United States of America v. Roshaun Terry

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted July 24, 2024
Decided July 25, 2024
Before
ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge
AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge
JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge
No. 24-1164
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
ROSHAUN TERRY,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Central District of Illinois.
No. 22-cr-10028-001
Michael M. Mihm,
Judge.
O R D E R
Roshaun Terry appeals an order requiring the restitution of unemployment
benefits fraudulently obtained during the COVID-19 pandemic. See 18 U.S.C. § 1343,
§ 641. Her appointed lawyer asserts that the appeal is frivolous and moves to withdraw
under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). Counsel’s brief explains the nature of
the appeal and addresses the issues that an appeal of this kind might be expected to
involve. Because counsel’s analysis appears adequate, and Terry did not respond to the
motion, see C IR . R. 51(b), we limit our review to the subjects that counsel discusses.
See United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (2014).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. A PP. P. 32.1

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No. 24-1164 Page 2
Terry pleaded guilty in 2017 to wire fraud and submitting false, fictitious, or
fraudulent claims. See 18 U.S.C. § 1343, § 287. She was released from prison in the
summer of 2020.
While on supervised release, she submitted applications for unemployment
benefits in both Illinois and Minnesota under the Pandemic Unemployment Assistance
program. See 15 U.S.C. § 9025. On the applications she stated, falsely, that she was out of
work because of the pandemic. Both states began providing her benefits.
The probation officer who monitored Terry’s bank records soon noticed
irregularities in her bank account. The officer confronted her, and Terry later admitted
to him that she had filed the claims fraudulently. The officer, in turn, petitioned to
revoke her supervised release. At the revocation hearing, Terry acknowledged the
fraud; the district court revoked her supervised release and sentenced her to twelve
months’ imprisonment. See United States v. Terry, No. 17-40080 (C.D. Ill. Apr. 16, 2021).
A year later, in August 2022, a grand jury indicted Terry for defrauding the
United States to obtain unemployment benefits in Illinois and Minnesota. Terry later
entered an open plea of guilty. At the plea colloquy, where she was represented by
counsel, she confirmed that she understood the charges and admitted to making false
statements to obtain unemployment benefits.
In advance of sentencing, the probation office prepared a Presentence Report
stating that Terry owed $16,854 in restitution to Illinois and $5,319 to Minnesota. (The
restitution amount from Illinois was calculated by totaling the deposited amounts of
benefits specified in separate counts of the indictment. The Minnesota amount was
based on a letter from the state recognizing that it had overpaid her and asking her to
pay back that sum.) Terry’s counsel objected to the PSR, stating that Terry did not
believe she should have to pay restitution for benefits received from Illinois on January
5, 2021 (count six of the indictment)—amounting to $574—because she in fact was
unemployed at the time. The probation office revised the PSR to note the objection.
At the sentencing hearing, the district court twice asked Terry if there was
anything in the PSR that she thought was inaccurate or incomplete that she wished to
challenge. The first time, Terry said only that the report did not mention the educational
programs she had completed. The second time, Terry confirmed there was nothing else
in the report that she wished to challenge. The court ultimately sentenced her to a
below-guidelines sentence of nine months’ imprisonment (which she appears to have

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No. 24-1164 Page 3
since served) and three years’ supervised release. The court also ordered her to pay
$22,173 in restitution.
On appeal, counsel does not tell us, as he should, whether he has consulted with
Terry about a potential challenge to her guilty plea. See United States v. Larry,
104 F.4th 1020, 1022 (7th Cir. 2024); United States v. Knox, 287 F.3d 667, 671 (7th Cir.
2002). But we can overlook counsel’s misstep because challenging the plea would be
frivolous. Because Terry did not move to withdraw her guilty plea in the district court,
our review would be for plain error, see United States v. Hogue, 998 F.3d 745, 751 (7th Cir.
2021), and a review of the plea colloquy shows that the district court substantially
complied with Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Even though the
court omitted mention of Terry’s right to representation at trial, see FED. R. C RIM. P.
11(b)(1)(D), the oversight was harmless because Terry was informed at an earlier
proceeding of her right to an attorney, she was represented by counsel at the colloquy,
and the record does not suggest she would have done things differently had the judge
informed her of the right. See United States v. Lovett, 844 F.2d 487, 491–92 (7th Cir. 1988).
Counsel does consider whether Terry could challenge two parts of her restitution
order. First, he considers arguing that the $574 restitution imposed on count six should
not have been ordered because Terry in fact was unemployed on the date in question.
Counsel rightly concludes that she waived this argument when, at sentencing, she
confirmed that the information contained in the PSR was factually correct. See United
States v. Harris, 102 F.4th 847, 851 (7th Cir. 2024). The court asked her if anything in the
report was incomplete or inaccurate, and she answered no. Having confirmed the
accuracy of the facts in the PSR, which included documentation that the $574 payment
was obtained by fraud, Terry cannot now contest that restitution amount. See id. Even if
she forfeited rather than waived this challenge, we see no basis for reversal under the
plain-error standard, especially where, as here, she appears to have had a strategic
reason for not objecting—any objection would have contradicted her admission at her
change-of-plea hearing that she had obtained the $574 through fraud. See United States
v. Robinson, 964 F.3d 632, 641–42 (7th Cir. 2020) (no error, plain or otherwise, for court to
sentence defendant—who had failed to object to certain drug quantity—based upon his
admissions at change-of-plea hearing and his strategic reason to acquiesce).
Second, counsel asks whether Terry could challenge the $5,319 in restitution she
owes to Minnesota. Counsel understands Terry to contend that this amount is based
upon inaccurate and insufficient information. But as counsel rightly observes, Terry

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waived this challenge by confirming at the sentencing hearing that she had no
objections to the information contained in the PSR. See Harris, 102 F.4th at 851.
We therefore GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.

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