ROUSEMARY VEGA and JESUS RAMOS v. the Chicago Board of Education

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 23-1183
R OUSEMARY VEGA and JESUS R AMOS ,
Plaintiffs,
v.
THE C HICAGO BOARD OF EDUCATION , et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
A PPEAL OF : C ARYN S HAW , A NNE S HAW , and DONALD VILLAR
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 15-cv-3221 — Gary Feinerman, Judge.
____________________
A RGUED NOVEMBER 3, 2023 — DECIDED J ULY 29, 2024
____________________
Before K IRSCH , JACKSON -A KIWUMI , and PRYOR , Circuit
Judges.
JACKSON -A KIWUMI , Circuit Judge. Caryn Shaw, an attorney
for the Plaintiffs in this case, allegedly assaulted opposing
counsel Lisa Dreishmire after a heated deposition at the Chi-
cago Board of Education building. When Dreishmire brought

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2 No. 23-1183
the incident to the district court’s attention, the court ordered
briefing and held an evidentiary hearing to “get to the bot-
tom” of it. The district court ultimately concluded that Shaw
misled the court about the incident and her falsehoods unnec-
essarily prolonged the litigation. As a sanction for Shaw’s
conduct, the court removed her from the case and ordered
“Plaintiffs’ counsel”—a total of three attorneys—to reimburse
Defendants for reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. Plaintiffs’
counsel filed this appeal challenging those decisions. We af-
firm the district court’s imposition of sanctions against Shaw
but vacate the sanctions against the remainder of “Plaintiffs’
counsel” for lack of notice.
I
In 2015, Plaintiffs Rousemary Vega and Jesus Ramos sued
the Chicago Board of Education and various Board members
and security officials. They alleged that the officials violated
Vega’s First Amendment rights by removing her from a pub-
lic Board meeting and restricting her ability to attend subse-
quent meetings and violated Vega’s and Ramos’s rights under
state law. We introduce the lawsuit for context, but the details
are not relevant to this appeal. This appeal concerns the con-
duct of the parties’ attorneys after a deposition in that litiga-
tion.
We recite the facts as developed by the parties before, dur-
ing, and after the evidentiary hearing in district court. On July
13, 2017, Plaintiffs’ attorneys Caryn Shaw and Donald Villar
met at the Board’s office building to depose Jadine Chou, the
Board’s Chief of Security. The Plaintiffs’ third attorney, Anne
Shaw, did not attend. Chou was represented by Lisa
Dreishmire, the Assistant Deputy General Counsel for the
Board. Also present were Kathleen Gamble, the Board’s

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No. 23-1183 3
Senior Assistant General Counsel, and Pauline Strohl, a court
reporter from Urlaub Bowen & Associates. The deposition be-
gan around 2 p.m. and lasted until just after 6 p.m. By all ac-
counts, it was a tense encounter, with the Board’s attorneys
objecting early, often, and at great lengths.
According to the witnesses at the evidentiary hearing,
when the deposition ended, as Dreishmire was leaving the
room, a frustrated Caryn Shaw screamed at her, asking “what
the [f***] is your problem.” Dreishmire reentered the room
and instructed the court reporter to go back on the record.
Shaw responded, “No, this is personal,” and moved in
Dreishmire’s direction.
This is where the parties’ recollection of the event di-
verges. Dreishmire told the district court that Shaw physically
assaulted her by pushing her out of the room. Shaw said that
she was simply trying to leave the room and made “uninten-
tional contact” with Dreishmire on her way out. Whatever
happened resulted in Dreishmire calling the police, pressing
charges against Shaw, and filing a complaint with the Illinois
Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission
(“ARDC”).
Dreishmire brought the incident to the district court’s at-
tention the following week in response to Plaintiffs’ motion to
compel the deposition of Jesse Ruiz, the former Board vice
president. Dreishmire’s response characterized Shaw’s con-
duct as “criminal assault and battery.” On the same day,
Plaintiffs moved for unrelated discovery sanctions against
Defendants’ counsel, and described the incident as “uninten-
tional contact.”

