Word Seed Church , now known as Grace Fellowship Covenant Church v. Village of Hazel Crest

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 23-1754
WORD SEED C HURCH ,
now known as Grace Fellowship Covenant Church,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
VILLAGE OF H AZEL C REST,
Defendant-Appellee.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 1:20-cv-07725 — Harry D. Leinenweber, Judge.
____________________
A RGUED J ANUARY 9, 2024 — DECIDED A UGUST 6, 2024
____________________
Before R OVNER , HAMILTON , and JACKSON -A KIWUMI ,
Circuit Judges.
HAMILTON , Circuit Judge. Plaintiff-appellant Word Seed
Church believes that the Village of Hazel Crest zoning ordi-
nance discriminates against churches and other religious as-
semblies. The district court disagreed, granted summary
judgment to the village, and later denied the church’s motion
for relief from judgment. The church has appealed.

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Before we reach the merits of the church’s arguments,
though, we must address some preliminary jurisdictional is-
sues posed by the case’s unusual procedural posture. The
church did not appeal the district court’s grant of summary
judgment. Instead, the church filed a motion under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) for relief from that final judg-
ment and then appealed only the district court’s denial of its
Rule 60(b) motion. When an appeal arrives to us in this pos-
ture, we may not second-guess the district court’s exercise of
its subject matter jurisdiction unless the court made an egre-
gious mistake on that score or intervening events have ren-
dered the case moot. Neither happened in this case. We there-
fore have appellate jurisdiction and subject matter jurisdiction
over this appeal, and we affirm on the merits the district
court’s denial of the church’s Rule 60(b) motion because the
district court did not abuse its discretion in making that deci-
sion.
I. Factual Background
The Word Seed Church, now known as Grace Fellowship
Covenant Church, is a congregation in the south suburbs of
Chicago. Like many new congregations, the church did not
have a permanent home but began looking for one in 2018 or
2019. The church identified the Village of Hazel Crest as one
possible location, but the church had trouble finding a suita-
ble property there. The church claims that this difficulty was
caused by the village’s zoning ordinance, which it contends
discriminates against religious assemblies.
The village’s zoning ordinance establishes nine zoning
districts: four for residential use (R-0, R-1, R-2, and R-3), two
for business (B-1 and B-2), one for limited manufacturing (M-
1), one for Special Planned Development (SPD), and one for

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No. 23-1754 3
office, research and compatible use (M-OR). The ordinance
imposes certain restrictions on properties in each district,
such as limits on building heights and lot sizes. It also sets out
permitted and special uses for each zoning district. A permit-
ted use is one that “may be lawfully established in a particular
district or districts, provided it conforms with all require-
ments, regulations and performance standards (if any) of such
district.” Churches are not an enumerated permitted use in
any of the nine zoning districts.
Only three zoning districts, all of them residential, permit
churches as a special use: R-1, R-2, and R-3. But a group or
person may not open a church in these districts without a spe-
cial use permit. The zoning ordinance establishes a multi-step
process for acquiring one. First, a land user must submit a
special use application to the village’s Zoning Administrator.
Then a nine-person Zoning Commission reviews the applica-
tion, prepares a written report outlining their findings, holds
a public hearing on the application, and makes a recommen-
dation to the Village Board of Trustees. Finally, the Board of
Trustees approves or denies the application.
II. Procedural Background
Word Seed Church sued the Village of Hazel Crest claim-
ing that the zoning ordinance discriminated against religious
assemblies. By not including churches as a permitted use in
any of the nine zoning districts, the church alleged, the village
denied it the ability “to meet freely as of right.” By forcing
religious groups to go through “an onerous, expensive, time
consuming, and overly discretionary process” to obtain a spe-
cial use permit, the church alleged, the village imposed bur-
dens on religious assemblies that were not imposed on non-
religious groups. From the church’s perspective, this

