United States of America v. Aimen R. Garro

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted July 24, 2024
Decided July 25, 2024
Before
ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge
AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge
JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge
No. 23-2112
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
AIMEN R. GARRO,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Illinois.
No. 4:20-CR-40086-JPG-1
J. Phil Gilbert,
Judge.
O R D E R
In 2020, on an online dating platform, Aimen Garro urged someone he believed
was a 15-year-old girl to have sex with him. Unaware that he had contacted an
undercover agent, he agreed to go to the purported minor’s home. At the appointed
time, Garro drove to the house, pulled into the driveway, then left. A traffic stop
ensued. Garro subsequently was arrested and charged under 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) with
attempted enticement of a minor. After a jury convicted him of that charge, Garro was
sentenced to the statutory minimum of 120 months in prison and five years’ supervised
release. Garro appeals, but his appointed counsel asserts that the appeal is frivolous and
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 23-2112 Page 2
moves to withdraw. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). Counsel’s brief
explains the nature of the case and addresses the issues that an appeal of this kind
might be expected to involve, and Garro did not respond to the motion with additional
potential issues. See C IR . R. 51(b). Because counsel’s analysis appears thorough, we limit
our review to the subjects that counsel discusses. See United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774,
776 (7th Cir. 2014).
Counsel begins by correctly noting that Garro did not file any substantive
pretrial motions, such as motions to suppress or dismiss. Therefore, counsel rightly
concludes, Garro has not preserved potential pretrial issues. Counsel does, however,
recount one aspect of jury selection: After the court swore in the jurors, one of them told
the court that his ex-wife, who was friendly with Garro’s wife, had texted him during a
break to ask if he was on the jury and to mention that Garro had recognized him. After
the juror stated that he did not discuss this contact with any juror, the court excused
him. Counsel notes that Garro proposes arguing that the court was biased by permitting
the trial to proceed after it dismissed the juror. See 28 U.S.C. § 455. But “judicial rulings
alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion,” United States
v. Walsh, 47 F.4th 491, 499 (7th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted), and the decision to proceed
after excusing the juror—who did not improperly influence the jury—reflects no bias.
Counsel next considers whether Garro could challenge the sufficiency of the
evidence in the government’s case and properly determines that he could not. Garro
would have to convince us that, after viewing that evidence most favorably to the
government, a rational jury could not have found him guilty. See United States v. Moore,
572 F.3d 334, 337 (7th Cir. 2009). But on this record, that is not possible: The text
messages that Garro sent to the purported minor discuss their sexual histories, desires,
anticipated sex acts, requests for explicit photos, and an arranged meeting at what he
believed was her home. These messages amply show that Garro attempted to induce
someone he believed was under the age of 18 to engage in sexual activity. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 2422(b); United States v. York, 48 F.4th 494, 500–01 (7th Cir. 2022) (similar messages
were sufficient evidence to convict defendant of attempt to entice a minor to perform
sexual activity), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 1772 (2023). In addition, Garro could not
successfully argue that he did not believe he was speaking with an underage girl. Even
though the purported minor’s profile stated that she was 18 years old, she told Garro in
text messages that she was 15, lived with her mother, went to school, and could not
drive. With that knowledge, he still pursued her.

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No. 23-2112 Page 3
Next, counsel evaluates arguments regarding the jury instruction on entrapment.
First, she considers whether the jury had to acquit based on Garro’s defense that, in
light of the agent’s responses to his texts, the government induced him to commit the
crime, and she properly concludes that Garro could not plausibly so contend. As
counsel notes, the record is devoid of any evidence of improper inducement. “[T]he fact
that government agents initiated contact with the defendant, suggested the crime, or
furnished the ordinary opportunity to commit it is insufficient to show inducement.”
See York, 48 F.4th at 502. Nor is the purported victim’s statement to Garro that she was a
minor sufficient for entrapment. See United States v. Mercado, 53 F.4th 1071, 1082 (7th Cir.
2022).
Second, counsel considers whether the district court erred in combining another
instruction with the entrapment instruction. When the court instructed the jury on
entrapment, it also instructed the jurors that the government could use deception when
investigating a crime. Defense counsel unsuccessfully objected to the latter instruction,
arguing that the government’s actions went beyond mere deception. Counsel rightly
observes that Garro did not raise in the district court a new, proposed objection—that
the two instructions in combination were confusing; therefore, appellate review of that
new contention would be limited to plain error. See F ED. R. C RIM . P. 30, 52(b). But Garro
could not reasonably argue that the combined instructions were plain or even ordinary
error because, in light of the overwhelming evidence of guilt, there is no reasonable
probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different without the latter
instruction. See United States v. Carson, 870 F.3d 584, 602–03 (7th Cir. 2017).
Counsel next turns to sentencing. The presentence investigation report proposed
a total offense level of 30 (including a two-level enhancement—applied over Garro’s
objection—for using a “computer,” a term defined broadly enough to include a smart
phone, to commit the offense) and a Category I criminal-history score. This yielded a
range of 97 to 121 months’ imprisonment. Because, as Garro conceded, the statute
mandated a minimum prison term of 120 months, 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b), the applicable
guidelines range was 120 to 121 months. The court adopted this proposed guidelines
range and imposed the statutory minimum sentence of 120 months in prison.
Counsel correctly concludes that Garro could not reasonably challenge his
sentence. First, because the statutory mandatory minimum prison term was 120 months,
even if Garro had not been subject to a two-level enhancement for using a computer, he
could not have received a prison term under 120 months. Second, the five-year term of
supervised release was also the statutorily required minimum. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(k).

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No. 23-2112 Page 4
Finally, Garro did not object to the proposed conditions of supervised release, thereby
waiving any related challenge. See United States v. Raney, 842 F.3d 1041, 1044 (7th Cir.
2016) (“When the district court allows the defendant an opportunity to challenge
conditions of supervised release, the defendant waives any objection to conditions to
which he fails to object.”).
Therefore, we GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.

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