Irma Leibas v. Thomas J. Dart

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 23-1275
I RMA LEIBAS ,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
THOMAS J. DART, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 1:19-cv-07592 — Rebecca R. Pallmeyer, Chief Judge.
____________________
A RGUED M ARCH 29, 2024 — DECIDED J ULY 29, 2024
____________________
Before R OVNER , S T. EVE, and PRYOR , Circuit Judges.
R OVNER , Circuit Judge. Irma Leibas is employed by the
Cook County Department of Corrections (“DOC”) as a correc-
tional officer. Due to certain diagnoses that predate her em-
ployment with the DOC, Leibas requires accommodations at
work, including up to three additional breaks per shift. After
the DOC denied Leibas’s request for additional breaks, she
brought suit alleging violations of the Americans with Disa-
bilities Act (“ADA”). Because Leibas does not offer evidence

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sufficient to create a dispute of material fact that she is a qual-
ified individual under the ADA, we affirm.
I.
The following facts are undisputed and, where disputed,
are relayed in the light most favorable to Leibas, against
whom summary judgment was granted. The DOC hired Lei-
bas as a correctional officer on May 10, 2010. The DOC is one
of three offices within the Cook County Sheriff’s office, and it
operates one of the largest single site pre-trial detention facil-
ities in the United States. Sheriff Thomas J. Dart is the elected
head of the Sheriff’s office. Correctional officers are responsi-
ble for maintaining the safety and security of the DOC’s staff,
inmates, and visitors. Neither party disputes that doing so is
one of the correctional officers’ essential functions.
Security incidents occur regularly in the DOC. Correc-
tional officers must respond to security incidents in their as-
signed area, and some security incidents might require the re-
sponse of all correctional officers. Correctional officers must
respond to security incidents appropriately so that any
threats are quickly and effectively diffused. Failure to do so
could result in fatal consequences.
Before the DOC hired her as a correctional officer, Leibas
was diagnosed with Scleroderma, Irritable Bowel Syndrome,
Lupus, and Raynaud’s Syndrome. At times, these conditions
flare up. To respond to these flare ups, Leibas sought accom-
modations from the DOC.
Initially, the DOC accommodated Leibas by putting her on
a modified duty assignment at the Visitor Information Center.
However, following budget cuts, the DOC was faced with a
severe staffing shortage. In response, Human Resources

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No. 23-1275 3
sought to maximize the existing DOC workforce. Specifically,
Human Resources sent a letter to all employees in light or
modified duty assignments, including Leibas. The letter
stated that the recipients were unable to perform the essential
functions of their position. The letter asked the recipients to
respond in one of three ways: 1) provide updated medical
documentation indicating the recipient no longer had work
restrictions; 2) request a reasonable accommodation under the
ADA; or 3) take a skills assessment to determine whether the
recipient qualified for a vacant position at the DOC.
Leibas was on medical leave when she received the letter
in 2018. In February of 2019, Leibas briefly returned to full-
duty work at the DOC before taking disability leave in March
of 2019. Since that time, Leibas has been “off the … payroll,”
and her disability benefits have expired.
On May 29, 2019, Leibas provided an “ADA Accommoda-
tion Form” completed by her physician, Dr. Monica Aloman.
The form opined about Leibas’s ability to perform the essen-
tial functions of her position, Leibas’s functional limitations,
and the accommodations Leibas would require to perform
her position’s essential functions. Dr. Aloman wrote, “[Lei-
bas] requires more frequent breaks to avoid standing for long
periods” and “is unable to stand for long periods without re-
lief/rest.” R. 96-10, Exh. 82. The form also stated that Leibas
could perform the essential functions of her position if she is
“allowed more frequent breaks and rest periods and bath-
room breaks, up to three additional times per shift.” Id. Leibas
completed a similar form. Leibas wrote that she was “unable
to stand for long periods without relief/rest,” and she re-
quested the same accommodations Dr. Aloman required. Id.