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4 No. 23-1183
The district court held a hearing on Plaintiffs’ motion to
compel on July 20, 2017. During that hearing, the court
brought up the incident and stressed the need to “get to the
bottom” of it. After the hearing, the court gave Plaintiffs the
opportunity to respond to the assault allegations in their not-
yet-filed reply brief in support of their motion to compel.
Shaw took that opportunity to accuse Defendants’ counsel of
violating the rules of professional conduct and biasing the
court by presenting the assault allegations. Shaw did not di-
rectly contest Dreishmire’s allegations about what happened.
In September 2017, the district court held another hearing
and asked about the status of the ARDC and police investiga-
tions into the incident. The court found that the incident was
“important” and “serious,” and prohibited Shaw and
Dreishmire from participating in further depositions in the
case. The court then scheduled an evidentiary hearing about
the alleged assault.
The evidentiary hearing took place over two non-
consecutive days in October and November 2017. Four
witnesses testified: Dreishmire, Villar (Plaintiffs’ second
attorney), Strohl (the court reporter), and Chou (the
deponent). On the first day of the hearing, Shaw expressed
that she intended to testify. But by the time the district court
reconvened for Day 2 of the hearing in November, Shaw had
retained counsel who explained that she would not testify.
Once all the evidence had been presented, the court informed
the parties that they would be allowed to present any
additional information in post-hearing briefs. Dreishmire’s
post-hearing brief deferred to the court on “the appropriate
sanctions for Ms. Shaw’s conduct and misrepresentations,”
but requested at least “the attorney’s fees and costs incurred

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No. 23-1183 5
as a direct result of Ms. Shaw’s conduct.” Several days later,
Shaw submitted a brief in support of discovery sanctions
against Dreishmire and the Board but did not respond to
Dreishmire’s request for sanctions.
On March 28, 2018, the district court issued the first sanc-
tions order. See Vega v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., No. 15 C 3221, 2018
WL 11587042 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 28, 2018). That order removed
Shaw from the case, referred her for further disciplinary ac-
tion, and informed the parties that a calculation of fees and
costs would be forthcoming. The court found that “Shaw
swore at Dreishmire and then intentionally pushed her with
force sufficient to knock her backwards.” Id. at *1. Addition-
ally, the court found Shaw’s description of the contact as “un-
intentional” to be false and vexatious. “As a sanction for her
verbal and physical attack on Dreishmire,” the court prohib-
ited Shaw from participating as an attorney in the case and
found that “Plaintiffs’ counsel must reimburse Defendants for
the reasonable attorney fees and costs they incurred in litigat-
ing the incident.” Id. at *2.
Almost a month later, Shaw moved for reconsideration of
the sanctions against her. The motion marked her first time
contesting the sanctions after the evidentiary hearing. The
court denied Shaw’s motion on May 1, 2018. That same day,
in light of the court’s decision to sanction Shaw, Defendants
petitioned for fees and costs. Plaintiffs objected to the fee re-
quest.
Four and a half years later, on December 28, 2022, the court
entered the second sanctions order. That order required
“Plaintiffs’ counsel” to “reimburse Defendants $11,920.95 in
attorney fees and costs.” The court also overruled Plaintiffs’
counsel’s objections to the fee request. Plaintiffs’ counsel had

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6 No. 23-1183
argued that they did not have adequate notice of the sanc-
tions, the sanctions were not warranted, and the court should
have abstained from issuing the sanctions given the ongoing
ARDC investigation.
Plaintiffs’ counsel now appeal and raise four issues for our
review: (1) whether the district court provided adequate no-
tice of its intent to sanction “Plaintiffs’ counsel,” which in-
cludes not just Caryn Shaw, but also Anne Shaw and Donald
Villar; (2) whether the sanctions were proper; (3) whether the
district court was required to abstain in light of the ongoing
state proceedings; and (4) whether the district court correctly
calculated the monetary sanctions.
II
Before we reach the issues for review, we must first ad-
dress a jurisdictional issue: who are the parties taking this ap-
peal? See Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134, 147 (2012) (the re-
quirements for notices of appeal are jurisdictional in nature).
Appellants bring this appeal on behalf of “Plaintiffs’ counsel,”
but Appellees (Defendants) maintain that only Caryn Shaw is
a proper appellant. Appellees point out that Plaintiffs’ notice
of appeal in the district court, as well as their docketing state-
ment and Rule 26.1 disclosure in this court, list only Caryn
Shaw and Shaw Legal Services, Ltd., as appellants. Citing Al-
len Archery, Inc. v. Precision Shooting Equipment, Inc. 857 F.2d
1176 (7th Cir. 1988), Appellees maintain that the failure to list
Donald Villar and Anne Shaw on the notice of appeal means
that the two attorneys are not proper appellants. And Shaw
Legal Services, Ltd. cannot be a proper appellant, Appellees
argue, because the district court “did not identify that law
firm by name in either of its sanctions orders” and “in the

