United States of America v. Christopher Truett

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-1349
U NITED S TATES OF A MERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
C HRISTOPHER TRUETT,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.
No. 1:18-cr-00313 — James P. Hanlon, Judge.
____________________
A RGUED O CTOBER 26, 2023 — DECIDED A UGUST 1, 2024
____________________
Before F LAUM , BRENNAN , and K IRSCH , Circuit Judges.
K IRSCH , Circuit Judge. Christopher Truett ran a metham-
phetamine distribution operation from jail. For his role in the
operation, he pleaded guilty to a drug conspiracy charge.
During the change-of-plea hearing, he notified the judge of
his mental, cognitive, and memory impairments and, before
sentencing, provided additional evidence of those impair-
ments and their degree. He now argues that the district court
should have sua sponte held a competency hearing because

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2 No. 22-1349
his impairments and behavior at the change-of-plea hearing
suggested that he might have been incompetent. He also chal-
lenges the court’s Sentencing Guidelines calculation, contend-
ing that it was based on a drug quantity that erroneously at-
tributed to him all the methamphetamine obtained by the
conspiracy. Finally, he requests that we vacate a condition of
supervised release that the court included in the written judg-
ment but failed to orally pronounce.
We conclude the district court did not err by failing to hold
a competency hearing, nor by attributing all the methamphet-
amine to Truett. Further, because the condition of supervised
release included only in the written judgment is a mandatory
condition, we decline to vacate that condition and affirm.
I
While incarcerated in the Marion County Jail awaiting
trial on state methamphetamine charges, Christopher Truett
helped organize a methamphetamine distribution operation.
Calling from the jail telephone, he purchased methampheta-
mine from a codefendant and then directed his girlfriend to
pick up the drugs and sell them to others for distribution.
Once the drugs had been sold, Truett directed his girlfriend
to collect the proceeds from the sales.
Truett and his coconspirators were charged with various
drug and firearm offenses. Truett was only named in Count
1, which charged conspiracy to possess with intent to distrib-
ute and to distribute methamphetamine in violation of 21
U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A), & 846.
Truett pleaded guilty to the charge. At the change-of-plea
hearing, Truett told the court that he was not being given his
medication, had been diagnosed with mild cognitive

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No. 22-1349 3
impairment (MCI) and PTSD, and had “trouble reading a lot.”
And he remarked that he did not know if his MCI and PTSD
affected his ability to understand the proceeding. But after
these statements, Truett conferred with his counsel, who
stated that he was “confident that [Truett] is competent to go
forward today.” Counsel noted that, earlier that day, he had
engaged Truett in conversation about the details of his case
and that, at the hearing, Truett understood who was present
in the courtroom and their roles. Truett also affirmed he
would like to go forward with the plea but noted that he has
“a lot of trouble remembering the past.”
During the hearing, Truett made some odd, informal com-
ments but affirmed that he understood the charges and the
consequences of pleading guilty. These comments included
him telling the court, “I like you” after the court told him it
would determine the Guidelines range and saying, “I don’t
like [guns]” after the court advised him that, by pleading
guilty, he would lose his right to possess firearms. Truett also
misread the minimum penalty noted in the Presentence In-
vestigation Report (PSR) as the maximum penalty and sought
clarification from the court on that issue. And he later inter-
rupted a colloquy between the government and the court re-
garding forfeiture to state, “None of that forfeiture belongs to
me.” Similarly, following the government’s statement of facts
it would be able prove at trial, he stated that he did not know
and did not work with a codefendant whom the government
described as his coconspirator. And, as the court explained
the Sentencing Guidelines and their advisory nature, Truett
asked, “What’s that mean, revisory?” but, after speaking with
his counsel, noted that he understood the term advisory.