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4 No. 23-1275
Rebecca Reierson, the Director of Employee Services for
Human Resources at the DOC, called and emailed Leibas
about her requested accommodations. Leibas asked Reierson
to speak to her attorney instead. Following that request, Lei-
bas did not respond to any of Reierson’s further communica-
tion attempts. On November 11, 2019, Reierson contacted Lei-
bas by email and informed her that no reasonable accommo-
dations existed that would assist Leibas in performing the es-
sential functions of her position.
Leibas subsequently sued the DOC. Leibas alleges that the
DOC failed to accommodate her and discriminated against
her, in violation of the ADA.1 The defendants moved for sum-
mary judgment before the district court. Initially, the district
court denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment
on Leibas’s accommodation and discrimination claims. How-
ever, the defendants moved for reconsideration, and the dis-
trict court invited both parties to supplement the record. Lei-
bas supplemented the record with declarations from herself,
her husband, who is also a correctional officer at the DOC,
and another correctional officer at the DOC. The defendants
supplemented the record with a declaration from Matthew
Burke, the Executive Director for the Human Resources De-
partment of the DOC. After reviewing both parties’ submis-
sions, the court granted the defendants’ motion for summary
judgment on the basis that Leibas is not a qualified individual
under the ADA. Leibas appeals, and we affirm.
1 Leibas also brought Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S.
658 (1978) and Equal Protection claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district
court granted summary judgment on these claims, which Leibas does not
challenge on appeal.

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No. 23-1275 5
II.
We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment
de novo. In doing so, we examine the record in the light most
favorable to Leibas, drawing all reasonable inferences in her
favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986);
Yahnke v. Kane County, Ill., 823 F.3d 1066, 1070 (7th Cir. 2016).
Summary judgment is appropriate only if there is no genuine
dispute of material fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.
To succeed on either of her claims, Leibas must demon-
strate that she is a “qualified individual” under the ADA.
Castetter v. Dolgencorp, LLC, 953 F.3d 994, 996 (7th Cir. 2020);
Brumfield v. City of Chicago, 735 F.3d 619, 631 (7th Cir. 2013). A
qualified individual is one who, “with or without reasonable
accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the
employment position.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). To determine
whether an individual is qualified, we follow a two-step pro-
cess, evaluating first whether the individual satisfies the nec-
essary prerequisites of the position and then considering
whether the individual can perform the essential functions of
the position with or without a reasonable accommodation.
Bombard v. Fort Wayne Newspapers, 92 F.3d 560, 563 (7th Cir.
1996). The DOC does not allege that Leibas is unqualified for
the position, so we look only at step two.
An employer must make reasonable accommodations to
allow a qualified individual to perform the essential functions
of his or her job. Tate v. Dart, 51 F.4th 789, 793–94 (7th Cir.
2022). However, if an employee’s medical restrictions prevent
the employee from performing an essential job function with
reasonable accommodation, the employee is not a qualified
individual. See id. at 794. We review the record in the light
most favorable to Leibas, but it is up to Leibas to provide

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6 No. 23-1275
sufficient evidence to create a genuine dispute of material fact
that she can perform the essential functions of her position.
Bombard, 92 F.3d at 562–63.
There is no disagreement that maintaining the safety and
security of the DOC is an essential function of the correctional
officer position, so the only question for us is whether Leibas
has put forth sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to con-
clude that she is a qualified individual capable of performing
that function. This depends on the particular circumstances of
this case and the needs of this employer.
Prisons are a uniquely violent and unpredictable environ-
ment, a sentiment that we have recognized time and again.
See e.g., Tate, 51 F.4th at 799; Miller v. Illinois Dep't of Corr., 107
F.3d 483, 485 (7th Cir. 1997). Uncontroverted record evidence
demonstrates that violent incidents happen regularly at DOC
facilities. R. 96-2, ¶ 14. Corrections officers are responsible for
responding to these incidents, and they must always be pre-
pared to respond as needed to unpredictable threats. Some
scenarios may require that every correctional officer respond
to one location at one time.
Over the course of litigation, Leibas has described her re-
strictions and symptoms differently. In the accommodations
paperwork Leibas submitted to Human Resources, Leibas
stated she was “unable to stand for long periods without re-
lief/rest.” R. 96-10, Exh. 82. At her deposition, Leibas testified
that she agreed with her doctor’s statement, which included
the same restrictions. R. 96-10 at 52–53. At summary judg-
ment, Leibas agreed that “[w]hen her conditions flare up she
experiences extreme fatigue and needs to rest and limit her
movement.” R. 109 ¶ 91. On reconsideration, however, Leibas
suggested that she only needed additional breaks to go to the