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No. 23-1183 7
Northern District of Illinois, a law firm may not appear as
‘Plaintiffs’ Counsel’”.
Appellants appear to concede that the law firm is not a
proper appellant because it was not specifically “named by
the district court,” but Appellants maintain that Anne Shaw
and Donald Villar are proper appellants. We agree.
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(c)(1)(A) provides
that a notice of appeal must “specify the party or parties tak-
ing the appeal by naming each one in the caption or body of
the notice.” The rule permits “an attorney representing more
than one party [to] describe those parties with such terms as
‘all plaintiffs,’ ‘the defendants,’ ‘the plaintiffs A, B, et al.,’ or
‘all defendants except X’.” F ED. R. A PP . P. 3(c)(1)(A). But even
when the notice fails to broadly define the prospective appel-
lants, Rule 3(c)(7) offers a backstop by preventing courts of
appeals from dismissing an appeal “for failure to name a
party whose intent to appeal is otherwise clear from the no-
tice.” F ED. R. A PP . P. 3(c)(7). We have construed that rule lib-
erally to protect the appeal rights of persons who have an in-
terest in the orders being appealed. See Foreman v. Wadsworth,
844 F.3d 620, 625–26 (7th Cir. 2016); see also Cooper v. Retrieval-
Masters Creditors Bureau, Inc., 42 F.4th 688, 693–94 (7th Cir.
2022).
In Foreman, for example, plaintiff’s counsel failed to name
himself in his notice of appeal challenging the district court’s
censure order. Foreman, 844 F.3d at 625. But the body of the
notice clearly identified the issue on appeal as the district
court’s order censuring the plaintiff’s counsel. Id. at 625–26.
We allowed the attorney to proceed as an appellant because
he was “the only party with an interest in” the censure order;

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8 No. 23-1183
his intent to appeal was “clear from the notice.” Id. at 626; F ED.
R. A PP . P. 3(c)(7).
The same was true in Cooper, and the same is true here. In
this case, the notice of appeal identifies the district court’s
sanctions order of March 28, 2018, order denying Plaintiffs’
motion for reconsideration of May 1, 2018, and sanctions or-
der of December 28, 2022, as the matters on appeal. Those or-
ders were directed at “Plaintiffs’ counsel” which, at the time
the orders were written, included Caryn Shaw, Anne Shaw,
and Donald Villar. The March 2018 order terminated Caryn
Shaw’s participation in the case, but none of the orders sug-
gested that the remaining sanctions were limited to Caryn
Shaw. Indeed, the orders referred broadly to “Plaintiffs’ coun-
sel,” even though the district court knew how to single out
Caryn Shaw when it wanted to limit a sanction to her. As
members of “Plaintiffs’ counsel,” Anne Shaw and Donald Vil-
lar have “an interest in” the orders under review, such that
their intent is “clear from the notice.” Foreman, 844 F.3d at 626;
F ED. R. A PP . P. 3(c)(7). Thus, we hold that Caryn Shaw, Anne
Shaw, and Don Villar are all proper appellants in this appeal.
III
With that jurisdictional dispute resolved, we turn to the
issues Plaintiffs’ counsel raise with the district court’s sanc-
tions orders and fee award.
We review a district court’s imposition of sanctions for
abuse of discretion. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32,
55 (1991); Dal Pozzo v. Basic Mach. Co., Inc., 463 F.3d 609, 614
(7th Cir. 2006). A district court abuses its discretion in impos-
ing sanctions when it fails to explain the basis for the sanc-
tions; when it does not properly notify the offender that it is

