Daroush Ebrahimi v. Mohammed Siddiqui

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 23-1859
D AROUSH EBRAHIMI,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
MOHAMMED SIDDIQUI, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Illinois.
No. 3:18-cv-01350 — Nancy J. Rosenstengel, Chief Judge.
____________________
A RGUED FEBRUARY 16, 2024 — D ECIDED A UGUST 21, 2024
____________________
Before R IPPLE , BRENNAN, and J ACKSON-A KIWUMI, Circuit
Judges.
R IPPLE , Circuit Judge. Daroush Ebrahimi, a prisoner serv-
ing a life sentence in an Illinois state prison, commenced this
action against, as relevant to this appeal, Wexford Health
Sources, Inc. (“Wexford”), a company providing medical ser-
vices to inmates, and Dr. Mohammed Siddiqui, a physician
employed by Wexford. The district court granted summary
judgment to the defendants. Wexford and Dr. Siddiqui then

-- 1 of 10 --

2 No. 23-1859
submitted a bill of costs for deposition transcripts totaling
$5,243.45. Mr. Ebrahimi opposed the bill of costs, relying on
his indigency status. The district court nevertheless awarded
costs in full. It explained that because the documentation
Mr. Ebrahimi submitted established that he had “ample
funds,” he had not met his burden of showing that he was
incapable of paying the costs then or in the future.
Mr. Ebrahimi now appeals the district court’s imposition
of costs. Based on the record before it, the district court did
not err in awarding costs to Wexford and Dr. Siddiqui. We
therefore affirm the assessment of costs against Mr. Ebrahimi.
I
BACKGROUND
Mr. Ebrahimi is serving a life sentence in an Illinois state
prison. In July 2018, he brought this action in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Illinois. His com-
plaint named as defendants Wexford, Dr. Siddiqui, the Illi-
nois Department of Corrections, and various prison officials.
He generally alleged medical mistreatment at the Menard
Correctional Center in Illinois. Mr. Ebrahimi filed a motion
for leave to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915
and attached documentation showing that his prison trust
fund account contained $233.17 on June 13, 2018.1 The district
1 As part of his in forma pauperis motion, Mr. Ebrahimi stated, under the
penalty of perjury, that he had not received any income in the last twelve
months, including from gifts or inheritances. As required under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(a)(2), he also attached a statement of his inmate trust fund account
for the six-month period preceding the filing of his complaint. That state-
ment showed Mr. Ebrahimi received a monthly payroll credit ($9.18, $10,
( … continued)

-- 2 of 10 --

No. 23-1859 3
court granted the motion. After the district court screened the
complaint as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, it assigned
Mr. Ebrahimi counsel. Later, after that counsel withdrew,
Mr. Ebrahimi was appointed new counsel. He retains that
same counsel on appeal.
All parties moved for summary judgment. The district
court granted summary judgment to the defendants and de-
nied summary judgment to Mr. Ebrahimi.
Following the judgment in their favor, Dr. Siddiqui and
Wexford jointly submitted a bill of costs, totaling $5,243.45.
They sought reimbursement for deposition transcripts.
Mr. Ebrahimi opposed the bill of costs. He submitted a decla-
ration stating that his financial status “remain[ed] the same
today as it was on July 2, 2018,” when he filed his complaint,
and that, as of October 2022, his inmate trust fund account
had a balance of less than $1,000.2 He explained that he was
incapable of paying the costs at that point or in the future.
After filing the objection, Mr. Ebrahimi submitted supple-
mental documentation showing the balance of his prison trust
fund account and the transactions made within the account
for a two-and-a-half-month period from July 13, 2022, to Sep-
tember 30, 2022. That documentation demonstrated that
Mr. Ebrahimi’s account contained $1,663.70 on July 13, but
that the account had been depleted to $936.84 by September
30.
$2.38, $8.84, $10, and $3.74), as well as a payment of $150 from the Pakistan
Embassy.
2 R.170-1 ¶ 3.

-- 3 of 10 --

4 No. 23-1859
The district court granted the bill of costs in its entirety.
Although the court noted that Mr. Ebrahimi had been granted
in forma pauperis status at the beginning of the lawsuit, it
pointed to the balance of his account in July 2022 ($1,663.70)
and observed that he had “received ample funds” since the
litigation had begun in 2018 (when his account contained
$233.17). Ebrahimi v. Baldwin, No. 18-cv-1350, 2023 WL
3275046, at *1 (S.D. Ill. April 3, 2023). Thus, in the court’s view,
Mr. Ebrahimi “ha[d] not demonstrated that he [could not] pay
the costs in this case now or at some point in the future.” Id.
Mr. Ebrahimi appealed the award of costs.
II
DISCUSSION
A.
We begin by setting forth the general principles governing
in forma pauperis designation and its relation to an award of
costs. Litigants in federal court generally must pay a fee when
initiating litigation. 28 U.S.C. § 1914 (requiring parties insti-
tuting a civil action to pay a filing fee). Those who cannot af-
ford to make this payment in full at the outset may file a mo-
tion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(a)(1).3 In forma pauperis status may be requested in
any civil or criminal action or on appeal. 10 Charles Alan
Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice
3 Our colleagues in some of the other circuits have noted explicitly that
28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) applies to prisoners and non-prisoners seeking in
forma pauperis designation alike, despite its “prisoner possesses” lan-
guage. Hymas v. United States Dep’t of the Interior, 73 F.4th 763, 766 n.3 (9th
Cir. 2023); Lister v. Dep’t of the Treasury, 408 F.3d 1309, 1312 (10th Cir. 2005)
(collecting cases).