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4 No. 22-1349
At the sentencing hearing, Truett offered additional evi-
dence of the degree of his impairments but did not seek a
competency hearing, and the court did not order one sua
sponte. Truett provided the results of a neuropsychological
evaluation, which included the conclusion that he functions
at the level of understanding of a ten-year-old. And his coun-
sel remarked that his memory loss had become more appar-
ent.
During the hearing, the court adopted the findings of fact
set forth in the PSR that Truett ran a methamphetamine oper-
ation from jail by using the jail phone to direct drug pur-
chases, sales, and the collection of proceeds. The court also
adopted the PSR’s calculation of the Guidelines range of 210
to 262 months, which was based in part on the finding that
the conspiracy had obtained at least three kilograms of meth-
amphetamine. Truett did not object to the PSR’s description
of his conduct or to the court’s calculation of the Guidelines
range. But, in response to the government’s description of his
conduct, he did ask his counsel to briefly clarify how long he
knew one of his coconspirators.
The court sentenced Truett to 240 months of imprison-
ment, five years of supervised release, and a $250 fine. The
court also orally pronounced the conditions of supervised re-
lease, but the written judgment included an additional condi-
tion requiring Truett to pay the fine in accordance with the
Schedule of Payments included in the judgment. Truett ap-
pealed.
II
Truett asserts that the district court should have held a
competency hearing sua sponte prior to accepting his guilty

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No. 22-1349 5
plea and before sentencing him. We review the district court’s
failure to sua sponte hold a competency hearing for abuse of
discretion. United States v. Stoller, 827 F.3d 591, 596 (7th Cir.
2016); United States v. Garrett, 903 F.2d 1105, 1116 (7th Cir.
1990) (“[W]hile our review is comprehensive, the district
court retains a good deal of latitude in how it evaluates the
need for a formal competency hearing.”).
Due process bars courts from both accepting an incompe-
tent person’s guilty plea and sentencing him. Anderson v.
United States, 865 F.3d 914, 919 (7th Cir. 2017). To protect the
due process rights of such persons, 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a) re-
quires district courts to order a competency hearing sua
sponte “if there is reasonable cause to believe that the defend-
ant may presently be suffering from a mental disease or defect
rendering him mentally incompetent to the extent that he is
unable to understand the nature and consequences of the pro-
ceedings against him or to assist properly in his defense.”
Whether reasonable cause exists is a “highly individualized”
inquiry and depends on a broad range of evidence bearing on
competency, such as the defendant’s demeanor in court and
medical opinions on his competency. See Sturgeon v. Chandler,
552 F.3d 604, 612 (7th Cir. 2009). Truett argues there was rea-
sonable cause at either the change-of-plea or the sentencing
for the court to hold a competency hearing.
A
Having taken a comprehensive review of the record, we
conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
not ordering a competency hearing sua sponte at the change-
of-plea hearing. Truett argues that the court should have
found reasonable cause based on his: (1) mental, cognitive,

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6 No. 22-1349
and memory impairments; (2) professed lack of medication;
and (3) behavior during the hearing.
Not every mental, cognitive, or memory impairment is
sufficient for reasonable cause to believe a defendant is in-
competent. Price v. Thurmer, 637 F.3d 831, 833–34 (7th Cir.
2011). The court engaged in a thorough plea colloquy under
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11, and Truett actively
participated, which suggests his impairments did not pre-
clude him from understanding the proceedings or assisting
his counsel. See United States v. Weathington, 507 F.3d 1068,
1074 (7th Cir. 2007) (finding no error in the failure to order a
psychological evaluation for a defendant whose demeanor
the court observed at the plea colloquy and who “provided
cogent answers to the court’s questions” and fully engaged in
the hearing). Truett’s counsel told the court that, despite his
impairments (MCI, PTSD, and memory loss), Truett “was able
to intelligently engage [ ] in conversation” about the case and
could identify the courtroom personnel and their roles. The
court was entitled to rely on counsel’s statement that Truett
was competent to proceed. Chichakly v. United States, 926 F.2d
624, 634 (7th Cir. 1991). Truett’s objection to specific aspects of
the government’s statement of the facts it would prove at trial
also suggested that he at least had sufficient memory to assist
counsel and understand the proceedings because he remem-
bered the circumstances of the offense.
Because Truett’s unmedicated condition did not support
reasonable cause, the district court was right to not identify
reasonable cause due to his lack of medication. We have re-
marked that there are competency concerns when people
with severe mental conditions are not taking medication. See
Brown v. Sternes, 304 F.3d 677, 698 (7th Cir. 2002). But once