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4 No. 23-1754
disparate treatment violates the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment and the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc
et seq. The church also alleged that the zoning ordinance was
unconstitutionally vague.
The church moved for a preliminary injunction and de-
claratory judgment. It sought to enjoin the village from en-
forcing its zoning ordinance against the church while it
looked for a new property. The village opposed the motion,
arguing that the church lacked standing and was not likely to
succeed on the merits. The district court denied the church’s
motion. Word Seed Church v. Village of Hazel Crest, 533 F. Supp.
3d 637 (N.D. Ill. 2021). Before deciding that the church failed
to show a likelihood of success on the merits, the district court
held that the church had standing at the preliminary relief
stage. The court reasoned that the church adequately alleged
it had identified a suitable property in a Hazel Crest business
district, but that the village’s zoning ordinance prevented the
church from buying it. These allegations satisfied the court
that the church was “likely to experience a future injury.” Id.
at 648.
The parties later filed cross-motions for summary
judgment. The district court granted the village’s motion and
denied the church’s. Word Seed Church v. Village of Hazel Crest,
No. 1:20-cv-07725, 2022 WL 1028836 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 6, 2022).
The district court did not revisit its standing determination
but rejected the church’s claims on their merits. The court
concluded that RLUIPA did not apply because the church
“never had a property interest in any real estate located in
Hazel Crest.” Id. at *3. The court denied the church’s Equal
Protection claim for several reasons: (1) the church’s decision

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No. 23-1754 5
not to seek a special use permit precluded any possibility of
discrimination against it; (2) the church did not show that
comparable secular organizations had been treated worse
than churches; and (3) contrary to the church’s allegations,
there was no property in the village that could accommodate
the 120-member capacity the church hoped to need as it grew.
Id. Finally, the district court rejected the church’s vagueness
challenge, noting that this circuit has upheld zoning
ordinances with similar special use regulations. Id., citing
Vision Church v. Village of Long Grove, 468 F.3d 975, 990 (7th Cir.
2006).
Thirty days after the district court granted summary judg-
ment to the village, the church moved for relief from the final
judgment under Rule 60(b). The church asserted that the vil-
lage had amended its zoning ordinance in 2008 to remove nu-
merous organizations from its list of permitted and special
uses in business districts, and that the district court had erred
by evaluating the church’s arguments under the pre-2008 ver-
sion of the ordinance, rather than the post-2008 version. The
district court denied the church’s Rule 60(b) motion, and the
church has appealed.
III. Analysis
The merits of this appeal concern whether the district
court abused its discretion by denying the church’s Rule 60(b)
motion, but we first must determine whether we have juris-
diction to decide the merits. It is axiomatic that federal courts,
including appellate courts, “have an independent obligation
to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists, even
in the absence of a challenge from any party.” Arbaugh v. Y &
H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006). We explain first why we have

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6 No. 23-1754
jurisdiction over this appeal and second why the district court
did not abuse its discretion in denying the Rule 60(b) motion.
A. Jurisdiction
Federal courts have the jurisdiction needed to determine
their own jurisdiction, for how else could they determine ju-
risdictional issues if they did not? Chicot County Drainage Dist.
v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 376–77 (1940); Stoll v. Gottlieb,
305 U.S. 165, 171–72 (1938). When multiple jurisdictional is-
sues present themselves in one case, courts must address
them in an appropriate order.
Here, we must determine first whether we have jurisdic-
tion over the appeal and then whether the district court had
jurisdiction. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523
U.S. 83, 94 (1998) (“On every writ of error or appeal, the first
and fundamental question is that of jurisdiction, first, of this
court, and then of the court from which the record comes.”
(quoting Great Southern Fire Proof Hotel Co. v. Jones, 177 U.S.
449, 453 (1900))).
1. Mootness
Our subject matter jurisdiction would be defeated if some-
thing happened after the district court issued its final judg-
ment that made the church’s claims moot. See, e.g., Parvati
Corp. v. City of Oak Forest, 630 F.3d 512, 515, 518 (7th Cir. 2010)
(holding that plaintiff who appealed denial of Rule 60(b)(3)
motion lacked standing because she sold property at heart of
the underlying litigation after district court’s final judgment
but before denial of her motion for relief). Unless at least one
party maintains a “live” claim or a “cognizable interest” in the
outcome of this case, we do not have a “Case or Controversy”
within the meaning of Article III and must dismiss for lack of