-- 4 of 10 --

No. 23-1859 5
& Procedure § 2673, at 312 (2014). The grant of in forma pau-
peris status waives only the prepayment requirement. “[T]he
litigant continues to owe the fees.” Whitaker v. Dempsey,
83 F.4th 1059, 1060 (7th Cir. 2023) (Wood, J., in chambers). If
the litigant is a prisoner, the procedure for making such pay-
ments by installment is set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b).4
Notably, an in forma pauperis designation does not auto-
matically exempt a litigant from paying costs awarded after
judgment. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(f)(1) (“Judgment may be rendered
for costs at the conclusion of the suit or action as in other pro-
ceedings … .”). The inclusion of indigent individuals within
the general requirement that costs be awarded to the prevail-
ing party is designed to discourage frivolous claims and to
treat litigants alike despite their financial status. Wright, Mil-
ler & Cooper, supra, § 2667, at 216–17; McGill v. Faulkner,
18 F.3d 456, 459 (7th Cir. 1994) (explaining that “unsuccessful
indigent litigants are not automatically shielded from the im-
position of costs against them” because costs “serve[] the val-
uable purposes of discouraging unmeritorious claims and
treating all unsuccessful litigants alike”). If costs are assessed
against a prisoner, payments are made “in the same manner
as is provided for filing fees under [28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2)].”
28 U.S.C. § 1915(f)(2)(B).
4 Under § 1915(b)(1), the prisoner must pay an initial partial filing fee of
20% of the greater of the average monthly deposits to his trust fund ac-
count, or the average monthly balance in his account for the six-month
period prior to the filing of the complaint or notice of appeal. The remain-
der of the fee is paid in monthly installments of 20% of the prisoner’s pre-
vious month’s income, as long as the account balance exceeds $10. Id.
§ 1915(b)(2).

-- 5 of 10 --

6 No. 23-1859
The general presumption, therefore, is that in all proceed-
ings and for all litigants, the prevailing party will recover
costs. Richardson v. Chicago Transit Auth., 926 F.3d 881, 893 (7th
Cir. 2019). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1),
“[u]nless a federal statute, these rules, or a court order pro-
vides otherwise, costs—other than attorney’s fees—should be
allowed to the prevailing party.”5 This presumption “is diffi-
cult to overcome.” Richardson, 926 F.3d at 893 (quoting Weeks
v. Samsung Heavy Indus. Co., Ltd., 126 F.3d 926, 945 (7th Cir.
1997)). Although the “ultimate decision rest[s] within the dis-
trict court’s discretion,” the court “must award costs unless it
states good reasons for denying them.” Weeks, 126 F.3d at 945.
We have recognized that the losing party’s indigency can
constitute a good reason for denying costs. See Rivera v. City
of Chicago, 469 F.3d 631, 635–36 (7th Cir. 2006). But we have
required the district court to engage in a two-step analysis
when considering whether to deny costs because of
indigency. Lange v. City of Oconto, 28 F.4th 825, 846 (7th Cir.
2022). First, the district court must make the “threshold
factual finding that the losing party is incapable of paying the
court-imposed costs at this time or in the future.” Id. (quoting
Richardson, 926 F.3d at 893). The losing party must make “an
affirmative showing that taxed costs are not appropriate.”
Beamon v. Marshall & Isley Tr. Co., 411 F.3d 854, 864 (7th Cir.
2005). That party must provide the court with “sufficient
documentation,” such as an affidavit or other documentary
evidence detailing income, assets, and a schedule of expenses.
5 The term “costs,” as used in Rule 54(d), is defined in 28 U.S.C. § 1920.
Weeks v. Samsung Heavy Indus. Co., Ltd., 126 F.3d 926, 945 (7th Cir. 1997)
(citing Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437, 441 (1987)).
That statute authorizes deposition costs, including transcripts. Id.