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No. 23-1183 9
considering sanctions; or when its decision is based on an er-
roneous view of the law or a clearly erroneous assessment of
the evidence. Doe v. Maywood Hous. Auth., 71 F.3d 1294, 1299
(7th Cir. 1995).
A
Plaintiffs’ counsel challenge the sanctions orders on due
process grounds, contending that the district court failed to
afford them “the requisite notice and opportunity to respond
to any potential sanctions.” While we agree with the district
court that Caryn Shaw had notice of potential sanctions for
her conduct, we are unable to conclude that Anne Shaw and
Don Villar had adequate notice, so we vacate the sanctions
against them.
“Before a court may impose sanctions sua sponte, it must
give the offending party notice of its intent to do so and the
opportunity to be heard.” Johnson v. Cherry, 422 F.3d 540, 551
(7th Cir. 2005); The Jolly Group, Ltd. v. Medline Indus., Inc., 435
F.3d 717, 720 (7th Cir. 2006). “This is true whether the court is
sanctioning a party pursuant to its authority under Rule 11,
section 1927, or its inherent authority.” Johnson, 422 F.3d at
551. General notices are “insufficient:” “the offending party
must be on notice of the specific conduct for which she is po-
tentially subject to sanctions.” Id. at 551–52 (citing In re Rimsat,
Ltd., 212 F.3d 1039, 1045–46 (7th Cir. 2000)).
1. March 2018 Sanctions Against Caryn Shaw
The district court correctly found that Caryn Shaw was on
notice of the potential for sanctions before the March 2018 or-
der. That is true even though the district court never explicitly
stated as much. We have explained that “[f]air notice can
come from the court or an opposing litigant,” so long as it

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10 No. 23-1183
“inform[s] the person that he or she is in jeopardy of being
sanctioned by the court.” Rimsat, 212 F.3d at 1045. If previous
interactions between the parties afforded the attorney “ample
notice that his opponents were seeking sanctions and he was
given an opportunity to respond,” due process is satisfied.
Dal Pozzo, 463 F.3d at 613.
Both the district court and Defendants gave Shaw ade-
quate notice of the March 2018 sanctions. After learning about
Shaw’s alleged assault, the court emphasized its intent to “get
to the bottom” of it and scheduled an evidentiary hearing ex-
clusively devoted to the incident. The content of the hearing
made clear that Defendants were seeking to hold Shaw ac-
countable for her actions. The fact that Shaw enlisted an attor-
ney to represent her at the second half of the hearing demon-
strates that she understood similarly. Moreover, in their post-
hearing brief, Defendants explicitly requested “appropriate
sanctions for Ms. Shaw’s conduct and misrepresentations.”
Given the parties’ submissions and the district court’s actions
and remarks on the record, it should have been obvious to
Shaw that sanctions were on the table.
Shaw sees the issue differently. She says she was not given
an adequate opportunity to respond or “to vigorously defend
herself” because the district court did not hold a separate
hearing on whether she should be sanctioned. We are unper-
suaded.
We have held that a separate hearing is not required be-
fore imposing sanctions, and a party who fails to request a
separate hearing can waive any right to such a hearing. Rim-
sat, 212 F.3d at 1046. Even without a hearing, Shaw had sev-
eral opportunities to respond or to defend herself in writing.
She submitted her post-evidentiary hearing brief several days

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No. 23-1183 11
after Defendants, which means she was aware of and had the
opportunity to respond to Defendants’ sanctions request.
Shaw did not take that opportunity. It was not until the 2018
sanctions order that Shaw first contested the sanctions
through a motion to reconsider. Notably, that motion did not
raise the notice issues she now raises. Shaw was given an ad-
equate opportunity to respond to the opposing party’s re-
quest for sanctions; she was simply dilatory in doing so.
2. December 2022 Sanctions Against “Plaintiffs’
counsel”
The December 28, 2022, sanctions against “Plaintiffs’
counsel” require a different result. Other than Caryn Shaw,
neither of the two other individuals under the umbrella of
“Plaintiffs’ counsel”—Anne Shaw and Don Villar—had no-
tice that they were at risk of being sanctioned or the reason
they might be sanctioned. Their actions were the subject of no
hearing; Defendants did not seek sanctions against them; and
they had no chance to respond to or defend themselves
against sanctions. On appeal, Defendants admit that “[their]
post-hearing brief is devoted entirely to whether Caryn Shaw
should be sanctioned.”
Still, Defendants insist that “Plaintiffs’ counsel” had
notice—specifically, in the March 2018 sanctions order.
According to Defendants, that order provided notice by
stating that “a monetary sanction would be forthcoming
against ‘Plaintiffs’ Counsel’.”
But that order cannot provide the requisite notice because
that order does not simply preview sanctions against Plain-
tiffs’ counsel, it also imposes them. The order states that
“Plaintiffs’ counsel must reimburse Defendants for the