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No. 22-1349 7
Truett affirmed that he did not have medication in his system,
the issue was only whether his unmedicated state gave rea-
sonable cause to doubt his competency. It did not.
Truett also points to his conduct during the hearing.
Truett’s statements of “I like you” and “I don’t like [guns],”
when taken out of context, might indicate confusion. But his
remarks, while perhaps incongruous with the formality of the
courtroom setting, were not irrational and did not “indicate[]
a failure of memory or understanding” that would give rise
to reasonable cause. United States v. Graves, 98 F.3d 258, 261
(7th Cir. 1996). His comments, rather than suggest incompe-
tence, demonstrate that Truett was engaged in the hearing
and that he understood the judge’s role and the consequences
of his plea. Truett also asked specific questions to clarify his
understanding of the Guidelines and expressed disagreement
with both the government’s description of the facts it would
prove at trial and its identification of what property was sub-
ject to forfeiture. And though he misread the minimum pen-
alty as the maximum penalty, he did so because he read the
PSR and had a question for the court regarding it. Given his
engagement in the proceedings, the court, which had the op-
portunity to observe Truett’s demeanor, did not abuse its dis-
cretion in not finding reasonable cause based on his behavior,
even when considered alongside his various impairments.
B
At the sentencing hearing, the district court had additional
evidence (a neuropsychological evaluation) of the degree of
Truett’s impairments, but it was not an abuse of discretion for
the court not to order a competency hearing. While the eval-
uation and his counsel’s comments about his memory loss
showed that his impairments were not insignificant, such

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8 No. 22-1349
impairments alone may not give rise to reasonable cause
where the defendant is otherwise demonstrating an under-
standing of the proceedings and an ability to assist counsel.
Cf. Eddmonds v. Peters, 93 F.3d 1307, 1314 (7th Cir. 1996); id. at
1319 (finding a defendant competent notwithstanding his
schizophrenia in part because the defendant “participate[d]
actively and meaningfully in the adversarial process”). And
at the sentencing hearing, Truett was still engaged and re-
sponsive. He affirmed he had read and discussed the PSR
with counsel and later asked the court to read the proposed
conditions of supervision to ensure he could ask any ques-
tions he might have. He also, through counsel, challenged the
government’s description of his relationship with his cocon-
spirators. Truett was “oriented to and participating appropri-
ately in the proceedings.” United States v. Ewing, 494 F.3d 607,
623 (7th Cir. 2007). The district court did not err by failing to
hold a competency hearing.
III
Truett next argues that the district court erred in attrib-
uting the entire drug weight of the conspiracy to him as rele-
vant conduct without making the special findings required by
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B). We review the district court’s Guide-
line calculation for plain error because Truett did not raise this
objection to the district court, and the failure to object appears
inadvertent, as there were no sound strategic reasons to forgo
the objection. United States v. Dridi, 952 F.3d 893, 898–99 (7th
Cir. 2020) (Waiver, “the intentional relinquishment of a
known right,” precludes appellate review, but forfeiture, “the
accidental or neglectful failure to timely assert a right,” allows
for plain error review.).

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No. 22-1349 9
Truett’s argument is premised on the court’s supposed at-
tribution of the drugs to him based on the relevant conduct
Guideline provision for “jointly undertaken criminal activ-
ity.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B). But that is not what the court
did. Instead, the court found that Truett was personally in-
volved in every purchase of methamphetamine, directing not
only the purchase and distribution of drugs but also the col-
lection of the proceeds from the sales. It attributed the entire
drug quantity obtained by the conspiracy to Truett as “acts …
counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or willfully
caused by the defendant” under § 1B1.3(a)(1)(A). Thus, the
special findings required by § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B) were irrelevant
because no one else’s conduct was attributed to Truett.
IV
Finally, Truett asks us to vacate a condition of supervised
release imposed only in the written judgment but not orally
pronounced at sentencing. We review a claim of inconsistency
between the oral sentence and written judgment de novo.
United States v. Strobel, 987 F.3d 743, 747 (7th Cir. 2021). If there
is a conflict between the oral sentence and written judgment,
the oral sentence controls, and we must vacate conditions
only imposed in the written judgment unless the conditions
are mandatory—in other words, required by statute. Id. at
747, 749–50. In that case, we need not vacate them. Id. at 749–
50.
Here, the court made payment of the fine according to the
Schedule of Payments a condition of Truett’s supervised re-
lease in the written judgment. At sentencing, the court did not
orally state this fine payment schedule condition, though it
orally announced the fine. And, because the court levied a
fine, the condition is not a “nullity”—it imposes an obligation