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No. 23-1754 7
subject matter jurisdiction. Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U.S.
85, 91 (2013) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
One intervening event stands out as a possible source of
mootness in this case. In December 2022, after the church filed
its Rule 60(b) motion but before the district court ruled on it,
the church filed a status report informing the court that it had
closed on the purchase of a property elsewhere in Cook
County. The church conceded that this change rendered its
claim for injunctive relief moot. The church contends, how-
ever, that its claim for nominal damages survived. The village
disagrees and argues that the church’s property acquisition
left all its claims moot.1
To assess that argument, we must figure out which claims
remain on appeal. The church’s amended complaint alleged
four RLUIPA claims, an Equal Protection Claim, and a void-
for-vagueness challenge. In its opening appellate brief, the
church dropped its RLUIPA claims entirely, and nowhere
mentioned its vagueness claim. The village responded by ar-
guing that only the church’s Equal Protection claim remained.
The church did not deny that assertion in its reply brief. We
thus consider only whether the church’s Equal Protection
claim seeking nominal damages is moot.
The village faces a “demanding standard” in proving that
the church’s Equal Protection claim is moot. Mission Product
1 In its status report, the church also argued that its prayer for attorney
fees and costs remained alive. If the church meant to argue that a claim for
attorney fees and costs could stave off mootness, that argument would be
mistaken. See Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 107 (“An ‘interest in attorney’s fees is
… insufficient to create an Article III case or controversy where none exists
on the merits of the underlying claim.’” (alteration in original) (quoting
Lewis v. Cont’l Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 480 (1990))).

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8 No. 23-1754
Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC, 587 U.S. 370, 377 (2019). The
village must show that “it is impossible for a court to grant
any effectual relief whatever” to the church if it prevailed on
its claim. Chafin v. Chafin, 568 U.S. 165, 172 (2013) (internal
quotation omitted). So long as the church retains “a concrete
interest, however small, in the outcome of the litigation, the
case is not moot.” Id. (internal quotation omitted).
The Supreme Court addressed the relationship between
nominal damages and mootness in Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski,
592 U.S. 279 (2021). The Court focused on redressability—the
third element of Article III standing—but only because it
framed mootness as standing set in a time frame. Id. at 282–
83, 291–93; but see Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw
Environmental Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 190–92 (2000)
(critiquing generalization that mootness is simply “standing
set in a time frame”); West Virginia v. EPA, 597 U.S. 697, 719
(2022) (noting that one difference between standing and
mootness is that plaintiffs bear burden of proving standing
while party asserting mootness bears burden of proving it).
In Uzuegbunam, the plaintiff alleged that he suffered a First
Amendment violation when campus police, acting pursuant
to university policies, prevented him from speaking on his
college campus about his religion. 592 U.S. at 282–83. He
sought nominal damages and injunctive relief. Id. at 284. The
university officials ended the challenged policies while
Uzuegbunam’s lawsuit was pending, causing his claim for in-
junctive relief to become moot. But the Supreme Court held
that the policy reversal did not render moot his claim for nom-
inal damages. The Court examined common law cases
stretching back centuries and concluded that plaintiffs had
traditionally used claims for nominal damages to obtain