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No. 23-1275 7
restroom, and that she was able to stand for long periods of
time. R. 134, ¶¶ 2, 14. Although Leibas claims on appeal that
she has no issue standing for long periods and only needs
more frequent breaks to go to the bathroom, Leibas Br. 26–28,
an employer is not required to let an employee exceed the
treating doctor’s restrictions. Kotaska v. Fed. Express Corp., 966
F.3d 624, 631 (7th Cir. 2020). And, in any event, a plaintiff can-
not manufacture a genuine dispute of material fact by contra-
dicting her prior deposition testimony with an affidavit. See
Kelley v. Stevanovich, 40 F.4th 779, 787 (7th Cir. 2022). Thus, we
look at what Dr. Aloman concluded about Leibas’s re-
strictions and required accommodations.
Dr. Aloman wrote that Leibas “is unable to stand for long
periods without relief/rest” and Leibas “requires more fre-
quent breaks to avoid standing for long periods.” R. 96-10 at
121. Dr. Aloman described Leibas’s requested accommoda-
tion as follows: Leibas requests “that she be allowed more fre-
quent breaks and rest periods and bathroom breaks, up to three
additional times per shift.” Id. (emphasis added). Thus, the
accommodation at issue is not brief bathroom breaks, the way
Leibas tries to describe it on appeal. Instead, we must examine
whether Leibas can adequately supervise inmates despite her
inability to stand for long periods without rest, and her need
to take up to three additional breaks per shift both to go to the
restroom and rest.
Uncontroverted record evidence shows that correctional
officers must be able to stand unassisted for long periods of
time, sometimes for the entirety of their eight-to-ten-hour
shift. R. 132 at ¶ 6. In reconsideration and on appeal, Leibas
insists that she is able to stand for long periods of time, but,
as explained above, we are not required to credit Leibas’s

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8 No. 23-1275
casting of her restrictions over that of her doctor’s, which
were presented to her employer. Kotaska, 966 F.3d at 631. And,
in any event, this recasting of her restrictions contradicts the
restrictions for which she sought accommodation. See Kelley,
40 F.4th at 787.
Despite Leibas’s recasting of her accommodation, it is Lei-
bas’s burden to “make a prima facie showing ‘that the accom-
modation is reasonable in the sense both of efficacious and of
proportional to costs.’” Filar v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Chicago,
526 F.3d 1054, 1068 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting Oconomowoc Resi-
dential Programs v. City of Milwaukee, 300 F.3d 775, 784 (7th Cir.
2002)). “Once the plaintiff has made this showing, the defend-
ant/employer then must show special (typically case-specific)
circumstances that demonstrate undue hardship in the partic-
ular circumstances.” US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391,
402 (2002). Employers are not required to give an employee
his or her requested accommodation. Kersting v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., 250 F.3d 1109, 1116 (7th Cir. 2001). “Accommoda-
tions which require special dispensations and preferential
treatment are not reasonable under the ADA.” Hammel v. Eau
Galle Cheese Factory, 407 F.3d 852, 867 (7th Cir. 2005). Employ-
ers are not required to hire additional employees to accom-
modate the plaintiff. Sieberns v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 125 F.3d
1019, 1022 (7th Cir. 1997).
The additional breaks—particularly in the way that they
are described by Leibas’s doctor—are not a reasonable accom-
modation at the DOC. Burke’s declaration indicated that “un-
planned or additional breaks” would limit where Leibas can be
assigned, thus creating additional staffing issues. R. 132 at
¶ 11 (emphasis added). Although correctional officers bid on
specific units, their assignments can change daily, depending

