. The offense in A-117 is defined as “committing battery against a staff
person,” and elsewhere “battery” is defined, in relevant part, as “knowingly or
intentionally touching another person in a rude, insolent or angry manner.” Ind. Dep’t
of Corr., Disciplinary Code for Adult Offenders No. 02-04-101, § 3(F); App’x (2020). The

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offense does not contain an element of bodily injury to the victim. True, the guide to
sanctions suggests that for an enhanced punishment, “photographs or other
documentation of the bodily injury should be included.” Id. § IX(E)(3)(e) n.1. Hawkins-
El, however, did not receive any enhancement in this proceeding (although he did in
the one involving Sergeant Betzner). In any case, a hearing officer’s failure to comply
with procedures in the state’s disciplinary manual is not a ground for habeas relief
because such a deviation alone does not violate the federal Constitution. See Caffey v.
Butler, 802 F.3d 884, 894 (7th Cir. 2015).
As to Hawkins-El’s more general challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, the
record supported the finding that Hawkins-El committed battery against Officer
Conley. Due process requires only “some evidence” to support a finding of guilt in a
prison disciplinary proceeding. Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454
(1985). Leaving aside that Hawkins-El would later admit to battery in a criminal
prosecution, there was sufficient evidence of the disciplinary violation at the time of the
hearing. A conduct report alone provides “some evidence” for a decision if it contains
sufficient detail. McPherson v. McBride, 188 F.3d 784, 786 (7th Cir. 1999); see Ellison v.
Zatecky, 820 F.3d 271, 274 (7th Cir. 2016). Here, the conduct report included a statement
by Officer Conley that Hawkins-El pushed her onto the bed and covered her mouth and
nose with his hand, and that she suffered bruises and cuts. That description provided a
sufficient basis for the officer’s finding.
And although Hawkins-El protests that Officer Angle wrongly ended the
hearing before he could present his best defense (and exculpatory evidence), the
hearing officer did not have to entertain his theory of self-defense. A disciplinary
hearing officer may not “arbitrarily refuse to consider” evidence that is potentially
exculpatory, Piggie v. McBride, 277 F.3d 922, 925 (7th Cir. 2002), but Hawkins-El does not
point to any such evidence. He tells us now that he had wanted to explain that he was
struggling against an illegal chokehold and to submit evidence that Officer Conley has a
history of unethical de-escalation techniques. That argument fails for several reasons.
First, Hawkins-El did not raise this argument until a reply brief in the district
court, and the court was “entitled to treat an argument raised for the first time in a reply
brief as waived.” O'Neal v. Reilly, 961 F.3d 973, 974 (7th Cir. 2020); see also Thompson v.
Battaglia, 458 F.3d 614, 616 (7th Cir. 2006) (habeas petition must “specify all the grounds
for relief available to [the petitioner].”). Further, we have recently reaffirmed that the
due-process rights of prisoners in disciplinary proceedings do not include “the right to
present mitigating arguments prior to a discretionary decision on good time credit

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revocation.” Love, 73 F.4th at 451–52; see Scruggs, 485 F.3d at 938–39 (addressing self-
defense). And the disciplinary code does not make exceptions for self-defense, so
Hawkins-El’s assertions about Officer Conley would not have been exculpatory in any
event.
Finally, Hawkins-El does not show that he was deprived of an impartial
decisionmaker. Disciplinary review officers are given a “presumption of honesty and
integrity.” Piggie v. Cotton, 342 F.3d 660, 666 (7th Cir. 2003). But a hearing officer who
was “directly or substantially involved” in the events underlying the charge or in the
investigation is not considered impartial. Id. at 667. Hawkins-El argues that Officer
Angle had such involvement because he did not fairly review the evidence, was
previously attacked by a prisoner, and refused to recuse himself, but none of these
circumstances establishes the kind of involvement that violates due process. See id.
Moreover, they are unsupported by the record. Officer Angle wrote in his hearing
report (and in an affidavit submitted in response to the habeas petition) that he
considered all the witness statements, including Reed’s. He also attested that his
previous experience with prison violence “played no part” in the hearing and that a
staffing shortage would have prevented his recusal in any event. Beyond the
unsupported assertions of partiality, Hawkins-El’s argument seems to be based on the
guilty finding, but an adverse decision—one that was based on some evidence as
required—is not evidence of bias.
Hawkins-El’s remaining contentions lack merit or are waived. He argues that his
lay advocate was also biased against him because she worked closely with Officer
Angle and had some involvement with the restitution sanction imposed at his first
hearing. But Hawkins-El had a right to an impartial “decisionmaker,” which was
Officer Angle. See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 570. He further argues that he was denied access to
the surveillance footage of the incident at his hearing and that the imposed restitution
was not supported by medical expenses, but he did not raise those arguments in his
habeas petition, so they are waived. See O'Neal, 961 F.3d at 974; Thompson, 458 F.3d at
616.
We have considered Hawkins-El’s remaining arguments, but none merits further
discussion.
AFFIRMED

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