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No. 23-1754 9
declaratory relief or to redress non-monetary harms in legal
systems that lacked a declaratory judgment act. Id. at 286–91.
The fact that nominal damages sustained those claims
showed that they provided a concrete interest capable of re-
dress by a court. Applying that reasoning to Uzuegbunam’s
claim, the Supreme Court held that his First Amendment
claim for nominal damages saved the case from being moot.
Id. at 293.
The village argues here that the church’s claim is different
from Uzuegbunam’s. Whereas Uzuegbunam had suffered a
completed constitutional injury that could be redressed by
nominal damages, the church has not. According to the vil-
lage, the fact that the district court labeled the church’s claim
as a “facial challenge” and found that the church had never
“had any property located within Hazel Crest and has never
applied for a special use” permit meant that it had not suf-
fered a completed constitutional violation. Without a com-
pleted constitutional violation, this appeal would be moot be-
cause there would be no basis for an award of even nominal
damages.
To address this argument, we must review the procedural
history of the church’s Equal Protection claim. In its amended
complaint, the church alleged that the village’s zoning ordi-
nance, which prohibited churches in most zoning districts
and allowed them as a special use in only three districts, dis-
criminated against churches. This discrimination allegedly
harmed the church by impeding its ability to obtain property
in the village. On the church’s motion for a preliminary in-
junction, the district court found these allegations sufficient to
support standing. The court specifically noted that the church
was alleging that the village’s zoning ordinance prevented it

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10 No. 23-1754
from obtaining a specific property on West 170th Street, which
was in a business zone that did not allow churches as a per-
mitted or special use. Word Seed, 533 F. Supp. 3d at 648.
Later, however, the church’s Equal Protection claim failed
on its merits when the court granted summary judgment to
the village. Word Seed, 2022 WL 1028836, at *3. The district
court did not revisit the issue of standing explicitly. Because
the church had never applied for a special use permit, the
court concluded, it could not bring an as-applied challenge to
the administration of such permits. Id. But the court allowed
the church to pursue its challenge to the zoning ordinance as
a whole through a facial challenge. Id. Though the court
granted summary judgment for the village on this claim, the
fact that the court decided the merits necessarily means it
found, at least implicitly, that the church had shown it had
been injured by the zoning ordinance. See Steel Co., 523 U.S.
at 93–102 (recognizing that federal courts must have subject
matter jurisdiction before reaching the merits).
The church had not yet secured a property when the court
granted summary judgment, so the prospect of future
injury—the possibility that the church would be unable to
obtain property in the village because of the allegedly
discriminatory zoning ordinance—sufficed to establish
standing for injunctive relief. The church’s allegation that it
had been searching for but unable to secure a property for
some time before filing its complaint alleged a completed
constitutional violation for which it could seek nominal
damages. If we assume for purposes of standing that the
church was actually the victim of discrimination by the
village, it would have been suffering from that discrimination

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No. 23-1754 11
every day that it was looking for property in the village and
unable to buy or rent a suitable property.
The church was free to pursue both injunctive relief and
nominal damages in tandem. After its claim for injunctive re-
lief became moot, it could continue to pursue its claim for
nominal damages. Awarding nominal damages could have
shown that the church was wronged and that its rights are
valued and protected in our judicial system. And it would
have warned the village not to repeat its conduct. As the Su-
preme Court recognized in Uzuegbunam, these are cognizable
interests. See 592 U.S. at 286–91 (noting that “every legal injury
necessarily causes damage,” and that nominal damages are
“concrete” because they can “affect the behavior of the de-
fendant towards the plaintiff” (alterations and internal quota-
tions omitted)); see also Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266
(1978) (noting that “the law recognizes the importance to or-
ganized society” that certain rights “be scrupulously ob-
served” even if their infringement does not result in actual in-
jury); Sadie Blanchard, Nominal Damages as Vindication, 30
George Mason L. Rev. 227, 250 (2022) (arguing that suits for
nominal damages provide reliable information to the public
that can be used for “reputation-based private ordering”).
Nothing in the district court’s opinion granting summary
judgment to the village undermined nominal damages as a
basis for standing. The district court found that there was “no
existing parcel of land” in residential zoning districts that
could accommodate the church’s anticipated 120-member
congregation, 2022 WL 1028836, at *2, 3, but it did not contra-
dict its previous finding that the church could have (and
would have) bought property in the business districts but for
the allegedly discriminatory ordinance. Also, the fact that the