-- 6 of 10 --

No. 23-1859 7
Rivera, 469 F.3d at 635. Second, the district court must
“consider the amount of costs, the good faith of the losing
party, and the closeness and difficulty of the issues raised by
a case.” Lange, 28 F.4th at 846 (quoting Rivera, 469 F.3d at 635).
B.
With these principles before us, we now turn to an analy-
sis of Mr. Ebrahimi’s argument on appeal. We review the dis-
trict court’s decision to impose costs for an abuse of discre-
tion. Lange, 28 F.4th at 845.6
1.
The district court conducted only the first step of the two-
step analysis. It went no further because it concluded that
Mr. Ebrahimi had not shown that he was incapable of paying
costs. Mr. Ebrahimi now submits that the district court erred
in reaching this conclusion. He explains that his prison trust
fund balance was high ($1,663.70 on July 13, and $936.84 on
September 30) because he had received a COVID-19 stimulus
payment. In his view, because the stimulus payment “does
not represent a regular source of income” and because he oth-
erwise “has no job or regular income source,” the district
court erred in imposing costs.7
6 See also Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 401 (1990) (“When
an appellate court reviews a district court’s factual findings, the abuse-of
discretion and clearly erroneous standards are indistinguishable: A court
of appeals would be justified in concluding that a district court had abused
its discretion in making a factual finding only if the finding were clearly
erroneous.”).
7 Ebrahimi Opening Br. 7.

-- 7 of 10 --

8 No. 23-1859
But the district court did not have before it any infor-
mation suggesting Mr. Ebrahimi’s account balance was in-
flated due to receiving a stimulus payment.8 When consider-
ing the bill of costs, the district court had the following infor-
mation available: Mr. Ebrahimi had $233.17 in his inmate
trust fund account in July 2018. Four years later, on July 13,
2022, Mr. Ebrahimi had $1,663.70 in his trust fund account. By
September 30, he had $936.84 in his account. In the two-and-
a-half-month span from July 13 until September 30,
Mr. Ebrahimi spent $751.56 at the commissary and $1.30 at
the library, and received two payroll payments of $13 each.
On these facts, the district court was entitled to conclude
that Mr. Ebrahimi was capable of paying costs. He failed to
carry his burden of showing he was incapable of paying costs.
Cf. Rossi v. City of Chicago, 790 F.3d 729, 738 (7th Cir. 2015)
(holding no abuse of discretion for district court to award
costs to prevailing party when losing party “failed to provide
an affidavit or any other documentary evidence to support”
the conclusion that he was unable to pay).
2.
Mr. Ebrahimi also submits that the district court did not
explain sufficiently its rationale for imposing costs. We cannot
accept this contention. To be sure, “[i]n making a discretion-
ary decision, a court must present an explanation for its choice
8 At oral argument, counsel for Mr. Ebrahimi stated that counsel was un-
able to receive the inmate trust fund account statement until after the ob-
jection to the bill of costs was due. In such a scenario, we fail to see why
counsel did not file a motion for an extension of time. We also fail to see
why counsel did not file a motion for reconsideration and seek to supple-
ment the record with this information.

-- 8 of 10 --

No. 23-1859 9
sufficient to enable a reviewing court to determine that it did
not act thoughtlessly, but instead considered the factors rele-
vant to its decision and in fact exercised its discretion.” Lange,
28 F.4th at 849–50 (quoting Patton v. MFS/Sun Life Fin. Dis-
tribs., Inc., 480 F.3d 478, 491 (7th Cir. 2007)). And we have “re-
iterate[d] our mandate that district court judges provide at
least a modicum of explanation when entering an award of
costs.” Cengr v. Fusibond Piping Sys., Inc., 135 F.3d 445, 454 (7th
Cir. 1998). The district court has done so here. It emphasized
that Mr. Ebrahimi had “substantial funds” despite submitting
“an affidavit indicating that his financial status remains the
same as it was when he sought pauper status” and that
Mr. Ebrahimi’s “account records clearly demonstrate that he
has received ample funds since 2018.” Ebrahimi, 2023 WL
3275046, at *1. This explanation is sufficient.9 The district
court examined the information available to it and explained
its rationale adequately for our review. It has met its require-
ment to provide “at least a modicum of explanation.”10
9 This case is therefore different from those where the district court gave
no explanation. See, e.g., Krocka v. City of Chicago, 203 F.3d 507, 518–19 (7th
Cir. 2000) (remanding for an explanation because the district court “did
not make a record of its reasons for denying the Defendants’ request for
costs”); Cengr v. Fusibond Piping Sys., Inc., 135 F.3d 445, 454 (7th Cir. 1998)
(explaining that reviewing the district court’s award of costs “is an impos-
sible exercise given the utter lack of explanation for the award”).
10 Weihaupt v. American Medical Association, 874 F.2d 419, 430–31 (7th Cir.
1989), relied on by Mr. Ebrahimi, is not to the contrary. There, we vacated
the district court’s award of costs because the court had failed to deter-
mine whether the requested costs were allowable and reasonable. Id. No-
tably, that award of costs included $3,086.60 in photocopying costs, which
we observed would have been equal to 12,346 copies at $0.25 per copy. Id.
( … continued)

-- 9 of 10 --

10 No. 23-1859
Conclusion
For these reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district
court.
AFFIRMED
at 431. We remanded to the district court to determine if that number of
copies was “reasonable in amount and necessity to the litigation.” Id.

-- 10 of 10 --