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12 No. 23-1183
reasonable attorney fees and costs they incurred in litigating
the incident.” See Vega, 2018 WL 11587042, at *2 (emphasis
added). At that point, the sanctions decision against Plaintiffs’
counsel had been made. It cannot be that an order imposing
sanctions also provides notice of sanctions. Furthermore, the
order states no basis for sanctioning other members of “Plain-
tiffs’ counsel” besides Caryn Shaw. Given the lack of specific-
ity about the conduct that apparently subjected Anne Shaw
and Donald Villar to sanctions, they had no notice of the
court’s intent to impose sanctions and no opportunity to show
cause why sanctions were not proper. Johnson, 422 F.3d at 549.
For these reasons, we conclude that the district court
abused its discretion in sanctioning Plaintiffs’ attorneys Anne
Shaw and Donald Villar. We therefore vacate the sanctions
against them.
B
Next, Shaw challenges the merits of the district court’s de-
cision to sanction her, arguing that her conduct was not sanc-
tionable under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 or the court’s inherent author-
ity. We disagree.
Under § 1927, an attorney “who so multiplies the proceed-
ings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be re-
quired by the court to satisfy personally the excess costs, ex-
penses, and attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred because of
such conduct.” Our precedent defines “vexatiously” as either
“subjective or objective bad faith.” Kotsilieris v. Chalmers, 966
F.2d 1181, 1184 (7th Cir. 1992). The standard for imposing
sanctions under the court’s inherent authority is similar: the
court must find that the party to be sanctioned “willfully
abused the judicial process or otherwise conducted litigation

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No. 23-1183 13
in bad faith.” Fuery v. City of Chicago, 900 F.3d 450, 463 (7th
Cir. 2018). To invoke its inherent sanctions authority, the
court must first make a finding that the sanctioned party en-
gaged in bad faith to obstruct the judicial process or bring
about the violation of a court order. Id.
The district court found that Shaw engaged in bad faith
when she lied to the court about how the alleged assault tran-
spired. The court found that “the only reason the court and
the parties engaged in the exercise of getting to the bottom of
what happened after the deposition was Plaintiffs’ counsels’
representations in Plaintiffs’ sanctions motion about what in
fact happened.”
These factual findings cannot be an abuse of discretion be-
cause the record amply supports them. Witnesses for both
sides—Villar, Strohl, and Dreishmire—testified that Shaw in-
itiated the encounter by swearing at Dreishmire as
Dreishmire was leaving the deposition room. And most of the
witnesses testified that Shaw physically touched or pushed
Dreishmire. This testimony, which the district court found
credible, undermines the timeline of events that Shaw pre-
sented to the court in her first sanctions motion and the sub-
sequent hearings. For example, Shaw described the incident
as “unintentional contact” in her motion for discovery sanc-
tions; she misled the court about how the incident started at
the July 2017 hearing; and she misled the court again about
the gravity of the incident, calling it “an inadvertent brush-
ing” in her opening statement at the October 2017 evidentiary
hearing. Based on these statements, the court reasonably
found that Shaw’s depiction of the event was contrary to the
weight of the evidence.

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14 No. 23-1183
Shaw contends that her conduct was not vexatious be-
cause she was acting on the information she had available
when she first described the incident to the court. This argu-
ment is completely implausible. See Walter v. Fiorenzo, 840
F.2d 427, 433 (7th Cir. 1988) (conduct is sanctionable when it
is “without a plausible legal or factual basis and lacking in
justification”). We agree with the district court that Shaw
“must have known that her representations were false” be-
cause she was “a direct participant in the confrontation.” That
constitutes bad faith and vexatious conduct under our prece-
dent, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in find-
ing as much. See Vega, 2018 WL 11587042, at *2.
C
Shaw next argues that the sanctions were improper be-
cause the district court should have held off on imposing
them in light of the ongoing ARDC proceedings. Again, we
disagree.
It is true, as Shaw points out, that attorney disciplinary
proceedings in Illinois qualify as state-court proceedings for
purposes of the abstention doctrine set forth in Younger v. Har-
ris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). See Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Gar-
den State Bar Assoc., 457 U.S. 423, 432–34 (1982); see also Stor-
ment v. O’Malley, 938 F.2d 86, 88–90 (7th Cir. 1991). But that
does not mean a district court is required to abstain whenever
a party is involved in an ARDC proceeding. Abstention is not
that categorical. To the contrary, before a court may invoke
Younger abstention, there must first be the possibility that the
federal court’s action would impact the state court proceed-
ing. See, e.g., Younger, 401 U.S. at 43 (describing abstention as
a “longstanding public policy against federal court interfer-
ence with state court proceedings”); Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 431