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12 No. 23-1754
church never tried to obtain a special use permit for a partic-
ular parcel does not mean it could not have suffered a com-
plete constitutional violation. The relevant portion of the
church’s amended complaint challenged the zoning ordi-
nance as a whole, not just the permitting process. If the ordi-
nance had in fact been discriminatory in a way that prevented
the church from ever obtaining an interest in a specific prop-
erty for which it could seek a special use permit, that would
not mean the church’s rights had not been violated.
Accordingly, the church’s claim for nominal damages pre-
vents this appeal from having been rendered moot by the
church’s purchase of property outside the village.
2. The District Court’s Jurisdiction
Since the appeal is not moot, we consider next whether the
district court had subject matter jurisdiction. Buchel-
Ruegsegger v. Buchel, 576 F.3d 451, 453 (7th Cir. 2009) (“[W]e
are bound to evaluate our own jurisdiction, as well as the
jurisdiction of the court below, sua sponte if necessary.”
(internal quotation omitted)).
Standing is one essential piece of a court’s subject matter
jurisdiction. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559–61
(1992). If this case were a direct appeal of the final judgment,
we would have to review whether the village had caused the
church to suffer an injury in fact that is capable of being re-
dressed in court. E.g., Cook County v. Wolf, 962 F.3d 208, 218
(7th Cir. 2020). We would review the district court’s factual
findings for clear error and decide de novo whether the
church proved the three elements of standing. Id.
But this case is not on direct appeal. The church appealed
only the denial of its Rule 60(b) motion for relief, which is a

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No. 23-1754 13
collateral attack on the district court’s underlying judgment.
See United States v. Tittjung, 235 F.3d 330, 335 (7th Cir. 2000)
(rejecting collateral attack on jurisdiction where challenger
had opportunity to litigate question prior to entry of chal-
lenged judgment). That difference changes how we assess the
district court’s jurisdiction. Instead of reexamining whether
the district court had subject matter jurisdiction, we treat its
determination that it had jurisdiction—a necessary condition
for the district court to reach the merits as it did in granting
summary judgment to the village—as the court’s final judg-
ment on the matter. Id., quoting In re Edwards, 962 F.2d 641,
644 (7th Cir. 1992).
A district court could make an error in its jurisdictional
analysis, but after the time for challenging that error directly
expires, the district court’s conclusion is treated “like any
other erroneous but final judgment,” meaning that it is “good
against collateral attack.” Edwards, 962 F.2d at 644. As the Su-
preme Court put it: “A party that has had an opportunity to
litigate the question of subject-matter jurisdiction may not …
reopen that question in a collateral attack upon an adverse
judgment. It has long been the rule that principles of res judi-
cata apply to jurisdictional determinations—both subject mat-
ter and personal.” Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie
des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 n.9 (1982); see gener-
ally Philos Technologies, Inc. v. Philos & D, Inc., 645 F.3d 851,
855–56 (7th Cir. 2011) (discussing Insurance Corp. of Ireland and
res judicata on jurisdictional issues and a defendant’s options
for challenging personal jurisdiction in direct appeal or collat-
eral challenge).2
2 Note that preclusion principles apply only if the challenging party
previously appeared in the district court and contested jurisdiction. If the

