United States of America v. Angelo Johnson

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Argued September 14, 2023
Decided July 29, 2024
Before
ILANA D IAMOND R OVNER , Circuit Judge
D AVID F. H AMILTON, Circuit Judge
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge
No. 22-2239
U NITED STATES OF A MERICA ,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
A NGELO J OHNSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois,
Eastern Division.
No. 1:20-cr-00755-1
Robert W. Gettleman, Judge.
O R D E R
Defendant-appellant Angelo Johnson appeals the 108-month sentence he
received for knowingly and intentionally possessing, with the intent to distribute,
cocaine base, see 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and unlawfully possessing a firearm following a
felony conviction, see 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). We affirm.
Based on Johnson’s 2014 Illinois convictions for robbery and kidnapping (which
qualified as crimes of violence, see U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2) (Nov. 2021)) along with a 2018
Michigan conviction for delivering less than 50 grams of cocaine (which qualified as a
controlled substance offense, see § 4B1.2((b)), he was deemed a career offender under
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. A PP. P. 32.1

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No. 22-2239 Page 2
the Sentencing Guidelines, see § 4B1.1(a), and his offense level was set at 32 (adjusted to
29 after he was given credit for acceptance of responsibility pursuant to section 3E1.1).
Johnson contended that his Illinois convictions for robbery and kidnapping do not
qualify as crimes of violence, given the possibility that he might have been convicted as
an aider and abettor to robbery and kidnapping rather than as a principal and given
what Johnson argues is the unique breadth of an Illinois rule of aiding and abetting
liability known as “common design.” See 720 ILCS 5/5-2(c); People v. Fernandez, 2014 IL
115527, 6 N.E.3d 145 (2014); Gonzalez v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 193-94 (2007).
Johnson also argued that his Michigan conviction for delivery of cocaine does not
qualify as a controlled substance offense because the Michigan controlled substance
statute under which he was convicted was “overbroad” in comparison with its federal
counterpart. The district court rejected both arguments. R. 78 at 2-3.
Johnson renews these arguments on appeal, but we find no merit to either one.
His argument as to the breadth of Illinois accomplice liability is resolved by our recent
opinion in United States v. Carr, No. 22-1245, —F.4th—, 2024 WL 3324727 (7th Cir. July 8,
2024), which concludes that Illinois common-design liability is not out of step with
mainstream accomplice liability. His argument as to the overbreadth of the Michigan
controlled substance statute is foreclosed by United States v. Ruth, 966 F.3d 642, 651–54
(7th Cir. 2020) (“controlled substance offense,” as used in sections 4B1.1(a) and 4B1.2(b)
of the Guidelines, is not limited to the federal definition of such offense but extends to
felony state-law offenses related to controlled or counterfeit substances), and although
Johnson urges us to revisit Ruth, we have reaffirmed the relevant holding of Ruth on
multiple occasions, e.g. United States v. Ramirez, 52 F.4th 705, 711-16 (7th Cir. 2022), cert.
denied, 143 S. Ct. 2480 (2023), and most recently in United States v. Holder, 94 F.4th 695,
699 (7th Cir. 2024). Ruth remains the law of this circuit.
AFFIRMED.

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