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No. 23-1183 15
(abstention is appropriate to prevent “federal-court interfer-
ence with pending state judicial proceedings”).
In abstention cases, the emphasis is on interference. So the
threshold question—even before the question of whether a
court should abstain—is whether the federal action threatens
to interfere with or intrude upon a state court proceeding. See
Mulholland v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 746 F.3d 811, 815 (7th
Cir. 2014) (Younger abstention applies in “exactly three classes
of cases: where federal jurisdiction would intrude into ongo-
ing state criminal proceedings, or into certain civil enforce-
ment proceedings (judicial or administrative) akin to criminal
prosecutions, or into civil proceedings ‘that implicate a State’s
interest in enforcing the orders and judgments of its courts.’”)
(quoting Sprint Communications, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69
(2013)). Where there is no serious threat of interference, fed-
eral courts have a “virtually unflagging obligation” to resolve
the questions before them. Colorado River Water Conservation
Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976).
We demonstrated what a threat of interference looks like
in Storment. In that case, an Illinois state court judge referred
an attorney to the ARDC for disciplinary action after the at-
torney encouraged a witness to lie in a family court proceed-
ing. Storment, 938 F.2d at 87–88. The attorney sued the ARDC
in federal district court, alleging violations of the federal
eavesdropping statute and seeking to enjoin the ARDC from
considering certain pieces of evidence that the state court
judge submitted along with the judge’s complaint. Id. at 88.
The district court granted the ARDC’s request that the court
abstain under Younger and Middlesex. Id. We affirmed that de-
cision, and it is easy to see why: if the district court had en-
joined the ARDC’s use of the disputed evidence, the ARDC

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16 No. 23-1183
would not have been able to conduct its investigation as it saw
fit. Such intervention by the court would constitute a signifi-
cant intrusion into the ARDC’s investigatory process.
No similar threat of intrusion exists here. The district
court’s sanction for Shaw’s conduct in the federal case would
have no effect (let alone an adverse effect) on the ARDC’s de-
cision of whether and how to discipline Shaw. And the mere
fact that the district court and the ARDC could run parallel
investigations and each impose sanctions for Shaw’s behavior
is not enough to require abstention, for we have held that the
mere existence of parallel proceedings does not require a dis-
trict court to invoke Younger. See Mulholland, 746 F.3d at 816.
Because the district court could resolve the sanctions issue
without offending comity and federalism, or posing any
threat to the ARDC process, it was not required to abstain.
D
Finally, Plaintiffs’ counsel contend that the district court
erred in calculating the award of legal fees by applying the
wrong percentage deduction and by including costs for “ex-
cessive and vague billings.” We see no error.
We review the district court’s fee awards under a “highly
deferential abuse of discretion standard.” REXA, Inc. v. Ches-
ter, 42 F.4th 652, 673 (7th Cir. 2022). “A district court is ac-
corded significant deference in matters concerning attorneys’
fees because (1) the trial court possesses a superior under-
standing of the factual matters at issue; (2) that superior un-
derstanding outweighs the need for uniformity in fee awards;
and (3) it is important to avoid, wherever possible, expending
the resources associated with conducting a second major liti-
gation concerning fees.” Id. (citations omitted). But the district

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No. 23-1183 17
court “still bears the responsibility of justifying its conclu-
sions.” Id.
Plaintiffs’ counsel criticize the fee calculation to no avail.
They raise no legal issues that would have required the dis-
trict court to calculate or justify the fee it imposed any differ-
ently, and we cannot discern any. The district court explained
that it examined Defendants’ counsel’s timesheets and found
their rate of $250 per hour “eminently reasonable.” The court
also reviewed each line item request for reimbursement and
ultimately deducted nearly 42.5 hours’ worth of billing. We
cannot say on this record that the district court’s fee determi-
nation was an abuse of discretion.
IV
In sum, we AFFIRM the district court’s sanctions and fee
award against Caryn Shaw but VACATE those decisions as to
Anne Shaw and Donald Villar. The case is REMANDED for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

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