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14 No. 23-1754
Where jurisdiction was actually litigated, the cases recog-
nize a narrow exception allowing collateral review of a dis-
trict court’s jurisdiction if the jurisdictional error was “egre-
gious.” Tittjung, 235 F.3d at 335, quoting Edwards, 962 F.2d at
644; see also United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S.
260, 271 (2010) (a party can obtain relief from a final judgment
under Rule 60(b)(4) only if the “judgment is premised either
on a certain type of jurisdictional error or on a violation of due
process that deprives a party of notice or the opportunity to
be heard”). An egregious error is different from an ordinary
jurisdictional error and will result in the underlying judgment
being deemed void. An egregious error is one that involves “a
clear usurpation of judicial power, where the court wrong-
fully extends its jurisdiction beyond the scope of its author-
ity.” Tittjung, 235 F.3d at 335. Generally, that means there
must be no plausible basis for the district court’s jurisdictional
determination. See Espinosa, 559 U.S. at 271; see also United
States v. Indoor Cultivation Equip. from High Tech Indoor Garden
Supply, 55 F.3d 1311, 1316–17 (7th Cir. 1995) (concluding that
district court’s judgment was void because government failed
to commence underlying forfeiture action within timeframe
prescribed by statute); Brumfield v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ.,
806 F.3d 289, 298 (5th Cir. 2015) (concluding that district
court’s order was void because it went “beyond correcting”
bounds of the structural injunction that was basis for court’s
continuing jurisdiction).
No egregious error occurred in this case. Although the vil-
lage argues that the church did not have standing in the dis-
trict court—which, if true, would have deprived the district
party did not, then the standard for relief is lower. See Philos Techs., 645
F.3d at 855–57 (discussing the differences as applied to default judgment).

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No. 23-1754 15
court of jurisdiction over the church’s claims—the district
court had already concluded that the church had standing at
the preliminary injunction stage. Any errors that the district
court might have made in failing to reconsider the church’s
standing after that point would have been just jurisdictional
errors. We are not implying there were any such errors. Ra-
ther, we are confining our observations to the issue before us
in this appeal from denial of a Rule 60(b)(4) motion. There
were no “egregious” mistakes of the degree that would allow
and require us to reexamine the district court’s jurisdiction.
The village argues that the foregoing reasoning applies
only to collateral challenges brought under Rule 60(b)(4),
which entitles a party to relief from a final judgment if “the
judgment is void.” It is true that all the cases we cited feature
collateral attacks brought under Rule 60(b)(4). There is a good
reason for that. Of the six grounds for relief listed in Rule
60(b), only Rule 60(b)(4) provides relief from a void judgment.
Anything that involves a district court’s subject matter juris-
diction (or lack thereof) would naturally be funneled into a
Rule 60(b)(4) analysis.
The village also argues that we could reconsider subject
matter jurisdiction under another Rule 60(b) provision. It’s an
odd argument coming from the party that was opposing relief
under Rule 60(b), but we see no basis to disregard the law that
has developed under Rule 60(b)(4) to address collateral chal-
lenges to subject matter jurisdiction. Relief may actually be
easier to obtain under Rule 60(b)(4) than under other portions
of the rule. Other courts confronting similar situations have
kept a similar focus on Rule 60(b)(4). See, e.g., Spitznas v.
Boone, 464 F.3d 1213, 1225 n.11 (10th Cir. 2006) (“A Rule
60(b)(6) motion may not be used as a vehicle to re-allege

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16 No. 23-1754
60(b)(4) allegations.”); Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. AMH Roman
Two NC, LLC, 859 F.3d 295, 301–04 (4th Cir. 2017) (evaluating
appeals of denials of both Rule 60(b)(4) and (b)(6) motions,
but evaluating jurisdictional arguments only under Rule
60(b)(4) analysis); Kocher v. Dow Chemical Co., 132 F.3d 1225,
1229–31 (8th Cir. 1997) (same); see generally Corley v. United
States, 556 U.S. 303, 314 (2009) (“a statute should be construed
so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will
be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant” (altera-
tions, quotations, and citation omitted)).
In sum, because there was no egregious jurisdictional er-
ror in this case, we may not reconsider the district court’s ju-
risdictional determination as we would need to on direct ap-
peal. We therefore treat that determination as binding. Since
no intervening events since that decision have defeated sub-
ject matter jurisdiction, we have jurisdiction and must decide
the merits of the church’s motion for relief from final judg-
ment.
B. Merits Under Rule 60(b)
After navigating those jurisdictional and procedural
issues, we finally come to the merits. The church’s motion for
relief from judgment under Rule 60(b) asserted that the
district court evaluated the wrong version of the zoning
ordinance. The village amended its zoning ordinance in 2008,
but the amendments still had not been codified by the time
the church filed suit in December 2020. The church contended
that the district court should have evaluated the published
version of the zoning ordinance, which was the same as the
pre-2008 version, instead of the unpublished post-
amendment version. According to the church, that mistake
led the district court to use the wrong comparators in