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10 No. 22-1349
on Truett—and thus renders the written judgment incon-
sistent with the oral sentence. Id. at 750–51. Truett contends
that, because the district court failed to orally pronounce the
fine payment schedule condition, we must vacate it because
it is not mandatory.
The Sentencing Commission considers payment of a fine
according to a schedule to be a mandatory condition of super-
vised release. Id. at 750 & n.17 (citing U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(a)(5)
and 18 U.S.C. § 3624(e)). Truett argues that, in light of United
States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245–46 (2005), the Sentencing
Guidelines cannot make a condition of supervised release
mandatory because the Guidelines are advisory, not binding.
But Truett reads Booker at too high a level of generality. Booker
held that 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1), which required courts to im-
pose a sentence within the Guidelines, violated the Sixth
Amendment and thereby severed that provision from the
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984. 543 U.S. at 245. Booker did not
reject other statutory bases for the mandatory provisions of
the Guidelines. Id. at 258–59. And it does not “suggest[] that
the [Guidelines’] conditions of supervised release … are prob-
lematic.” United States v. Ford, 106 F.4th 607, 608 (7th Cir.
2024); see also United States v. Reyes, 18 F.4th 1130, 1137 (9th
Cir. 2021) (“[T]he substantial change wrought by Booker’s
elimination of the statutory mandate in § 3553(b)(1) to impose
a sentence within the Guidelines range … has no analog in the
context of special conditions of supervised release.”). Accord-
ingly, nothing in Booker prevents us from concluding that a
mandatory condition of supervised release under the Guide-
lines is a mandatory condition where there is statutory au-
thorization. United States v. Anstice, 930 F.3d 907, 909–10 (7th
Cir. 2019) (identifying that a condition can be mandatory if it
appears in § 3583(d) or is otherwise “made mandatory by

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No. 22-1349 11
statute,” which can be indicated by its description as manda-
tory in the Guidelines). But see United States v. Rodriguez, 75
F.4th 1231, 1246 (11th Cir. 2023) (A discretionary condition is
“any condition of supervised release other than those manda-
tory conditions set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d).”).
Here, the statutory authority—18 U.S.C. § 3624(e)—relied
on in Guidelines § 5D1.3(a)(5) reflects a congressional choice
to make payment of a fine according to a schedule a manda-
tory condition of supervised release. It provides, in relevant
part
Upon the release of a prisoner by the Bureau of
Prisons to supervised release, the Bureau of
Prisons shall notify such prisoner, verbally and
in writing, of the requirement that the prisoner
adhere to an installment schedule, not to exceed
2 years except in special circumstances, to pay
for any fine imposed …, and of the conse-
quences of failure to pay such fines under sec-
tions 3611 through 3614 of this title.
18 U.S.C. § 3624(e) (emphasis added). This provision, while
primarily mandating notification, sets out that adherence to
the payment schedule during supervised release is required
in every case, or in other words, mandatory. Moreover, if the
prisoner then defaults on the payment of a fine, the court may
revoke his supervised released (among other possible conse-
quences). 18 U.S.C. § 3613A(a)(1). And default is defined as
when “a payment is delinquent for more than 90 days,” 18
U.S.C. § 3572(i), and a payment is delinquent if it is “more
than 30 days late,” id. § 3572(h). The premise of these provi-
sions is that fines must be paid in accordance with a schedule:
if there were no such requirement, a court could neither find

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12 No. 22-1349
a payment to be delinquent nor find the payment to be in de-
fault. In other words, if a prisoner has not paid a court ordered
fine by the time he is released from prison to supervised re-
lease, he must pay the fine as the schedule requires or his su-
pervised release may be revoked. Under this statutory frame-
work, the court had no discretion regarding whether to make
payment of the fine according to an installment schedule a
condition of Truett’s supervised release, so the Guidelines
correctly describe it as mandatory.
A FFIRMED

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