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No. 23-1275 9
on the DOC’s needs. Moreover, unplanned breaks may re-
quire assigning a second person to the same post to ensure it
is covered. Id. Leibas does not contradict this directly. Instead,
she insists that she would never leave her post without cover-
age and, in a declaration offered at reconsideration, Leibas
claimed that “the accommodation could allow [her] to have
to plan for [her breaks].” R. 134, ¶ 17. But this is not what Lei-
bas’s doctor stated Leibas needed, nor is it supported by rec-
ord evidence. As Leibas’s counsel conceded at oral argument,
the requested accommodation “has discretion built in” thus
emphasizing the unplanned nature of Leibas’s accommoda-
tion. And separately, Leibas attributes her need to rest and go
to the restroom to “flare ups” in her conditions. R. 109, ¶ 91;
R. 134, ¶¶ 2, 3. There is no evidence that Leibas’s flare ups
happen at predictable times each day, or that Leibas can ef-
fectively plan for them. In short, aside from Leibas’s own af-
fidavit, which departs from the accommodations as her doc-
tor described them, Leibas has not offered any evidence that
her breaks could be planned in a way that does not interfere
with her essential functions. See R. 132, ¶ 11.
There is a separate issue that further complicates the rea-
sonability of Leibas’s accommodation, and that is the uncon-
troverted record evidence that the prison does not have
enough staff to provide the necessary coverage for her addi-
tional breaks due, in part, to budget cuts outside of the DOC’s
control. Leibas stated the following at her deposition, “From
what I understand, we are entitled to receive at least two 15-
minute [breaks] and a lot of times you wouldn’t get that and
that would … create a problem with me if I needed to eat
something, you know, or sit down and take a break.” R. 96-10
at 30. When the DOC initially denied Leibas’s request,

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10 No. 23-1275
Reierson attributed it to the fact that the prison could not
guarantee coverage for additional breaks. Id. at 32.
Leibas argues that she can wait to take her breaks until
coverage is available—i.e. that someone can assume her
post—and that she has never been denied a break in the past.
But Leibas’s own declaration shows that, at times, she has
asked other officers to watch her post in addition to their own
so that she could take a break. R. 134, ¶ 8 (“There have also
been instances where I needed to use the restroom and was
able to ask an officer on the neighboring tier to watch the tier
while I did so.”). Leibas hypothesizes that supervisors are
aware of this practice and in some assignments—although not
necessarily the assignment she had when she engaged in this
practice—the DOC assigns officers to watch two tiers at the
same time. However, another officer noted that despite the
widespread use of this practice, it is “not preferred.” R. 134-2,
¶ 5. It is clear why this practice would be undesirable and un-
reasonable as an accommodation at the DOC. If Leibas is
away from her post, then the officer watching Leibas’s post in
addition to his or her own must divide his or her attention
between two posts. If an emergency arises in the coverage of-
ficer’s original post, then Leibas’s post would be uncovered
while the coverage officer responds to the emergency. The
consequences for this can be fatal. R. 132, ¶ 11. Similarly, Lei-
bas suggests that she could be given the first break once cov-
erage becomes available. But such preferential treatment is an
unreasonable accommodation, especially considering that
some officers do not get their bargained-for breaks as it is.
Hammel, 407 F.3d at 867.
Leibas’s suggestions also do little to answer the question
of what happens if Leibas experiences a flare up when no

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No. 23-1275 11
officer is available to cover her. As Leibas herself admitted,
correctional officers often do not receive the breaks to which
they are entitled. R. 96-10 at 30. Even though Leibas claims
that she would never leave her post unattended, an individ-
ual seeking a reasonable ADA accommodation cannot both
insist that she requires an accommodation and maintain that
she can forgo the same accommodation if necessary. Tate, 51
F.4th at 801–02.
Although the ADA does not provide an exemption to the
DOC, it also does not require that the DOC compromise the
safety and security of its inmate population to provide a rea-
sonable accommodation. See Gratzl v. Off. of Chief Judges of
12th, 18th, 19th, & 22nd Jud. Cirs., 601 F.3d 674, 680 (7th Cir.
2010). Notwithstanding the fact that Leibas’s restrictions as
described by her doctor and as presented to her employer
might be reasonable in other contexts, they are not reasonable
under the unique circumstances of the DOC. See id. at 682. On
this record, Leibas simply has not provided enough evidence
to create a genuine dispute of fact that she is a qualified indi-
vidual.2
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of
the district court.
2 Although Leibas does not mention it on appeal, she brought an in-
demnification claim against Cook County. Because there is no underlying
liability on Leibas’s claims, summary judgment was appropriate.

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