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No. 23-1754 17
determining whether churches were treated worse than
secular organizations.
It is not clear which of the six grounds for relief under Rule
60(b) the church meant to invoke, but only one seems plausi-
ble given the nature of the church’s argument: Rule 60(b)(1),
which provides relief for “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
excusable neglect.”
We review a denial of a Rule 60(b) motion for abuse of dis-
cretion. Banks v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 750 F.3d 663, 667 (7th Cir.
2014). We often frame the abuse of discretion standard as re-
quiring a showing that “no reasonable person” could agree
with the court’s ruling, e.g., Robb v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co.,
122 F.3d 354, 357 (7th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation omitted),
even if the standard is not quite that demanding in practice.
Motions filed under Rule 60(b)(1) frequently seek to rectify
errors that could not be fixed on appeal, but Rule 60(b)(1) is
not limited to those situations. See Mendez v. Republic Bank,
725 F.3d 651, 659 (7th Cir. 2013) (affirming grant of Rule 60(b)
relief that avoided need for appeal to correct error). In any
event, we have emphasized our deferential standard of re-
view of district court decisions under Rule 60(b). Easley v.
Kirmsee, 382 F.3d 693, 697 (7th Cir. 2004).
In this case, the district court did not abuse its discretion
in denying the church’s Rule 60(b) motion. The district court
noted that the church might have waived the argument it
raised in its motion by failing to raise it in the summary judg-
ment briefing. But the court proceeded to analyze the merits
of the church’s argument and concluded that its analysis re-
mained unchanged under either version of the zoning ordi-
nance. The court concluded that the church’s difficulty in

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18 No. 23-1754
finding a property in the village was due to the fact that the
church could not find a large enough parcel of land.
We do not disagree with the district court’s conclusion,
and we see two more fundamental flaws in the church’s argu-
ment. As the district court noted in its opinion denying the
church’s motion for a preliminary injunction, the 2008
Amendment removed multiple categories of businesses from
its list of permitted and special uses in business districts. Word
Seed, 533 F. Supp. 3d at 644. All the removed businesses were
secular in nature. The church did not explain how it could
succeed under the post-2008 zoning ordinance, but not the
pre-2008 ordinance, if the amendment did not affect religious
assemblies in any way. If anything, the church’s chances of
success were higher under the pre-2008 ordinance when there
were more secular organizations against which to compare
the church’s treatment—an argument something along the
lines of, “if all those organizations are permitted uses, why
can’t churches be permitted uses, too?” That argument seems
less likely to succeed if numerous secular comparators were
removed without other secular organizations taking their
place.
Perhaps more daunting for the church, the 2008 amend-
ment affected only the B-2 district’s permitted and special
uses. Yet the church explicitly waived any challenge to the B-
2 district in its summary judgment briefing. Pl.’s Resp. to
Def.’s Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 63 at 6 (“On summary judg-
ment, Plaintiffs do not argue that its Equal Terms or Equal
Protection claim entitles them from relief in the B-1 or B-2 dis-
tricts.”). The district court cannot be blamed for disregarding
an amendment that the church itself said would be irrelevant
to its argument.

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No. 23-1754 19
The denial of the church’s Rule 60(b) motion for relief is
AFFIRMED.

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